Iran bombs entire Middle East after Ayatollah Khamenei assassinated by Israel and US

Summary

Battle Lines – The Telegraph

Episode: Iran bombs entire Middle East after Ayatollah Khamenei assassinated by Israel and US
Date: March 2, 2026

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Episode Overview

This gripping episode of Battle Lines explores the escalating crisis across the Middle East after the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a joint US-Israeli operation. Veteran correspondents Roland Oliphant and Venetia Rainey break down the fast-evolving situation—ranging from mounting civilian and military casualties, Iran’s multi-front retaliation, political and military calculations in Israel, US and UK policy responses, and the uncertain future for Iran and the wider region. The episode features in-depth interviews with Danny Citrinovic (former Israeli intelligence officer) and David Blair (The Telegraph’s chief foreign analyst).

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Key Segments & Timestamps

• Opening Headlines & Updates – [02:13]
• Current Death Tolls & Regional Escalation – [03:05]
• Iran’s Succession, Internal Dynamics, and Regime Survival – [07:12]
• Gulf States, International Reactions, and Dilemmas – [14:22]
• Interview: Danny Citrinovic, Israeli Intel Fellow, on Israel’s Objectives & Risks – [16:49]
• Perspectives from Tehran & Iran’s Calculus – [27:06]
• Military Objectives & Overstretch in Israel – [30:22]
• Interview: David Blair, On Khamenei’s Legacy and Trump’s Gamble – [35:32]
• UK Position, Legalities, and “Free-Rider” Dilemma – [45:05]

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Main Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Aftermath of Khamenei’s Assassination

• The death of Ayatollah Khamenei is described as “the most significant development” with seismic consequences regionally and globally ([02:44]).
• Death tolls are rapidly rising: 555 in Iran (including 180 children in one school strike), civilian casualties in Kuwait and UAE, 31 killed in Lebanon, and American/Israeli casualties. The violence is rapidly broadening across the region ([03:05–05:15]).
• Israeli and American missile strikes have missed military targets, hitting civilian areas; the air war’s scale and imprecision are acknowledged.

“There’s absolutely no underestimating what a moment that is for Iran, for the region and in world history.”
— Roland Oliphant [02:44]

2. Regime Change, US Objectives, and Unclear Goals

• Donald Trump’s messaging is described as erratic—swinging between calls for negotiations and urging revolution, with no clear or consistent objective ([05:24–06:24]).
• Both Israeli and US leadership are accused of betting on an Iranian popular uprising, for which there’s little evidence; anti-regime Iranians are staying home amidst widespread bombing ([07:12]).
• The operation is compared to previous Western interventions: “The ghost of the Iraq War... hangs really heavily over this” ([06:46]).

“There is a real mixed message from Donald Trump about the purpose of this operation and what the military goal is.”
— Roland Oliphant [06:24]

3. Iran’s Leadership Vacuum & Succession Process

• Khamenei’s death has triggered constitutional emergency procedures: a three-person interim council is in power, but several likely successors are dead or unaccounted for ([08:16–10:34]).
• The fate of Khamenei’s son and other high-profile figures is uncertain; the regime was prepared for such an existential event with succession plans.

“They’ve, you know, they’ve cut the head off the snake... but what happens next? We don’t know.”
— Venetia Rainey [08:16]

4. Wider Regional Dynamics and Gulf States’ Calculations

• Iran expands the conflict by targeting US assets and allies across the Gulf, seeking to pressure both foes and undecided regional actors ([12:46, 14:22]).
• Gulf states face public opinion challenges; alliances are fragile as leaders make secret moves at odds with public pronouncements—Saudi’s MbS covertly backed the strike on Iran ([15:20–16:11]).
• Closing of the Straits of Hormuz threatens global oil supply and regional economies.

“Their [the Gulf states’] reputation is under threat... the Straits of Hormuz... is very nearly completely closed.”
— Roland Oliphant [14:22]

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INTERVIEW: Danny Citrinovic (Israeli Intelligence Expert)

[Starts: 16:49]

On Israel’s Calculus:

• Netanyahu views this operation as a historic, almost personal, opportunity—combining US support with Israeli military action to seek regime change in Iran ([18:18]).
• Danny is openly skeptical:

“Yes, we have major achievements... but our expectations are too high regarding Iran... I think that we are underestimating the strength of the regime.”
— Danny Citrinovic [19:30]

• Compares Israel’s hopes for regime collapse to “a huge gamble,” arguing Israel is not well prepared for the aftermath.

On Iran’s Response:

• Iran’s priority is maintaining regime cohesion and projecting business-as-usual, despite the unprecedented loss ([27:19]).
• They’re attacking Gulf states and US bases not just in retaliation, but as deterrence and leverage to pressure the US (and allies) to halt hostilities.
• Emphasizes Iranian resilience and resourcefulness: “They have no intention to capitulate. They have no intention to raise a white flag. For them, it’s a war for the future of this regime.” [29:49]

On Israeli Objectives and Risks:

• The Israeli objective is unusually vague and essentially political—not military: “The goal... is the cabinet-approved goal of creating the relevant condition that will allow people to go to the street and revolutionize whatever or overthrow this regime.” ([31:31])
• The IDF is overstretched across Gaza, the north, and internally; public morale is strained by the endless war.

“The bottom line... we cannot live in constant war. I’m afraid that this is something that we know how we’re going to start, but I’m not sure we know how we’re going to finish this war.”
— Danny Citrinovic [33:25]

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INTERVIEW: David Blair (The Telegraph’s Chief Foreign Analyst)

[Starts: 35:32]

On Khamenei’s Legacy:

• Khamenei transformed Iran into a “fortress” through nuclear and proxy strategies, but these ultimately provoked the catastrophic confrontation he sought to avoid.

“His strategy... was extraordinarily ambitious, but in its own terms and quite demonstrably, it completely failed.”
— David Blair [37:08]

On Regime Survival:

• Despite immense pressure, Iran’s theocracy has institutional strength and is not a personality cult like Assad’s Syria—making sudden regime collapse less likely ([38:45]).

On Trump’s Gamble:

• Trump is wielding overwhelming force “without a clearly defined objective,” oscillating between regime change and negotiation, which is dangerously incoherent ([40:10]).

“He’s using about half of all the deployable air power that America possesses, and he can’t really decide why.”
— David Blair [40:10]

• Points to the risk: Trump built his appeal on non-intervention, and is now exposed to both military overreach and domestic political backlash—especially with military casualties and mid-terms looming.

UK’s Role and Dilemmas:

• Britain, under Starmer, hesitated but now allows US access to its Middle East bases, limited (on paper) to defensive operations ([45:05]).
• David Blair calls this a classic “free rider” scenario and predicts deeper UK involvement is likely inevitable as Iranian attacks persist.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

“What happens next? We don’t know... This is a regime that is prepared for an existential attack on it.”
— Venetia Rainey [08:16]

“There’s no evidence... that the Iranian people are on the verge of a revolution. Most people are staying at home.”
— Roland Oliphant [07:12]

“This regime... it’s not a demon, but you shouldn’t underestimate it.”
— Danny Citrinovic [19:30]

“You have to have full domestic political unity... It seems to me that this [war] is failing on many counts.”
— Roland Oliphant [43:52]

“The only thing that’s going to stop them is when those missiles or their launchers are destroyed.”
— David Blair [47:22]

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Conclusion

This episode paints a picture of a rapidly widening and unpredictable Middle East war, rooted in the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader. The hosts and their expert guests probe the strategic logic and peril of attempting regime change by air power alone, the resilience and complexity of Iran’s governance and society, and the awkward, shifting positions of global powers caught in the crossfire. All agree: the stakes are monumental, the risks widespread, and the ending unknowable.

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Transcript

[A]

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[A]

Acast.com 2 days ago, under the direction and direct orders of President Donald J. Trump, the Department of War launched Operation Epic, the most lethal, most complex and most precise aerial operation in history.

[D]

We will measure our success not only by the battles we win, but also by the wars we end.

[A]

Right now, all eyes are on Washington,

[D]

but who's actually watching Europe at the moment?

[E]

The deepening ties between China, Russia and North Korea would certainly have some in Washington concerned.

[D]

And then Daddy has to sometimes use strong language.

[B]

A short time ago, the United States

[D]

military began major combat operations in Iran.

[A]

The IDF will continue to uphold the

[E]

ceasefire agreement and will respond firmly to any violation of it.

[D]

I'm Roland Oliphant.

[E]

And I'm Venetia Rainey.

[D]

It is Monday 2nd March 2026 and day three of Israel and America's assault on Iran.

[E]

On today's episode, we're going to be giving you some of the headlines, some of the updates, the biggest ones. We know this is a really fast moving situation, so we'll just run through the things that you have to know at the time of record and then we're going to be speaking to a former Israeli intelligence expert about what's going on in Iran and Israel's objectives in all of this. Plus, we'll be speaking to the Telegraph's very own David Blair about what next after Khamenei's death and the UK's involvement in all of this. So, Ronan, let's start with some updates. Where do you want to kick off?

[D]

The absolutely most significant development is the death of Ali Khamenei, but we'll get into that later in the podcast, but there's absolutely no underestimating what a moment that is for Iran, for the region and in world history.

[E]

Yeah, absolutely. And as you say, we're going to be getting into that in more depth with David Blair. But should we kick off maybe with death tolls?

[D]

The Iranian Red Crescent puts total deaths at 555. We don't know the breakdown between military and civilian there or if that's complete. The deadliest single incident was a strike on an elementary girls school in the city of Minab in southeastern Iran. Iranian authorities now put the deaths there at 180 children. And that's going up. There was 165 when we finished reporting that the previous even evening hospital was also hit in Tehran, forcing nurses to evacuate newborn babies. So it's clear that some Israeli and American missiles are missing their military targets, clearly, which is what happens in war in Israel. At least 10 people have been killed so far, nine of them in a missile strike on a synagogue in Beit Shemesh, west of Jerusalem on Sunday. We now know that three US service members have been killed. These are the first confirmed casualties on the American side since the war began. That's from U.S. central Command. Five others have been seriously wounded, but we've got no information on where or how they were killed and injured. At least one US fighter jet crashed in Kuwait on Monday morning during an Iranian missile attack on an American air base there. The pilot at least survived by ejecting. It's not yet clear if that was friendly fire from an American air defence unit or if the Iranians managed to bring it down. The war was expanded on Monday. Hezbollah fired rockets into Israel. I don't have any updates on casualties on the Israeli side from that, but retaliatory Israeli strike and we're told killed 31 people and injured 149 in Lebanon and in the Gulf states on the southern side of the Persian Gulf. So far we have at least one person killed in Kuwait over the weekend. Three civilians killed in the United Arab Emirates during an Iranian missile and drone strike there over the weekend. So that is the current death toll. And also you can see Venetia from that. The war is really seriously spreading. We're talking about Israel and Lebanon now involved in direct conflict, the Gulf. And there were strikes on, well, a suspected strike on RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus as well, I believe.

[E]

Yeah. And we'll come on to the sort of UK's involvement in all of this later with David Blair because Starmer gave a very interesting speech over the weekend, he basically said that America will be allowed to use our military bases.

[D]

Now, he's taken a lot of flak for this on a diplomatic front, for being slow off the mark, slower than some other American allies such as Canada. He's now given the US Limited permission to use bases to strike a Iran in order to destroy Iranian missiles. And he says that British bases will only be used for that very limited purpose, not part of the broader regime change operation. But one thing I do want to highlight this morning is that Donald Trump has been speaking. He's been speaking to a number of journalists in turn, systematically, and he's also given another address overnight. And the message is quite confused, actually. He has said in the space of a few hours, I'd really like to talk to the Iranians now. Maybe we can wrap this up in a couple of days with a deal. And he simultaneously said that now it's up to the Iranian people to rise up and overthrow the regime. And he said that his goal is the freedom of the Iranian people. So there is a real mixed message

[E]

from Donald Trump about four weeks, apparently, but they're ahead of schedule.

[D]

There's real mixed messaging here from Donald Trump about the purpose of this operation and what the military goal is. It's going to be alarming to those who remember, or who doesn't remember intervention in Iraq and the sense that without having a clearly defined and achievable goal, you can get sucked into all kinds of things.

[E]

Yeah, the ghost of the Iraq War, I think, hangs really heavily over this. And Starmer actually referenced it in his speech. He said, you know, we're wary of Iraq. That's not what this is. But that's not what this is right now. Who knows where this all ends up going?

[D]

So really, really big fundamental questions, largely about what happens in Iran now, to be absolutely honest, because it's been made clear that the outcome of this operation depends very much on Iran, the Iranian people, whether there is this revolution that Donald Trump seems to be expecting, which,

[E]

crucially, we haven't really seen evidence of.

[D]

No, there's no evidence of it. In fact, I've been Speaking to Akhtar McCoy, our foreign correspondent. Most people are staying at home. The streets are busy in Tehran, but they're busy with the regime supporters. The regime has called on supporters to come out on the street.

[E]

40 days of mourning. We're going to see a lot of things in support of the regime.

[D]

I think they're very conscious of the threat of losing control of the streets, and therefore they've asserted control of the streets. So to me right now, now it's very difficult to see where this supposed uprising is meant to come from. It's definitely anti regime. People in Iran will not be coming out on the streets at the moment. Bombs are falling everywhere as well. Everyone we've heard from in Iran is reporting hearing explosions left, right and center. It's not a limited operation. That brings us to the other big point is that the removal of Khamenei raises the question of what's the new government, the new leadership going to look like? And ultimately is America going to settle for a Venezuela style outcome? Will there be a deal with whoever the new leadership is?

[E]

I mean it's a fascinating idea to try and effect regime change only via an air campaign. No boots on the ground at the moment. I'm not sure that's ever been done before. It's a pretty extraordinary effort. We'll see whether they get anywhere. As you say, they've, you know, they've cut the head off the snake in their favorite Israeli saying. But what happens next? We don't know what's happened to Amanai's son. We know that they've already elected a new sort of three person council to try and take over from him and to shepherd through what happens next. And I was reading that Khamenei asked everyone to elect four people who could replace them in the event of exactly this kind of things. This is a regime that is prepared for an existential attack on it.

[D]

That's right. They were prepared in advance. Donald Trump did say that the so many people have now been killed. That includes many of the people who were lined up to succeed and you can see them ticking off. Ali Shamhani for example, disappeared, it was reported, killed along with, along with Khamenei. You're absolutely right. We believe they killed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad yesterday. The former president, I must say, I think a bogeyman from my perspective that is, that was unnecessary. He was largely sidelined. He'd been completely frozen out of the establishment. But symbolic, well symbolic, but he was if anything a bit of a dissident. He was not a person with any real clout. I don't know why they had to, why they felt they had to kill him. But as you mentioned there, Hamenei's son, Moshtaba Khamenei, his wife is dead, his child is dead.

[E]

Yeah, 14 month old toddler was in the Khamenei's compound with him when it was struck.

[D]

Right, right. But we don't yet know About Mujtaba. What we do know about Mujtaba is that Mujtabar was the IRGC's favored candidate for the succession. And therefore, if he's still alive, he is a speaking in old fashioned medieval kind of terminology. He would be a pretender to the throne. He would be a contender in this game of turbans that has been unleashed. So his whereabouts is a really, really big question. As you said, at the moment they're following through the Iranian constitution. So under the constitution, if the Supreme Leader dies, a triumvirate contemporary rule in council, that's the president, the head of the judiciary and a representative of the assembly of Experts, I believe, or the Guardian Council rule until the next supreme Leader is appointed.

[E]

What do you make of the fact that they haven't tried to assassinate, that we know of Petish Kan, do you think he might be the Delsey Rodriguez figure, the deputy president of Venezuela who they left intact as someone who they could work with within the regime?

[D]

It's so weird because during the 12 day war last year, the Israelis dropped a bomb on Pezeshkayan. He was chairing a cabinet meeting and a whole bunch of them were there and they survived, but the roof came down around them and Pezashkayan apparently had to. He was nearest the window. So he dug the tunnel through the rubble for the others to get out.

[E]

Oh, wow.

[D]

So they've tried to kill him before. I think Pezeshkian is seen as a relatively, relatively pragmatic, relatively moderate figure, but it's about clout and how much real power you have. Could it be Pezaskyam? Maybe. So the Ayatollah Ali Reza Arafi, he is the representative of the Guardian Council on the three person interim ruling body. He's an interesting character because he has been named as a potential. He has the clerical qualifications to become a supreme Leader and he's also seen as a relative moderate.

[E]

I guess this is all relative as well, right? If the Islamic Republic is in a fight for its life, which it is at the moment, they're probably all going to be hardliners relative to what America would like. Just looking at something that Pezesh Khan has said. Iran is ready to crush the bases of enemies and will powerfully continue the path. The Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. So fighting talk. Obviously it doesn't sound like he's going to be a Delsey Rodriguez figure, but who knows?

[D]

Well, it depends. This is part of the problem with the American messaging and Donald Trump's really mixed, mixed Rhetoric, you know, between I want freedom for the people of Iran, we want to end this now completely, or I want to just talk to them. Putting yourself in the shoes of, of the Iranian regime, if you've got those two messages coming down the line, you've got to assume the worst and that means you've got to assume you're in a fight for your life and therefore there is no reason to show restraint,

[E]

which is what we've seen.

[B]

Right.

[E]

I mean, the reaction compared to the 12 day war last year, where they took, I think, 18 hours to respond, this response was quick. So clearly they were a lot more ready. And it's been so much wider as well, you know, targeting a lot of, kind of allies in the Gulf. I mean, you've been looking a lot at the Gulf over the weekend. What's the thinking behind that?

[D]

For Iran, they've clearly concluded, and reasonably, given the rhetoric from Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump, that this is an existential fight. Victory for them is surviving this onslaught, which means bringing this onslaught to an end sooner rather than later. And their calculation seems to be to inflict as much pain as possible on America is going to be difficult because America is so far away. But then on American allies and on American bases, on American bases and on American allies in order to force Donald Trump to end operations at some point. And that's basically why you've seen attacks not only on American bases in, in Qatar, Bahrain and so on, but, but attacks hitting civilian targets. So we've had strikes on the civilian airports in uae, you know, drones slamming into these big glass towers in Dubai and so on. And the numbers of rockets and drones coming across the Gulf are quite significant. I don't have in the hand now, but we're talking about in three figures. The air defence systems over those countries seem to be working quite well. The other point, of course, is, look, not many people have been killed, there's not much physical damage, but they've had to shut down the international airports. Their hubs are crippled, so they can't fly. They've built this reputation for being open to business, zero tax regimes. They're safe, they're dependable. It's where the elite should go. So that reputation is under threat. And more importantly, the Straits of Hormuz, which carry 20% of seaborne oil in the world, is very nearly completely closed.

[E]

Yeah, they haven't officially closed it, have they?

[D]

But not officially.

[E]

Pretty treacherous.

[D]

Pretty treacherous and pretty risky. And all of that is meant to combine to put this huge amount of pressure on Those American allies in the Gulf.

[E]

But it can go both ways, can't it? Because it can add pressure or it can draw in countries on American Israel's side that weren't previously getting involved. I mean, that's what we're seeing with Britain and potentially France as well.

[D]

Britain, France, countries that are traditionally allied to America and Israel. Yes, you can see that coming. The Gulf monarchies have a, they've got a really tricky dilemma here. First of all, there's public opinion on the streets which monarchies? They're monarchies, but they can't ignore it. Siding with Israel against a fellow Muslim country is not necessarily going to go down well.

[E]

I mean, all of this is off the back of the Gaza war and

[D]

it's all off the back of the Gaza war.

[E]

So huge hostility towards Israel across the region that we've sort of forgotten about but is very much still there.

[D]

So that's a problem.

[E]

Some of the most interesting reporting I saw over the weekend was that Mohammed bin Salman, the effective leader of Saudi Arabia these days, gave his backing to this attack on Iran. He said go soon. And so it seems like he was working behind the scenes as well to push this ahead.

[D]

Massive double game. So in public, Saudi officials have been selling himself, were saying we want diplomatic solution. And he, like all of the Gulf countries like Britain until yesterday afternoon, had banned America from using their soil for the attacks. Turns out behind the scenes he was egging Trump on saying do it. That speaks to two things. He speaks to that dilemma. I was talking about the security dilemma. Do we want to get involved? Can we survive it? Can we take that risk? And there was also a rapprochement between Saudi and Iran that was meant to be going okay over the past couple of years, broken by China. But there were fundamental differences between the Gulf monarchies and Iran.

[E]

Bin Salman, just like the Israelis thought this is too good an opportunity, I

[D]

think, I think, I think so. Because the bottom line is the regime in Iran is it's a revolutionary republican, anti king regiment. It is political Islam which is anathema to those regimes. It's Shiite rather than Sunni and it's Persian with a good dose of kind of good old, from an Arab point of view, good old fashioned Persian imperialism and chauvinism. There's a whole bunch of reasons why Gulf monarchies have always been suspicious of or incredibly hostile to Iran.

[E]

So much to get into. Let's turn now to our guest, Danny Citrinovic, a fellow at the Institute for National Security studies. Danny served 25 years in a variety of command, position units, units in the Israeli Defense Intelligence, including as head of the Iran Research and Analysis Branch. Danny, welcome to Battlelines. Thank you for joining us. I know you've been sheltering amid air raid sirens. What's been going on this morning? Tell us.

[B]

As the war started three days ago, we are constantly under missile attacks from Iran. The Iranian, unlike the 12 Day War, what they're trying to do, they're trying to minimize the barrages, but to expand that during the day. So we have from the morning to night, almost every hour, two hours, we have some sort of an alarm and they are hitting in a minimal way, but still have some minor achievements in their attacks. Because our defense, our active defense is good, but it's not perfect. There's no 100%. But we knew that it will happen from the get go. We knew when once Israel attacked them, definitely killed the supreme Leader, they will retaliate. So, so no surprise here. The big question I think that we'll discuss is actually what is the end game for everything? Because it seems like that now we are constantly attacking them. But again, we have to ask ourselves, what is the exit strategy from this campaign?

[E]

Well, Danny, let's definitely get onto that in a moment. But first off, I wonder if you could just talk to the significance of this moment. Israel's cut off the head of the snake, something Netanyahu in particular has been wanting to do for decades. How big is this moment for Israel?

[B]

For Israel, Netanyahu specifically, it's a dream come true. We have to say that for him it was unique event in time. We said that even from the war started, that Netanyahu is not going to forego this moment for him, bringing the US President, bringing the US Capabilities to the region and leading the way together with Israel. This is something that he knew that there will be launches and there will be probably very hectic time in Israel. But for him, it was a major achievement that he can coordinate with the US Working together to decapitate the Syrian leadership of Iran, especially Khamenei. I think that really Netanyahu believes that he's able to create a change together, President Trump, that will be meaningful in the region first and foremost to maybe try to topple this regime again. We'll discuss if that's a possibility or not. But I think that for him, this is a crucial event, crucial stage. He's not going to forgo that. He will continue as much as he can in order to fulfill his achievements. So for him, it's a celebration in a way.

[D]

Danny I spoke to you a few days before this started and I'm going to quote from memory, but you said, I don't think this is a good idea. But who asked me? You were pretty skeptical about this operation. Does your skepticism remain?

[B]

Sometimes people tell me that they wish they wouldn't speak with me because after every conversation with me, they're becoming very upset. But it's not that I'm trying to be skeptical. I'm trying to be realistic about this regime. And I'm still very skeptical for an important question. I think that yes, we have major achievements Operation Wise, but we had that also in the 12 Day War. The main reason that I'm asking myself, how are we going to win this war in a way that will preserve our achievements? I think there is a great danger in finding ourselves in an attrition war. Something that you have to understand the Israeli public, we can sustain that, but at the end of the day, we're paying a grave price. I'm not talking about the people that killed Naim yesterday, a whole family. But I'm talking also about the economical and the political price that we are paying. And I'm afraid that our expectations are too high regarding Iran. It's so that Iran, they have their downfalls and they have the problems. But I think in terms of what we're trying to achieve in decapitating the leadership, are now bombing the IRGC police headquarters, maybe thinking that people go to the streets. I think that we are relying too much on our air force capabilities and we are underestimating the strength of the regime. This regime, again, it's not a demon, but you shouldn't underestimate it. And I think that as they go by, I think the price will pay harder and graver. And for them, they are able to sustain that in a way that like they did. It's not like an Iraqi war, but I think they're more constantly it's a big country and they can sustain. The resilience is different than our resilience. So the bottom line thing, I think that we have a major achievement it had and I knew that it will be because we have air operational intelligence superiority goes without saying. But I'm still skeptical there because I think that the target that we are putting now on the table is too high, are too high. And even more than that, I think that we came unprepared for what we call the regime change activity. And I'm afraid, and this is laughing for that, that we still will pay a price for killing of Khamenei I think that this is something that it I'm not talking about even Hezbollah getting into the business and becoming like a regional war and the Houthis probably getting I think it's only a matter of time. I think that for the future, I think we might pay a price for that. And I really think that I thought that it's important to reach even an agreement with this regime hoping to prevent a war. And I don't see a path for that in the future. This is why I think that we are betting too high. And on top of that, I think that now we're aligned with the U.S. but if things will turn sour, I think we'll be blamed in the US for pushing the US to the war itself. So, yes, achievements now, but maybe dark clouds in the horizon.

[E]

Danny, that's fascinating. I wonder if you could just walk us back because so many details have emerged over the weekend. So much has happened that we now know in terms of the planning that's gone into this operation to start this war to kill Khamenei. Can you just tell us a bit about the sort of dual track military preparations that were going alongside the nuclear negotiations? How real were those negotiations and when was the decision finally made to start the attack? On Saturday morning.

[B]

I think that what we know right now, I think it's correlated with reality. Of course, we weren't in the room of Netanyahu, Trump speaking. But I think it's safe to say that what we had is first Netanyahu came to Mar A Lago before the demonstration started, asking Trump for the system to attack the missile depots of Iran. And I think he gave him the green light. We have assurances for that from multiple places now. After the demonstration started, I think it was combination of Trump really thought that he can change Iran as he changed Venezuela. And he's not going to be as President Obama not supporting the demonstrations like in 2009 or President Biden 2022 with Mas Amini demonstration. He decided to do something. I think Netanyahu identified that he sent his charge to Washington to cooperate to build the plan that I think it was at first it was a contingency. While the American really thought that they understood that maybe war is a problematic thing, but Iran is too weak and maybe we can get some sort of a good deal, meaning they will going to capitulate on our demands, the nuclear, the missiles, the proxies, whatever. So actually we'll change the regime without the war and we'll bring our beautiful armada and that pressure actually will Force the Iranians to capitulate and give us everything that we want. In parallel, we have the Israelis preparing everything. Negotiations started. I think that the American understood that the Iranians are not going to give them anything substantial in their expectation. The Iranians were willing to give them compromises on the nuclear, solely on the nuclear, nothing else. And for the American expectations, so not

[E]

the missiles, not the proxies, those were the sort of other elements that, yeah,

[B]

Kushner and Witkov, they are real estate negotiators. They are thinking like Trump, you are weak. We can dictate. They are not even actually calculating ideology and things like that. They couldn't care less about that. They really thought, although everybody told them it's not going to happen now. Then the administration came to two options or it going to agree to some sort of an agreement. JCPOE plus in a way the Iranians were willing not to enrich in a way that maybe, I'm sorry to say they wanted to write unreached, but they willing to cap it. They are willing not to accumulate the material. So they're actually blocking any path to bomb their thought. Actually, if you call it with what Trump said, nuclear bomb, whatever. But Trump, in his mind, no nuclear bomb is something more than that. No missile that can deliver that, whatever. So they had two options. One option is to go to that agreement. Other option is starting a war. And now you have Israel on the sideline pushing for war because as I said with Netanyahu, for him this is a moment that won't return back. And then Trump decided, okay, if they're not going to do that with negotiation, I will go with the Israelis. We'll have already the plan. And it decided to strike now. Of course, they waited for something good to start with. The intel came whether CIA, idi, whatever,

[E]

CIA, idi, whatever the reporting is that came from the CIA. But would you like to claim that one for the idi?

[B]

Listen, it doesn't matter. It really doesn't matter whether CIA. The fact is that he is dead. So we decapitate and then we started the war. But I have to say one important thing. I'm not sure we are aligned with the US on the end goal. Yes, Trump is saying everything. I don't know if he really knows what he want to achieve from Israel from the get go. It's not depriving the missile capabilities of Iran. We know we cannot do that from the get go. It's trying our hardest to topple this regime. We are working now not to bomb some scattered locations In Iran, we are bombing the Basij and the police making sure that we are weakening this regime. So people go to the streets. It's a huge gamble, huge. Because what will happen if they're not going to arm to the streets. But I think that in that regard the onus now is not on Israel. Israel will continue. It's on President Trump. There is a question of A, everything related to the oil prices, B, everything related to the weaponry and the ammunition that they have, C, the internal pressure coming from us especially then the Iranian managed unfortunately to kill three American soldiers. So we have to see what will happen in Washington. The bottom, of course, and for that we have to calculate of course, what's happening in the region. Everything related to the Iranian attacks on the Gulf states that we are not surprised they set up from the get go. So we are in a very, we are in a regional conflict. We are not in a 12 day war. Everybody is involved. And I think this has its pros, but it has its cons. And you have to see how things will develop in the next couple of days. But definitely were an historical moment in the Middle east that will have an enormous effect on the relations between the Gulf states in Iran. Iran and Israel, US and Israel, US and Gulf states. I think we're in a very pivotal moment in terms of the future of the Middle East.

[D]

Danny, you were focused on Iran in your intelligence career. I'm wondering what the point of view would be from Tehran right now. What can you tell us about their strategy, their objectives, how they're going to try and get through this?

[B]

I tried to focus on Iran for almost the last 20 years. And I always told my subordinates in the IDI, the Israeli army, Israeli Defense Intelligence, that I want them to look at how Iranian look at things in life. I don't want to be judgmental, they're stupid, they're not whatever. Just think how they try to think. And I'm really trying to do that every day. I'm not a regime apologist. I'm trying to understand where they're coming from. And I think that they have a couple of things that they want to do right now. First, cohesion. It's important internally. They have to actually to broadcast to the people on the ground and of course the Iranian public that nothing has changed. Yes, we lost the father of the revolution in a way, but nothing has changed. We knew that from the get go. It can happen. We have an ordinary development, we have an ordinary process that we can replace it. This is why I think that internally this is important thing they're doing. And I have to say for now, from the outside, there's no cracks. It seems like the cohesion is there. Second, in terms of what they're trying to do on kinetic side, first and foremost, attacking the Gulf states. They're saying, of course, the military bases of the U.S. to the Gulf states. But it goes more than that. Right now they're trying to put a lot of pressure on them. It's not that the Iranians now thinking about returning back to nuclear negotiation, although what Arakshi said yesterday, I think Alarijani said it better today. There is no interest for negotiation. Now they're trying to create to actually to see whether they can raise the price for everyone that the gold state that really I think that are in shock, what everything is happening right now will pressure the US will pressure the international community. China will pressure the US to stop the war because the price is too high. Although they are threatening of attacking Iran or whatever. I think that for them, first and foremost, they're countries that build on open society, open country. In terms of hubs, the Emirates is a hub for flights and let alone everything related to the energy sector, I think that for them, every day that they continue the war is continuing, the price is getting higher and higher. So this is what the Iranians try to capitulate. This is another element that they're trying to do. And third, of course, operationally, everything related to what we call the calculation of the missiles, they know it's going to be a prolonged war. They have to calculate because for now, unlike the 12 Day War, they're attacking Israel and the Gulf states and all the way almost to Cyprus. So for them, it's important that we calculate that. And pressuring the Shiite issues in Iraq, Hezbollah that entered the war, I don't think he wanted to, but didn't have any other choice. And the Houthis in Yemen to just ease the pressure on Iran right now. So they are playing for time, hoping that every day that will go by, the pressure on the US Will continue to accumulate. Of course, they're trying to persuade everyone it's an Israeli war. That pressure Trump and it's not a US war. They're trying to create some sort of a wedge between us and the US Making sure that at the end of the day the war will end, they will preserve and they will have the chance to rebuild the capacity. They have no intention to capitulate. They have no intention to raise a white flag. For them, it's a war for the future of this regime. And I think they're still thinking they can win.

[E]

What military objectives has Israel set itself and how achievable do you think those are? I'm very conscious as well that the IDF is still barely recovering from the Gaza war. You still have commitments in Gaza. The northern front has now reopened. The west bank is on fire. Is the IDF massively overstretched? What objectives has it set?

[B]

First and foremost, yes, it's overstretched, but we have of course the US this is a major change that we had drove the war. We are looking at the jobs of the work that's being done. Actually you can have some sort of a burden sharing. You go this, we go there. So that's important. Still is stretch, but we have the US monumental force. So this is something important. But for your important question, I have to say one thing about that. The power that I'm thinking is the fact that the targets that we have right now that we set is not a military target. It's not like let's deprive their military capabilities or let's deprive the missile capabilities or nuclear whatever the goal that we know in Israel, meaning that what being said in the media is the cabinet approve the goal of creating the relevant condition that will allow people to go to the street and revolutionize whatever or cheating this regime.

[E]

Okay, so it's the Trump style regime change. That's what Israel is saying as well.

[B]

Exactly. And this is not tangible and this is not militarily and you're putting the bar too high. So if you're not going to achieve it, then what it means that you lost the war though you managed to really decapitate the senior leadership or whatever. So I think the problem that we have right now that the goal is not tangible, it's very vague and it's not military. So you actually can accumulate that in a way that it's like something that you won or you lost. So this is the problem that we have and of course the burden sharing. Now we had to draft more resources, more reserve. We are focusing now on the north bombing, but there are multiple indications that maybe something on the land will happen. So I think in that regard we are returning back to the broader elements in Gaza. I think the situation is quite calm because I don't think Hamas has some sort of intention to do something. He's interested in completing the second stage of the Trump plan. So I don't think we'll see something dramatic in Gaza. But I think that in terms of the north, in terms of the Houthis will start firing rockets against us and maybe the Shia militias again will be stressed. Again, I think the stress is on the idf, but also on the Israeli public. Just remember, we are constant war from the 7th of October 2023. And this is a bad thing as well, because the security of a country is not building on only the F35 or F15 or amazing pilot that we have. The security is built on the ability to live here and prosper. And I think this lengthy war is something that creating a lot of problems. People are leaving Israel and I think this is something that our leadership needs to understand that, yes, we can decapitate Khamenei, we can kill this, we can kill that, but the bottom line of things that we cannot live in constant war. And I'm afraid that this is something that we know how we're going to start, but I'm not sure we know how we're going to finish this war.

[D]

Is that your safe room you're speaking from? Yeah, I was going to say no windows.

[B]

Yes, yes. By the way, just a minute. I explained to you that a lot of people in Israel, they don't have safe room. We are lucky because we build a house. So when you're building your house in Israel, you have to be in a safe room. But a lot of people are old houses. They say around 40% of the Israeli public has not saved from. They have to go to community shelters. And it's a risk. And this is why another element that we have to be very careful in not prolonging the war in a way that will find ourselves in more problems in the future. This is why I think I'm truly hoping that this war will end. I think we have to be very realistic in our objectives and I think this is the start, maybe to think about the way out.

[E]

Danny Citrinovic, thank you very much for joining us on battle lines and hope you stay safe. We're going to take a quick pause there. Coming up after the break, we'll be speaking to the Telegraph's David Blair about the significance of Khamenei's death and what next for Trump's attack on Iran.

[B]

Support is available 247 with VRBoCare. We're here day or night, ready whenever you need help because a great trip

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starts with the right support. Podcast advertising works. And with ACAS Ads Academy, you'll learn exactly how our free on demand courses are built from more than a decade of podcasting experience, giving you practical tools to create campaigns that drive results complete the course, and you'll earn a certification that proves your skills in one of the fastest growing channels in media. Get started today at go.acast.com academy foreign. Welcome back. You're listening to Battle Lines, the Telegraph's foreign policy and defense podcast. Ali Khamenei ruled Iran for nearly four decades. His death in an Israeli American airstrike on Saturday morning marks a turning point not only in Iranian history, but that of the Middle east and the world.

[E]

Joining us now to discuss perhaps the significance of this moment is the Telegraph's David Blair, our chief foreign analyst.

[D]

David, welcome to Battle Lines. You've been reporting in and out of and around Iran for most of your career, actually, and Ali Khamenei has always loomed over that. What were your thoughts when you heard the news on Saturday?

[A]

Well, whatever you think of him, he was one of the most significant figures in the modern Middle East. He ruled Iran from 1989 right up until the other day. During those 37 years almost, he reshaped Iran's strategy to create this axis of resistance, as he called it, an axis of terrorist groups stretching right the way across the Middle east designed to deter Iran's enemies from ever striking the regime. Meanwhile, at home, he built up the nuclear program to give himself the option of building a nuclear weapon. By doing those two things, he massively raised the stakes of Iran's confrontation with America and its allies. With the results that we've seen. His strategy that was designed to secure Iran's regime has instead brought it to the brink. The cards that he built up that were designed to, he hoped, would be able to deter an American attack have instead provoked one. And the nuclear program now largely lies in ruins, having brought down on Iran's head the full weight of international economic sanctions. So his strategy was extraordinarily ambitious, but in its own terms and quite demonstrably, it completely failed.

[D]

It's pretty clear that he miscalculated in some sense here. He misread the American and Israeli intentions and determination. I'm wondering, though, if you think that they also misread him. Donald Trump at least seemed to be expecting some kind of concession in these past few weeks. And I suppose I'm asking you to kind of tell us a little bit about the man and whether his character, what animated him, was somewhat misread abroad.

[A]

Well, he was very easy to misread because he never left Iran, he never traveled. From the moment he became supreme leader, he never left the country at all. He met very few foreign leaders. A few were ushered into his presence, generally quite friendly leaders or people who had a less poisonous relationship with Iran, like Vladimir Putin, for instance. But very few Western leaders ever met him. So he was always this enigmatic figure. He was quite easy to misread. But in a sense, his strategy, in its own terms, was coherent. It was to maximize all the ways in which Iran could inflict harm on. On those who he believed posed a threat to the regime. But there's always a problem with a strategy of that kind that you might end up provoking exactly what it is that you're trying to prevent. And that's the trap that Khamenei eventually fell into.

[E]

Does the regime continue without him? I mean, we haven't seen it instantly crumble, clearly, like when Assad left Syria, everything just fell apart almost instantly. Are we expecting to see something like that in the days and weeks to come in Iran, or is the regime, and we were talking about this a bit earlier, is it sufficiently prepared for this eventuality?

[A]

There is an institutional strength to the Iranian regime which makes it very different from Assad. For example, the Assad regime was a completely personalized dictatorship. The only reason why Bashar Al Assad was president of Syria was because his father had been president. And the only legitimacy that Bashar had was that his father had mounted a successful coup in 1970. It's a pretty slender grounds for legitimacy. Now, the Islamic Republic of Iran is very different. They have a constitution. They've already had one transfer of power from Ayatollah Khomeini to Khamenei back in 1989. So there is an institutional strength there. But it's now being tested, and it's being tested in the most extraordinary way, because not only does Iran face this concerted onslaught from America and from Israel, but until a few weeks ago, they had thousands of and thousands of their own people out on the streets demanding the downfall of the regime. So whether the institutions of the Islamic Republic are strong enough to withstand this test is something we're going to learn in the coming days and weeks. I can't predict. I don't think anyone can predict whether they will pass that test or not. We will see.

[E]

You wrote a column over the weekend saying that attacking Iran is far riskier than anything Trump has done before. And basically looking at this idea that he's trying to affect racial regime change with an air power campaign, which has never been done before. Why do you think this is so risky?

[A]

For Trump, it's enormously risky, partly because he can't actually decide what the objective of this campaign is he's using about half of all the deployable air power that America possesses, and he can't really decide why. So yesterday he said, in the morning, I'm going to be talking to Iran's new leaders. They want to talk to me and I've agreed to talk to them them. By the afternoon, when he delivered a video message, he said, I call on the Iranian people to rise up and take back your country and tear down the people who rule you. So on the same day, he defined his objective as being regime change and what you might call regime alteration. Negotiating with the new post Khamenei leadership of Iran. You can't really do both. You have to decide which one it is that you're going for. And if his real objective is total regime change, the downfall of the Islamic Republic, well, that can only be affected by the Iranian people. And whether they now rise up against their rulers is something that Trump cannot possibly control. No one can. No one knows whether they will do that or not. That depends upon millions of individuals. If you put all that together, he's running the most extraordinary risk.

[E]

There's a real risk for him at home as well, isn't there? I mean, we've got midterms coming up later this year. He's not doing that well. In the polling, he came into power on a ticket of ending wars. We've literally got a clip that runs at the beginning of this podcast that says, I'll be measured not just by the battles I win, but also by the wars that I end. And he has JD Vance as his deputy president. This isolationist who doesn't think foreign interventionism is a good idea has been sort of talked around over the sort of Venezuela style hit' em and run attacks. But this is looking to be something very, very different. Aren't there huge risks of him splitting his base and having some real problems at home?

[D]

It's a really interesting moment in the history of the MAGA movement in a sense. I mean, J.D. vance, he would never call himself an isolationist. He'd call himself a. I'm not sure, but probably a fastest, maybe, or maybe a restrainer or maybe just responsible kind of person. I mean, J.D. vance represents a generation of people roughly my age who actually went to war in the Great War on terror, rather than me who decided to go and be a journalist. And people were stung by that. It's impossible to underestimate the impact of the experience in Iraq and Afghanistan on, not just on America, but on this country. And that is one of the driving forces behind the the MAGA appeal. And JD Vance is seen as the chief apostle of that branch of the movement. There's always been this contradiction there at the heart of this movement, because on the one hand, you have this appeal to call it what you want, isolationism, restraint, let's not get involved in any more Middle Eastern wars with no ends, with poorly defined objectives. As David says, this is probably an even more poorly defined objective than the invasion of Iran in 2002 because you could control what happened to Saddam. You had hundreds of thousands of troops of your own on the ground here. You don't. But at the same time, there doesn't seem to be an appetite to give up America's status as a global superpower. And global superpowers have to assert their will and dominance around the world. This is the tension inherent in those two strains of thinking. When we spoke to Jonathan hackett, the former U.S. marine, in the hours before that, he made the point. The current chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Kane, is a disciple of the, what is called the Colin Powell Doctrine. Colin Powell, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the first Gulf War and who himself was stung by the American experience in Vietnam. And his doctrine essentially says things like, okay, if you're going to go to war, you need to know exactly what it is you want to achieve. It's got to be achievable. You have to have full domestic political unity and support for this action, and you have to be able to bring overwhelming or as he put it, decisive force to achieve that goal as quickly as possible. It seems to me that this is failing on many counts there. As we've discussed. As Danny Citrinovic has told us, the objective is not very well defined at all. And in terms of domestic support, it seems that Donald Trump has decided that the American public will go along with it because success is its own justification. Seems like a bit of a gamble to me.

[E]

We'll see how long that lasts once and American troops are already dying. David, I'm really interested to get your perspective. Starmer put out a statement late last night talking about how the UK would now allow the Americans to use its military bases, including de Garcia, which we know there's been a huge row about in the Chagos Islands and lots of back and forth. We don't need to get into all of that right now. But what did you make of Starmer's statement and also the legal advice that they put out that they think this is legally justifiable? The shadow of Iraq war hanging heavily over all of this and Starmer even referenced it in his speech yesterday.

[A]

Well, the new reality is that Iran is now firing ballistic missiles at just about every country within range for the first time, firing those missiles at all the Gulf states, plus Jordan as well, on top of Israel.

[D]

I think they hit Oman.

[B]

Right?

[D]

They weren't meant to hit Oman.

[A]

Yeah, it's extraordinary. And in the Gulf states there are at least 200,000 British people. So Starmer has a responsibility to defend them. So here in his mind, we're talking about something completely different from the wider Donald Trump mission to whether it's bring down the regime or alter the regime. It's something completely different. This is about defending British citizens from missile attack. And of course, under Article 51 of the UN Charter, every country has a to right to self defense. There's no question that defending yourself against incoming ballistic missiles is entirely legal under international law. So what he's doing is he's allowing America to use two British bases, the one in Cyprus and one in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean for that purpose, but only for that purpose, not for the wider mission on Iran. And British planes have also been deployed in the Middle East. They can't do anything against ballistic missiles. No fast jet can shoot down a ballistic missile, but they can shoot down drones, which I understand has happened on at least one occasion. The problem is, in the end, the most effective way of defending yourself against ballistic missiles is to destroy them before they're launched. That is destroy them in Iran, either in their storage sites or better still, destroy the launchers themselves. And the British position at the moment, moment seems to be we'll leave the Americans to do that, but we'll let them use our bases. But once you let them use your bases, then legally and morally, you're part of the effort. So there's no logical reason why you shouldn't be part of the effort operationally as well. And it seems a bit odd to say to the Americans, would you please take all the risk and all the burden of destroying the missiles before they hit our citizens? There's a word for that and it's not a very pleasant word. That's called being a free rider. And I expect that the government will have to think more about that.

[E]

Do you think you can see us becoming more militarily involved then in the days and weeks to come?

[A]

It depends what happens. The Iranians started this war with about 1,500 ballistic missiles and about 100 launchers. From their perspective, they're just going to fire them for as long as they can. The only thing that's going to stop them is when those missiles or their launchers are destroyed. Now, you can be sure that will be a top priority for both the American and the Israeli air forces, and they will be very effective. So it's possible that they will reduce the flow of missiles in the coming days. However, stopping drones is much harder because they are manufactured much more simply and easily. And destroying every factory in Iran that could make a drone is probably impossible. And remember that the projectile that slammed into the hotel in Dubai was a drone. The pictures we've seen of a tower block in Malama being hit, it was hit by a drone. You know, these are still very dangerous. Even if they're not ballistic missiles, stopping them is going to be much harder.

[D]

That was David Blair, the Telegraph's chief foreign commentator. That's all for this edition of Battle Lines. We will continue to follow the situation as closely as you would expect in the coming days.

[E]

And it goes without saying, when you're not listening to Battle Lines, do check out the Telegraph's website for all the latest. We've got live blogs running, David Blair's writing analyses. Roland will be writing stuff. We've got our Iran expert Akhtar McCoy. So do check out our website for all the latest news and updates. That's it for Battle Lines. We'll be back again soon. Goodbye.

[D]

Goodbye. Battle Lines is an original podcast from from the Telegraph, created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Roland Olyphant and Venetia Rainey. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following Battle Lines on your preferred podcast app. And if you have a moment, leave a review as it helps others to find the show. To stay on top of all our news, subscribe to the Telegraph, sign up to our Dispatches newsletter or listen to our sister podcast, Ukraine, the latest. You can also get in touch directly by emailing battlelines elegraph.co.uk or contact us on X. You can find our handles in the show Notes the producer is Peter Shevlin and the executive producer is Louisa Wells.

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