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- [00:04]
Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
The telegraph.
- [00:12]
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Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
Having an adversarial Iran on the other side remaining in power and also maintaining its capability is not reassuring.
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Podcast Advertiser/Host
A short time ago, the United States military began major combat operations in Iran.
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Sophia Yan
Today, President Trump says Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in the attacks.
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Podcast Advertiser/Host
The Pentagon is weighing a takeover of
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Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
that island as a way to force
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Sophia Yan
the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
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Podcast Advertiser/Host
Iran begged for this ceasefire and we all know it.
- [01:44]
Sophia Yan
Does anyone really think that someone can tell President Trump what to do? Come on. I'm Sophia Yan and this is Iran. The Latest. It's Friday 12th June, 2026, the 105th day of the war, 65 days into the ceasefire, though attacks have continued. Later on in the podcast, we'll be speaking to an analyst in the Gulf about what the view is like from that part of the world just across from Iran. But first, a quick look at where we are with the news. As of Friday around lunchtime, US President Donald Trump has again flip flopped. At first, he vowed to strike Iran on Thursday night, threatening to hit the country, quote, very hard. He also threatened to seize Kharg island, which is vital to Iranian oil infrastructure structure. But Trump canceled the operation at the last minute, saying a deal would be announced shortly, alluding that it could be completed before the G7 summit begins in France next Monday. Trump said, quote, the straight will officially open as soon as we sign, which could be soon, very soon, maybe over the weekend in Europe. Most importantly, we have a deal that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon, which was the whole purpose of what we had to go through to get this. So it was a very big thing. Now, if confirmed, this would be the most significant diplomatic development yet since war broke out on the last day of February. But for context, CNN has done a count. Trump has suggested at least 38 times that a deal was close since a ceasefire was announced more than two months ago. Iran, as of now, has not yet made a final decision on any agreement with the U.S. a spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry has said that a large part of the negotiating text has been finalized, but that the US has continued changing his position during the talks. Even still, the text that's being considered is, quote, closer to being approved than ever before. So we'll be keeping an eye on that. I also just wanted to bring you some news from Turkey, where I'm based, that you might have missed this week. There were some very strong remarks out by the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He said that Israel's attacks, its, quote, aggression on Syria and Lebanon had advanced to a point where they also threatened Turkey. Now, Turkey has been one of the most vocal critics of Israel, especially over its war in Gaza, its attacks in Lebanon. While Turkey has maintained trade ties with Israel, it is still a major supporter of Palestine. There's often very strong rhetoric coming from the country's leadership. Now, Syria is particularly interesting. It's a potential flashpoint for Turkey and Israel. Both Turkey and Israel occupy slivers of Syria, and Syria is still a very much fragile state. There's a new interim government that's still trying to restore order and to unify the country after the fall of Assad back in December 2024. And so Syria, though it seems relatively stable in the region considering everything else that's going on, it remains a potential proxy for what is a growing rivalry between Turkey and Israel. And I have to say that the fears here in Turkey are very strong. There's a major concern that if Iran is neutralized as a threat, the way the Israelis see it, then Israel will turn its sights on Turkey. Today on the podcast with me is Anissa Basiri Tabrizi. She's an associate fellow in the Middle east and North Africa program at Chatham House. She's based in Abu Dhabi. Thanks for joining us today, Anissa. I wanted to start today with where you think the talks are. Now, both Trump and the Iranian side have alluded that there is something in the works that were potentially closer than before Trump saying that an agreement might even possibly be signed before the G7 summit next week. So what's in the agreement that's being discussed and could we see some sort of resolution in the coming days?
- [05:30]
Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
Well, it's unclear, obviously, because we have heard multiple times Especially from President Trump, that we are close to a deal. And then tensions started again and sticking points remained on both sides. So it's difficult to say whether we are close. I think we're closer than in the past. I think some of these sticking points have been addressed. But from that to say that an agreement is going to actually be signed and announced, as President Trump alluded by the weekend, I think it's hard to forecast that it's possible. And I think the fact that both sides are not denying that they are closer, it's promising. But we know, as in the past, that there are chances that spoilers come in into the picture or that last minute changes to the text of the agreement make it hard for either side to announce it. And I think the main difficulty here is that both sides will want to portray whatever comes out of this as a win. So that is going to be very, very challenging because obviously it's not just a deal. This is a deal to close a war, at least temporarily, until a final agreement is announced. So both sides will want to make sure that they are depicted as the winner of this war.
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Sophia Yan
Can you talk through the sticking points that remain between the US And Iran and what sort of compromises might have been reached?
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Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
Yes, for sure. I think obviously we know that the main discussion has been focusing on the Strait of Hormuz and the blockade in a first instance. So it seems that from the initial terms that are emerging from, from reports that any MOU would entail some sort of ceasefire and, you know, down the road in 30 days time, the reopening of the Strait Hormuz, which obviously would entail also the lifting of the blockade imposed by the US I think what we are less clear is what is the financial concession given from the US To Iran, because obviously that's quite sensitive and complicated and I think there needs to be some sort of, you know, compromise on that front. But for the US to admit that it would allow, say, some unfrozen assets to return to Iran is politically challenging. So that's, that's one thing. And then I think the next stages of what this would all mean are also the sticking points. We know that obviously these would be a first phase of an agreement, but that, you know, more would need to come. So even if there is an agreement, say in text, as President Trump alluded, that Iran would not go for, produce or acquire or any other route to a nuclear weapon, then I think the nitty gritty will come later in the second stage of the negotiations on what that means in practice. So I think it seems that the US has agreed for the highly enriched uranium to stay in Iran, which obviously was a big sticking point. But what that would mean in practice in terms of, okay, diluting data to a lower enriched uranium or, you know, like saying there is a consortium that would take over the enriched uranium. We don't know what that would look like in practice. And I think this is going to be a particularly sensitive issue, especially for Israel that will be worried about what the future of the Iranian nuclear program would look like.
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Sophia Yan
What do you make of Iran's attacks this week against US Forces in Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan? I mean, so far Jordan has managed to, in terms of all the countries in the region, has managed to most stay out of this conflict compared to the other countries in the Middle East. But why these targets are not elsewhere in the region against the US Presence?
- [09:44]
Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
Well, first of all, I think the attacks were a direct response to the attacks that were conducted first by Israel and then by the United States. So we haven't really seen Iran taking, if you wish, the initiative in attacking these countries in the first place. It was mainly a retaliation. And I think both sides were looking at these exchanges for, you know, like as in the context of the negotiation, for them to be contained, limited, if you wish, and not to get into the larger war that we have seen between end of February and second week of April. I think in terms of the target, it's pretty clear that for Iran, Bahrain and Kuwait have played a very different role compared to other countries in the region in supporting the US Logistically in the war. And I think even rhetorically, these two countries have been probably the most vocal against Iran throughout and to this day, whereas some of the other regional countries which have been attacked in the first stages of the war and even more recently. So I'm talking about Qatar, Oman and the UAE in particular, but also Saudi Arabia. These countries have, well, Oman, we know that they played a very different role. They were involved in the negotiation, in the de escalation efforts since day one. They were trying to avoid this war in the first place. But even those other three countries, so we are talking Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, they are now looking at de escalation as the only way. It looks like even the uae, which obviously has been, you know, the country targeted the most by the war and very vocal against Iran in the first phases of the war. I think right now the position has shifted by both sides, by Iran vis a vis the UAE and by the UAE vis a vis Iran, because obviously you know, there are neighbors and I think the assessment is that they need to work it out somehow and diplomacy is the only way. Jordan, I think, as you said, is an interesting case, but I think rather than attacking the uae, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or even less so Oman, Iran decided to strike together with Kuwait and Bahrain, also Jordan, to demonstrate this capability, to demonstrate its resolve to inflict costs and ability to continue to do so despite the initial assessment that its launchers, missile launchers, drones, and you know, you name it, have been destroyed during the war. So it's, you know, it's an attempt to restore deterrence after more than 100 days of on and off war. And I think it somewhat worked. Obviously, you know, this is not over and if a deal will not be announced, I think more these skirmishes will likely continue and we can see probably the same type of countries being targeted again.
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Sophia Yan
Do you think there's any teeth behind what Iran is doing? Obviously these attacks happening show or at least give the impression that it's that Iran is willing to allow war to resume, which the regime for sure knows that Trump doesn't want because of how it's been negatively impacting him in the US in terms of the American political sphere. So do you think that Iran truly is willing to take that risk to allow war to come back in a big way, or is this just kind of their way to posture in this moment to try to keep the upper hand as negotiations continue?
- [13:35]
Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
I think it's more of the latter. They are using these instances to put pressure on the negotiation table to demonstrate their capability on the military side, but at the same time to maintain a somewhat contained and calibrated response, which does not mean triggering another war or the resumption of full scale war. So I think it's also not in Iran's interest to go back to full scale war. And we have seen that since 8th of April. Really, the behavior of both sides has been mirroring each other. And I think that is promising. Obviously it doesn't mean that, you know, calm will be ensured and a deal will be announced. But at the same time, it looks like both sides see how much war costs, you know, in terms of longer term, but also shorter term repercussions and are willing to avoid it, at least for the time being.
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Sophia Yan
More recently, there's been discussion, more discussion really about possibly using frozen Iranian assets abroad to pay for damage that's been sustained in the Gulf region during this war. There's some hundred billion Iranian money floating in bank accounts around the world. The US Treasury Secretary has Just said this again. What do you make of this proposal? Is this something that would be welcomed by the Gulf and is it enough in terms of repairing the damage and starting to kind of move forward to whatever the new normal will look like once the conflict is over?
- [15:14]
Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
Look, I think there are two components here. One is obviously the economic damage that, you know, that has been inflicted to Gulf countries. And I think while this offer is obviously welcome, I assume, I don't think that that's going to be the key sticking point from their point of view. I think what the Gulf countries really want, at least most of them, is to go back to a stable region that allows this country to resume their vision, resume their, you know, ability to rely on tourism, on investments, which has not been the case to the scale that it was before the war. So even if, you know, the US actually implements its offer and uses some of these frozen assets to compensate for the damages, I think the longer term costs of this war are so big if not addressed and if the war is not wrapped up that that is not in itself going to be sufficient. But if it comes with the MoU between the US and Iran, with also some, if you wish, de escalation between the Gulf countries and Iran, some non aggression pact, however you want to call it, that ensures that this does not happen again, then I think that's enough for them to potentially move on from the current state and try to presume some, even if not amicable, but functional relation with the Iranian side to make sure that their economic impact is not going to be long lasting.
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Sophia Yan
Yeah, I think the economic fallout in the Gulf is really interesting. You mentioned some of it, but there's also the issue of migrant workers. We've seen Indian sailors, for instance, killed just this week. We've had other Indian nationals that have lost their lives in these Iranian attacks. So they've been killed by both sides of the war. And so much of that underpins the economy in the Gulf. These workers who are employed as cleaners, as security guards, do you see any change? I mean, you're in the Gulf now. Do you see a change in how these migrant workers are looking at jobs in the Gulf, their confidence in having employment and a life there?
- [17:44]
Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
Not really. I mean, it's hard to. I think it's too soon to see a long, longer term impact. And that's what the Gulf countries want to avoid. Right. So if it's contained to say three months issues, but then it can go back to normal, then I think the longer term implications are not going to be felt to the scale that we, you know, we could anticipate otherwise. So obviously, it's a concern. It's something that Gulf countries are watching carefully in general. I think the economic repercussion is the one big issue that has been really a big concern for the Gulf countries and has been the case for the past three months. So they want to wrap this up, they want to move on. But at the same time, you know, like having an adversarial Iran on the other side remaining in power and also maintaining its capability to continue to do what has been done, it's not reassuring. So, you know, like this in itself is not a prospect. That's a prospect that is very, very welcome in here. It needs to be somewhat addressed. Yeah.
- [19:00]
Sophia Yan
The Gulf is interesting because they're going to have to find a way to repair relations with both Iran and the US to rebuild confidence. Right. With the US Security guarantees also with Iran, which is just next door. This week there were some senior security officials from the Emirates that met with Iranian officials face to face. That's the first time since war broke out in late February. And this could be a really serious turnaround in where relations are. What do you make of what the future of UAE Iran relations look like, what Gulf and Iran relations might look like after this war?
- [19:33]
Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
Well, look, it's a big question. It's one that it's going to be obviously a big focus here in the region. I think it's still developing. The answer to this question is still developing. We saw some countries obviously taking a very antagonistic stance towards Iran, and I would say almost supporting the war to the point of wanting this regime gone in Iran because of the threat that it poses in terms of its regional posture, its missile program, drones program, you name it. But at the same time, I think if this regime is there to stay, then I don't think an adversary relation is convenient for anyone. And I think this is somewhat the conclusion that most of the Gulf countries came to between 2022 and 2023 when they decided to resume diplomatic relation with Saudi Arabia, for instance, having that agreement mediated by China. And I think since then there has been the realization that having, as I said, a functional relation doesn't mean that you have to be friendly or on the same page with everything. But at least you can, you know, decompartmentalize de escalate if things get out of hand with Iran. Seem to be more in the interest of most Gulf countries back then. And I think unless, you know, things develop in a different direction, if the regime survives as it looks it will. And if you know, most of the capability that Iran has remains intact, then there is no interest for Gulf countries to go back to an antagonistic relation. But on the other hand, I think there is more to gain in regaining that kind of functional relation and compartmentalization that we have seen in the past.
- [21:39]
Sophia Yan
We're going to take a short pause now. Coming up after the break, we'll be with Anissa again telling us where the Gulf sees its relationship with China.
- [21:53]
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- [22:14]
Sophia Yan
Welcome back. You're listening to Iran, the latest with me, Sophia Yan. We're with Anissa Bas, Siri Tabrizi of Chatham House speaking about what the view is like from the Gulf pulling even further back in terms of trying to find a less antagonistic relationship. Before the war in Gaza broke out, so we're going pretty far back now, a couple of years, there was a trend for normalizing ties between Israel and Arab nations. Do you think that that is still possible once the dust settles around what's happening now with Iran pulling that far back? Do you think it's possible for the region to then find some sort of stability going forward?
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Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
I don't think it's a priority at the time. I think it's, I mean, what the war has triggered, I think is some acceleration of the transit we have seen in the past in the region when it comes to most issues. So, you know, like the normalization with Israel, we saw that just a few countries moved along that path and others were more skeptical. I don't see that changing anytime soon. And in fact, the war might have, you know, accelerated, accelerated that kind of, if you wish, skepticism towards moving down that road unless, again, something big changes in the regional picture. But at the time, I think at the moment it looks like, you know, like stability will be the main drive. And for that to happen, this kind of big alliances, big shift in stance are not the trajectory that seems, you know, the most natural. Rather, you can see maybe more bilateral engagements, more bilateral discussion, more bilateral arrangement. And this applies to Iran and Israel, like, you know, like with both sides, also with the United States and China, I think there is going to be a diversification of relation and, you know, like kind of assessment that having multiple players serve your interest is better than put your eggs in one basket only. And I think this is probably rational after everything that has happened.
- [24:23]
Sophia Yan
From the perspective of the Gulf, how would you say the US could consider approaching that relationship in terms of rebuilding confidence? I've discussed this a lot with other people we've had on the podcast, but does a US Security guarantee even still matter? Can the US have confidence amongst its Gulf allies?
- [24:46]
Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
To my knowledge, and this again, it varies and depends on which countries you talk about. I don't think there has been really, again, a change in the view towards the U.S. i mean, that kind of security guarantee. And if you wish, the downsides of this relationship were already clear for most of their Gulf countries. And still they invested in that relationship. They continue to bet on that relationship. So I don't see, even despite the war, despite the outcome of the war, I don't see a change in that direction. And this is beyond just the rhetoric. What do you see from the region? It doesn't look like the regional countries and Gulf countries will necessarily move away from the relationship that they have built with the United States, including in military terms. So I think how to square that with ensuring your strategic interests are met, your security is not undermined? This is going to be the big question. And I think this is why maybe edging and diversifying your relationship will be the key, rather than moving away from the biggest ally, if you wish, security partner that Gulf countries has had. So that is going to be too tricky. But maybe reinforcing some of the regional alliances, diversifying with some of the relationships which have been growing over the past few years anyways, this might be the trajectory.
- [26:22]
Sophia Yan
How important is China in this equation in terms of diversifying away from the usual suspects, in terms of alliances and partners? China's been for a number of years selling drones, for instance, to the Emirates, to the Saudis, to the Emiratis, the Saudis further afield, to Egypt, Morocco. I mean, is this a relationship that you think the Gulf wants to prioritize at this time?
- [26:48]
Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
I don't think prioritization is the name of the game. I think. You know what, as I said, I think you are probably going to see similar trends to what you have seen moving forward, maybe in some sectors reinforcing that relationship and some others weakening that relationship. But I think, yeah, China has been an important player in the region. That is not going to change. I don't think that you can see any shift from that kind of choice that several of the guard countries have made at the same time. I don't think that that will mean necessarily moving away from some more traditional, if you wish, partners, Western partners. It will be a kind of pick and choose, depending on the issue, on the topic, on the kind of item. And I think that is probably something that they have chosen to do.
- [27:45]
Sophia Yan
Anyways, your responses are really interesting to me. I mean, it just seems like there's a general hope for the status quo to be maintained, which is not what Trump had hoped when he started, or so he says. Right. When he started this war, which was to change everything, to undo the regime, to remove the nukes. And now it seems like the volatility is much higher than before, yet everyone just wants to try to maintain some sort of working relationship with all the neighbors in the region. I mean, it's just incredible to me.
- [28:15]
Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
Yeah, you're putting it in a very, you know, it's a very right way to put it. And I think this speaks volume about the miscalculation that were made at the beginning of this war when initially there was raging change in the picture and there was the anticipation that everything would shift. I think that was a miscalculation. If analysts looking at the country were actually listened to, it seemed very unlikely that because of the war, despite of the war, things like the balance of power would shift or that the decapitation campaign would lead to instability or to a new type of regime across the country. I mean, this might be, again, the trajectory that we are looking at when you speak about Iran, but it's not going to be triggered by the war. It's not going to be something that happens overnight. It's a very gradual shift that most likely, in my opinion, is going to happen internally, not necessarily with external input. And I think, in fact, the war might have slowed down some of this process and instead resumed some of the strengths of the regime before the war. So I think this is something that probably was not anticipated or calculated properly by the United States and Israel. And I think this is something that now has to be factored in, in whatever is the kind of outcome of this war being the MoU, the final deal. I mean, we wouldn't even discussing about the deal with the Iranian regime if the assessment was that this regime is not stable, that it's going to collapse, or that a new regime would take over. But I think very early into the war, even President Trump say regime change has happened. Most of the people have been killed and now there is new people. But that is not regime change. The same structure is in place. We have the Islamic Republic still there and we have most of the figure reshuffled or just change in the roles. But at the same Time, the whole pillars of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy, regional policy, domestic policy are still there. So that is not regime change in my view. And I don't think regime change is in the cards in the coming months. You know, it's not a consequence of the war.
- [30:59]
Sophia Yan
Anissa, you're based in Abu Dhabi in the uae. You're in the Gulf region. What's the vibe like in this part of the world? How is the Gulf looking at the rest of the world, given this particular conflict? It feels like a very critical turning
- [31:14]
Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
point, I think, from the Gulf perspective, but also from the regional perspective. Overall, I see the war as having increased the sum of the vulnerabilities or perception of vulnerabilities. And the sense that I get is that some sort of resumption of the status quo is what, what most countries want, not because the status quo was good. I don't think many countries liked the Islamic Republic, the regime, the posture, the drive towards a nuclear whatever program, civilian or weaponized or threatening program. But I think compared to what is now, which is unstable situation with a very fragile ceasefire, with some very unpredictable skirmishes across the region, which increase the perception of vulnerability of these countries and the people who live here, I think it speaks volume about the fact that some sort of resumption of what it was before the war is the goal here. We have to remember the Strait of Hormuz was open. There was no issue whatsoever in the oil flow across the region. And obviously these countries rely very much on oil income, but also on the flow of items and the connectivity driven by the Strait of Hormuz being open. So I think it's only reasonable that the current status quo is not working. It makes it very concerning for most countries across the region, economically speaking, especially, and the goal is to end it as soon as possible.
- [33:21]
Sophia Yan
I think I just have one last question. I don't know if you follow football, but I was wondering if you're rooting for any particular team, because there's quite a few from the region out playing in the World Cup.
- [33:32]
Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
No, I'm not. I'm Italian as well as Iranian. Yeah, no, I'm, I'm. I'm for sports in general. No, I think it's going to be a very interesting tournament, to be honest. I think, you know, in the past we have seen some of the geopolitics dynamics are reflected in sports, and that is likely to be the case in this tournament. And we already see some of this in, you know, the football team, the Iranian football team, and how they have to travel back and forth from Mexico to go and play their games in the United States. Obviously, if there were to be direct games between Iran and the United States or any of, you know, the countries involved in this regional escalation, that would be critical. Very interesting to watch in terms of dynamics, but I think, yeah, in general, geopolitics has a way to get into also the sports, but that's not always for the worst. It could be also for the best.
- [34:36]
Sophia Yan
Yeah, maybe the footballers can find us peace for the world, you know, leave it to them. Yeah, maybe that's the way.
- [34:45]
Anissa Basiri Tabrizi
Tell me about it. Yes, for sure.
- [34:48]
Sophia Yan
That was Anisa Basiri Tabrizi of Chatham House speaking to us about what the view is like from the Gulf and where relations with Gulf states in Iran might go once the dust settles. That's all for today on Iran the Latest. I'm Sophia Yan. See you next week. Iran the Latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Sophia Yan, Roland Oliphant and Venetia Rainey. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following Iran the latest on your preferred podcast app. And if you have a moment, leave a review as it helps others find the show. For more from our foreign correspondents on the ground, sign up for a new daily newsletter, cables via our website or listen to our sister podcast Ukraine the Latest. We're still on the same email address battlelinestelegraph.co.uk or contact us on X. You can find our handles in the show Notes the Producers Max the executive producers are Venetia Rainey and Louisa Wells.
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