US Apache helicopter downed & why Trump’s war is ‘colossal failure’ for Israel

Summary

Podcast Summary:

Iran: The Latest
Episode: ‘Colossal failure’: How Israel and Trump lost to Iran’s regime
Date: June 9, 2026
Host: Venetia Rainey (The Telegraph)
Guest: Danny Citrinovic, Senior Researcher in the Iran and Shiite Axis Program at the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies, former head of the Iran Branch, Israeli Defense Intelligence

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Main Theme

This episode deeply analyses the aftermath and implications of the recent war involving the US, Israel, and Iran, examining why the campaign failed to achieve its main objectives—namely, regime change in Iran—and how diverging interests between the US and Israel have led to strategic setbacks. The conversation with Danny Citrinovic provides an insightful Israeli perspective, reflecting on military, diplomatic, and regional consequences, including the evolving situation in Lebanon, Gaza, the West Bank, and the risk of Iranian nuclear escalation.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. State of Ceasefire & Immediate Developments

• The war is at Day 102; ceasefire on Day 62 (03:16).
• Recent strikes between Israel and Iran have de-escalated ("nothing to see here. It’s all over," Venetia Rainey, 03:16).
• US and Iran potentially close to a deal, possibly motivated by the upcoming World Cup as a deadline (03:35).
• Revealed: significant divide between US and Israeli objectives—Israel sees unfinished business, US wants out (03:45).
• News update:
  • Israeli strikes killed two Iranian soldiers (05:45).
  • US Apache helicopter crash and Navy UAV rescue near the Strait of Hormuz (06:20).
  • Continuing Israeli strikes on Hezbollah in Lebanon; ongoing evacuations.

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2. Israeli Perspective: War as a ‘Colossal Failure’

Guest: Danny Citrinovic (08:32)

• Operational Success, Strategic Failure:
  “Despite the operational achievements of Israel and the US during this war, it was a colossal failure… If after the war the Iranian regime is ready to attack Israel… then it’s obvious that it's not a win, it’s a failure.” (Danny Citrinovic, 08:32)

• US-Israel Divergence:
  The US is determined to avoid reinvolvement, limiting Israel’s operational freedom and damaging its deterrence towards Iran.
  “Israel is so dependent on the US… this is very damaging to Israeli ability to project power against Iran.” (08:32)

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3. Where Did Israel’s Strategy Go Wrong?

• Overestimated Air Power, Underestimated Ground Needs:
  “You cannot do everything from the air… there was an overestimation on relying on air force.” (Danny Citrinovic, 10:23)
• Misjudged the Complexity of Iran:
  “You cannot change the trajectory of a nation that's been independent for over 500 years.” (10:51)
• Hubris and Strategic Gaps:
  The initial phase was marked by euphoria; Israeli leadership overestimated influence on the US and underestimated the resilience and complexity of Iranian society and regime (10:10–11:39).

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4. Divergence of US and Israeli Interests (Trump vs. Netanyahu)

• Trump’s Support Not Absolute:
  “Trump has his own interests, and sometimes these interests are not aligned with the US [or Israel’s] interests.” (11:51)
  “When you’re going to war with a superpower like the US… they will determine how it's going to start and how it’s going to end.” (12:21)
• Implications for Israeli Policy:
  If Trump reaches an agreement with Iran, “that would be the end of Israeli ambitions to topple the regime.” (13:06)

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5. Israel’s Motivation to Continue the War

• Unfinished Business:
  “Israel… is interested in transforming Iran to become a failed state… A country that cannot pose a threat to the State of Israel. No missile, no nuclear, whatever.” (14:13)
• Hitting Energy Infrastructure:
  Israel’s hope is that striking Iran’s energy infrastructure (oil, gas, electricity) would force choices between military and economic recovery.
  “But nobody will allow us to do that, especially not Trump… You’d have mutual destruction of energy infrastructure across the Gulf.” (14:48)

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6. Ground Forces, Proxies, and Tactical Limitations

• No Commitment to ‘Boots on the Ground’:
  Israel and the US had no serious plan for ground invasion—limiting goals to air operations and small-scale tactical missions.
  “While you are not using your own forces… you’re missing a significant part in your ability to topple the regime.” (16:18)
• Proxy Plans Unrealistic:
  “Another flawed assumption: the Turks would never approve the Kurds invading Iran… it was obvious Erdogan would call Trump and say, listen, forget it.” (16:36)

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7. The Lebanon/Hezbollah Front

• No Clear Israeli Strategy:
  Israel is attacking Hezbollah while simultaneously negotiating with Lebanon’s government, but lacks a comprehensive endgame.
  “We don’t have a strategy to do that. We are continuing attacking in Lebanon while negotiating… Not sure that is helping the Lebanese government.” (18:55)
• Calls for Diplomacy:
  “We have to do everything to strengthen [Lebanese President] Nawaz Salam… Think harder, use more the diplomatic muscle, less the military muscle in order to reach… understanding.” (18:32–19:38)
• Peace Prospects:
  Full normalization with Lebanon—or any Arab state—hinges on Israel making progress on the Palestinian issue.
  “There’s not going to be a peace between Israel and the Arab world without moving forward on the Palestinian issue.” (21:13)

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8. Internal Israeli Politics & Prospects for Change

• Upcoming Election (October 2026):
  Unclear if a change of government would yield substantive policy shifts.
  “Policy didn’t change much under past governments; Netanyahu’s strategy prevailed even when he wasn’t PM.” (23:50)
• International Legitimacy at Stake:
  “Losing legitimacy because of what happens in West Bank and Gaza… This is more problematic to Israel than Iran.” (27:30)

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9. Situation in Gaza and West Bank

• Gaza:
  “We’re in stalemate… as things not moving in the right direction, the chances of a new escalation are becoming extremely high.” (26:28)
• West Bank:
  Surge of violence and political deadlock; Israeli ministers calling for annexations exacerbate matters (27:02).

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10. Erosion of Western Deterrence towards Iran

• Implementation of Threats Revealed Western Limits:
  “Sometimes deterrence is better if you're not implementing it… We tried to topple this regime and the regime survived. There is nothing now that we can threaten… that will change its behavior.” (29:06)
  • Loss of deterrence is paradoxical: “It’s crazy because three, four months ago we meant to topple the regime, and now this regime is forcing us new equations because we failed in the war.” (30:24)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On War’s “Colossal Failure”:

  • “Despite the operational achievements… it was a colossal failure.” (Danny Citrinovic, 08:32)

• On Israel’s Overreliance on Air Power:

  • “You are missing boots on the ground. You cannot do everything from the air.” (10:23)

• On Overestimating Influence:

  • “He managed to persuade the American president actually to do that… But it’s obvious there was an overestimation on relying on air force.” (10:14)

• On Strategic Mismatch with US:

  • “When you’re going to war with a superpower like the US…they will determine how it’s going to start and how it’s going to end.” (12:00)

• On Erosion of Deterrence:

  • “We implemented the threat, tried to topple the regime and the regime survived. There is nothing now that we can threaten.” (29:27)

• On Regime Change Objective:

  • “If Trump reaches an agreement with Iran, that would be the end of Israeli ambitions to topple the regime.” (13:06)

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Key Timestamps

• [03:16] – Ceasefire status and diverging US-Israeli priorities
• [08:32] – Danny Citrinovic on why Israel considers the war a strategic failure
• [10:23] – Air power/ground power imbalance and Israeli miscalculations
• [11:51] – US-Israel divergence, Trump restraining Netanyahu
• [14:00] – Why Israel wants the war to continue and the unattainable goals (energy infrastructure attacks)
• [16:05] – No boots on the ground or reliable proxies
• [18:26] – Lebanon/Hezbollah: Israel’s lack of postwar strategy, opportunity for diplomacy
• [21:13] – Peace with Lebanon dependent on Palestinian progress
• [23:50] – Domestic Israeli politics and the challenge of meaningful change
• [26:28] – Gaza and West Bank: security situation and political consequences
• [29:06] – Lost deterrence: how the war weakened the West’s posture towards Iran
• [31:50] – Quickfire: Biggest winner (Iran), biggest loser (Israel), most significant moments
• [36:03] – Has the war made it more or less likely Iran gets a nuclear bomb? (“Unfortunately, right, the opposite.”)

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Noteworthy Conclusions

Biggest Winner & Loser of the War (31:50–34:19)

• Winner: “Definitely the Iranians… this war gave the regime a lifeline. He was on his deathbed.” (31:50)
• Loser: “Definitely Israel and more specifically, the policy of Israel towards Iran…we have a worse regime than we started with, and the US is not supporting us.” (32:57)

Most Significant Moments (34:24)

1. Decapitation of Ali Khamenei – “He was such a dominant figure… changed Iran forever.” (34:24)
2. Trump Refuses Kurdish Involvement – Ended regime change ambitions (34:36)
3. Closure of Strait of Hormuz – “A game changer… implications are now enormous.” (34:45)

On Nuclear Risk (36:03)

• “The war that meant to prevent them from reaching a bomb might be the war that pushed them beyond the Rubicon… I’m very skeptical about that… we didn’t prevent this threat, actually we maybe expedited it.” (36:03)

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Overarching Tone & Language

The discussion is candid, analytical, and critical—often somber. Both host and guest maintain a tone of urgency and realism, with Citrinovic occasionally deploying metaphors and analogies (e.g., “the fly running with the elephant”). The overall assessment is that military victories did not translate into strategic gains, and that the war has exposed, not solved, deeper dilemmas for Israel and the Western alliance.

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Summary Table of Key Questions and Answers

| Question | Answer (Citrinovic) | Timestamp | |--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| | Biggest winner of the war? | Iran (“the regime got a lifeline from the war”) | 31:50 | | Biggest loser of the war? | Israel and its Iran policy (“we have a worse regime, lost US support”)| 32:57 | | Most significant moment? | 1) Khamenei’s death, 2) Trump’s refusal to use Kurds, 3) Hormuz closure| 34:24–34:45 | | Has nuclear risk increased? | Yes, risk has increased, not decreased | 36:03 |

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In sum:
This episode offers a sobering Israeli analysis on the strategic dimensions of the 2026 Iran war, explaining how ambitions for regime change unraveled, leaving Iran’s regime paradoxically stronger and more emboldened, while Israel faces growing diplomatic and security challenges—especially as its interests diverge from those of its closest ally, the United States.

Transcript

[Venetia Rainey]

The telegraph.

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[Danny Citrinovic]

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[Venetia Rainey]

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[Danny Citrinovic]

Hello everyone.

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[Tom Merritt]

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[Sarah Lane]

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[Tom Merritt]

Yes, Live with it started as an occasional DTNS segment for our patrons [e-mail] DTNs but because of such great feedback, we decided to open it up as a standalone show with even more reviewers and a wider range of products.

[Danny Citrinovic]

And now, because of even greater feedback we've gotten since then, we're giving Live with it its own YouTube channel. Yay.

[Tom Merritt]

It's still produced by the DTNS family of folks and friends. Nothing changes. Content wise, we'll be reviewing all the tech products, services and platforms that we think you'll care about.

[Sarah Lane]

We are also leaning on all of you, our community, for ideas and suggestions. Are you thinking about a new smart speaker, Robo vacuum modular laptop, kitchen gadget, or a software purchase for your next creative project? We'll live with it so you stay informed. We've also heard you like our show to be easier to access on YouTube and especially easier for new subscribers to find us. So that's exactly what we're doing. Can't wait for you to join us for the next round of episodes. Subscribe now.

[Danny Citrinovic]

ACAST helps creators launch, grow and monetize their podcasts everywhere. Acast.com. It's crazy because three, four months ago we meant to topple the regime, and now this regime is forcing us new equations because we failed in the war.

[Venetia Rainey]

A short time ago, the United States

[Danny Citrinovic]

military began major combat operations in Iran.

[Venetia Rainey]

Today, President Trump says Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in the attacks.

[Tom Merritt]

The Pentagon is weighing a takeover of that island as a way to force the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran begged for this ceasefire and we all know it.

[Danny Citrinovic]

Does anyone really think that someone can tell President Trump what to do? Come on.

[Venetia Rainey]

I'm Venetia Rainey and this is Iran. The latest. It's Tuesday 9th of June, 2026, day 102 of the war and day 62 of the ceasefire, which, ladies and gentlemen, is back on. As for the exchange of strikes we saw yesterday and the day before between Israel and Iran, nothing to see here. It's all over. We're back to vague suggestions from Trump that a deal is imminent. Last night he said the US And Iran were in the final throes of a deal. We heard previously that he thought one might be struck on Tuesday or Wednesday before all of this happened. So let's see if anything comes of that. World cup starts on, as we discussed yesterday, a potential deadline that he'd like to get things wrapped up before. But one thing we have learned from the past few days, and that is the diverging US And Israeli views on this war. That aspect of this has been thrown into sharp relief. Israel believes there is unfinished business in Iran. The US can't wait to declare the whole thing over. And those competing interests very nearly unraveled. For now, Trump has managed to keep a handle on it all. Now, in yesterday's episode, we did a review of the last 100 days of war with an American, former general, Ben Hodges, and an Iranian analyst, Holly Dagres. The full chat was filmed and is exclusively on YouTube. So if you're listening on your podcast app and you're a bit confused, you need to go to YouTube. We will post a link to it in the show. Notes. Apologies for initially forgetting to do that yesterday. I have since corrected. We will also publish it as an audio episode on these audio feeds this this weekend. But if you can't wait, do go watch it now. It's very good. We originally wanted to include an Israeli voice in that discussion, given that they are the third major player in the war. But plans fell through last minute, so we're going to tackle that perspective today instead. Why does Israel want to continue this war? What more does it want to do in Iran that couldn't be done in 40 days of intense bombing? And what's its strategy to tackle Hezbollah in Lebanon? But first, a quick update on where we're at this morning. So, Iranian media reported that two Iranian soldiers were killed in Monday's attacks by Israel I haven't seen any other reports of other casualties at around midday on Tuesday, but usual caveats apply in terms of reporting censorship restrictions inside Iran. Intriguingly, we have had some more details on a US Apache helicopter that crashed off the coast of Oman yesterday near the Strait of Hormuz. Apparently it was a mechanical failure. We've heard that the US Used an unmanned Navy surface drone, so a drone boat basically to rescue the two crew members. Quite an interesting development there. Trump says both of the crew members are fine. Tehran state media did acknowledge the crash, but didn't say anything more. We do know that Apache helicopters have been a key asset for the American military to enforce the blockade on any ships going to Iranian ports, so we assume it was there doing that. Whether it was caught in some kind of crossfire, that's not clear at the moment. Fighting is continuing in Lebanon. The Israeli military has continued to bomb at targets a day after Iran called for the attacks to stop and threatened a severe response if they didn't. Eight people have been killed in the southern city of Tyre. There are more evacuation orders there. We've seen scenes of people fleeing, and some Christians have been calling for the international community to help protect the ancient Phoenician city known as Sur in Lebanon. We've also seen reports of a lone gunman who was shot dead after trying to cross into Israel from southern Lebanon and opened fire on Israeli troops. Residents in nearby Israeli villages were told to stay indoors while the army searched the area. Those are all the news updates. We're going to take a short pause now and coming up afterwards, who are the biggest winners and losers of the war so far? From an Israeli perspective,

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[Venetia Rainey]

Welcome back. You're listening to Iran, the latest. Now to discuss the Israeli perspective on the conflict, I'm joined by Danny Citrinovic, senior Researcher in the Iran and Shiite Axis program at Israeli think tank the Institute for National Security Studies. He previously served 25 years in the Israeli Defense Intelligence, including as head of the Iran Branch. Joining us now from Tel Aviv. Welcome to around the Latest. Danny, good to have you back on. We're speaking in the aftermath of an explosion of violence that was triggered by, as far as I can tell, an entirely predictable attack by Hezbollah on northern Israel, which triggered an attack by Israel on Beirut, which triggered an attack by Iran on Israel, which led to Israel attacking Iran. What do you think the last few days have taught us about the state of the war?

[Danny Citrinovic]

When we are analyzing what happened in the last two days and connecting that to what actually happened in the war, it's safe to say that despite the operational achievements of Israel and the US during the this was a colossal failure. If we have after the war a regime in Iran that is ready to attack Israel, when Israel attacking the dacha in Beirut, not even the dachi in Iran, and then we have the US Administration that is rushing to contain the Israeli reply or response, then it's obvious that it's not a win, it's a failure. But the problem is that it's not ending there. Iran is not only forcing Israel a new equation when Israel would attack in the Beirut in the future we'll probably have another larger bits are coming from Iran. But I think that what is really alarming from the Israeli standpoint is the fact that the US is highly interested in reaching an agreement, but definitely not interested in returning back to the war. So Israel is so dependent on the US that this is problematic also in front of the Israeli deterrence towards Iran because Iran will know in the future that Israel will not be supported by the US and this is something that is very damaging to the Israeli ability to project power against Iran.

[Venetia Rainey]

How have we got here? Because this war started with Israel going in to strike Iran alongside the world's most powerful military. Presumably Netanyahu thought this is the opportunity I've been waiting for years, decades. And now we're in a place where, as you say, most Israelis, I think, share your view that Israel's hands are tied as they're trying to deal with threats to their national security. How did we get here?

[Danny Citrinovic]

Yeah, it's very interesting because if you return back to 28th of February, we were all in euphoria. Well, not me, but a lot of people were in euphoria saying that this is the dream come true, that the US and Israel work together to top up the regime. This was really the dream of Netanyahu since he entered the Israeli politics, that he managed to persuade the American president actually to do that. And this actually happened eight months after he persuaded Trump to attack Odoin Atal. So definitely he had a lot of influence on the American president. But it's obvious that there was an overestimation on relying on air Force. And yes, Israeli Air Force, US Air Force are amazing. But you cannot do things. You're missing boots on the ground. You cannot do everything from the air. And second, everybody thought about, from the Kurds to Hodina Jog, they built actually this puzzle on the very bad pieces that are not connected together. But I think the common dominator is the hubris, thinking that you're too strong and they're too weak and you can do whatever you want. And that combination is very problematic. One, yes, Israel controlled the Iranian sky. Yes, we have operational intelligence superiority. But at the end of the day, you cannot change trajectory of a nation that more than 500 years is independent. Even if you had achievements, when you're comparing that to the purpose you put in the beginning of the war, obviously it's a failure. And I think it's a problem. And I think we see that now in the gap that was created between Israel and the US When Israel, as I mentioned, trying to reach agreement. And Israel is still thinking about returning back to war. Maybe the only country in the world that's really interested in returning back to war against Iran.

[Venetia Rainey]

Were we always going to reach this point where American and Israeli interests in this war would diverge and Trump would end up trying to restrain Netanyahu? Or is there a version of this war where we could have ended up with things going well for the Israelis?

[Danny Citrinovic]

From the Israeli perspective, what's happening between Trump and Netanyahu is really fascinating. Fascinating. I'm not sure in a good way for Israel. You know, Trump is really supported by Israel, and rightly so. I think he. He's a president that really supported Israel. Cause you remember what happened in Gaza, the releasing of hostages. And I think even Netanyahu said that one of the strength points that Israel has is his relations with Trump, and Trump support Israel. And I think what is happening in these days, and especially since the war and now we truly understand that Trump has his own interests, and sometimes these interests are not aligned with the US Interests. And I think what's happening here, again, it's like the fly running with the elephant and saying to him, look how much dust we are doing. I'm not saying that Israel is a fly. But definitely when you're going to war with a superpower like us, you have to know one important thing that they will determine how it's going to start and how it's going to end. And I think Netanyahu didn't actually implement this way of thinking. Really thought that they can still influence Trump. But Trump moved forward. He doesn't have an interest returning back to the world. And I think that's create problem in Netaneo's ability to influence Trump. And I say even more than that why it's so problematic for Israel. Because when Obama was president, it was easy for Netanyahu to give speech against Obama in the Congress. Whatever. If Trump will reach a ruminary with Iran, nobody can bypass him from the right, not the Republicans, not the Democrats. And what we'll have then it's a collapse of the Israeli standpoint regarding Iran because we are highly depending on the support from the Americans and the fact that we see eye to eye regarding the need to topple the regime. Now what we have now is a different story. And it's not we're not aligned. And if Trump originally agreement with Iran, that would be the end from the Israeli ambitions to topple the regime. So this is a very problematic situation that we got into. And really in a stark difference what we had in the end of February, when you started this campaign, you mentioned

[Venetia Rainey]

that Israel is probably the only country that wants this war to continue. Why is that? What exactly militarily does Israel think there is still to achieve that couldn't be achieved in 40 days of intensive bombing?

[Danny Citrinovic]

It's a very good question because I think the missing piece of course is hitting the energy facilities in Iran. Look, Israel first and foremost we are interested, you know, Israel interested in top of the regime, obviously. But if not, then Israel is interested in transforming Iran to become a failed state. A country that cannot pose a threat to the state of Israel. No missile, no nuclear whatever. So I think that Israel believes that hitting hard of the energy facilities, oil and the gas and the power plants and electricity, those things actually will force Iran to choose between putting money to build its military capabilities or putting money investing to rebuild its infrastructure. And I think that Israel is hoping that eventually that will transform Iran not to become a threat to the state of Israel. The problem is that in Israel we don't understand one important thing that nobody will allow us to do that, especially not Trump. Because what we created in the Gulf is more or less like a mutual shoes destruction in terms of energy mad concept like we had between the USSR and the usa, meaning that everybody knows that if we'll attack the energy facilities in Iran, Iran will retaliate them against the energy facilities in the Gulf. That will create economical ecological damage to the entire planet. So I think Israel is hoping to do that, but Trump will not allow us, I think, anytime soon to do that because he knows what will happen then. The implication on the oil revenues, oil prices and things like that would be dramatic. So I think Israel is hoping to do that, but I don't think it will happen. And that leaves us to attacking the same facilities that we attacked, beginning of the war, knowing that the underground facilities in Iran, it will be very hard for the IDF to attack. And so I don't think we have something dramatic more than that. And I don't think we have the ability to attack the LG facilities because of the restraints coming from Washington.

[Venetia Rainey]

You mentioned ground troops. Earlier we heard reports that Israel set up elite troops in Azerbaijan. I think I saw last week, we obviously heard lots about two secret bases in Iraq they were operating out of. I don't know if there were ground troops supposed to be based there. Can you talk a little bit more about that element of the plan and why it didn't happen?

[Danny Citrinovic]

Well, I have to say that Azerbaijan is denying. I don't know if it's true or not, refer to Azerbaijan because they want to preserve the good relations with Iran. I can understand, even if it's right, why they're denying. So definitely a very important country for Israel. And also in terms of Iraq, Israeli acknowledged that. But I would say something in general, even if we had bases in those places, it was very. For tactical missions like saving pilots if they were being shutting down or things like that. The main problems that we had in this campaign, or one of the main problems that we had American had, is the fact that we didn't have any plan to use boots on the ground. No maybe tactical thing, maybe commander thing, but nothing in terms of invasion or taking Kharag island, all those things. Why is it so important? Because then you're relying on proxies like the Kurds. And we all knew, listen, another flawed assumption. The Turks would never approve that, let alone the Iranians and of course the shepherds in Iraq, that the Kurds will invade to Iran. So I think it was obvious that Erdogan will call Trump and say, listen, forget it. And Trump will say yes. And I think. But even if he wouldn't say yes, it doesn't matter. The Kurds wouldn't have changed Anything in terms of how the war will develop. So I'm attending the act to the constraints. While you are not using your own forces because you're afraid of soldiers being kidnapped or killed, then you're missing a significant part in your ability to top up the regime. And if you're relying on people like Ahmadinejad or the Kurds, it's obvious it's a loose cannon. You cannot really control them, let alone what happened with obeisance, probably, if there were obese, probably tactical one. I think the main problem was the fact that we don't have the ability to use the military of the Israeli army in order actually to continue and invade Iran. It sounds, you know, problematic to begin with. But if you are putting the purpose of toppling the regime but you are not willing to bring the necessary troops to do that, then you failing happen in this campaign.

[Venetia Rainey]

Can you talk about the Lebanon aspect of this war from Israel's perspective? We see more strikes today, I believe eight people killed in the southern city of Tyre. So in Lebanon, Israel is clearly intending to continue its campaign against Hezbollah. We know it has a sort of agreement with Lebanon to create these pilot zones where the Lebanese army will come in. But the Lebanese army have also been attacked by the Israelis. They held a funeral over the weekend. Can you just talk us through the logic of the Israeli military campaign there, what they're trying to achieve and how viable you think that is?

[Danny Citrinovic]

Yeah, and again, I'm. I'm sorry, I'm not the bearer of good news here. And I'm saying that because in Lebanon we have a strategic opportunity. Joseph found Nawaz Salam. I see them as brave people, especially Joseph looking as his interview to cnn, the Lebanese president. Yeah, he's the level of Sadat. I'm not really exaggerating. You know, when you have war against your country and you're still negotiating with the enemy Israel, and you're willing to move the extra mile, I think that we have to do everything to strengthen him in Osalam. Now, I'm not ignoring the fact that the Lebanese armed forces are weaker than Hezbollah and it could be very hard to dismantle Hezbollah militarily. But I'm saying that Israel need to do things, dramatic things, even withdrawal from Lebanon in order to strengthen the Lebanon forces that are now on the power that we have in Lebanon, that we don't have strategy, we don't know what we're going to do. We caught in the problem during the campaign. Forty hours after we decapitated Khamenei, Hezbollah launched missiles against Israel and put us in some sort of strategic trap because we didn't have strategy to cope with that. Now, definitely we are stronger than Hezbollah. Hezbollah is weak after we decapitated Nasral and Hashem Safiyodin. But it's still very strong in Lebanon. It can still cause damage. Now, Israel cannot dismantle this organization by force. We cannot. In order to do so, we need to invade and control over all Lebanon. We don't have enough troops for that. And if we had, we don't want to Turn back to 82, 2006. We don't want to be there. We don't want to rebuild the security zone. It's a major problem. But we want to defend our northern border. That's important, the problem. We don't have the strategy to do that. We are continuing attacking in Lebanon while negotiating with the Lebanese government. And I'm not sure that is helping the Lebanese government to fulfill its mission. I think the bottom of things needs to be as we are strengthening Lebanese armed forces withdrawing from Lebanon and of course agreeing on some sort of a borderline agreement that will strengthen those in Lebanon that believe in negotiation with Israel. Now Israel is trying to hold, you know, hold it in two ways. Attacking Lebanon but also negotiating. I'm not sure it will bring us anywhere, but I really think we have to return back to the drawing board and think harder, clear how we're going to use more the diplomatic muscle, less the military muscle in order to reach this kind of understanding, strengthening Aun and his friends and thus changing the reality of Lebanon. He will not return to do that. Unfortunately, we'll be in the Lebanese quagmire. Soldiers will die, unfortunately and without reaching some sort of of strategic purpose of target.

[Venetia Rainey]

You mentioned Sadat. You compared the Lebanese president to a former Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat. He signed a peace deal to remind our listeners in 1979 with Israel. And it was a landmark moment. It was a really historic peace treaty with a neighbour which they'd previously been at war with. Do you really think there is the potential for that kind of historic moment to create peace between Lebanon and Israel here?

[Danny Citrinovic]

Definitely. But we have to remember one thing about that, that there's not going to be a peace between Israel and Arab world without moving forward on the Palestinian issue. You know, returning back to Sadat. The relations between Israel and Egypt today are catastrophic because relations between Israel or what Israel is doing in Boris bank and in Gaza and the Israeli wishes to push the people that live in Gaza to Egypt. And I think it's A major problem. We have to rethink hard and clear about that as well. But returning back to Lebanon, I think that we have a major problem because again, we are not using the political diplomatic vassal where you only using the military one. And I think even more than that, when you're looking at what is happening right now in the war, in the negotiations, I think that we have to return back, as I mentioned then, to really think about how to improve this kind of negotiation, how to give tangible earning to those who actually want to interact with the state of Israel. And I think that what is happening right now is as we continue the attacks in Lebanon and especially in Beirut, regardless of what happened with Iran, actually we are justifying those inevitably saying we need to work against Israel and not for Israel. And I think, but the problem is that after 7th of October, in general terms, I have to say that Israel is relying only on the F35 or only on the F15, neglecting those issues. Now we have, you know, Iran is a problem in Israel, but the legitimacy of Israel in places, from the US standpoint, in Great Britain, in Europe in general, is so problematic. It was what, because we are an endless war. But we have to understand that without ending those conflicts and moving forward, then nothing will happen. Now we turn back to normalization. No normalization between Israel and our world will happen. If Israel will not move forward on the Palestinian issue. And then you have the Saudi as a key, not only for normalization, Saudi Arabia, but also with Syria and Lebanon. So the Lebanese will not sign a peace agreement with Israel even if we'll have some sort of progress on the borderline until we have something on the Palestinian issue, we have to accept that. We have to understand that. And it's our actually interest to find a solution for that. Because we don't want to be a one state solution, then things will be very hard for Israel in terms of legitimacy. So yes, I think we can reach a peace agreement, yes, in the way I think we can bring some sort of a security arrangement that will lead us to this agreement. But full normalization will occur only if Israel will move forward. Also on the Palestinian issue, do you

[Venetia Rainey]

think your views are widely shared in Israel? You've got an election coming up in October. I saw some polls suggesting that Netanyahu's bloc might win again. Do you think there's much political will to move in that sort of direction?

[Danny Citrinovic]

It's very hard to know because we are very close in terms of the polls right now and the election. Israel will be dramatic and historical One because it will set the tone for the future state of Israel. But even then I have to say something about the Israeli policy. We had the government of change before Netanyahu. We turned back to be prime minister with Ben Ethel Aqid and actually didn't change much the policy of the state of Israel. Yes, we had different prime ministers that physically were seated in Jerusalem, but spiritually Netanyahu policy was still there. Focusing on Iran, you know, Lapid refusing to talk to Abu Mazen because it's in Holocaust denial and Abu Mazen, Abu

[Venetia Rainey]

Mazen, the common name for Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president.

[Danny Citrinovic]

Yeah, exactly. And I think that this is another problem because if we have a change of gods in Israel, I think there is need to change also the policy. Now we'll have a right wing government regardless who's going to be elected because Bennett, Lieberman, all those people are very right wing, even more than Netanyahu sometimes. So I think that the problem that we have is I'm not sure that even change of gods in Israel will bring change of policy in Israel. And I think it's much needed because as I feel things happening in the US and in Europe, we cannot have it both ways. I think we're getting to a very dangerous junction when Israel is perceived as poisoned in terms of its behavior, especially what's happening in the west bank. In Gaza and Israel, you know, we are not island geography wise, but geopolitics wise, we are an island. And I think we cannot, you know, we are relying economically on Euro. It's crucial for us. And I think what is happening right now can really put us in a real danger. This is why I'm hoping that the change, if there'll be a change regardless of which prime minister will be, will be a change also in terms of politics. And I think maybe something good will come out from the failure against Iran because then it's really forcing us to rethink our policy. Nobody will support again, as I mentioned, I think the policy to top of the regime. But that will maybe force us to think broadly on how we can rule the Iranian activity in the region. And the first thing to do that is normalization in Saudi Arabia.

[Venetia Rainey]

You brought up the west bank and Gaza there. We don't talk about it very often on this podcast these days because we're so focused on Iran. But it was a subject that we covered a lot obviously over the last few years. What is the security situation like there at the moment? We hear a lot about settler violence in the West Bank. I know there was a stabbing by an Arab Israeli inside Israel last week in Gaza. It seems like airstrikes have picked up again. Can you just talk us through a sort of a broad picture of the security situation there?

[Danny Citrinovic]

Yeah, I think that in Gaza we are in stalemate. We passed the first stage of the peace plan, but now a stalemate. Israel is demanding Hamas to dismantle its capabilities and Hamas is demanding to not being dismantled but to join some sort of unified Palestinian force. And I think this stalemate won't going to move. And I think that as things going are not moving in the right direction in Gaza, then the chances of a new escalation are becoming extremely high. Not that the US is highly interested in that and I think that US is putting some sort of a red line for Israel regarding that. But I think that for now the ability to find a solution to the Gaza issues limited. Especially because the natural solution will be the bring back the Palestinian Authority to Gaza. This is something that Israel is totally against because you don't want to create this kind of unification that will lead to political demands by the Palestinians. So Gaza is sustainment. West bank is another problem. We have, you know, Mazda and Hud Abbas controlling the Pasinos is I think over 90 and they have a lot of problems, political, economical, 1 corruption. But of course we have also the Israeli activity and I think we have ministers in the government that calling for annexation of the territories. Can we have, of course, as we mentioned, the violence within the west bank and it seems that Israel is not able or is not willing to stop it. Now there's a lot of discussion in Israel about that, a lot of pushing also from the right people in politics to stop this violence that's really eroding the legitimacy of that of Israel. But I think the combination of a stalemate on the political side and us moving towards an election period, that is a fatal ground for those elements that definitely are not the majority to do those horrible acts in the West Bank. So combining both things with Gaza and West Bank, I think that Iran is not the biggest problem that Israel has today. Yes, Israel is a dangerous country for the State of Israel, but losing the legitimacy because of what happened in west bank and Gaza, this is more problematic to Israel. We are, as I mentioned, we are island in a way. We're highly relying on connection to the international community, high tech industries and others. And you cannot have that if your legitimacy is in problem. So I think that towards the future, hopefully there is government we have to rethink hard and clear that because continuations happening in Gaza and the west bank will cause us a lot of damages, much more than what Iran even could do to the state of Israel.

[Venetia Rainey]

You wrote a really interesting post on X about how deterrence has been lost by the west through this Iran war. Can you sort of unpack that a bit for us?

[Danny Citrinovic]

Yeah, definitely. And I think that, you know, sometimes deterrence is better if you're not implementing it. You know, all the time we threatened on Iran, Iran of Ali Khamenei that if they will rush into a nuclear bomb or they continue building its capabilities, then we will use force in order to tackle it. And that was important because the Iranians really feared from Israel and the US and the ability of combined efforts in order to tackle them. This is why, for example, 2003, Khamenei decided to leave the military dimension of the nuclear side because he was afraid that Iran was next after the invasion of us to Afghanistan and Iraq. Now what we have is that we implemented the threat, we tried to topple this regime and the regime survived. There is nothing now that we can threaten due to the regime that will change his behavior. Meaning that he can think that he can rush to a bomb because what will happen? They will try to topple us already try to topple that they will kill the leader. They already killed the leader. So we did what you plan to do. Also we showed our constraints. No boots on the ground. You can see the problems with coordination between Israel and the US you can see also the fear coming from the Gulf state that are interested in ending the war because they don't want to continue the war. And then we'll be suffering from the Iranian attacks. So actually this war highlighted that the friction showed the strength of Israel in the US but also it highlighted the constraints that we have and the bottom line of things when decision making will occur with Mujtaba and Ahad Wa, the command of the agency under limit within Iran, they will think, okay, what Israel and US can do to us definitely when they don't want to strike the energy facilities because they know what we can do to the Arab countries, the Gulf countries. And that opened venues for very problematic issues. For example, Iran rushing to Obama. For example, Iran launching missiles to the state of Israel because Israel attacked in Dacha and Beirut. So you see there is no deterrence whatsoever. And it's really the paradox and the irony. It's crazy because three, four months ago we meant to topple the regime and now this regime is forcing us new equations because we failed in the war. And I'm not saying that. Definitely Iran suffered severe blows. Economically, militarily, they have their own problems but strategically, mentally they are behaving that they're not being deterred. They're attacking the US forces every day in the Gulf. So the bottom line of that is obvious. They are not deterred. So we lost a lot of our deterrence towards this regime. While at the end of the day going out to two wars against the regime and the regime survived and using that for its own benefit. It's all good.

[Venetia Rainey]

Can I end with a few quick fire questions that we did for the 100 days of war roundtable And I'd love to put to you, who do you think has been the biggest winner so far of this war?

[Danny Citrinovic]

Definitely the Iranians. Unfortunately the Iranians, especially the Al Jazee, they didn't want Ali Khamenei to die but they got a present. They're actually controlling Iran today. And we have to remember one thing about that. When the demonstration occurred in beginning of January, the ajc, the Iranian regime didn't have a solution to the problem being faced. A economical problem being faced by the regime itself. The citizen demanding things but the regime couldn't bring it because he had so many economical problems. Now this war gave this regime a lifeline. He was on his deathbed and he gave him lifelines. So definitely the biggest winner is Iran. I'm not saying they don't have problems. They have multiple problems economically, militarily they are not definitely they enter weak to this war in terms of economics. If no listing of sanctions they will get out very weak as well. They still have many problems. The fact they didn't have Internet shows that they are afraid from their own population. I'm not saying that everything is good for them. But looking at where they were before the war and after the war, it's safe to say that they are the biggest winners unfortunately.

[Venetia Rainey]

Who's been the biggest loser so far?

[Danny Citrinovic]

Definitely Israel and definitely more specifically the policy of Israel towards Iran. So I'm not saying yes, as I mentioned we have major achievements. We show our capabilities, our you know, air force going back and forth to Tehran. That's amazing. You know, just to think a country 2000 km away from Israel and we control in the skies drones and everywhere attack everywhere. Anyone killing Khamenei, killing senior leadership, inter superiority within the war. We managed to kill people. That really showed the level of penetration of Israel to the Israel to the Iranian decision making process. So definitely that was amazing. But those are operational achievements. Strategically what we have now we have A worse regime that we started with. We have the US that is not supporting us and forcing us to contain and not to retarget and looking to the future, everything that we build on in terms of using sticks and not carrots to all this regime now is being crumbled because you have us negotiating with the same regime. And in the future, I don't think we'll see any US President after Trump that return back to this adventure, regardless when it's going to be Republican or Democrat. So Israel lost not only now in this campaign, but actually lost in the broader terms regarding the ability to change the regime and going with the US Together to implement this purpose. That's not going to occur, not in the foreseeable future. And this is why I think Israel is the biggest loser right now.

[Venetia Rainey]

And finally, most significant moment of the war from an Israeli perspective, I will

[Danny Citrinovic]

pick three of them. First, of course is the decapitation of Ali Khamenei. He was such a dominant guy, such a dominant figure within decision making process in Iran. They changed Iran forever, as I mentioned for the bad. But it's not that I'm supporting of him, but I think definitely he had advantages. He was weak, he was very afraid. The risk averse didn't want to use his capability. So this is one element. Second is the decision of Trump not to use the Kurds three days into the war that actually ended the illusion that we are actually going to change the regime. I thought then it was best to stop. I think the third one of course is the closer of the Strait of Hormuz by the Iranians. That is a game changer. Unfortunately, the genie is out of the ballot. It's not going to turn back the implication. The second third order implications are now enormous from what's happening in Southeast Asia to Africa. And I think that this is something that highlighted for the US and also from Iran that you don't have a viable solution unless you reach an agreement with the Iranians. And that actually was the moment that I think Iran again won the war. Not really in terms of how we think winning, but actually finding some sort of a leverage that will force the US Will force the Gulf states to end this war. And I think those are for me the three main points in the war itself.

[Venetia Rainey]

The main goal, the main one that we've had stated consistently throughout by Trump and by Israel, is to stop Iran getting a nuclear bomb. That was the sort of number one goal that we've heard throughout this conflict. Do you think they've done that? Do you Think Iran is less likely to be able to get a nuclear weapon now than it was before the start of this war?

[Danny Citrinovic]

Unfortunately, right, the opposite. You know, in the 12 day war, not now, the minute hammer attack was significantly important because it prevented Iran from having industrial enrichment capacity. Not in Natal, not in Fodo, but they still have the capacity to enrich even tomorrow. They have the knowledge, they have the centrifuges, they have the new sites, whether pickaxe counten or in Isfahan. And I think that if they would decide to reach a bomb, they will have the ability to do so. They're weeks away from reaching to 90%. And then in the weaponization part, despite the computation that we had, I think they still have the ability to do that. So the war that meant to prevent them from reaching a bomb might be the war that pushed them beyond the Rubicon to acquire this bomb. Because you have to remember one other thing, that Khamenei died and also the fatwa diagn of the religious order not to develop a nuclear bomb. So yes, I'm very skeptical about that. This is why I'm hoping that even a bad deal is good if it will dilute the material or taking it out the material that they have right now and forcing them to freeze the program for considerable number of years. Because if this not that they happen, we'll still have the regime sitting on the 440 kilos for 60% with the knowledge and the motivation, with no Ali Khamenei fearing and no deterrence are afraid that they might rush into a bomb. And this is a nightmare for the state of Israel and for the region because Iran has threatened them with many things. But there's not only one existential threat and this is the nuclear thing. And then I have to say that we didn't prevent this threat, actually we maybe expedite it Foreign.

[Venetia Rainey]

That was Danny Citrinovich, senior researcher at the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies. That's all for today's episode of Iran the Latest. We'll be back again tomorrow. Until then, goodbye. Iran the Latest is an original pocket podcast from the Telegraph created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Venetia Rainey and Roland Oliphant. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following around the latest on your preferred podcast app. And if you have a moment, leave a review as it helps others find the show. For more from our foreign correspondence on the ground, sign up for our new daily newsletter Cables, or listen to our sister podcast Ukraine the latest we're still on the same email address battle lineselegraph.co.uk or you can contact us on x. You can find our handles in the show. Notes the producer is Peter Shevlin. The executive producers are Venetia Rainey and Louisa Wells.

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