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- [00:04]
Sophia Yan
The telegraph.
- [00:09]
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- [00:42]
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- [00:50]
Amy Archer
As we all live through the chaos
- [00:51]
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of another Donald Trump presidency, it can be easy to lose sight of his most troubling legacy.
- [00:57]
Sophia Yan
The U.S. supreme Court has reshaped the country's legal landscape on abortion, guns, religion and more.
- [01:04]
Jonathan Hackett
In Slate's new season of Slow Burn,
- [01:06]
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- [01:09]
Jonathan Hackett
He is the most unpredictable vote on this court.
- [01:12]
Amy Archer
Slow Burn becoming Justice Gorsuch out now.
- [01:16]
Jonathan Hackett
Wherever you get your podcasts,
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- [01:33]
Jonathan Hackett
They've got a couple of objectives. One is to generate fear within the communities they're targeting, which is in the Jewish communities. The other is to identify or inspire new people to go out and keep that flame burning. A short time ago, the United States military began major combat operations in Iran.
- [01:52]
Sophia Yan
Today, President Trump says Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in the attacks.
- [02:02]
Jonathan Hackett
The Pentagon is weighing a takeover of that island as a way to force the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran begged for this ceasefire and we all know it.
- [02:13]
Roland Oliphant
Does anyone really think that someone can tell President Trump what to do? Come on.
- [02:20]
Venetia Rainey
I'm Venetia Rainey.
- [02:21]
Sophia Yan
And I'm Sophia Yan.
- [02:22]
Venetia Rainey
And this is Iran the Latest.
- [02:24]
Sophia Yan
It's Wednesday 20th May, 2026, 82 days since the war began, 42 days since the ceasefire was declared.
- [02:32]
Venetia Rainey
On today's show, we've got one of your favorite guests. Jonathan Hackett is back on, and this time he's in the studio with us. He'll be talking about the mad, stunning new report that the US apparently wanted to install former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in place of Ali Khamenei. We're going to be interrogating that as well as Israeli disinformation and why he thinks the Iranian terror threat is likely to rise in Europe.
- [02:56]
Sophia Yan
But first, a quick look at where we're at. Venetia. We heard from US Vice President J.D. vance yesterday for the first time in quite a while. What did he say?
- [03:05]
Venetia Rainey
So he was giving a bit of an update on the Iran peace talks, which do seem to be ongoing. That's the good news. But basically he said what we've been hearing for a while now is that Iran needs to give up its nuclear ambitions or else the war will restart. Here's a clip of what he said.
- [03:19]
J.D. Vance
It's actually a very simple proposition here. There are two options, two pathways we can go down when it comes to the Iran situation. So step back for a little bit. What the President United States has said is, number one, Iran can never have a nuclear weapon. Where we are now is the President has asked us, has told us to aggressively negotiate with the Iranians. Why did I go to Islamabad, Pakistan? Why did I spend, I think, probably 22 hours on a plane going there, 24 hours coming back, and then 21 hours on the ground negotiating with the Iranians is because we wanted to show a sign of good faith. The Vice President of the United States is willing to cut a deal with. So long as the Iranians are willing to meet us again on that core issue of never having a nuclear weapon, we think that we've made a lot of progress. We think the Iranians want to make a deal. The President United States has asked us to negotiate in good faith, and that's exactly what we've done. So we're in a pretty good spot here. But there's an option B, and the option B is that we could restart the military campaign to continue to prosecute the case, to continue to try to achieve America's objectives, and we could talk a little bit about what that looks like. But that's not what the President wants, and I don't think it's what the Iranians want either. But it takes two to tango. We are not going to have a deal that allows the Iranians to have a nuclear weapon. So as the President just told me, we're locked and loaded. We don't want to go down that pathway, but the President is willing and able to go down that pathway if we have to.
- [04:44]
Venetia Rainey
We've heard from Iran's Revolutionary Guard this morning, and they've responded to Vance's comments with the usual threats. They said we've not yet deployed all the capacities of the Islamic Islamic revolution against the U.S. but now, if aggression against Iran is repeated, the promised regional war will this time extend beyond the region. And our crushing blows in places you do not expect will bring you utter ruin. More bombastic talk, as we've come to expect from the Iranian regime. But it is interesting that they mention beyond the region. Obviously, we've had a spate of attacks targeting the Jewish community here in London. And we're going to discuss more with Jonathan Hackett later on in this podcast how credible that Iranian terror threat is and what it might actually look like. Sophia, you spotted a great story by our fore correspondent Akhtar McCoy that talks about how Iran might be readying for another stage of this war.
- [05:28]
Sophia Yan
Right. Akhtar's story is looking at how Iran is preparing for the potential resumption of hostilities, of war coming back in a physical, kinetic way. And if that were to happen, its neighbors in the Gulf are in the line of fire. There have been a spate of intelligence leaks recently from the US showing that some of these countries, Saudi Arabia, the uae, that they were carrying out the secret strikes on Iran during the war earlier this year. This answers a question that we have discussed many times on the podcast. At what point would the Gulf states, which were getting targeted by Iran, when would they choose to retaliate? It turns out now from these kinds of leaks that they were actually already acting. But keeping it very quiet. This particular revelation has completely transformed how Iran is now seeking to prepare for what might come next in the war. So take a look on telegraph.co.uk. it's a very interesting story. It does look at a question that many are asking, asking with peace talks stalling, with these negotiations not really going very far, there's a very real possibility that fighting may again resume, which is not something that many civilians across the region would like to see.
- [06:36]
Venetia Rainey
And I think that raises a really important question as well, that if war does restart, it could be worse, it could go even wider. Iran could hit further targets. And as you mentioned, that's what the Gulf states are worried about, that it might expand beyond American bases to target more civilian infrastructure, which they were already targeting. We should say they hit like a water plant. You know, they've hit all sorts of things, airports. That pace of attacks could become even more frequent. We could see more terror attacks in Europe, elsewhere in the West. It's interesting some of the details that he picked up on his reporting about the propaganda stuff that they're doing right, in Iran to sort of mobilize civilians and ready them for another state of war.
- [07:11]
Sophia Yan
Yes, this is a very significant development that We've seen. So the first time that Iran, through state media, called on its civilians to join in was when the Iranians were able to down a US Fighter jet. There was a big search for the pilots that went missing. As a result, they were saved and brought back. In that moment, it was very key because it was a totally new way of looking at the war, a shift in how the regime was trying to get the public involved. And so state television has become very strong. They have got news readers firing machine guns during live broadcasts. They're showing viewers how to handle weapons, demonstrating how to load magazines, showing proper firing stance. Akhtar's story also points out this detail, that public gun kiosks have appeared in squares in Tehran, mosques in multiple cities, hosting combat trait training sessions for citizens. This is trying to mobilize the general public, a civil defense in a way. But in this moment, obviously a very concerning development. If war may potentially resume, this could become very chaotic. And it might mean that these ideas that have been discussed at various points along the war, this possibility of whether or not the Iranian public might rise up against the regime themselves, this would be the very opposite. It would be the regime pushing its people to rise up against the enemy of the Americans and the Israelis. That's their perspective from the Iranian side.
- [08:38]
Venetia Rainey
I've also just seen the Foreign minister, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Sarakchi's statement overnight. Part of what he said is, with lessons learned and knowledge gained, return to war will feature many more surprises. The obvious caveat here is that this is all Iranian propaganda. They want the west to feel like they've learned loads and will come back bigger and stronger. Can they actually do that? We know that they've been militarily degraded, but it might have given them more motivation, let's say. On the plus side, discussions are clearly underway, despite the fact that we're hearing a lot less about it from Trump at the moment. Probably a good thing. We know that Pakistan's Interior Minister is heading to Tehran today. And that's not the only high level meeting underway. Sophia, you did some great reporting on the podcast last week, which I enjoyed listening to while I was off about Trump's visit to China to meet with Xi. And today Xi has a very different visitor. Putin. What have they been talking about? Anything about the Iran war?
- [09:25]
Sophia Yan
Yeah. Trump one week, Putin the next. Xi Jinping rolling out the red carpet for some of the world's most powerful leaders. Between China and Russia, they have had and enjoyed a very long relationship. Putin, in addressing Xi, called him my dear friend Xi to Putin, my longtime friend. They always give each other gifts. I mean, the pomp and circumstances, really, as you would expect. Again, she, using these lofty terms, that ties have reached, quote, the highest level in history. There was some mention of the war, China. And she sides used the opportunity to call again for an end to hostilities in the Middle east, which would then allow for an opportunity to stabilize the energy supply to the world. This is something that both China and Russia have made clear is of concern. But they also highlighted that between those two countries, between Beijing and Moscow, that there is a growing energy trade. Clearly, from China's stance, continuing its ties with Russia means that it itself can ensure its own stable energy supply. And this is what's very important. China, of course, is buying a lot from Iran as well. But the Strait of Hormuz closure has meant that, as with other countries in the world, the stability of getting energy products has completely changed. And so China is looking to shore up its own ability to make sure that it can keep prices, oil prices domestically down, that it can have a supply that it relies on. This is on top of its own very, very large reserve at home. So even though China's insulated, it's still looking outside to make sure that it won't be hit too hard by all the volatility in energy markets. It was interesting to note, I would say, that she again had this veiled way of addressing the us this criticism that he has used many times of, quote, unilateralism of hegemony. It's a veiled reference to what the US has said. He also, quote, said this. The world faces the danger of reverting to the law of the jungle. This is something that China has used before in describing US actions, particularly as it pertains to Iran. So it's another chance for Xi, a big win domestically to have these world leaders come to his doorstep. Both the US and Russia need China on side for very different reasons. And at the end of the day, it's yet another opportunity for Xi to look like the grand world leader, to. To cast himself and cast China as the stable, trusted actor on the world stage.
- [11:48]
Venetia Rainey
I think all of that is proof, if ever you need it, that this whole global situation, the Iran war, has already gone well beyond its regional locale. You know, it's all interconnected. And it also comes back to the Ukraine conflict that we're seeing here in Europe, because the UK has this morning announced quite a significant decision on Russian sanctioned oil, hasn't it, sphere?
- [12:06]
Sophia Yan
The UK is relaxing sanctions against Russia, imports of diesel and jet fuel refined abroad using Russian crude will now be allowed into Britain. This carve out affects energy supplies refined in third countries like India and Turkey. It's aimed at ensuring enough supply is available as energy prices have soared. Given the war in the Middle east and the ongoing closure of Hormuz, this is again where so much of the world's energy supply passes through. This is a very significant step considering that the UK from the very beginning has been a staunch supporter of Ukraine from day one of Russia's invasion. It's reopening, essentially a loophole that was very tough to close. Sanctions from the start of war were targeting Russia and it's easy enough to, to say, okay, we're not going to buy certain products from Russia, specifically energy products, because that has so much support, support for the Russian economy. But there was this secondary issue where Russian crude, these raw material products, were going into third countries where they were then refined and then exported onward. So when it made that stop to countries like India to Turkey, where I'm sitting, then it suddenly wasn't technically on paper, Russian of Russian origin. So this was a loophole that sanctions regimes were trying very hard to close. They did finally close it. So opening it now just underscores how much the energy crisis is affecting the UK and the rest of the world. It comes after the US made a very similar move, extending a sanctions waiver to allow purchases of Russian seaborne oil to support countries that have been hit by the supply disruptions.
- [13:38]
Venetia Rainey
So just this idea that Russia is benefiting from this conflict and then you see Putin and Xi having this nice cozy meeting, these longtime friends. It's all interconnected. We're going to take a short break now. Coming up afterwards, we're going to be looking at Iranian terror in Europe and the story that Ahmad Jin was hoped to be the new replacement for Ali Khameneiye.
- [14:03]
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- [15:07]
Sophia Yan
Welcome back. You're listening to Iran. The latest with me, Sophia Yan and Vinny Shahrani. We're joined now by Jonathan Hackett. He is formerly with the US Marine Corps as an interrogator, a counterintelligence agent and a special operations intelligence officer. He specializes and understands Iran and Israel and is currently on a speaking tour across the UK with the Britain Israel Communications and Research center, otherwise known as bicom.
- [15:30]
Venetia Rainey
Jonathan Hackett, welcome to Iran. The latest we first had you on day before the war started. Very prescient conversation with Roland and then we chatted to you again about two weeks in and you were telling us about how carefully planned this. I'm assuming the plan wasn't for it to end in this quite awkward limbo stalemate with Iran effectively controlling Strait of Hormuz and a more hired line government in power in Iran. What do you think went wrong?
- [15:55]
Jonathan Hackett
Yeah, it's interesting you say the war end using the word end, right?
- [15:59]
Venetia Rainey
It hasn't actually ended.
- [15:59]
Jonathan Hackett
Yes, kind of a stalemate. But it's interesting to look at the JCPOA Joint Comprehensive plan of action 2015 nuclear deal. What was promised there versus what Iran wants now, what Iran has now. In some ways they have more now than they did before the war started. In fact, their oil sales skyrocketed after the war started. They had more access to China after that started. And things like this. Their proxies are still operating, the infrastructure is still going. There were some interesting estimates from the US side about how many missiles remained and other stockpiles were there. There's a question of whether that's accurate. Perhaps downward estimate may be better. Very interesting because it's so hard to go inside of a denied area and actually confirm what's going on there. And obviously the US is kind of see sawing back and forth in its negotiations privately and publicly, which, you know, negotiations in public are never really a good idea anyway. But with a regime that is very, you know, values saving face and when you're publicly negotiating, saving face has to happen in public too. So there's a lot of entrenchment and backward movement and things that happen because of this method of diplomacy by X or diplomacy by truth, social and so on.
- [17:13]
Venetia Rainey
So do you think that's what's gone wrong? The kinetic stuff that all sort of roughly rolled out according to plan, but the diplomatic side that should have brought about some kind of resolution, you think that's where things have gone awry?
- [17:22]
Jonathan Hackett
Yeah. A military instrument is A continuation of policy by other means, as Clausewitz said. But of course, you've got the diplomatic, you've got the informational, you have the economic and political instruments of national power. And those don't seem to be viewed on the same level of importance in this conflict by the west or by the United States as it should be. These things should all be executed together in a coherent plan, which is what we call grand strategy. So if those things are missing, then we don't have a grand strategy. We have a military instrument being wielded without the guardrails of diplomacy, without the guardrails of economic interest in the region and the world generally. So it's kind of inevitable that it would end up the way it is now. We've had these operations on the, on the shelf for a long time, especially in the 80s, 90s, until now. You know, Operation Praying Mantis 1988. We put US flags on Kuwaiti flagged oil vessels and protected them. There have been lots of ideas about how to protect the Straits of Hormuz. Those on their own are great if they're part of a larger campaign to do something that is not military in nature as the end state. It seems instead that this is a military end state that does not fit into a larger strategy.
- [18:24]
Roland Oliphant
On strategy. There's a really interesting piece in New York Times today that says part of the strategy was to weirdly enough, free Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of all people, the fire breathing, populist former president, apparently to be. He was going to be the pragmatist who'd be installed, a kind of Delsey Rodriguez variant. That obviously didn't happen. There's a few things I want to unpack there. One is, how credible do you think that plan was in the first place to choose someone like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad? And I suppose the second question is, was the General Questro Delsey Rodriguez credible at all? Anyway, so what do you make of this? These reports that they wanted the Israelis and the Americans wanted to install Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the pragmatist.
- [19:08]
Jonathan Hackett
If I take a realist, idealist perspective, I would hope that Israel was saying this and releasing this to stir dissent inside of the regime, perhaps trying to create a divide between some regime officials. You know, for example, Trump saying that Mohammed Bagar Golubov is the person that we want to work with. That might make Ahmed Vahidi upset. Who's in charge of the IRGC now? Maybe we're also trying to turn people against Ahmadinejad to create all these different islands of power instead of having a unified regime. Again, that's my idealist, realist perspective.
- [19:40]
Roland Oliphant
New York Times report says this was an Israeli plan that was brought to the Americans. And one of the bylines is of course, the very impressive Ron M. Bergman. He's probably one of the best Israeli security things. So the New York Times report makes clear that this was an Israeli idea.
- [19:53]
Jonathan Hackett
Yeah, and I think that was probably part of the plan presented in early January when and Netanyahu brought his team with him and told Trump this is what you should do. And Trump agreed. And we had six or five people on the American side who decided, let's do that. So I think that probably was presented in that meeting, most likely.
- [20:09]
Sophia Yan
I just want to clarify your answer. Earlier you said that you think that this may have been leaked now just to try to sow divisions within the Iranian regime.
- [20:16]
Jonathan Hackett
That's one possibility. That's just framing it one way. Another way to frame it is that actually was part of the plan. And now there's some perhaps friction between different decision makers, between Israel, United States on what, how the war is going. And maybe whoever was using this as a tool is trying to actually change the direction of things by injecting new information into the narrative of how this is going. Because the information domain is a domain of warfare. Israel, the United States are aligned in their interests. But you know, in the intelligence community there are no friends, there are only interests. So it could be that one particular actor is trying to influence the other and that actor could be Israel against the United States or some other thing. It's very hard to say because we have to look at information as a domain of warfare.
- [20:57]
Sophia Yan
What's the likelihood that you think Ahmadinejad would have agreed to such a plan?
- [21:01]
Jonathan Hackett
Hard to say because he is not liked by many in Iran. In fact, the 2009 Green Revolution, John Bashi Saab's, was because he was, many would say, fraudulently reelected at the expense of a reformist. So the Iranian people certainly wouldn't accept that. That was the largest protest since 1979 up to that point until January. And if the people don't accept him, the IRGC has kind of pushed him to the side and sidelined him. The clerics don't like him. He's not a cleric. You know, he was the only non clerical president that Iran has had. So he's kind of an outsider there. There are many reasons for him not to be accepted by enough different factions who generally don't agree on much. They can agree on the fact that they don't like him. So it's an interesting development, to say the least.
- [21:43]
Venetia Rainey
I want to come back to Roland's point. What do you think of the viability more generally, that the Americans or the Israelis thought they could install this, as Roland says, Delsey Ridge Rodriguez figure some kind of other figurehead to replace Ali Khamenei. Was that ever possible? Whoever they would have chosen, very much
- [21:56]
Jonathan Hackett
not likely to be a positive outcome here, a successful outcome here. I think this just kind of goes into the larger issue that we see of a lack of understanding of the adversary from the outset, where we have this mirror imaging problem. We, the United States, similar to the Cold War, where we looked at the Soviets, for example, and thought they would fight just like us. And they don't. And they still don't. And we are doing that to Iran. And we have been doing that since, you know, the 80s when there was the Iran Iraq war going on. We thought it would be a wise idea to supply weapons to Saddam Hussein and Iran at the same time so that they would destroy each other. That didn't really work out very well for anybody except Saddam Hussein. Same thing in the 90s with the Kurds. I mean, the list kind of goes on and on where we strategically miscalculated the value and the understanding that the other side has of certain things in the region and what their state interests are. And that's kind of led us down this pathway almost inevitably to where we are today.
- [22:46]
Sophia Yan
Why Ahmadinejad, of all the people that could have been considered for this plan of this caliber?
- [22:52]
Jonathan Hackett
Yeah. So the why depends on which scenario. I don't think Ahmadi Dijad would have been an acceptable person for the existing regime, which means perhaps this was an intent to kind of shake things up and force people to pick a side. If it was actually a narrative thing, a narrative choice between Israel, United States, that's a totally different why. You know, that's probably more to advance certain tracks on the negotiations that we're not seeing right now, or certain moves by the U.S. u.S. We've seen different statements by Trump recently that the war might restart. The war won't restart. Gulf partners have asked us not to restart. So there's definitely something going on in the background that we are not seeing publicly that perhaps could be related to the Ahmadi Nejad release that was intended to create friction inside of that that we don't see right now. That's possible. But it's also possible that it was actually a true desire to put this man back in power, if that's the Case, you'd have to ask, where is the logic here? I'm sure somebody has the logic somewhere. I just. I don't have it.
- [23:45]
Sophia Yan
The three possibilities from where this information could have come from, the Americans, the Israelis, the Iranians. Can you talk through what the motivations might have been for all three of those to potentially put this kind of information out there?
- [24:00]
Jonathan Hackett
Now, on the Iranian side, it would likely come from Peseschkian's office, because Pescheshkian is the weakest link in the regime right now. And perhaps trying to create dissent between the Basij and the IRGC would be a helpful goal for him to consolidate and try to emerge as this pragmatic, rational actor in the regime, which it seems that he is, when you look at his Twitter and other social media posts, basically saying, come on, guys, let's try to negotiate like adults here. And then you see Vahidi saying, you know, death to America. Death to Israel right after that. So there's certainly friction there between the different camps within the regime. But it's important to remember the regime is a group of folks who went through a certain vetting process. None of them are true reformists. None of them are on our side. None of them are actually going to do things, things that benefit us unless it benefits them long term. So that's just kind of important to put a point in that. On the Israeli side, it's probably to push Trump in a particular direction, to force him into a corner to act in a way that would be advantageous to Israel, which would be resuming the kinetic war in Iran. On the US Side, it could also be something to perhaps intimidate the regime or scare the regime, or like I mentioned earlier, to sow dissent into the regime. Because when we're seeing. Right now we're seeing overt acts and military operations, there are also covert actions going on, one of them in particular, providing weapons to the Kurds, which Trump has expressed his frustration that we gave them weapons and then they kept them, which is kind of. I think that's what happens usually when you give somebody a weapon. Why would you give it up? Unless. Anyway, so that's going on. There's probably also a covert influence operation going on. Covert influence is when the sponsor of that influence is concealed, but the actions are visible. And the Ahmadinejad announcement is certainly visible, and it's hard to attribute to a particular source or origin. And it would have an influential effect. Even if it was fake, it would still have an effect. Even if you told the regime that this was not True. It was a mistake. And we didn't mean to say that someone's going to have their feelings hurt somewhere and behave differently now that that's been released.
- [25:47]
Sophia Yan
Sorry to backtrack. Jonathan, you said that from the Israeli perspective there would be interest to push back into war. Given your response, what's the likelihood, you think that Israel, perhaps in cooperation with the US might resume the war against Iran?
- [26:02]
Jonathan Hackett
Yeah. So I think it was Dmitry Medvedev said that Iran has realized that the Straits of Hormuz is a nuclear weapon, basically as far as negotiation power. So what is probably happening here is the realization that without sustained kinetic pressure, Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz. Now that needs to change. How can you change that status quo? There are ways to do it. Most short term, effective way probably is to attack the militarily, especially in the southwest and south portions of the country, to put up pressure on the, the aerospace forces, which are the IRGC's ballistic missile forces, to kind of create a standoff space, to create safety there in the straits. So I think also Israel's looking at US Domestic politics. They know there's a midterm election coming up in November. The regime knows that too. The regime has even said we can outlast you past November. So there's this view that we need to act immediately, quickly and sufficiently to stop whatever needs to be stopped now so that when the midterms start up, that doesn't change how the war ends for Israel.
- [27:00]
Sophia Yan
I'm interested to know if you think this means peace talks are done for now at least.
- [27:04]
Jonathan Hackett
I think peace talks were never actually the objective. I think peace talks have long been a ruse and that's been clearly demonstrated three times in a row in the past two years with the United States. That's not great for diplomacy and it's not helpful for future action because states won't be able to trust us.
- [27:18]
Venetia Rainey
But it has a ruse by America then, you mean, not by the Iranians?
- [27:21]
Jonathan Hackett
Oh yeah. The US has been abusing this, the negotiation tool. I mean, the Iranians have agreed to negotiations with the US multiple times, including the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action where they came, they actually surrendered some of their sovereignty with their nuclear program to get sanctions relief. And they abided by that treaty very closely until the US pulled out in 2017. So we've seen them demonstrate that they can follow the treaty, the US or follow negotiations. The US has done the opposite twice against Iran in June and then in January again, and then against Venezuela too. And obviously the US doesn't have the greatest history of keeping its word with certain countries doing certain things. So it'd be very tough for a state to believe that negotiations are the only way out.
- [28:00]
Venetia Rainey
There's another covert operation that we've recently learned about from the beginning of the war, and that's the presence of two Israeli bases in the desert in Iraq, one of which was discovered first by a shepherd who was then chased by a helicopter and killed. And then when some Iraqi local Iraqi troops went to follow up, I think one of them was killed too, and a couple injured. And subsequent reporting has suggested that there's another base, but we don't know where or whether that was actually discovered. What did you make of that reporting? And do you think the Americans were aware?
- [28:27]
Jonathan Hackett
Frankly, unsurprised. And yes, the Americans were aware. I think it's very common for Israel to use coalition bases in the region with various, let's say, quote, unquote, partners, but not admitted partners. Otherwise it'd be very hard for Israel to project power, especially with aircraft. When we're talking about attacks into Iran, it's not just the jet flying into Iran. You also need a forward staging point for fuel, you need personnel recovery forces around. You need quick reaction support, whether it's ground forces, air forces and other assets. You need collection assets, you need surface to air systems, lots of other logistical sustainment things that just cannot project from Israel. They have to be somewhere else. If you look at that southern border, Anbar Province with Iraq and Syria, that has long been kind of this amorphous space where anyone can act any way they want to until someone tries to stop them. When I was there a few times, we didn't know who controlled that part of the border. It could be Hashdashabi, it could be Hezbollah, it could be Iran, Syria, the us. The US owned Al Tanf Garrison for a long time, which was that small controlled border crossing of Tanf, which means the US could have allowed Israel to just bring trucks across through Jordan and Jordan couldn't do anything about it if that's what they wanted. There's lots of ways to operate in that desert space, especially when those states around, like Lebanon, for example, is not allowed to have an air force. You know, Syria doesn't really have an air force, although they have air force intelligence that's not really air force. The Iraqis can't really fly that area because of U.S. restrictions on the airspace. So when you're looking at this very permissive environment to put something you want to put there. If a state actor like the US allows it to happen.
- [29:56]
Roland Oliphant
Jonathan, Something really interesting happened in New York on Friday. There was suddenly the appearance in a Manhattan courtroom of a man called Mohammad Bakasaid Dawood Al Saadi, 32, who has been charged with, according to the complaint filed by the FBI unsealed that day with orchestrating a around 20 attacks across Europe, Canada and the United States. Of particular interest in Britain because those attacks include the recent stabbing of two Jewish men in Galders Green and a series of arson firebomb attacks against synagogues and Jewish charities and also the Iran International office here. He was allegedly part of an Iranian backed Iraqi militia and therefore presumably working for the irgc. Is there anything you can tell us about this guy Al Saadi? Because he's not someone who's been, you know, reported about before. He's not one of the big high profile, kind of Osama bin Laden style figures with reams of newsprint already written about him. Is there anything you can tell us about this guy?
- [31:02]
Jonathan Hackett
Yeah, he's about 32 years old. He is within Katab Hezbollah, which is a militia in Iraq. It's a very large, very credible militia, very combat seasoned militia that actually fought alongside the United States in 2016 during the liberation of Mosul. I have worked alongside these popular mobilization forces.
- [31:19]
Roland Oliphant
You fought alongside these guys?
- [31:20]
Jonathan Hackett
Oh yeah. Popular mobilization forces. Hashdashabi, which is what this group is part of, were a major reason the US was able to actually defeat ISIS in Iraq and retake Mosul during Operation Eagle strike in the summer of 2016. So these guys are seasoned combat veterans, including him. And these people should not be taken lightly. And they are true believers, especially people like Saadi, true believers in war, in basically protecting the Iranian regime as a force that can be called upon in this view of kind of martyrdom and this like shared feeling of, you know, despair and loss. And there's, there's a whole narrative actually that the IRGC has when it cultivates ideological development, development that these groups fit into. And you'll see a lot of photos that exist of him and others like him at these festivals where they're doing self flagellation, they're actually barefoot walking between Najaf and Karbala and doing all these things to kind of celebrate and relive the sacrifices and losses that both Iran and previous Shia groups have gone through over the years since the 9th century. And they have this kind of in their mind when they're planning these things that I mentioned to you. So their worldview is very different than, and we might think of Al Qaeda for example, very different. And he is part of this. And in fact, in that indictment, it's very interesting when they just did an F talk, which is a foreign transfer of custody, which is the nice way now of saying rendition. We use a different word now. And that indictment actually contains very interesting transcripts of him communicating with agents across the world. One of them, in fact, talking, asking, do you want me to do things in Europe? And he says, don't worry, we have Europe under control. What I need help with is Canada, the United States. I can pay you up to $10,000 for doing this activity. I don't care who you hire. I just want it done. And if it's done, I'll pay you. And if it's not done, you have to give me my money back. Very fascinating to read this. Very pragmatic. The end state is not necessarily the specific individual who is harmed with that knife in London. It's the reaction of the public to that attack, which is kind of the classic definition of terror.
- [33:11]
Venetia Rainey
Is this guy linked to Harakata Shah? Balyamina Lislamiya? Is that something else?
- [33:15]
Jonathan Hackett
It's connected.
- [33:16]
Venetia Rainey
Connected. So this is the Hayee group that has been. Has sort of sprung up over the last few months. Right. And is hiring people online to commit these attacks.
- [33:22]
Roland Oliphant
Exactly. And the FBI complaint says that that's basically the COVID name for him and what he's doing. And he's been carrying out all these attacks that we've seen. You said there, it's the public reaction to this. So one of the things we saw in Britain was this huge rising anxiety about a surge in anti Semitism, and perhaps in a sense that these attacks were perhaps organic, that there's a rising hatred against Jews. Is that the reaction that you think they were trying to generate? What is it they're trying to do here?
- [33:49]
Jonathan Hackett
They've got a couple of objectives. One is to generate fear within the communities they're targeting, which is in the Jewish communities. The other is to identify or inspire new people to go out and keep that flame burning and to make it a larger conflagration here, basically to create chaos outside of the Middle east, to change the way the world is behaving about the situation. And it's not really wise if you think about it, because it's probably not going to help them from our Western point of view. But if you're thinking about it from a martyrdom and suffering and kind of this perspective, they have said multiple times, they welcome death, they welcome the end of the world. So what they're trying to do is actually bring that closer to now.
- [34:25]
Venetia Rainey
What's your read on Hayy? There's been a lot of discussion over whether they're just claiming responsibility for things retroactively and it's, you know, just a sort of front to try and pull all these random attacks together or whether they are an actual group and we should think of them like Al Qaeda or something. What do you think?
- [34:39]
Jonathan Hackett
I think that it started as organic. Small little pockets of folks who were just feeling a certain thing and they did something. Then they were noticed by people like Saadi contacted. Saadi would contact them on Snapchat, for example, like the groups that were doing some of these attacks in the early stage would post it on Snapchat, telegram and things. Saadi would contact them and say, I saw your video, I like what you did. Would you be willing to do more? And he even told one of them, I would like you to attack Jewish facilities. And he listed off a couple of other types of targets. And he said, what I want to do is so fear within the Jewish community. This was in one of the Snapchat chat logs that's included in the indictment. So I think it did start out grassroots and then it was exploited by these observers outside who said, hey, maybe we can get something out of this for ourselves.
- [35:19]
Roland Oliphant
Al Saudi is Iraqi. He's a member of an Iraqi militia. Why would the irgc, if we think it's IRGC or Kids force the Iranians give him that job?
- [35:29]
Jonathan Hackett
So part of their doctrine is called the Mosaic Doctrine where they decentralize command and control to the lowest level possible. They want low level guys doing things without connection back directly to the top level headquarters. And actually they activated this mosaic doctrine. February 28, the foreign minister Abbas Aragchi announced on X, we have activated the Mosaic Doctrine. We have now decentralized our forces. We are no longer giving orders to our troops on the ground. They are acting independently. This is like at the brigade level, like a general, a one star general, all the way down to the lowest level officer. They're all operating independently. That's why you see a lot of of in western Iran, there are different military operations happening than in eastern Iran. There are different missile launches, different targets being hit based on which province they're launched out of because there are different commanders making those choices and they're not coordinating with Tehran.
- [36:16]
Sophia Yan
Where do you think things could go from here on that front? If war were to resume, how difficult would it be for anybody involved in the war to continue to fight on all sides? I Mean, we're talking this idea that it would be obviously very devolved, as you said, for what the Americans and the Israelis would face from the Iranian side. There's a real question of how much they have depleted in terms of stock. So can you talk through what that scenario could look like?
- [36:39]
Jonathan Hackett
Right, so they're willing to fight despite having diminishing stocks. I'll just put that out there to begin with. Kind of like the Japanese at Guadalcanal, willing to fight with their swords and katanas until death. And they all did fight to the end. And I think the Iranian mentality is similar to this, where they're going to fight to the death no matter what, whether they have one missile left or zero. But I don't think that our estimates about their stocks are accurate. I think they have a lot more than we think. I think their capacity remains both in material and personnel. And I think that because they've had this doctrine for so long that their. Their junior officers back in the early 2000s were taught this doctrine. It's not. It's not new to them. It's new to us. And I think that in. In their war gaming, in their naval operations and exercises, they've actually practiced it. So now they're getting to actually test it. It in the real world in combat, which is what everyone wants to do with the doctrine is tested in combat. See how it is. And it seems to be working pretty well. It's only a matter of how much more will exists to continue the fight at any of the particular positions that are empowered to do this. And I think right now the will is increasing, not decreasing, because they perceive the war to be moving in their favor. If you look at their rhetoric in Farsi and to their regional partners in Arabic, it sounds a lot like they think they're winning, at least through their propaganda tools, which. Which. There's always a kernel of truth in some of this. And if that's true, then perhaps the military instrument, as I mentioned in the beginning, is not the thing we should be focusing on. We should be focusing on some other way, perhaps economic and diplomatic combination to offset the stick that we're using. We need to implement a carrot to the Iranian people to actually want to balance against this regime right now.
- [38:09]
Sophia Yan
What do you mean by carrot here now? What would be the carrot?
- [38:11]
Jonathan Hackett
So Iran is not a monolith, and there are many actors with different interests within the regime and the people. And I think there are different ways to access those different groups to create separations between them. There is already a Separation between the regime and the people. You know that you hear the estimates of 95% resist the government or oppose the government for various reasons. Not sure exactly the number that is accurate, but there is that division. But there's also divisions within the regime itself, like we talked about with Ahmadinejad, the reformists, the pragmatists, the moderates and so on. There are ways to co opt some of those groups through either influence or incentives to create enough dissent that from the top there is a internal problem because right now it's an external problem. Everyone has the same adversary right now and that adversary is Israel, United States. If we can create more adversaries, more confusion, more decision points that have to be made where mistakes can be made, vulnerabilities exploited, this is going to move it in our favor because now we're going to regain some of the momentum back toward our side.
- [39:06]
Roland Oliphant
That's a phase of pushback on that. Jonathan, is that what you just described about creating divisions and exploiting so on? I thought that's exactly what's being tried. We keep being told that was the American Israeli plan and you know, okay, we've just talked about they were going to find a Delsey, whoever it was. And there was this talk of like creating defections and so on. Hasn't all this been tried? Isn't all this exactly what was meant to work to bring this war to a successful conclusion?
- [39:33]
Jonathan Hackett
Yeah, I think things have been tried without understanding what they're being tried against. And when we say reformist, what does a reformist actually mean? What does a pragmatist actually to us? Pragmatists? Oh, great. I'd love to work with them. They're pragmatic. But pragmatists, to them it's all relative, you know, and I think we're identifying the wrong people and we're using the wrong means to actually get to that end. State.
- [39:50]
Venetia Rainey
Do you think we're going to see a continued rise in Iranian terror in Europe? You mentioned from that transcript, we've got Europe under control. Do you think we're going to see more of what we've seen here in London?
- [40:00]
Jonathan Hackett
Absolutely, if the capacity and the will remains, yes.
- [40:02]
Roland Oliphant
Do you think this war was a good idea?
- [40:07]
Jonathan Hackett
Probably not.
- [40:12]
Sophia Yan
That was Jonathan Hackett joining us today on Iran, the late latest.
- [40:15]
Venetia Rainey
That's all for today's episode. We'll be back again tomorrow. Until then, goodbye.
- [40:19]
Sophia Yan
Goodbye.
- [40:27]
Venetia Rainey
Around the latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Venetia Rainey and Roland Oliphant. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following around the latest on your preferred podcast app. And if you haven't moment, leave a review as it helps others find the show. For more from our foreign correspondents on the ground, sign up for our new daily newsletter Cables, or listen to our sister podcast Ukraine. The Latest. We're still on the same email address battleionselegraph.co.uk or you can contact us on X. You can find our handles in the show Notes the producer is Peter Shevlin. The executive producers are Venetia Rainey and Louisa well,
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