Ships bash through Strait of Hormuz warzone as US-Iran peace talks grind to a halt

Summary

Iran: The Latest — “Ships bash through Strait of Hormuz warzone as US-Iran peace talks grind to a halt” (July 1, 2026)

Podcast: Iran: The Latest (The Telegraph)
Host: Roland Oliphant
Main Guest: Cdr. Tom Sharp (former Royal Navy Commander)
Special Contributions: Laura (Fox News Correspondent)

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Episode Overview

This episode delivers an urgent examination of the current state of the Strait of Hormuz as diplomatic peace talks between the US and Iran stall. With global oil flows at stake and the specter of renewed conflict, the episode features in-depth naval perspective from Cdr. Tom Sharp, who explains the operational chaos, risks, and strategic implications in the Gulf. The conversation then pivots to UK defense posturing, as Sharp provides a pointed critique of Whitehall’s defense investment plans, procurement failures, and the future direction of the Royal Navy.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The State of US-Iran Peace Talks

Timestamps: [00:10]-[04:35]

• Background: Clashes over the weekend have complicated progress. Envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are in Qatar for technical-level talks, but direct US-Iran negotiations are on hold.
• US Position: Trump is willing to extend the 60-day truce; Vice President J.D. Vance frames the US as holding “all the cards”—whether talks succeed or not, the US will have ensured Iran cannot develop nuclear weapons.
• Iranian Stance: Lead negotiator Mohammad Gallabouf demands fulfillment of initial peace conditions—including ending war in Lebanon and fully reopening the Strait of Hormuz—before advancing talks. Gallabouf calls the strait “a divine gift granted to Iran and now its greatest instrument of power.”

Notable Quote:

"My attitude on this, Laura, is we have all the cards in negotiation. We obviously want it to be successful. But even if it's not successful, we've accomplished the core mission: to ensure that the Iranians never have a nuclear weapon."
– J.D. Vance, US Vice President ([02:23])

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2. The Strait of Hormuz: Seaborne Risks & Shifting Dynamics

Timestamps: [06:01]-[17:20]

Shipping Activity and Security Measures

• Shipping Resumes: Despite recent Iranian attacks, ships are moving in both directions, aided by US air cover and uncrewed systems (not traditional warships) providing overwatch.
• Captains’ Desperation: Some ship captains, exhausted and low on provisions, are resuming runs in broad daylight, seemingly challenging Iranian threats.
• Multiple Routes: Ships are using varied, sometimes unofficial routes—some paying “Tehran tolls” illegally, others running the gauntlet with transponders off (the “darkened taxi service”).

Notable Quote:

"It does feel a little bit like ship captains going, 'I've had enough of this, come and have a go if you think you're hard enough.'"
– Tom Sharp ([06:29])

Navigational Chaos and Collision Risks

• Absence of Coordination: The usual traffic separation scheme has given way to a “free for all,” raising risks of collisions or ships running aground, especially with overworked, fatigued crews and possible GPS jamming.
• Iranian Claims: Iran’s state media alleges a ship running aground outside its official route, seen as either scaremongering or a plausible accident amid the chaotic navigation.

Mine Threats and British Naval Deployments

• Debate Over Mining: Both Sharp and Admiral Parkin believe Iran likely hasn't laid mines; they maintain control through other means and there have been no confirmed mine strikes.
• Royal Navy Actions: The RFA Lyme Bay is in the region to demonstrate capabilities, particularly for testing autonomous mine countermeasures, and for political signaling as much as actual mine clearance.

Notable Quotes:

"I've often questioned what it is that they and all the other ships would do on arrival... what do you need those ships for then? ...It's useful. It's a useful thing to have done. And if they do find mines, then they will be able to clear them."
– Tom Sharp ([14:08]-[15:14])

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3. US & European Naval Presence – Capability and Sustainability

Timestamps: [17:34]-[19:26]

• US Carriers Stretched: With two US carrier groups deployed (Lincoln and Bush), the American navy is under strain, pushing assets to the limit.
• Interceptor Missiles: High burn rates for Patriot and THAAD missiles in the region have US commanders worried about resource depletion intended for other theaters.
• Military Option Remains: Despite strain, the US retains the capacity to reengage militarily if diplomatic efforts fail.

Notable Quote:

"It's a 15 carrier world, so having two [US carriers] there will cause them pain."
– Tom Sharp ([17:51])

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4. The UK Defence Investment Plan & Future of the Royal Navy

Timestamps: [19:26]-[39:55]

Sharp’s Scathing Review of Whitehall’s Defense Spending

• Describes Plan as ‘a Botched Job’: The recent UK defense budget increase is considered insufficient, lacking transparency, and failing to offer a credible path to NATO targets.
• Calls for National Debate: Argues for whole-of-government discussion about true security needs, moving beyond inter-service squabbling and superficial “ships and tanks” counts.
• Hybrid Navy Concept:
  • The Royal Navy’s innovated approach, proposing a “hybrid navy” built around a common frigate (Type 31) and multiple new types of “sloops” — missile barges, anti-submarine vessels, large autonomous submarines, and new sensor platforms.
  • The hybrid solution aims not only at cost savings but enhanced survivability and adaptability in the modern era.
  • However, the plan is severely underfunded, likely due to lack of naval representation in budget negotiations.

Notable Quotes:

"This plan is not good enough... It’s a sticking plaster to talk about increased defence expenditure, but really what it is is an argument about how quickly do you want to carry on drowning?"
– Tom Sharp ([20:47])

"The navy bit makes me really, really angry... we are an island nation. We are dependent on the sea for our survival. It is our best contribution to NATO by far..."
– Tom Sharp ([22:22])

British Procurement Failures & Accountability

• Chronic Failures: Marina disasters like the Type 45 destroyer (massively over budget, fewer built, plagued with technical failures), Watchkeeper drones, and communications packages.
• Causes:
  • Budget annualization prevents long-term planning.
  • “Gold-plating” (customization and tinkering mid-design) leads to cost overruns and delivery delays.
  • Procurement processes lack accountability; failures rarely attributed to individuals.
  • Culture and rivalry (Army, RAF vs Navy) exacerbate poor resource allocation.

Notable Quotes:

"We are world champions at tinkering and gold plating mid design... but we are perhaps world champion."
– Tom Sharp ([29:09])

"It is now a good ship, a classic navy style. Over the years we've worked out how to do it. We've invested a huge amount of money in fixing the problem."
— Tom Sharp on the Type 45 Destroyer ([32:57])

"The only time we're ever honest in these situations is when people die." – Tom Sharp ([36:08])

Call for Culture Change

• Need for Accountability: Sharp is blunt about the necessity for “heads to roll” and a cultural shift that prioritizes honesty, transparency, and national resilience over short-term or departmental self-interest.

Notable Quote:

"For the culture to change, which it has to before you can change the system, then there has to be accountability, which is completely missing. There has to be honesty, which is basically missing. We are lying to ourselves about this."
– Tom Sharp ([38:36])

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Memorable Moments & Notable Exchanges

• [06:29] Tom Sharp’s depiction of mariners’ impatience: “I've had enough of this, come and have a go if you think you're hard enough.”
• [15:28] Explanation of modern minesweeping vs. traditional methods: Use of bright yellow sub drones for sweeping mines at much higher speeds and safety.
• [22:22] Sharp’s anger at defense mismanagement: A passionate plea for Britain’s naval future and the strategic necessity of a properly funded navy.
• [36:08/38:36] On tragic accountability and self-deception in defense: Only deadly disasters prompt real inquiry; the procurement culture “lies to itself.”

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Timestamps for Major Segments

• 00:10-04:35: Update on US-Iran peace talks, Qatari mediation, negotiating positions.
• 06:01-17:20: Strait of Hormuz — operational update, naval risks, mine debates, Royal Navy deployments.
• 17:34-19:26: US & allied navies—resource strain, sustainability, implications for escalation.
• 19:26-39:55: UK Defence Investment Plan, Royal Navy’s “hybrid” strategy, procurement failures, vision for reform.

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Summary

This episode provides a vivid and granular account of the precarious peace in the Gulf and its global consequences, exposing the intersections of military risk, maritime economics, and policy dysfunction. Tom Sharp’s expert insight moves fluidly from the tactical—how ships and navies are coping with the Strait of Hormuz’s dangers—to the strategic and political—how Western defense institutions risk strategic atrophy through repeated procurement blunders. The episode is brisk, sharp-edged, and unflinching in both its warnings and its calls for cultural transformation in defense.

Transcript

[Tom Sharp]

The telegraph.

[Roland Oliphant]

I'm Roland Oliphant and this is Iran. The latest. It's Wednesday, July 1, 2026, day 10 of the 60 day deadline to reach a peace deal between the United States and Iran. On today's episode, I'll be speaking to former Royal Navy Commander Tom Sharp, who has experience commanding frigates in the Persian Gulf, about the current state of play in in the Strait of Hormuz. We'll also be talking about the future of the Royal Navy.

[Tom Sharp]

A short time ago, the United States military began major combat operations in Iran. Today, President Trump says Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the attacks.

[Roland Oliphant]

The Pentagon is weighing a takeover of

[Tom Sharp]

that island as a way to force the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Everyone begged for this ceasefire and we all know it.

[Laura (Fox News Correspondent)]

The question before us now is how much more can we accomplish together? Can we turn over a new leaf? Can we change relations in the Middle east permanently?

[Roland Oliphant]

Does anyone really think that someone can tell President Trump what to do? Come on. But first, a quick look at the top headlines from the region. The big story of the day is the state of the peace talks following the clashes over the weekend. Donald Trump's special envoy spending Steve Witkoff and his son in law Jared Kushner are both in Qatar. But there's currently no plans to have face to face meetings with top officials from Iran. Instead, there are technical talks underway. These are between lower level officials in three working groups looking respectively at the nuclear issue, diplomacy and financing, and the return of frozen funds. The Qataris are working hard to get things back on track and restart direct talks. We understand. And so far, Washington seems sanguine. According to the Wall Street Journal, Trump was presented recently with a full rang of options to restart the war in Iran. But he told his advisors he'd rather give diplomacy a chance and was willing to extend the 60 day truce if needed. Meanwhile, Vice President J.D. vance has said that while the US obviously wants the talks to succeed, America was still in a much stronger position than Iran. Even if they fail. This was him talking to Fox News.

[Laura (Fox News Correspondent)]

You know, the Iranians have not hit ships in the last couple of weeks and the oil is flowing in the Strait of Hormuz in part because the President made very clear that if the Iranians hit ships, we were going to hit back. So, you know, you know, it's going to take sometimes the carrot and the stick here. But Laura, I actually think that the United States is in a great position. However, the negotiation ultimately shakes out. If the negotiation is successful, which obviously we want it to be successful, you have an Iran that is permanently transformed, that's not funding regionals, terrorism and instability, that has permanently given up on any nuclear weapons ambition, and that as a result is welcomed back into the world economy. That's a great outcome for the American people. It's a great outcome for the whole region. But, Laura, if, on the other hand, the Iranians don't behave, if they don't make the concessions in the negotiations that we need to see, their nuclear program is still destroyed, their conventional military is still destroyed, and the United States is still in a much stronger position relative to the Iranians. So my attitude on this, Laura, is we have all the cards in negotiation. We obviously want it to be successful. But even if it's not successful, we've accomplished the core mission, which, which is to ensure that the Iranians never have a nuclear weapon. In other words, it's a win, win outcome for the American people. And I think because of that, what you see in the room, Laura, is, I think, evidence of a real push and pull in their system. There are people within the Iranian system who recognize the way that they've done business for 47 years is a mistake and they want to turn over a new leaf. You also see some resistance, some of the old hardliners, some of the old radicals who don't want to change their behavior. Part of what we're trying to do in this negotiation, Laura, is to see how serious they actually are. And to be serious, they've got to not just say the right things, they've got to make real concessions. So whether it's the president, me, anybody else in the negotiation, we care a lot less about what the Iranians say. We care a lot more about what they do. We see some positive signs, obviously, we see some negative signs. We, what the President has told us is work the problem, see where the negotiation is going to lead and if it doesn't lead to a successful resolution. On the diplomatic side, we still have a lot of optionality and we still accomplished a whole lot for the American people.

[Roland Oliphant]

Similar attitude coming out from Iran yesterday. Their top negotiator, Mohammed Gallabouf, said they would not proceed with the full Memorandum of Understanding until the initial five clauses are fully realized. And if you watched our show going through the Memorandum of Understanding, you'll know that those are the ones relating to stopping the war in Lebanon, with both sides respecting each other's territorial integrity. And, of course, the question of control of the Strait of Hormuz and it being fully reopened. Tellingly, Gallobaoff also described the strait as a divine gift granted to Iran and now its greatest instrument of power. We'll be talking about that with Tom later on. Coincidentally, Iranian state media has today claimed that a container ship has run aground in the strait after sailing outside the official Iranian route. We don't have any further details verifying that for now. It might be scaremongering as part of their pressure campaign. Then again, it's not impossible to imagine. Recent attacks on commercial vessels have dented hopes for a return to normal shipping in the Gulf after a brief spike last week following the peace deal. And to discuss all that, I'm very happy to welcome Tom Sharp, the former Royal Navy commander and frequent guest on Iran the Latest. Tom, welcome to Iran the Latest. Could you give us first your professional steely eyed warfare officer's view of what is happening in the Strait of Hormuz right now?

[Tom Sharp]

Ships are moving again, that's the headline here. Ships are moving both ways, in and out. Whether that's Iran cleared, Iran sponsored or not Iran cleared. They are now moving and it's quite, it's interesting to watch because it looks like captains are just going, we have to go now because they're getting some assurance and they're getting some air cover from the US Navy. The US Navy is still not putting warships in the strait as far as I can tell. They are putting uncrewed systems in there. So they've got air overwatch, they've got uncrewed surface vessels and these are providing a degree of assurance for these ships as they go. Iran is still striking. They hit a couple of container vessels recently, but ships are still going. It's almost like they've just run out of patience. So ships are now going through with transponders on in broad daylight. And it does feel a little bit like ships captains going, I've had enough of this, come and have a go if you think you're hard enough. They're low on provisions. The ship's crew have been there for months in horrible conditions and they've just gone, right, let's go now. I don't know that for sure. They may be getting insurance via other means. It will be very expensive either way. It doesn't feel like an entirely sustainable business model. But it does look right now like that's what's going on and what kind

[Roland Oliphant]

of volumes are they moving in?

[Tom Sharp]

It's something like 50 billion barrels left yesterday. So that's, that's pretty good. Now pre war, pre this war it was roughly 130 to 138ships a day would transit the straightforward in the traffic separation scheme in the middle. We're nowhere near those numbers yet, but it does appear to be bouncing back. That's happened before. There were two sort of false dawns, two ceasefires and false dawns in the main part of the conflict. And ships started to move and immediately got whacked by the Iranians and immediately stopped again. And a few of them would get to the strait and turn around, or be warned on the radio, turn around and go back to anchor. That appears to have changed.

[Roland Oliphant]

Is it possible they're playing by the Iranian rules And some are.

[Tom Sharp]

So there's always. There were always.

[Roland Oliphant]

Because there's two routes.

[Laura (Fox News Correspondent)]

Yeah.

[Tom Sharp]

Right. Well, obviously there were the dueling blockades. There was the Iranian blockade and then the US blockade over the top of that. And there were different categories of ships. There were ones that paid the Tehran toll through various methods, whether that was Bitcoin or into various banking systems. No one quite figured that out. Reputable companies refused to do it, mainly because the entities into which you're paying were completely sanctioned and illegal. So they just said, well, we can't do it. And then, besides, you're setting the precedent of allowing Iran to toll the strait, which is something we should come back to because that can't be allowed. Then there were the ones that Iran would let go, but America did not. And they struck them using various different methods. You know, missiles down the funnel. They strafed one. They were firing missiles into the funnel, the smokestack, as they call it, and into the engine room, which is an incredible precision strike. But there's always going to be a risk of collateral damage. And it was very clear the way the Americans were enforcing that blockade was that they were okay with that. Their calculations on civilian casualties allowed for that. So they killed, I think it was some Indian sailors, because clearly that missile didn't go down the funnel. It blew up somewhere else and killed some people. And then there was a third type of ship that was cleared by both. It hadn't been to Iran. So it wasn't on the US blockade list, but it wasn't on the Iran blockade list either. And then there was also the ones running the gauntlet darkened. So they were going right around the Omani point at night with their transponder switched off and essentially just legging it.

[Roland Oliphant]

Yeah. We had Richard Mead from Lloyd's List in a couple of weeks ago describing this darkened taxi service that had kind of like they'd Gone in and never appeared again. He realized they were transferring oil and they picking up oil one and bringing it back and they were just. You couldn't see them.

[Tom Sharp]

Yeah. And then they pop up on somewhere else and these moving parts are still there. But the point is the overt bit, they're just sailing in daylight with AIs on has increased.

[Roland Oliphant]

That's really interesting. Which suggests that the violence is down to a degree. And as you say, either people have just got impatient, they just got to go, or there is a certain amount of a degree more reassurance that you can transit this without being blown up. The Iranians are claiming that a ship has run aground after using the none or their non permitted route, which I suppose they mean the, the American route on the southern. Right. How credible do you think that is?

[Tom Sharp]

It's quite likely. I mean there are thousands of these ships on either side of the strait. Without careful coordination, this was always a possibility. The traffic separation scheme, which was sort of introduced in the 1970s to impose traffic flow on the strait, was in the middle, obviously, and had a westbound leg and an eastbound leg as you went around the bend. The risk with the current situation is that it's become a free for all, a navigation free for all. Now look, it's 21 miles wide. That's still quite wide. One of the problems is when you look at marine tracking sites, the icons representing ships are massive. They're much bigger than the actual ships. So it looks much worse than it is. But what we're seeing here is an uncoordinated dash for the exit with no coordinated traffic schemes. The one place that most ships are avoiding is the original lane. Not all. So you've got ships going in both directions with no coordination. You've probably got tired crews who have been there for a long time and have been poorly fed. So the risk of collision and or running aground is definitely higher.

[Roland Oliphant]

They're quite close to the southern route kind of hugs the Omani coast. The northern kind of hugs the Iranian coast.

[Tom Sharp]

It does.

[Roland Oliphant]

How shallow is it on the edges then?

[Tom Sharp]

The southern route is actually deeper and it used to be the route, what we now call the inshore traffic zone. The ITZ used to be the route until the 70s and it got busier and busier and busier. And again, there was no, there were no lanes there. It was a free for all of sorts. So the IMO put in place the traffic separation scheme. So it's actually pretty deep right now. There are some rocks or shoals, there's lots of inlets and rocky inlets. You've got to be navigationally not paying attention because everything on there is going to paint on your radar very clearly so you can navigate out and keep yourself safe very easily with just a PI parallel indices on the radar and you use that to get yourself out. But the problem is a lot of ships don't do that. They're entirely dependent on gps and if GPS is being jammed and they're not paying attention and it's dark and none of this is lit, then it's entirely possible you could run aground. I mean, you shouldn't, if you're a competent mariner, you shouldn't.

[Roland Oliphant]

People get tired. And yeah, it's good that you mentioned a minehunter there. The UK sent the rfa, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Lyme Bay for demining. So tell us about that. When do we expect her to start work and how difficult will it be? I'm also interested actually, Tom. We had one of your former colleagues, Admiral Parkin, on a while ago and he said in his professional opinion he wasn't sure the Iranians had even actually laid any mines.

[Tom Sharp]

Yeah, I think he and I are the two people in the entire world who agree on that. I don't think they have either. And mainly because I don't think they ever needed to. They had control of the Strait by and large. Now if I was Iranian, if I was IRGC and I saw ships just going, do you know where we're going now? Cheers. Throw your drones at us, it doesn't matter. They bounce off. I would go for a limited offensive mining campaign because you wouldn't need to do very many ships would immediately go, okay, right, all stop. But I don't think we have. And I think James and I both said this a few weeks ago in the sort of face of the wisdom. Even CENTCOM said there may have been mines. But you know, I think that was partly because they wanted to get some of their kit in to clear the mines or to at least have presence there. And then you look at the number of ships that are leaving and coming and you look at the routes they're on and they are everywhere, they're scattered everywhere. Even the traffic separation scheme, that's the odd one going through there. So again that to me, I mean, that's a hell of a way to prove there are no, we haven't had

[Roland Oliphant]

any mine strikes as far as I'm aware.

[Tom Sharp]

So either they've just been lucky or there never were any in the first place. And I go with that, sir.

[Roland Oliphant]

Alright, so is Raf Line Bay, going there to de Mine, just a British stunt. We will fly the flag to show away here, but there's actually nothing to do.

[Tom Sharp]

I've often questioned what it is that they and all the other ships would do on arrival, because it's always been clear in my mind that if there's an Iranian threat in the Strait, to the point where you can't put warships in, then you're not going in. Charles de Gaulle's not going in with her task group, HMS Dragon's not going in. RFA Line Bay is not going anywhere near it. The Americans aren't going in, or there's no Iranian threat because they've said, we're not going to fire. In which case, what do you need those ships for then? Now, there is an assurance bit in the middle of this, and that's kind of the phase we're in at the moment where ships will be useful. Having those ships on hand will be useful. And linebay, we are testing this autonomous mine countermeasures kit in a combat zone. And that's a good thing to do. It tests things far, far better than you can in a lab or off the west coast of Scotland in benign conditions. So it's useful. It's a useful thing to have done. It's useful to be there. And if they do find mines, then they will be able to clear them. And they can actually, this tech can clear them.

[Roland Oliphant]

This tech. I saw some of this in an exercise in NATO exercise in Portugal last summer. You were talking about the things that look like torpedoes, but they're painted bright yellow and they've got cameras on and they kind of. They're kind of super drones. This is the stuff you're talking about.

[Tom Sharp]

Yeah, they look like little yellow submarines. There's two types, right? There's ones that hunt and there's ones that sweep. Hunting means looking forward with a sonar, detecting mine like objects and then either destroying them if they turn out to be a mine, or marking them if they turn out not to be. That's how our mine hunters worked for the last 15 to 20 years. Just hunting, looking ahead, it's quite slow. You get a lot of false positives, shopping trolley or whatever it is. And of course, a lot of mines are designed to submerge in the seabed and be very hard to detect. Some of them are made of grp, so they don't ping on your sonar. The second option is sweeping, where you go over the top and you've got a sweep out the back, which generates a magnetic signature and an acoustic signature to mimic whatever it is you're trying to mimic to set off the mine. And the advantage of that is it's very quick. You couldn't do it in a ship because it means going over the top of the mine. We used to. We used to mine sweep, but that was deemed unsafe. Rightly so. But in an autonomous vessel, you can do it. And the key point about that is you can do it at about 10 knots, 10 times the speed. Well, 12 miles an hour faster. Yeah. 10 times faster than hunting. So if the Americans have had kit in there looking for mines, it's almost certain that that's what they'd have been using. And Lime will be able to do the same thing, providing she can get close enough. And this is a high risk. You know, there is still an Iranian threat. There will be IRGC commanders who will be salivating at the prospect of a large, gray metal ship closing the strait. So they're going to have to be very, very careful. But I think it's. Whilst I question what they'll do, I've always said all along, you can't do anything if you're alongside in Portsmouth. That's a fact. That's a naval fact. If you're there, you can at least provide political options. And one of those options might be to turn around and come back. Fine.

[Roland Oliphant]

It might be. I will also note there's a NATO summit coming up and it might be useful to show the Americans that.

[Tom Sharp]

That we're there.

[Laura (Fox News Correspondent)]

We're there.

[Tom Sharp]

Dragon is contributing. We had our submarine there that came back extraordinarily early. I don't know what was going on there. So we have contributed down there and in limited numbers, but it's important that we continue to do so because it's an international strait that's currently, or was until recently, closed.

[Roland Oliphant]

What do we know about the state of the American and European naval presence at the moment? Because it's been going on for a long time. We're in this kind of Netherlands phoney war. I don't know what to call it now, this ceasefire with some bangs. How long can the Americans keep their ships there?

[Tom Sharp]

Yeah, so they've got two carriers, which they haven't had for a while. They had them briefly during the sort of early days of the Houthi campaign. They now have the Lincoln and the Bush group. The Ford was there now. The Ford did over 300 days on deployment. If that's become the new norm for US nuclear carriers, which wouldn't be advisable, but they are sweating those assets because like everyone else they don't have enough of them even though they've got 11. It's a 15 carrier world, so having two there will cause them pain. And of course it's not just the carrier, it's the entire infrastructure and air wing and bombs and missiles and logistics

[Roland Oliphant]

and the group around it.

[Tom Sharp]

Right, correct. So destroyers, destroyers, everyone looks in the carrier, but on the carrier at least you have space. The destroyer that was with the USS Ford for 300 plus days will wish to never see that ship again. They will be absolutely sick of the sight of it. And if it's rough, you feel it in the destroyer, you don't in a carrier. So yes, it's a big group. Now the Lincoln could carry on for a lot longer, the Bush even longer still. So they won't be feeling the pain there yet. I think much more significant has been their missile burn through rate interceptor missile burn through rate on both land based systems. So Patriot and Thaad and sea based systems they've gone through again depending on whose reports you believe. But you know, perhaps 50% of THAADs have been fired in the early exchanges and that is a very, very expensive system that Pacific Command PAYCOM will be looking at that going, hang on, you know those are supposed to be for us for the war and you're just pinging them. So there was a real concern about that.

[Roland Oliphant]

So the question is, I suppose I was going to, is, is the naval capability still there to go back to a military option if they want? Is they still there and they still could. They absolutely could. That's the bottom line because does Donald Trump still have the option to go back to war if he wants to? Yes, it's still there, he can still do it. All right, we're going to take a short break. When we come back, we're going to be Talking about the UK's Defence Investment Plan and what it means for the future of the Royal Navy. Welcome back. You're listening to Iran. The latest from the Telegraph. I'm Roland Oliphant and I'm speaking to commander to sharp formally of the Royal Navy. We've had this defence investment plan finally published in the uk. There are huge amounts of controversy. It forced one Defence Secretary to resign and the Armed Forces Minister. Huge amounts of controversy around this. I want to get your reaction to what you saw yesterday because there are kind of two reactions. One is that, okay, well there is going to be 15 billion more by 2030, more than was expected as 1.5 billion more than John Healey was promised and all of that. And yet we're also reporting that service chiefs are disappointed and it still leaves us short of the pledged NATO target of 3.5% by 2035. What did you see yesterday and what do you make of it?

[Tom Sharp]

Yeah, the whole thing, I'm sorry to say, is a Botched job. It's 1 billion more than the amount that caused the entire defence team to resign. The Chief of Defence Staff said at the time, this plan is not. Is not good enough. In the intervening weeks, they've sharpened it, added a billion and a half, and now it seems to be fine. Well, it. Well, it isn't, as you point out. The map to 3.5. What is that? What does it even look like? How long is it going to take? There is no precision in this plan. It's a sticking plaster to talk about increased defence expenditure, but really what it is is an argument about how quickly do you want to carry on drowning? We've got to get to 3% now, we've got to have a clear roadmap to 4. These are large sums of money and I'm not for one minute suggesting that they're going to come easily. But there needs to be a national discussion on how to resource, not just defence. I think one of the problems is defence inevitably ends up talking about ships and tanks. But actually it's much, much bigger than that. It's national resilience and security and that is a whole ship sport, pan Whitehall, cross Whitehall evolution. And if you think about it that way and you look at it that way, then you can start to find ways to resource this properly. What we've done is we've zoomed in on ships and tanks, we haven't allocated sufficient money and now we're patting ourselves on the back and saying nothing to see here. In fact, the number 10 response to Healey resigning was pretty much nothing to see here. So in an environment where you cannot be transparent and you cannot be honest with yourselves, then how can anything in that environment possibly succeed?

[Roland Oliphant]

Well, that sounds pretty bad. You were a navy man. What does it mean for the Royal Navy? This. This particular.

[Tom Sharp]

The navy bit makes me.

[Roland Oliphant]

Because they talk about hybrid. Yeah, hybrid navy. What does that mean?

[Tom Sharp]

Yeah, yeah, the navy bit makes me really, really angry because, you know, I don't necessarily like playing into service politics because we should be resourcing defense properly, not squabbling with our services. In fact, squabbling with the other services is part of the reason we're in such a poor state, because everyone looks in and goes well, look how wasteful you are as you pull each other's hair over the next capability that you can or can't have. So I try and avoid it. But we are an island nation. We are dependent on the sea for our survival. It is our best contribution to NATO by far. When you look at the continent and you look at what continental land armies are providing, the air and maritime part of this is just self evident. And yet the Navy in this last botched job has been botched harder than the other two services. And in particular, the bit that really gripes with me is that they recognize they saw this coming, Navy leadership saw this coming and they went what we used to call ugly early with this hybrid solution.

[Roland Oliphant]

Solutions. Quickly explain to me what is the hybrid solution.

[Tom Sharp]

What they are doing is instead of replacing the Type 45 destroyers, so the frigates are fine, submarines have been built. They're not fine, but they're being built. So this is really about how do we do surface warfare in a drone and modern and networked era. Navy's gone. Okay, there must be another way of doing destroyers because they are defined by a big radar, big powerful radar. That is what makes a destroyer. That and its missile systems. If you can do those another way, then you don't need a big multi billion pound heavy ship with a big radar at the top. And what the hybrid Navy has essentially said is that you can, you can do this another way and you can do it with smaller, more dispersed assets, which makes a lot of sense. If you've got a 4 billion pound destroyer and you lose it, or it fires all its missiles in the first six hours of a conflict and it's now undefended, that's a huge problem. If it gets sunk and goes to the bottom, that's a huge problem. So why not have six, let's say with the same number of missiles, but dispersed. And that's what the hybrid Navy proposes. So it has a common ship in the middle of it, common core vessel in the middle of it, which I'm pretty sure will be an extension of the type 31, which is very good news.

[Roland Oliphant]

The type 31 is a destroyer.

[Tom Sharp]

The type 31 is the common purpose frigate that we're building up in Rosyth. Ok, so you've got that specialist anti submarine frigate, that's the type 26, you've got the common purpose frigate, type 31, which is much, much cheaper.

[Roland Oliphant]

Okay, so there's a frigate in the middle of what?

[Tom Sharp]

So then you have these four different types of sloops. You've got the Type 91, which will be a missile barge so that you can put your weapon systems in. Whether that's asta and how many of those do you have, how many tubes do you have? All to be discussed. The Type 92 is an anti submarine sloop, so that will go with the frigates and go up to the high north and do the stuff up there. The Type 93 is an extra large undersea autonomous vessel, Xluuv Punchy abbreviation, but it looks like a tiny submarine, but it's actually big and has no people in it. And then the type 94 is, I think, where it gets really interesting. That's this, a new sensor platform. So that's the platform that takes multiple radars. You don't need a giant active radar on the top. You have smaller passive radars. You network it with satellites and all this other new technology. AI is transforming the business of radars. And I believe this. Now, I thought originally it was just tech chat, but I do now believe it. So you've got these. So you've got multiple options.

[Roland Oliphant]

All right, this sounds positive. So the Navy came up with this and they said. So they, they saw cuts coming down the line. I thought, is there a way of doing this? It's less expensive. Here's an idea.

[Tom Sharp]

Yeah.

[Roland Oliphant]

Right. Well, then what happened?

[Tom Sharp]

Well, actually, interesting point. They didn't necessarily say it was going to be less expensive, they just said it was. They said it's going to be better because you've dispersed for all the reasons. You've got all. You've got this flexibility. And the Navy over the centuries has been very good at innovating quite often in combat, but also in peacetime. So it was a good way and they priced it. And they said, right, this is what it's going to cost to do properly. Those figures were basically ignored. The dip team either just didn't read it or ignored it. And again, I had to play into service politics here because the dip team had two army officers and one RAF officer. There was no naval officer in the room.

[Roland Oliphant]

As an outsider, it's shocking to me that you literally think that because there wasn't a Royal Navy person on that board, the others stitched them up. You literally think that's what happened?

[Tom Sharp]

I do. I'm afraid everyone's jockeying for position, right? Everyone wants to back their own kit. And the service chiefs will have been leaning in on them. General Rowley would have been leaning in on the army team going, you know, how are we doing? Constant updates. Now. It's the Navy's fault For not having someone in that room.

[Roland Oliphant]

That's just insane though.

[Tom Sharp]

It is. It's absolutely insane. But we've seen it many times before, right? When inter service rivalry cripples another service. And I've written about this, it's kind of inevitable because you're trained to fight alongside your cap badge. It makes you deeply proud of your service, it's in your blood. You can't then expect people to switch that off. So it shouldn't be military at all doing it in the first place. It should be completely outsourced to avoid this. But we fall into this trap again and again and again. And in this case, I think it might be perhaps the most egregious example of it. Because what's happened is the Navy's reward for this hybrid plan for going for something that would have been perhaps a little bit cheaper, also has real benefits for exports and. And so on. They've been given basically a quarter of the money that they needed.

[Roland Oliphant]

Can I flip this around a little bit? So I've just been writing a kind of listicle for the paper about Britain's worst procurement disasters just of the 21st century. It was really difficult to whittle them down to a short list and the numbers are just unbelievable. Even Dan Jarvis said this. Dan Jarvis said it's not just about money, it's about how we spend the money. Why is it that Britain is so profligate? I'm sure it's not just a British problem, but it seems to be because there are lots of examples. I don't have one to pluck out of midair, but I think. Was it the Japanese Navy somehow being able to buy two missile cruisers for half the price of a British destroyer or something? Why can't British defense do things on time and in budget?

[Tom Sharp]

Yeah, look, it's a really good question. I would just start off by saying 90% of the time we do, you just never hear about it because it's smaller projects that just get delivered. But that doesn't mean it's not a car crash at the higher end, because it demonstrably is. There's a couple of parts here. It starts with the annualization of the budget, the sort of boom and bust that that generates. It's a Treasury tool to control defence, but it absolutely cripples the system because you can't budget, you can't plan, whereas France doesn't do that annualization.

[Roland Oliphant]

You mean you've got this much for the year?

[Tom Sharp]

Correct. And then if you don't spend it,

[Roland Oliphant]

we're taking it away, you lose it

[Tom Sharp]

or you end up. So you end up making cost cuttings. So every year that's essentially what this dip has become. It's become a cost cutting exercise. France don't do that. And once you set a project in train, let's say a major project like a ship built, you can't alter that design. We are world champions at tinkering and gold plating mid design. So you end up a bit like the US Constellation frigate that they've now had to abandon. That was supposed to be the FREMM model warship. It was supposed to share 85% of that hull design. It actually, by the time they had poked it, it was 15%. It was a different ship. So we're not the only ones who do it, but we are perhaps world champion.

[Roland Oliphant]

We're not this bad, but okay. So the Royal Navy says that we've got a wonderful new idea, okay, and it might be a little bit cheaper, but the main point is it's new and it's networked and it's got all this stuff. Well, we just did that kind of 20 years ago. So the Type 45 Destroyer, HMS Dragon, just down in the Gulf, meant to be this amazing thing that was the future of air defense and the most radar on the planet or something like that, they were three years late. They came out at about £1 billion apiece, which I understand I get lost in billions when I'm talking with defence. That even in defence terms, that was a bit mad. And then they all broke down and we've only got half as many as we wanted. One of them's been alongside, being refitted for nine years. So how.

[Tom Sharp]

Yeah, I mean, we were supposed to have 12, then it became eight, then it became six. And I remember the line because we had 12 type 42 destroyers. The predecessor, the line was. But it's twice as good, you couldn't make it up. So we ended up with not enough. And with the Type 45, it was very much a tale of two halves above the waterline. It's a good ship, that radar is, has elements of it that are genuinely, well, beating. Remember the Americans looking at it because it's rotating phased array. Their phased array radars are the plates that you see on the Arleigh Burkes. They don't rotate. So they say, well, you're mad. The whole point of a phased array is it doesn't need to rotate, it beam steers. But because of that there are elements that were absolutely cutting edge. We still have people in laboratories in white coats who can turn out some extraordinary kit. And the way Sampson talked to to the command system and the way that talks to the missile system is good. We proved that in the Red Sea with Diamond. Again, there are bits of that that are better than the spy Aegis standard, the holy trinity of shipborne missiles. There are bits of it that are better than that, which is extraordinary. Below the waterline, it's an absolute goat. It's noisy as hell. Now that doesn't necessarily matter because destroyers aren't supposed to hunt submarines, but I mean it's comedically loud. And then this reliability problem as we took an untested propulsion system and then didn't test it properly either. I remember in the early days of the type 45, I mean as a side dis, I was in line to be the first commander to drive one. So the first two were captain drives. I was in line to take diamond, which was number three. And I fought tooth and nail to avoid it because they weren't working. It was obvious they weren't working. So I was then going to spend. And the person you tried not to take.

[Laura (Fox News Correspondent)]

Correct.

[Tom Sharp]

I wanted a type 23 frigate that was deployable, which is what I got. And I ended up in the Gulf and in the high north. So it worked out. But it was very obvious in the early days of the 45 that we had inherited a bit of a basket case. It was cutting edge technology, a lot of high voltage stuff, which again was pretty new at the time and we made it poorly. It is now a good ship, a classic navy style. Over the years we've worked out how to do it. We've invested a huge amount of money in fixing the problem, which was this power propulsion problem. The type 45 is a good ship now. It's got very good capabilities. The probability of kill for some of its against certain missile types is very high. So it's good.

[Roland Oliphant]

Well, I suppose I raised the Type 45 because it was one of the naval examples in the list that I've got. And I've got Ajax, which don't need to go on now. I'm sure people are familiar with Ajax. There was a drone program for the army called Watchkeeper where we took a functioning Israeli drone, developed it, doubled the price and then canceled. It basically never. I think it saw two weeks of service in Helmand for an incredible amount of money. There's an army communications package called Morpheus which still hasn't been made. And I think people were talking about it back in 2013 or something.

[Tom Sharp]

There's more as we said Wedgetail will be on that list shortly.

[Roland Oliphant]

I think this is a new early warning aircraft.

[Tom Sharp]

Right. Absolutely. Vital to the defence of the country. And we're botching it.

[Roland Oliphant]

And we're botching it because we bought second hands or something. There's Nimrod disaster. I'm wondering who's to blame. Yeah. So if I bring you back to the type 45, because I think that's the case that, you know, and I think the type 45 at least has something of a happy ending, because, as you say, it is now quite a good ship, even if there are only six of them, even if only three of them are operational at the moment, and even if they're not, you know, they haven't got all the things that they could have. They seem to work, they seem good. But what went wrong? Who is to blame? Is there anyone we can point at and say, it's the Navy, it's the MoD, it's the government? Yeah.

[Tom Sharp]

One of the problems is the answer to that is quite often no. It's such an amorphous mass of decision makers and complex organizations, all with their own vested interests. The Navy are never blameless in this and are always guilty of gold leafing these things as they go along. Then you've got D and S, the defence equipment and support team, you've got the mod, you've got primes, whether it's BAE or whoever, and then you've got the ministers who are advised, sort of an amalgamation of all this data, and they are the decision makers. The military can only ever provide advice. So the lack of accountability, though, is a real problem here. And as you say, A, it's very hard to pin down who it was and B, that person is never pinned down. The only time I've ever really seen it done or attempted was the Haddon Cave review into the Nimrod crash. XV230 crashed in Afghanistan in 2006, I think it was, And Sir Charles Haddon Cave was called in to do a review and he pulled no punches and he eviscerated people by name, sometimes from 10, 15 years before. But that was tragically, because people died. It seems to be the only time we're ever honest in these situations is when people die. And so I said when RFA Argus, another Royal Fleet Auxiliary, which, by the way, is a fundamental part of having a globally deployable navy. And we've let that erode to almost zero. We've got 10 ships of which we can operate. Three or four. Lime is the one we've discussed is one of them. But RFA Argus was going around the world in 2024, 2025, she came alongside, someone did an inspection and deemed her so unsafe she couldn't get clearance to change berths in Portsmouth Harbour. And yet a year ago, she was traveling around the world as if everything was fine. So I suggested cheekily, but I think probably it was valid they should do a review on that. In fact, probably call in Sir Charles to do a review as if someone had died.

[Roland Oliphant]

He's busy at the moment.

[Tom Sharp]

He is quite busy dealing with someone with a sharp crimes, someone with a sharp pen. I'd happily give it a go. As if people had died, as if that ship had sunk. And, I mean, I was in a ship that nearly did sink, and I did refer to it occasionally as Haddon Cave 2. It's just we got away with it. If HMS Endurance had capsized and 100 people had drowned, then we would have a review that would answer some of the questions that you're describing. If RFA Argus had said sunk alongside in Portsmouth Harbour and people are drowned, then we would review this properly. But what's happened is it's just gone away. Everyone goes quiet. You get a team in. All right, we can now tow it to Falmouth or wherever it now is. We'll dispose of her, we'll keep her on the book so it looks like we've got an extra ship. I mean, it's that level of sort of gameplay and it's really dangerous. And if you look at our submarine fleet, if you speak to anyone who was once a submariner or knows anything about submarines and ask them about submarine safety right now, their blood will run cold. These things are standing into danger because we haven't maintained them properly. And if you're in a steel tube at 200 meters with a nuclear reactor in the middle and heavyweight torpedoes at the front, you need to be able to maintain those things and run them properly or terrible things happen. And that is the corner that the navy is being forced into. And then it provides a solution to that and it gets completely ignored. Yesterday was a deeply depressing naval day. And it's not because we're getting rid of destroyers, it's because the answer to future navies has not been treated with the respect it deserves and it's not been resourced. So we'll botch it like we did with the 45, like we did with the mine countermeasures, autonomous replacement, like we've done with carrier strike. The most complex thing you can do in warfighting and we've half done it. The ships are fantastic. The ship will never appear on your list of procurement debacles. When you look at the things we're discussing, it makes you realize actually how good the Queen Elizabeth cast ships are. They had that shafting problem and that was very avoidable. But other than that, they've been. They've been really good. They are a success story, no doubt about it. But the packaging, the wrapping, the strike bit, the weapons, the aircraft, the logistics,

[Roland Oliphant]

the destroyers to protect them, the destroyers,

[Tom Sharp]

the frigates, the submarines are all missing.

[Roland Oliphant]

I'm going to wrap up, but it sounds to me like one thing you want to see is for heads to roll. Yeah.

[Tom Sharp]

For the culture to change, which it has to before you can change the system, then there has to be a cultural shift. And for that to happen, there has to be accountability, which is completely missing. There has to be honesty, which is basically missing. We are lying to ourselves about this. And you look at the triumphal announcement of yesterday's dip and there is a case study in how we are not being truthful. So we've got to make this a votable issue. We've got to get it out. We've got to talk about national resilience in a way that drives the debate, that forces these systems that we've let atrophy over the years that led to these terrible decisions. We've got to completely redo that. But now you're back into the heart of government. It's not in their vested interest most of the time to make those changes. So many of those departments that we've touched on and a load that we haven't, are invested in the status quo. Their jobs and their livelihoods depend on not ringing the changes. So this is why we are where we are. This is why 15 reviews since 1990 into how we procure to stop wasting money. You know, your question about you can't have more money because you keep wasting it. It's a valid idea.

[Roland Oliphant]

I wouldn't give my kids more money

[Tom Sharp]

if they acted like they just threw most of it away. Yeah, right. And 15 reviews have been conducted into this since 1990 and virtually nothing has changed.

[Roland Oliphant]

Tom Sharp, thank you so much for joining us once again. It's always a pleasure to have you on Iran the latest, and we'll see you again soon.

[Tom Sharp]

Lovely, thank you.

[Roland Oliphant]

Tom Sharp, thank you for joining us on Iran the latest. That is all for today's episode. There is quite a lot coming up towards the end of the week and especially on the weekend. 250 years of the United States, but also Ali Khamenei's funeral in Iran, a major event over there. We'll be watching all of it. One of us will be back tomorrow, but until then, that was Iran. The Latest Goodbye.

[Vinny Sharaney]

Iran the Latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph, created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Vinny Sharaney and Roland Olyphant. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following around the latest on your preferred podcast app. And if you have a moment, leave us a review as it helps others find the show. To stay on top of all of our news, subscribe to the Telegraph, sign up to our Dispatchers newsletter or listen to our sister podcast Ukraine the Latest. We're still on the same email address battlelinestelegraph.co.uk or you can contact us on X. You can find our handles in the show. Notes the producer is Peter Shevlin. The Executive Producer is Louisa Wells.