Donald Trump (5:50)

We've wiped out the leadership phase one, phase two, and largely phase three. But we're dealing with the man who I believe is the most respected and the leader. You know, it's a little tough. They've wiped out. We've wiped out everybody. No, not the supreme leader. Well, nobody's ever, nobody heard of the second Supreme Leader, the Sun, nobody. We have not heard from the Sun. Every once in a while you'll see a statement made, but we have not. We don't know if he's living. But the people that seem to be running it, and they seem that based on really fact, because things they've said have taken place.

Roland Oliphant (6:30)

Could peace be about to break out? Who is Donald Trump speaking to in Tehran? And were international markets right to heave a sigh of relief and drop the price of oil briefly on hearing the news? To discuss all this, I'm joined by the Telegraph's chief foreign affairs commentator, David Blair, and Lena Hatib, associate Fellow at the Middle east and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. Lina, welcome to Iran. The latest. I know you've been following this war extremely closely since it began. I don't know about you, I feel like I've got a bit of whiplash today because suddenly Donald Trump is talking about peace breaking out. He says he's talking to someone at the top in Iran who's interested in peace, but they all seem to deny it. Any idea who he's talking to?

Lina Hatib (7:23)

It's anyone's guess because it is not really known who is in charge in Iran when it comes to decisions of war and peace. We can speculate that the irgc, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, are in charge of the military operations side of things. But who is in charge of foreign policy? Who is in charge of negotiations? That is not clear. But knowing that the IRGC run the show militarily, we can kind of take a safe bet that no matter who Trump might or might not be communicating with, ultimately the communication channel has to include the irgc. So it's basically the framework to understand this is one of military to military engagement, meaning whoever is mediating will have to have very good communication channels with the military and security apparatus in Iran.

Roland Oliphant (8:31)

Hmm. I just want to welcome David Blair to the conversation who's just joined us. Welcome, David.

David Blair (8:36)

Hi.

Roland Oliphant (8:36)

Do you have any good guess about who it might be he's talking about?

David Blair (8:40)

I prefer not to guess. And we don't know really whether these, these talks are happening or not. The consensus seems to be that messages have been passed between America and Iran by mediators, but the direct talks, face to face talks, have not yet occurred. And what we may be seeing is the preliminary to establishing those. But I think rather than the personalities, it's worth focusing on what Iran would want. And I suspect that Iran's capital demand will be continued control over the Strait of Hormuz in some form. They would want American consent for that? Because that would give them a new source of revenue and a source of revenue that would be immune from sanctions, and that would be an extraordinary gain for them if they can come out of the war with a sanctions proof. An American approved source of funds.

Roland Oliphant (9:35)

An American approved source of funds and effectively greater control of the Strait of Hormuz than they had going into this.

David Blair (9:42)

Yes, because going into this, of course, the Strait of Hormuz was an international waterway, and tankers exercising their right of free passage were going right past every day by dozens, without Iran making any money at all. Now, so far as we can tell, if you are prepared to cut a bilateral deal with Iran and you happen to be China or India, for example, then Iran will let your tankers through. But you pay $2 million per tanker. Now, that's very useful. That's a very good deal for Iran. And if you looked at Trump's latest comments, he said something about how America and Iran would jointly control the Strait of Hormuz. Well, it doesn't matter how you dressed up. If you concede any measure of Iranian control over the Strait, well, that's a source of revenue and that's a source of power that Iran did not have before the war. So that would be quite an extraordinary development for the regime. But maybe I'm getting ahead of myself. Lina, do you agree or am I going on a wild flight of speculation?

Lina Hatib (10:47)

I could see this happening only in one case, which is after the Islamic Republic, meaning if there is a change, not classic kind of, you know, regime change like in Iraq, but change where whoever rules Iran is not leading an Islamic Republic of Iran that screams death to Israel and death to America. If there is that kind of government in place in Iran, then, yes, maybe we could see not just actually the US And Iran making money there, we could see other Gulf countries, because, hey, the Strait of Hormuz is not just, you know, bordered on one side by Iran with nothingness on the other side. It's a strait. Who's on the other side? You have basically Arab countries that have a stake in this. So maybe, maybe that could be an arrangement further down the line, but that's not going to sweeten the deal for the current administration in Iran. So, personally, I don't think it's likely at all that the US Is going to make a deal with the current regime in Iran to do any such thing. And I also agree with you that we don't know whether any talks have happened. There may have been talks amongst the mediators. There's speculation that Turkey, Egypt, maybe Pakistan have offered at least to mediate, and maybe they're talking to one another, which is very plausible. Maybe someone has sent indirect signals to Iran. But we don't have currently any evidence of actual talks having taken place between Iran and the United States. And again, when we try to understand what's going on, I always say, let's look at what's happening on the ground. What's happening on the ground is Iran is continuing its military attacks. There were attacks on Eilat in southern Israel. There are continuing Israeli attacks on Lebanon to target Hezbollah. And the US Is also continuing its military campaign and actually sending more military assets to the region. So the talks speculation is one thing, and the military developments tell us another story.

Roland Oliphant (13:11)

Given all that, this is from Reuters this morning. And it's one of those stories that slowly, as you refresh the wire, every kind of half an hour or so, an update to the story comes up and there's yet another source confirming it. So this started with two sources this morning, and before I came in here, we're up to about four or five sources from at least two different countries. So a Pakistani official told Reuters that direct talks on ending the war could be held in Islamabad this week. The official said Vice President J.D. vance, as well as Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were expected to meet Iranian officials. So direct talks after a call between Trump and Asimouni, who's the head of the Pakistani army. What do you make of that? Is this the Pakistanis making something up, or do you think this is really happening? And also, I think what's a really interesting question here is we haven't heard much from Pakistan and Egypt since this war began, but apparently they're suddenly in the middle of the diplomatic effort to end this.

Lina Hatib (14:12)

Yeah. Because when you want to talk to Iran with the IRGC being really the decision maker in this war, you have to talk to the IRGC and who has strong connections and communication channels with the irgc. Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt. There have been relationships between those three countries and the IRGC for a very long time. And these are military and security relationships because there are some shared interests regarding the Red Sea, regarding maritime issues, in general, regarding terrorism, between quotation marks. So these countries have an open communication channel that could be useful in this regard. And also those countries are not obviously part of the conflict. So traditionally, the world would look at Oman and Qatar as the traditional mediators, but Oman and Qatar are basically part of the conflict because they're being attacked by Iran. So they can't be mediators. So this opens up space for these other actors who happen to just have the right profile.

Roland Oliphant (15:28)

Do we know anything about the kind of, I don't know what, what, what Islamabad or, you know, what Egypt or what Pakistan would want to get out of this, apart from just ending the war? Do they have any agenda of their own that. That we are aware of, or would. Would it be best to think of them simply as conduits rather than players in this?

Lina Hatib (15:48)

I mean, of course, anyone who engages in mediation is not just doing it for the, you know, sake of being a good actor. They are also bolstering their own diplomatic standing. Now, Pakistan is interesting because it has also signed a security deal with Saudi Arabia. And interestingly, that security deal obviously has not been activated in military terms in the context of this war, that has not been deemed necessary. So Pakistan has actually a stake in this, because the last thing I think Pakistan wants is to be dragged into this war as a result of having signed this agreement with Saudi Arabia. And so the more Pakistan can use its leverage, or at least communication capabilities to calm things down, the more its diplomatic status would be bolstered in this context, and the more it can protect itself from being dragged one way or another. And let's not forget that not too long ago, there was a military ship in international waters that had been not too far from Pakistan in India, that left India, and that was an Iranian warship that was attacked by the United States. And so, again, it's not like Pakistan can pretend that this conflict is, you know, not going to one day spread further geographically and present a more pressing kind of risk to Pakistani security when it comes to Egypt. Again, Egypt has played this mediation role with Israel in particular, for the longest time, usually when it comes to the Palestinians. And it always tries to, again, reassert its geopolitical importance by getting involved in these kinds of mediations, because it's also worried about its own security because it's under a lot of pressure from Israel regarding the Gaza situation, which no one is really talking about anymore. So Israel is actually, you know, indirectly pressuring Egypt when Israel talks about, for example, the displacement of thousands of Palestinians into the Sinai. So if Egypt can play a mediating role, perhaps it can get something back, you know, on that file. The Middle east is, you know, a place where crises are interconnected, and we have to really zoom out and look at the big political and geopolitical picture to be able to understand the motivations of the different actors.

Roland Oliphant (18:41)

Sure. It's a real Rubik's cube, isn't it, David? One element of that Rubik's Cube you wrote about yesterday, I'm thinking particularly of the Strait of Hormuz. You wrote this really interesting piece which is in today's paper. Go and buy the Telegraph in your newsagent. Keep your local news agents open or you can read it on the website. Basically arguing that maybe Donald Trump can't actually stop the war now because the, the Strait of Hormuz situation makes this into, is turned a war of choice into, into a war of, of necessity. I was wondering if you could expand on that thought. And does that mean that, that, you know, even if, if, if, if JD Vance shows up in Islamabad to speak to, I don't know, Muhammad Baga Calabouff or somebody, you don't really think it's going to be possible to put an end to this?

David Blair (19:35)

I think that's probably right. America now has a vital interest in restoring free passage through the Strait of Hormuz in some guise. What it never anticipated, incredibly, is that Iran would retaliate once it's backwards against the wall by taking the global economy hostage, by using the leverage it has, that geography gives it to disrupt traffic through the Strait. And with the effects that we've seen, I mean, 20% of the world's oil went through the Strait. In normal times, the oil price has shot up. That's done exactly what Iran hoped it would do, which is exert pressure on Donald Trump. Now, he has a dilemma. I don't think he can end this until free passage in some form has been restored. And he's got two ways of doing that. One is by using force. And you, Roland, have written a very interesting piece on exactly how difficult that would be and how incredibly risky it would be, and how it would almost certainly involve the use of American troops on the ground, never mind air power, to try and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. And his second option is to try and cut a deal. And I think what we're seeing now is sort of an attempt to try and cut a deal. Now, as Lina says, it would be extremely difficult for him to cut a deal with Iran's current leaders. But he appears to be focusing on Trump, appears to be focusing on what he's dreamed of from the beginning, which is imposing a sort of Venezuela type solution upon Iran whereby the regime remains in place, but there's a pliable figurehead who they can do business with and who will essentially do America's bidding. I think what we're seeing now is America exploring Whether that's a possibility, my suspicion is that it will not be.

Roland Oliphant (21:33)

He said that last night when he was speaking on the tarmac to those American TV crews.

Podcast Producer/Ad Voice (21:37)

What about the Strait of Hormuz? Who's going to be in control of oil?

Donald Trump (21:39)

That'll be opened very soon. If this works, how soon and who's in control of it?

Podcast Producer/Ad Voice (21:44)

Will Iran still be able to control

Lina Hatib (21:45)

the flow of oil?

Donald Trump (21:47)

Be jointly?

Lina Hatib (21:48)

Control by who?

Donald Trump (21:51)

Maybe me. Maybe me. Me and the ayatollah. Whoever the ayatollah is, whoever the next ayatollah. Look, and there'll also be a form of a. A very serious form of a regime change. Now, in all fairness, everybody's been killed from the regime. They're really starting off. There's automatically a regime change. But we're dealing with some people that I find to be very reasonable, very solid. The people within know who they are, they're very respected. And maybe one of them will be exactly what we're looking for. Look at Venezuela, how well that's working out. We are doing so well in Venezuela with oil and with the relationship between the president elect and us. And maybe we find somebody like that in Iran.

Roland Oliphant (22:42)

Didn't go into detail, but yeah, it does seem to be back on the table, doesn't it? What do you make of what the Iranians are saying about this? So all of this talk of peace coming from the Americans, I'm just going to read out to you both a handful of responses out of Tehran. So Mohammed Baga Kalabaf, powerful Speaker of Parliament, former IRGC general, he called the discussion of negotiations fake news. And then this morning we had Major General Ali Abdulhali Ali Abadi, who is a spokesman for Iran's top military command, who was quoted on state television today saying Iran's powerful armed forces are proud, victorious and steadfast in defending Iran's integrity. And this path will continue until complete victory. He didn't say what complete victory would look like, but that doesn't sound like. It doesn't sound like people who are, who are eager to settle this.

Lina Hatib (23:41)

I don't think Iran is actually eager to settle this at all. Again, as I said, when you look at what's going on, they're continuing their military campaign. And even if there are negotiations, it doesn't mean that the US Is going to stop attacking either. I mean, if you think back to 2025, on two occasions there were meant to be negotiations or negotiations had actually already somehow started and the US Carried on with its military attacks anyway. So I don't think the Iranians have much of a reason to either trust what the United States is saying or actually present themselves at this stage as bowing to American pressure. It is too early, I think, for Iran to be seen as giving concessions. And in a way, negotiations indicate that Iran is somehow feeling pressured, and the regime is keen to project an image of resilience domestically as much as possible and also, of course, internationally. So I think it's premature to really imagine that we are going to see negotiations in the next few days. This deadline of five days that President Trump gave, you know, implies that maybe something major diplomatically could happen before the end of the week. But as I said, the military movements on the ground indicate otherwise.

Roland Oliphant (25:18)

David?

David Blair (25:19)

Yes, I agree. And from Iran's perspective, if the other side is publicly musing about calling off the campaign and talking about doing deals and opening contacts and all the rest of it, well, from Iran's perspective, that's exactly the moment when you carry on. You will interpret that as being a sign that the pressure that you're exerting through your control of the Strait of Hormuz de facto is having the effect he wanted, and that Trump is feeling the pressure, and you should leave him where he is to stew on that for a bit longer. So I'm sure Lina's right. The Iranian regime will not be eager to settle this.

Roland Oliphant (26:02)

So you were saying, you guys both seem to believe that this kind of fighting talk genuinely reflects a sense in Tehran that, you know, despite being horrifically battered from the air, you know, I don't know how many thousand airstrikes we're up to now and how many top commanders they've lost. Despite all that, they kind of feel like things are going their way at the moment.

Lina Hatib (26:25)

I think they think so because their definition of victory simply means survival. And so far, the regime has survived.

Roland Oliphant (26:32)

Right?

Lina Hatib (26:32)

So so far, they have been telling their people that they are winning in this war. Of course, you know, in reality, the regime is incurring huge military losses. And in fact, it is because of this that it has resorted to using the economic pressure card, which is the Strait of Hormuz, because if they were doing well on the military front, they wouldn't probably need to use this card. And here we have to, you know, be careful when we say the Strait of Hormuz and Iran's role. A lot of people frame it as Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz. It's not control, it's disruption. And to cause disruption, you don't need to have a lot. You can do it with a quite small military capability. And that is what we are witnessing at the moment.

Roland Oliphant (27:23)

The Americans have said American intelligence is claiming the Iranians have laid a dozen mines in this, which doesn't sound like much, but it's enough to alarm any captain of a tanker going through.

Lina Hatib (27:35)

Yeah, but we have to remember why didn't they lay more than a dozen? It's because they would be hurting themselves. Because Iran's own oil flows through the strait of Hormuz. 80% of Iran's oil is sold to China and flows through this route. And so Iran, in planting more mines, will not be able to control what happens to those mines further down the line. Because even though they are mines in deep water is different from land. There's a chance they could shift where they are. And this would make it very difficult for the Iranians later to be able to deal with this problem. And so they are actually curtailed in how much they can do. And this is why I think now, you know, we should really pay attention to the military plan by the United States regarding the Strait of Hormuz because the US can see that militarily speaking, even the disruption is not something that Iran is doing comfortably.

Roland Oliphant (28:43)

David, do you have anything you want to say on the back of that?

David Blair (28:46)

Yes, I think what Lina's just said is very interesting. Iran depends on the Strait of Hormuz more than any other country. It was often said before the war that Iran would not close the strait because it would be cutting its own throat, because it would be blocking its own outlet for oil exports. But of course, that hasn't proved to be entirely true. They have allowed their own tankers to pass. The figures seem to vary on this, but something between half a million and a million barrels of Iranian oil on tankers have been able to go through the strait, and some Chinese and Indian tankers have been able to go through as well. But there's a limit, and as Lina says, if you sow too many mines in the waterway, then the risk is that your own ships might end up hitting them. So there's a sort of self imposed limit on what Iran can do.

Roland Oliphant (29:40)

And I'll just note here for the benefit of listeners, there are two Marine Expeditionary Units of the US Marine Corps on their way to the Middle East. What they're going to do we don't know. But they're due to arrive in the region around Friday. And there's clear signs that the administration is considering using them on amphibious operations around the strait, possibly to take strategic islands on the strait, possibly to raid the Iranian shoreline, possibly to take control of Kharg island, the oil exporter, to create economic pressure for Iran to open. So it's clearly Americans are thinking about this a great deal. We're going to take a short break now. When we come back, will this war mark the end of Hezboll?

Lina Hatib (30:33)

Foreign.

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Roland Oliphant (32:13)

Welcome back. You're listening to Iran, the latest from the Telegraph with me, Roland Oliphant. I'm speaking to the Telegraph's chief foreign affairs commentator, David Blair and Lena Hatib, associate fellow of Middle east and North Africa program at Chatham House. We've spoken a lot about what the Iranians might want from these talks and why they might not be that interested in suing for peace that soon. But what do we think the Americans will be asking for? This is Donald Trump speaking to reporters on the tarmac before departing from Palm Beach International Airport late on Monday for these talks.

Donald Trump (32:47)

Mr. President, we're looking for all of the things that we've been talking about. We want to see no nuclear bomb, no nuclear weapon, not even close to it, low key in the missiles. We want to see peace in the Middle East. We want the nuclear dust. We're going to want that. And I think we're going to get that. We've agreed to that. Yeah, we're getting. We've agreed to that.

Roland Oliphant (33:10)

We've agreed to that. What do you make of that, either of you?

David Blair (33:13)

It's a far cry from unconditional surrender, which is what he said on March 6. And he isn't talking about the downfall of the regime. He's talking about a deal with the existing regime and then just restating in his own inimitable fashion America's long standing demands.

Lina Hatib (33:30)

Yeah, but at the same time, when he says peace in the Middle East, I know this is such a cliched statement, but in this war it's actually very important because there cannot be peace in the Middle East. That does not mean peace with Israel. And there is no way the current Iranian regime is going to agree to that. So he doesn't even have to name regime change as such. What he is demanding is impossible to achieve with the current Iranian regime still being in place.

Roland Oliphant (34:03)

So that implication is clear. I want to zoom out a bit to the wider region and Lina, if I could come to you because you are from Lebanon, I believe there's been some interesting news out of there. I mean, of course the war is picking up pace. We've seen the Iranian authorities say now, sorry, Lebanese authorities say at least a thousand people have now been killed since the war began there. The Israelis have said, or Israel. Katz, the defense minister said this morning Israel is going to occupy Lebanon up to the Litany River. So it's clear that Lebanon's being drawn into a major theater of this war. There was also an interesting diplomatic development today which is the Lebanese Foreign Ministry saying that they were basically expelling the Iranian ambassador and I think recalling their own ambassador from, from Tehran having accused the IRGC of running Hezbollah operations against Israel from Lebanon. I suppose that struck me as potentially a big setback for Iran and quite a big development for Lebanon given Hezbollah's historic weight and clout there. What can you tell us about the significance of that?

Lina Hatib (35:22)

It's hugely significant. Now it's not going to make Hezbollah or Israel stop there attacks on one another, but it is a massive diplomatic move because this country, Lebanon, had been under basically Iranian political oversight for decades. And for Lebanon to take this bold step at the level of the state to basically say the Iranian ambassador is no longer welcome in Lebanon. This is not something that anyone really would have even imagined even not too long ago. And this goes to show how the Lebanese government is trying its best to show Iran and Hezbollah that it is not being intimidated by their threats. Because we have to remember that not too long ago, just few days ago, Hezbollah officials issued publicly threats to the Lebanese government. Two Hezbollah officials talked about executions, they talked about toppling the government. They basically were trying to project the same horror narrative that Lebanon went through in 2005 when Hezbollah assassinated many of its political opponents in Lebanon. 2008, when Hezbollah forced a de facto change in the Lebanese constitution to give Hezbollah legitimacy as a so called defense actor in the country. The current government of Lebanon reversed that clause in the constitution. It says only the Lebanese state should have authority to have weapons in the country and is calling on Hezbollah to disarm, but Hezbollah is refusing. So it is really a big move on part of the Lebanese government because it is saying to Hezbollah, you may be refusing to comply, but we are not scared of you anymore. But here I say it is very important for Lebanon to have international backing and guarantees because this very brave decision by the Lebanese government, which is the right decision, is also coming, you know, on the back of these Hezbollah threats, which I think should be taken seriously. So Lebanon needs a lot more support because it is also telling the world that Lebanon is ready to make the kind of diplomatic moves that perhaps maybe a year ago would be considered impossible. So if Lebanon's going to be brave, then it needs the international backing to move forward.

Roland Oliphant (38:05)

If they're having that kind of confidence and they feel that they can dare to say that kind of thing to Iran and stand up to Hezbollah. I mean, it sounds, I mean, I suppose in the context of the past few decades in the Middle east, this sounds like almost a slightly mad and naive thing to say, but could this be the end of Hezbollah? Does this mean that their power is finally broken?

Lina Hatib (38:30)

Yeah, absolutely. I mean, we are definitely witnessing the end of Hezbollah. The military capability of Hezbollah is really hugely reduced. I mean, yes, they are able now to continue to bomb Israel, but they are depleting their remaining long range missiles. Their top commanders have been assassinated to a large extent. And this is why there has been a replacement with actual IRGC figures. The political legitimacy of Hezbollah is gone. The military role that Hezbollah claimed to be playing as a so called defense actor is gone. The Lebanese government has banned, in fact, Hezbollah's military activity, which is another big decision that would have been unheard of not too long ago. And at the level of social kind of acceptance of Hezbollah, I would say most of the Lebanese population does not support Hezbollah and wants to see an end to having this actor drag Lebanon into useless wars again and again. And so ultimately, Hezbollah has nothing to offer, and this is why it is resorting to its tried and tested model of intimidation. And however, the difference now is its big patron. Iran is no longer the patron it used to be, you know, before this whole war began. In the past, Hezbollah was scary when it intimidated its opponents because it had the Assad regime in Syria backing it up. It had Iran backing it up and giving it huge resources, and the Lebanese government was very weak. Now things are different. And so I think, you know, Hezbollah is not gonna kind of go down easily, but it will never be able to survive this war and, you know, go back to what it was before. But, of course, it's because Iran is making the decisions for Hezbollah in this war, and Iran itself is being obstinate. Hezbollah will also be the same. So I don't think that any illusion that Hezbollah's decisions are domestic should cloud anyone's judgment. What is happening in Lebanon is very much about what Tehran is intending to do, which is to try to continue its influence in Lebanon, even if this means the destruction of Lebanon.

Roland Oliphant (41:05)

David, as we've got to wrap up, really, but that off the back of that. So I had this conversation with an Israeli official towards the beginning of the war, which seems a long time ago now, where he was saying to me, look, what we don't get about you Brits and you Europeans is you don't want to be on the right side of history. This war is going to completely remake the Middle east, and it's going to get rid of a lot of the bad actors and the conflicts and. And good things are going to happen. And I suppose if I was to call him back, which I might do actually, after this conversation, and ask him what he says that he would say what you've just described about happening to Hezbollah, effectively, the end of Hezbollah vindicates that point of view. David, do you think maybe they've got a point? Maybe this is as historic an event as the boosters of this war have claimed.

David Blair (42:02)

Well, the evisceration of Hezbollah predates this war. It goes back to the extraordinary Israeli operation in 2024 and the consequences that follow from that with the downfall of the Assad regime a few months later. But it's certainly true that the region has been reshaped the balance of power in the region has fundamentally changed, all part of the repercussions or reverberations of the October 7, 2023 attack. Netanyahu took his opportunity to eviscerate Iran's allies one by one, and he did succeed. But of course all of that doesn't really have very much to do with the war that we're witnessing now. But it is certainly a remarkable change, not just in terms of the capabilities of Hezbollah, but, as Lina's described in the Internal Politics of Lebanon, that things that were previously inconceivable are now starting to happen. And one point to reflect on is that the man who set all this in motion, oddly enough, was Yahya Simwa, who began it all with his atrocity on October 7, 2023. In the end, he turned out to be the biggest enemy that Iran and Hezbollah ever had.

Roland Oliphant (43:24)

Leena Hatib, Would you like the very final words on this edition?

Lina Hatib (43:29)

I remain optimistic because regional orders don't change cheaply, swiftly or in a linear way, and we are witnessing a historic transformation of the Middle east that I myself called at the beginning of 2025 the Middle East 1989. So I am optimistic, but I'm also under no illusions regarding how hard it will be to get there.

Roland Oliphant (43:55)

The Telegraph's David Blair and Chatham House's Leena Khatib joining me there. That's all for today's edition of Iran the Latest Venetia will be back in the chair tomorrow. Until then, that was Iran the Latest Goodbye Iran the Latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Roland Oliphant and Venetia Rainey. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following Iran the Latest formally battle lines on your preferred podcast app. And if you have a moment, please leave a review as this helps others find the show. To stay on top of all our news, subscribe to the Telegraph, sign up for our Dispatchers newsletter or listen to our sister podcast Ukraine for latest we are still on the same email address battlelinestelegraph.co.uk or contact us on X. You can find our handles in the show Notes. The producer is Peter Shevlin. The Executive Producer is Louisa Wells.

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