Iran's Trump assassination plot & Houthis restart Yemen war

Summary

Iran: The Latest – Episode Summary

Episode Title: Iran's Trump assassination plot & Houthis restart Yemen war
Date: August 11, 2026
Hosts: Venetia Rainey and Roland Oliphant
Guest: Mahmoud Sharra (Associate Fellow at Chatham House, former Yemeni diplomat)

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Overview

This episode dives into two escalating fronts in the ongoing US-Israel-Iran conflict:

• Revelations about a serious Iranian assassination plot against Donald Trump.
• The rapid intensification of Houthi attacks in Yemen, and what that means for the wider region, including the looming threat of renewed full-scale civil war.

Venetia Rainey and Roland Oliphant provide analysis and updates, then are joined by Mahmoud Sharra, a specialist on Yemen, for an in-depth discussion about the situation in the Red Sea and the dynamics driving Houthi actions.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Stalemate in Strait of Hormuz Negotiations (00:09 – 04:50)

• Ongoing deadlock in US-Iran negotiations to reopen the Strait of Hormuz after weeks of back-and-forth.
• Iran demands not just an end to naval blockades but also US compensation for alleged economic damage.
• Trump responds by demanding Iranian compensation for US casualties in past conflicts.
• Both sides amplify rhetoric, reinforcing their positions and emphasizing ongoing tensions.
• Iran frames recent military engagement as proof of being “a tough and invincible power.”

Notable Quote

“Can they make trouble? Yeah, they can make trouble, but they're broke, he said. They've no money... Iran is broke, totally broke, and they're not paying their soldiers.”
— Donald Trump’s claim on US strategy (03:00)

2. Revelations: Iranian Plot Against Trump & Air Force One Ruse (04:53 – 05:31)

• New reports suggest that during the recent NATO summit, US intelligence identified a credible Iranian threat against Donald Trump.
• Trump secretly switched planes using a catering cart to evade a suspected attack.
• The incident underlines how real and present the threat to Western leaders remains, even when dismissed as unlikely.

Notable Quote

“Donald Trump boarded Air Force One... then secretly got off it into a catering trap and was taken to another plane... perhaps everybody else on Air Force One may have been the potential target for whatever threat the US Secret Service felt was incoming — a remarkable bit of tradecraft, really.” (04:55)

3. Houthi Escalation & Yemen’s Return to Violence (05:32 – 11:00)

• A Houthi rocket or drone attack killed three sailors in the Bab El Mandab Strait, marking the first fatal maritime strike since hostilities re-erupted.
• Multiple missile and drone attacks targeting Yemeni government territory and Saudi installations signal a collapse of the 2022 truce.
• Renewed violence is linked to the wider US-Iran standoff.

Notable Timeline Event

• Saudi airstrike on Sanaa airport (July 13) blocked return of Houthi delegation from Iran, triggering latest Houthi escalation.

4. Understanding Houthi Motivations & Iran’s Influence (11:00 – 16:00)

• Mahmoud Sharra explains that the Houthi escalation is both a tool of Iranian regional strategy and a reflection of Houthi concerns about being sidelined in any US-Iran rapprochement.
• The Houthis act in their self-interest but are heavily reliant on Iranian military and intelligence support.
• Houthi military tactics and ideology are influenced by Iran but maintain some autonomy.

Notable Quote

“Houthis are not 100% proxy to Iran... there is a strategic relationship more than proxies. Iran gives Houthis some space to decide their own requirements... But the missiles, drones—anything cross-border—is controlled more by Iran.”
— Mahmoud Sharra (11:49)

• Houthi spokesperson claims (paraphrased): Houthi actions are primarily a response to Saudi aggression and humanitarian crisis, not purely directed by Tehran (10:42).

Notable Quote

“Houthis have a total control on the military, on the battlefield. But the aerial forces, it's controlled by the Iranians.”
— Mahmoud Sharra (13:20)

• The Houthis are described as jihadist, ideologically motivated, seeking constant escalation as a form of fulfilling religious beliefs (15:06).

5. Prospects & Dynamics of Renewed Yemeni Civil War (16:00 – 22:00)

• Yemen’s government is currently focused on defensive actions, avoiding full-scale engagement; Saudis are similarly hesitant.
• The Houthis are pushing for the timing and conditions of new hostilities—trying to seize the initiative.
• The balance of power has shifted since 2014–22:
  • Houthis are weaker on the ground due to sanctions and loss of tribal trust, but much stronger in missile, drone, and naval strike capabilities thanks to Iranian support.
  • Their investment in sea-based tactics and munitions has added an unpredictable dimension to the conflict.

Notable Quotes

“It is a compulsory route. They don't have a choice... Yes, it's going to be a war. They don't have a choice until they do something to deter Houthis.”
— Mahmoud Sharra (17:49)

“Houthis... have a lack of economic revenues. They have also a lack of mobilization, recruiting fighters, not like before... especially the tribes. Houthis [have] lost even the trust with the tribes.”
— Mahmoud Sharra (19:17)

“But in their technology, on the airspace, the gap is very huge between the Yemeni government because Houthis are equipped in [ballistic] missiles, drones, suicide boats...”
— Mahmoud Sharra (21:05)

6. Naval Escalation and International Strategic Implications (22:00 – 28:00)

• Houthis have become significant naval operators, building capabilities with Iranian and Somali (Al Shabaab) cooperation.
• Effective blockade of the Bab El Mandab has increased costs and risks for international shipping, resembling the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz.
• The Houthis use smuggling networks, black market arms sales, and relationships with non-state actors (pirates, al Qaeda) to augment their power.

Notable Quotes

“Houthis... have really invested in the sea... they exploit the past years of truce to invest in their missiles and naval capabilities... And they start to establish intelligence military coordination with other part of the African coast, with Somalians and Shabab... [creating] a black market for ammunition...”
— Mahmoud Sharra (22:16)

• Shipping insurance and costs are rising as companies reconsider routes through the Red Sea due to repeated attacks.
• International naval responses (e.g., US-led Operation Rough Rider) have been ineffective because the root problem is political fragmentation and the presence of non-state actors along the coastlines.

7. The Only Solution: Ground Operations & Shifting Power Balance (28:00 – 33:00)

• Deterrence at sea is insufficient; only a fundamental change in the ground balance of power—retaking Houthi-controlled territory—will change dynamics.
• The Houthis’ regional prominence allows Iran to use them as leverage while simultaneously keeping options open for a future deal that may not favor them.
• Houthis seek recognition and leverage, not just survival.
• Historically, truces only entrench Houthi strength unless battlefield realities are altered.

Notable Quotes

“If there is a truce, it should be after the changing the power balance in the ground. This is a lesson learned from 22 until now... If you reach a truce without changing it, Houthis are going to build themselves again.”
— Mahmoud Sharra (31:14)

“The peace treaty is the verdict of the battlefield...”
— Venetia Rainey (32:19)

“Houthis, they consider themselves that we are the strongest [resistance group] ...but they are afraid of being excluded [by Iran] from any future deal.”
— Mahmoud Sharra (32:27)

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Memorable Moments & Quotes with Timestamps

• Trump’s Air Force One Escape: “Donald Trump actually changed planes on his way home. This is from the Washington Post. It's a remarkable bit of tradecraft, really...” (04:53)
• On Iranian Control of Houthis: “Houthis are not 100% proxy to Iran...” — Mahmoud Sharra (11:49)
• The Ideological Drive: “They are not inclined to calm things down. They're inclined to escalation.” — Venetia Rainey (15:06)
• On the Prospects for War: “Yes, it's going to be a war because they don't have choice until they do something to deter Houthis...” — Mahmoud Sharra (17:51)
• Sea Power Shift: “Houthis... have really invested in the sea... [they] exploited years of truce to invest in naval capabilities...” — Mahmoud Sharra (22:16)
• Lesson Learned on Truce: “This area, this duration. 22, 23, during the truce, it was the golden era of Houthis because they start to be a regional actor... threatening... in the Red Sea...” — Mahmoud Sharra (31:14)

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Important Segment Timestamps

• Overview of Hormuz Negotiations & Trump’s Comments: 00:09 – 04:50
• Iranian Plot Against Trump Revealed: 04:53 – 05:31
• Recap and New Houthi Attacks in Yemen: 05:32 – 11:00
• Houthi Motives, Iranian Influence Discussion: 11:00 – 16:00
• Prospects of Full-Scale Civil War: 16:00 – 22:00
• Houthi Naval Capabilities & Smuggling: 22:00 – 28:00
• Potential Solutions & Ground War Analysis: 28:00 – 33:00

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Tone and Language

The episode balances urgent, investigative journalism with accessible analysis. The hosts and guest maintain a serious, analytical tone, peppering conversation with memorable quips (“diplomatese for Iranian demands”) and strategic insights.

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Takeaways for Listeners

• Negotiations in the Gulf remain at an impasse, with both US and Iranian leadership digging in rhetorically and operationally.
• The Houthi resurgence in Yemen, including success at sea and renewed missile attacks, is both an Iranian pressure tactic and a local gamble.
• Any hope for peace will require fundamental military shifts on the ground—truce alone sustains instability and emboldens non-state actors.
• International naval operations have struggled because the problem is on land, not just at sea.

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Recommended for:
Listeners interested in Middle East geopolitics, maritime security, proxy conflict strategies, and the intertwined fates of Yemen and Iran in the broader US-Israeli confrontation.

Transcript

[Roland Oliphant]

Foreign.

[Venetia Rainey]

Oliphant and this is Iran. The Latest. It's Tuesday 11th August 2026. On today's episode, the Houthis have struck a key Red Sea port in Yemen with more ballistic missiles. I'll be speaking to a former Yemeni diplomat about how this all helps Iran and whether Yemen's civil war is is about to restart. Plus, an Iranian assassination plot against Donald Trump that forced him to hide in an airplane catering trolley.

[Roland Oliphant]

A short time ago, the United States military began major combat operations in Iran.

[David Knowles]

Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was

[Roland Oliphant]

killed in the attacks.

[David Knowles]

For the first time ever, the US Navy used a surface sea drone in combat to strike Iran. Iranian targets.

[Venetia Rainey]

The strait are almost completely closed again. Does anyone really think that someone can

[Roland Oliphant]

tell President Trump what to do?

[Venetia Rainey]

Come on. First, the latest from Iran and I'll try to keep it brief because we are told once again, for possibly the 10th day in a row, I'm losing count that the Iran Omani deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz is at an advanced stage. That's from Qatar's foreign minister this morning. There is still, however, a gulf in pun intended between Tehran and Washington that may still be difficult to bridge. Abbasarakchi, the Iranian foreign minister, told reporters in Iran the country has astonished the whole world in the war against the United States and Israel, proving it is a tough and invincible power. And that seems to have been meant to underline extra demands that Iran has placed on the deal to reopen the strait. He said on his Telegram channel following a call with German Foreign Minister Johann Vaderful late on Monday that he had emphasized that making the Strait of Hormuz secure requires an end to the United States aggressive actions and unlawful interventions, including the naval blockade and other violations of U.S. obligations. And that is essentially diplomatise for Iran's demand that the US not only lift its naval blockade of Iranian ports, but pay compensation. Donald Trump shot back on social media that he was directing his own negotiators to demand compensation from Iran for all the people they've killed and gravely wounded over their roadside bombs and many conflicts. The US President also claimed on Monday in the Oval Office when talking to reporters that the US had 100% control of the Strait of Hormuz. But the situation remained complex. He said the US Navy's blockade is preventing Iran from selling oil on the international market, effectively choking the Iranian economy. Can they make trouble? Yeah, they can make trouble, but they're broke, he said. They've no money Iran is broke, totally broke, and they're not paying their soldiers. We're going to leave that there because I think we're now very much repeating the same cycle of news that we've gone through over the past two weeks regarding those negotiations. One extra comment out of Iran. A former IRGC commander has responded to the new pact between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in Turkey, playing it down rather as the Iranian Foreign Ministry did yesterday. Today, Hossein Kahhani Moqaddam, a former commander of Iran's irgc, said in an interview with Chinese cctv, treaties like these are more about deterrence than operational use. That is, if we were to attack the US based in Saudi Arabia tomorrow, Pakistan wouldn't react. Even Turkey, because they know that if they respond, they'd be drawn into a war against Iran, is mostly engaging in propaganda. And in my view, there's no effect in terms of threatening Iran. So a brave face there. We're going to leave the Iran question there and turn our attention to another critical waterway in this conflict. But before that, a few weeks ago, when Sophia and I and our other colleagues were in Ankara reporting on the NATO summit, we were reflecting on whether or not the Iranians, who were not really that far away in terms of ballistic missile range, might decide to take a potshot at Donald Trump and his fellow Western leaders, along with the hundreds of journalists still there. This was kind of laughed off to a degree at the time, but it now emerges that the Americans were taking that so seriously. Donald Trump actually changed planes on his way home. This is from the Washington Post. It's a remarkable bit of tradecraft, really. It seems that Donald Trump boarded Air Force One, so did the journalists who usually travel with him, and then secretly got off it into a catering trap and was taken to another plane, which he boarded and flew off in. Which means that perhaps everybody else on Air Force One may have been the potential target for whatever threat the US Secret Service felt was incoming. An interesting little coda there, a reminder perhaps, that when we jest about such things, there is sometimes a seed of deadly serious truth in the middle of it all. We'll leave the news there for now, though. I want to focus our conversation on another key waterway on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula. I'm very pleased to say I'm joined by someone who knows all about it. Mahmoud Sharra is an associate fellow at Chatham House and a former Yemeni diplomat whose political and professional career is has focused on preventing and resolving violent conflict in Yemen.

[Roland Oliphant]

Thank you. Thank you very much for having me.

[Venetia Rainey]

This morning, three sailors were killed when a Houthi rocket or drone, we're not sure what, hit a small cargo vessel in the Bab El Mandab Strait. That's the neck of water between Yemen and Africa that connects the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Now the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations watchdog has confirmed a vessel was struck by an unknown projectile but hasn't yet talked about casualties. If those deaths are confirmed, then these would be the first fatalities in a Houthi strike on a ship since the Middle east conflict was triggered by US Israeli attacks on Iran at the end of February. And the violence is not confined to the sea. Iranian backed Houthi rebels in Yemen attacked the government held port of Mocha and the central province of Marib with missiles and drones. That's the Yemeni military talking this morning. Elsewhere in Yemen on Monday, a Houthi drone killed two Yemeni government soldiers, wounded seven others in the south central province of Shabwa. And Yemeni forces and a series of post onyx said they targeted Houthi rebels and their sites in eastern Al Jaf province, northeast of Sadar province and the Al Tibis area of central Mari. But the point is all this comes just two days after weekend strikes on moca, which killed seven people including three troops and a Houthi strike on a refinery in Saudi Arabia. Which leads us to the question is the war in Yemen, which killed nearly 400,000 people by the time it stopped in 2022, back on and is this really all about Iran and its control of the Houthis or is it about the Houthis, the Saudis and the Yemeni government settling old scores. Akrid, welcome to Iran. The latest, let's start with these latest strikes. The strike on a ship and these strikes on this port.

[Roland Oliphant]

What's going on with the recent escalation with the Houthis? We can explain or analys. This kind of escalation is that we are witnessing a turning point that the truce has been in since 2022. And this kind of escalation, we can explain it in two angles. First we can do, we can say it as an international or regional angle because we cannot separate the file, you know, what's happening on Yemen with Houthis, we cannot separate with what is going on in Iran and Hormuz and also with the dead bloc MoU between Iran and the United States.

[Venetia Rainey]

There's a definite relationship here between what's happening in Yemen.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah. No, we can't separate these files because Iran want to have another tools of Pressure alongside with Hormuz. So they start to activate the card of Bab El Mandab. This is one side, we can say it as a regional or international pressure tool of Iran. And the other angle, Houthis themselves, they have also their own calculation of this kind of escalation because Houthis they have concerns about if there is a future deal. They are concerned that they are not going to be excluded from any Future deal during MoU or with the Iran,

[Venetia Rainey]

the deal between the United States and Iran.

[Roland Oliphant]

They want that we are here. They don't want to be ignored in the future. Other things also that makes Houthis escalate that concerns that there is a power shift in domestic or national field with the Yemeni government because Houthis they feel that a power balance is going to be changed to the government of Yemen. And they also this is the kind of concern that try to escalate and try to attack the Yemeni government facilities, civilian infrastructure and also military targets.

[Venetia Rainey]

This all started on July 13th when a Saudi airstrike hit the Runway of the airport in Sanaa, Yemen's capital, which the Houthis control preventing the landing of an Iranian flight carrying a high ranking Houthi delegation. So the Houthis had been to Iran, they were coming back, the Saudis hit the Runway, didn't shoot down the plane, but hit the Runway to stop it from landing. Why did they do that? And why has that in turn led to what looks like the restarting of the civil war?

[Roland Oliphant]

If we compare this incident with the first of the war at 2014, when Iran start to operate a direct flight from Tehran to Sanaa, when they start the couple against the Yemeni government in Sana' a in that time and then the war start and they announce a coalition against the Houthis. So it's a kind of establishing an escalation. Why now? Because they feel that it's a time for escalate to gradually. Iran always and IRGC always use gradually pressure. They have using their pressure tools. They didn't, they don't want to use their more two cars at the same time. It's not a smart idea even from Iranian perspective. So that's why they, they start word Hormuz now with Babel Mental.

[Venetia Rainey]

Okay, so can I can I ask you something then? Because you, you know the Houthis quite well. So NASA Al Din Nasser Al Din Amr, he's a, a member of the Houthi politburo. He was speaking to CNN on Friday night and he said that they don't need orders from Iran to ramp up the conflict with Saudi Arabia. Paraphrasing here, this isn't a direct quotation, but he basically said Saudi aggression against the group, including Sanai's, reason enough for military action against Riyadh's forces. He said the Saudi economic and air blockade of Houthi controlled territory has created the worst man made humanitarian crisis. This is a quotation. These reasons alone are sufficient to compel us to act more decisively than we have been doing. We do not need any other agendas. So there he's kind of agreeing with you. He's saying we have our own agenda to get in. I suppose the question then is if someone in Tehran were to pick up the telephone and say to the Houthis, well listen, we've got our deal with America now you've done the job, can you stop doing this? Would they necessarily listen or would they keep fighting?

[Roland Oliphant]

Houthis, they are not 100% proxy to Iran. Iran has a huge influence into the Houthis decision makers. But in the same time, Iran has a huge influence. Iran supporting Houthis with the expertise with oil free oil. And Houthis, they need Iran also to import their social control tactics. Most of the Houthis intelligence agencies, six agencies have six agencies. Intelligence agencies, the Houthis have six intelligence agencies. Six intelligence agencies are. All these tactics or techniques has been imported from the Iranian regime. So Houthis, they need also Iran. There is a strategic relationship more than proxies. Also Iran, they need Houthis, they give Houthis some space to decide their own requirements according to their own requirements to decide what they want according to their own requirements. Houthis, they have a total control on the military, on the battlefield. But the aerial forces, it's controlled by Iranian. So the missiles, hypersonic missiles that Houthis have, plastic missiles and drones, this kind, anything that is a cross border tendency or beyond Yemen that's controlled more than Iranian decision and IRGC decision more than

[Venetia Rainey]

more than the local Houthis. Is it your understanding that there are IRGC men or Iranian personnel who are manning and operating those on the ground in Yemen?

[Roland Oliphant]

Of course, when it comes to a cross border border hostility or aggression in a house border.

[Venetia Rainey]

So these strikes on Israel which we had a few years ago, or the strikes into Saudi Arabia recently, you're saying that would have been ordered from and orchestrated by Iranian.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah, I believe that it's. That it's coordinated between them.

[Venetia Rainey]

Coordinated?

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah. Because why? Because Houthis themselves, from Houthis perspective, they believe that they can survive without Iran. This is about the Houthis perspective because Houthis they have their own revenues. It's going to be very hard for Houthis to. I know it's to survive without Iran, but they believed according to their own perspective. Another things it's about the escalation, the disk literature and about the ideology of Houthis. That's a very important driver or we should consider it. How to understand Houthis. Houthis are a jihadist. They are not a political group. Houthis are jihadist extreme fighters, non state actors. They have capabilities of a military capabilities. It's like similar like a state calming things down is against their own belief.

[Venetia Rainey]

They're not inclined to calm things down. They're inclined to escalation.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah. Being an escalate, it means that they are believers on God. So this is a kind of religious perspective. They are dominated with very religious ideas. That keeps them escalate in a state of being escalated.

[Venetia Rainey]

We're going to take a short break now. When we come back, would this war in Yemen differ from the last one foreign. Welcome back. You're listening to Iran, the latest with me, Roydon Olaf and I'm in the studio with Mahmoud Shara, a former Yemeni diplomat. Can I ask the civil war in Yemen which began in 2014 and it and it ended in I think 2022 with this ceasefire and then by 2023, I believe Saudi Arabia, who led the coalition intervening on behalf of the Yemeni government and the Houthis were very close to signing a roadmap to peace. That all seems to have gone out of the window. But the international community was putting casualties in that war by the end at nearly 400,000, including people who died in the famine. Are you saying that this is restarting, that we are going back to or Yemen is going back to full scale hostilities.

[Roland Oliphant]

Until now the government of Yemen they are doing a protective action or a protection response. They are not engaged in war in the battle. And even the way that even the statement if we see that for PLC Presidential Leadership Council that all that we can understand that the way that they are engaging in a battle with Houthis as a protection. They don't want to avoid engage in a full battle with Houthis.

[Venetia Rainey]

What about the Saudis?

[Roland Oliphant]

Are they even the Saudis themselves don't have.

[Venetia Rainey]

Yeah, they don't think they have the appetite for to go back and finish what they failed to finish before.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah, the, the dispute is about who choose the zero hour, who choose the zero Hour. They don't want to make the Houthis choose the zero hour. This is the dispute.

[Venetia Rainey]

What do you mean?

[Roland Oliphant]

Houthis now is he choose the zero hour force resume the battle.

[Venetia Rainey]

Okay, so the Houthis, the Houthis are trying to gain the initiative.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yes.

[Venetia Rainey]

By starting the war at a time of their choosing.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yes.

[Venetia Rainey]

The Saudis and the Yemeni government want to give them that.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yes.

[Venetia Rainey]

But that sounds like all sides are getting ready for another full scale war.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah, but in my perspective, it is a compulsory route. They don't have choice.

[Venetia Rainey]

So there is going to be a war.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah, it's going to be a war because they don't have choice until they do something to deter Houthis striking strike for strike and limited strikes. This is not going to prevent Houthis for stop or de escalate because Houthis, they choose the war by plastic missiles and drones and aerial forces. They don't want Houthis, they don't want to engage in a battlefield.

[Venetia Rainey]

They don't want a ground war.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah. Because it's going to be very hard for them and very going to cause them a higher cost. And even now, because Houthis now their military capacity on the battlefield is not like before.

[Venetia Rainey]

Well, this is what I want to ask. So in the original, the first, well, the war officially never ended. We generally say it began in 2014. Saudi Arabia and its coalition intervened in 2015 and then it ends in this ceasefire in 2022. But it ended basically in a stalemate because the Saudis and the Yemeni government they backed and the coalition could not dislodge the Houthis. In the end, they failed in their objective. Is there any reason, if you're saying we're on a road in Yemen back to full scale war, is there any reason to think it would be different this time?

[Roland Oliphant]

Yes, we are going to see about the Yemeni government capabilities because now the Yemeni government, the military are in the ground. It's different with the Houthis because Houthis right now, after the sanctions, they have been affected and severe affected from sanctions. They have a lack of economic revenues. They have also a lack of mobilization, are recruiting fighters, not like before because of the anger on the domestic audience about the economical situation in Yemen and the humanitarian situation in Yemen.

[Venetia Rainey]

In the area they control.

[Roland Oliphant]

In the area they control.

[Venetia Rainey]

So they have a public.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah. And they don't have reason or drivers to recruit. They don't have a real war. They don't have.

[Venetia Rainey]

They will if this happens, if Saudi and the Yemeni government go on the offensive as you are suggesting, they will have a reason.

[Roland Oliphant]

It's not a reason like they were using 7 of October and Gaza war. It was a reason to recruit and to have a war. But right now people, they don't have this kind of trust with Houthis and people are angry, especially the tribes in Yemen. Houthis lose even the trust with the tribes. Recently he has provoking and the tribes tribal leaders in Yemen who were depending on them in the past years.

[Venetia Rainey]

So you're saying, it sounds to me like you're saying that the Houthis are actually in a much weaker position in the ground. On the ground than they were.

[Roland Oliphant]

But in their technology, on the airspace, the gap is very huge between the Yemeni government because Houthis are equipped in plastic missiles, drones, suicide bombs, suicide boats, drones, boats.

[Venetia Rainey]

So let's talk about that a bit because it sounds like you're saying that on the ground if there's a ground war, maybe this time the Saudi coalition and the Yemeni government might have the upper hand.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah.

[Venetia Rainey]

But this technological difference you're talking about, this is interesting. So I was speaking to your, your colleague at Chathamous and for and and fellow former Yemeni official Ferrer.

[Roland Oliphant]

He could be disagree with this, you

[Venetia Rainey]

might disagree but he, he said I don't know if you disagree with this. He, and I hope he doesn't mind me repeating this, he disagrees. He said to me that Houthis traditionally they just, they don't do the sea. He said, I've never even seen a fish on the table at a Houthi dinner party or something. But that now they really are, they've really invested in the sea and so on. So I suppose the question is how powerful have they become at sea? Do they have the capacity to completely close the Strait of Baban Mandeb?

[Roland Oliphant]

Yes, they have. And Houthis, they exploit the past years of truce to invest on their plastic missiles and their sea capabilities and naval capabilities. And also they start to establish intelligence military coordination with the other part of the African coast with Somalians Shabab, with the Somalian and Somalians piracy. Also Houthis has recruited their own Somalians leaders fighting for them. And there becomes a LIU zone in the other parts of the Red Sea. Houthis equipped them, transferred the technology that they have for drones and suicide boats, drones. And also since 2022, they were very good partners of smuggling IRGC smuggling program. Even when Iran was under the attack from Israel in that time when they start warring, the smuggling program was continuing

[Venetia Rainey]

what were they smuggling? Smuggling to Yemen.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah, smuggling to Yemen from Iran. From Iran they smuggled dull uses items that could be manufacturing for drones and weapons also. Weapons. All this kind of smuggling was facilitating between the Somalians piracy and the Somalian smugglers and Shabab. So there is.

[Venetia Rainey]

So you're saying the Somalis were. Al Shabaab were The middlemen.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah, was the middleman. Yeah, the delivery.

[Venetia Rainey]

The delivery. They were delivering it by boats.

[Roland Oliphant]

Exactly. So the Houthis, they intensified their existence on Horn of Africa also. Also they expand beyond the military existence and intelligence existence. They have a black market for amusion. Black market ammunition. Ammunition Black market. Because Houthis, they sell all these, they have this regular ammunition to the black market in central Africa because Houthis they become an producing a good quality. Right.

[Venetia Rainey]

So it's business, people go to them to buy. They're a big arms producer. Yeah, no idea.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah, so.

[Venetia Rainey]

So they're a big part. So. So I suppose the question is at the moment they've said that they have. They're saying they've imposed a naval blockade of the Babel Mandeb against. Only against Saudi shipping is what they're saying. Yeah, it seems to be effective. They seem to be hitting things. Could they close the strait completely?

[Roland Oliphant]

They can because it's not. They just do several attacks on several ships and the all most of the insurance shipping companies are going to reconsider and to do a reconsideration that Ritzy is in high risk. That's going to implicate a higher cost of the maritime navigation, just as we've

[Venetia Rainey]

seen in the strait of hormones.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah. And this is what they need. So they did their own objectives and also they serve Iran's objective. So they intersect their objectives with Iran.

[Venetia Rainey]

Okay. In the past when they did that, we did see international naval coalitions put together. There was a U S led, I think was Operation Rough Rider last year. I mean could that happen again and would that solve the problem?

[Roland Oliphant]

Actually I just want to tell you about this issue because it was not working in that time because I was following, I was watching the Espidas, the European coalition. It's not, it's only. It's convoying or escorting the ships and it has a very limited mission, mandates to protect and the problem on red. On Red Sea. It's not on the sea, it's on the land.

[Venetia Rainey]

Right.

[Roland Oliphant]

It's about the fragile. There is a fragile state on the southern Red Sea that should be addressed. This is number one. Number two, the deterrence for non state Actors, those who are attacking ships on the Red Sea. It should be a new approach because even the hitting or striking the Americans are. Yeah, even the American when they start to do a coalition. They didn't even. They couldn't even have a significant address or important to address this issue. The idea is it has to be like a new deterrence strategy. How it's about combating non state actors on the lands and addressing the fragile states on land. Like supporting the government. The governments on the lands on the coast.

[Venetia Rainey]

They're talking about the internationally recognized Yemeni government which is based.

[Roland Oliphant]

And the Somalian government. Yes, the southern rich. There is a fragile states on the fragile coastal states.

[Venetia Rainey]

On the whole kind of. On the whole Arabian Gulf kind of Red Sea.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yes, exactly.

[Venetia Rainey]

It's even Sudan. Of course.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah. The root of. The root of. Of the Red Sea is different from Hormuz. It's a very. It's a history of. Of an insecure issues of piracy. And they need to address the root of. Of the issue not. Not the result.

[Venetia Rainey]

And the whole Red Sea as you say of Somalia.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah, but, but, but was previously was just a regular piracy. Now is organized crime is because Houthis is there. Houthis controlling Al Shabaab. Houthis coordinating and take the lead with Al Shabaab. Houthis is coordinating with aqap also the Al Qaeda.

[Venetia Rainey]

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah. All these together are operating their military operation. The operation led by Houthis.

[Venetia Rainey]

Okay. It sounds to me like you're saying the answer to this is not a naval operation or diplomacy. The answer to this is a ground operation. Tell me if I'm getting ahead of myself. But that achieves the objectives that the Yemeni coalition, the Yemenis and the Saudis failed to achieve last time and which defeats the Houthis and retakes Sana'.

[Roland Oliphant]

A.

[Venetia Rainey]

Is that where you think this is going?

[Roland Oliphant]

I think it's about the concept. The idea of the concept is how to make the cost of these capabilities much higher than against the Houthis objectives. This is number one. Number two is to prevent them from turning a Red Sea as a permanent platform that threatening a maritime navigation. This is the concept. The idea. The idea. Because Houthis still have a window to a risi. How can and this is a very dangerous idea. I don't know how people are understanding that is a non state actor. Do they accept the idea of a non state actors controlling a very important route.

[Venetia Rainey]

Okay, okay. Well, I mean the thing is the you know, we've seen how The United States, the most powerful military in the world, has struggled to reopen by force the Strait of Hormuz on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, fighting against Iran, which, okay, is more powerful than the Houthis and much more sophisticated and all of that, but is still a much inferior military actor. I'm just trying to get to what you are proposing physically. Are you proposing. You seem to be saying that the advantage that the Saudi government and that the Yemeni, the official Yemeni government have is on the land in a land war. And it seems to me that you're suggesting that they should defeat the Houthis on the land. And are you saying go all the way, retake Hodeidah, retake Sana', a deterrence

[Roland Oliphant]

Houthis on the land and preventing them controlling at least, at least at the beginning of the coastal line, which is Hudaydah. Because even if you are going to reach a truce or truce without changing the power balance in the ground, it means that Houthis are going to build themselves again. This is what happens. This is a Lesson learned from 22 until now. I can see that I'm always calling that this area, this duration. 22, 23, during the truce, it was the golden era of Houthis because they start to be a regional actor, not even a local actor, threatening the shipments and maritime shipments in the Red Sea. So this is a kind of lesson learned. Like if there is a truce, it should be after the changing the power balance in the ground.

[Venetia Rainey]

Yes. This is the general rule of warfare, is it not? That the peace treaty is the verdict of the battlefield, as you say around

[Roland Oliphant]

here, from Houthis perspective. Houthis, they think that they won the war. And Houthis also, they think that Iran is winning the battle.

[Venetia Rainey]

That Iran is winning the battle, not the war.

[Roland Oliphant]

They won the battle. And they are afraid that in the future, they are concerned about themselves, that they are in the future that they couldn't, they could be excluded from a deal. And they said, we are, we are the most permanent axis of the resistance actors. Because when we see. And they lost, Iran lost in Syria. Syria regime has been collapsed and Hezbollah has been weakened from Israel. Yeah. And Houthis is raised. So Houthis, they consider themselves that we are the strongest. They consider themselves strongest.

[Venetia Rainey]

And yet you're saying they are afraid that the Iranians are going to throw them under the bus.

[Roland Oliphant]

Under the bus?

[Venetia Rainey]

Why would the Iranians do that?

[Roland Oliphant]

It's not throw them under the bus. They think that they need to gain a political recognition political gains and also financial gains from the Saudis. They think that the Saudis, it's a time to establish a new rule of a new security rule of engagement with the Saudis. They need to reidentify their relationship with the Saudis and to blackmail the Saudis to have more financial. They are trying to blackmail the Saudis and they find it it's a time, it's a good time right now.

[Venetia Rainey]

They think it's the time now. But you were saying that the war, the new war was coming anyway and they're deciding it's the time for us. Yeah, well, that's a. It's a big thought. I think we're going to have to keep our eyes focused on that. Mahmoud Sherer, former Yemeni diplomat thank you so much for joining us on Iran the Latest. That's all for today's episode. We'll be back again tomorrow. Until then, that was Iran the Latest. Goodbye,

[David Knowles]

Iran. The Latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Venetia Rainey and Roland Oliphant. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following around the latest on your preferred podcast app. And if you have a moment, leave us a review as it helps others find the show. To stay on top of all of our news, subscribe to the Telegraph, sign up to our Dispatchers newsletter or listen to our sister podcast Ukraine the Latest. We're still on the the same email address battlelines at Telegraph Co uk or you can contact us on X. You can find our handles in the show Notes the producer is Max Bauer. The executive producer is Louisa Wells.