Roland Oliphant (3:48)

I mean, I suppose the question of Mojtaba brings us onto the question of who really is running Iran at the moment. And that seems important because Donald Trump is now claiming that he's going to postpone or extend the deadline for peace talks or for finding a deal because the regime is terribly fractured and it's not clear who's in charge and they haven't been able to come up with a consistent set of proposals. Is that right?

Sanam Vakil (4:16)

No.

Roland Oliphant (4:17)

No. Okay. Well, that was easy.

Sanam Vakil (4:19)

President Trump makes things up and posts them online particularly. And we know this because since beginning of this war that began with a lot of misconceptions on his side, he thought the system would break quickly. He thought this would be a short war. He really doesn't understand the Islamic Republic, its system, its ability to endure. And I think that he's using the so called very old argument about divisions in the system to try and justify why he hasn't been able to extract a quick and easy deal from Tehran. But I think it's worthwhile just reinforcing again how the Iranian system works and functions and has functioned for quite some time. As I already said, this isn't a system that is personalized around one person. Manei's father, Ali Khamenei, was the Supreme Leader for many decades and the system is very much run, or he ran the system very much as the chairman of a conglomerate, if you will. All of the institutions do work together, some more dominant than others. But key foreign policy decisions have always been consensus based and made in the Supreme National Security Council, where members of the executive and parliamentary branch sit alongside military leaders, appointees by the Supreme Leader's office and others, and their recommendations are made. This search for a key figure or key decision maker I think is going to fail because obviously Mojabah Khamenei is not quite. He hasn't been seen, obviously he's in hospital. There are continued fears that he could be taken out and killed by Israeli strikes. And I don't think he has fully asserted power, so he's working with his team. And one final point. I personally think it will take quite some time if he does recover and if he does assume the position in a public way, I think it will take quite some time for him to become an authoritative supreme leader for no other reason than the country has come through a terrible crisis. And it will take time to build a base. It will take time to establish authority. And that process for his own father, Ali Khamenei, also took a number of years. He was elected in 1989. He didn't really assert his authority until about 1994, let's say. So I think that we're being a bit impatient.

Roland Oliphant (7:04)

You were saying this old distinction between hardliners and moderates, which Donald Trump is drawing on, is somewhat misleading. I'm wondering about the personalities that we do know is in charge. I, I know it's being very opaque and, and it's very difficult to understand what's going on, you know, behind closed doors in Tehran. But there, I don't know. Have you been following Muhammad Kalabaf, the parliamentary speaker? He was the key lead in talks in Pakistan. We had some reports, I think, yesterday or the day before that, that he may have been sidelined from that role. And I, and I do see today that he. I think it's Abbas Arakchi, who's the foreign minister, who's now on his way to Pakistan today, it seems, rather than Calabaaf. Are there any signs of internal discord inside Tehran? And is there any suggestion that the efforts of those who do want to deal are being stymoned by the other side?

Sanam Vakil (7:56)

I suppose quickly, to your first point. Iran is a factionalized system. There are tactical differences, policy differences among the factions. But today and every day since this war broke out, the factions have been unified in what they're trying to achieve. Perhaps some of them have stronger opinions on certain issues and others are more anxious for a deal. But I would say that most, if not all of this system is motivated to get a deal with the Trump administration. And why do they need one? Because this war, of course, has been existential for them, and the economic damage is substantial. They've been bearing the brunt of sanctions for decades. There were protests already in January that were brutally suppressed. And so a deal, a deal that will grant them some sort of economic relief can help them reconstruct and help them rehabilitate and help re legitimize this third itineration of the Islamic Republic. So back to the negotiations. I believe Arakchi is the foreign minister going to Islamabad to meet officials in the Pakistani Foreign Ministry. I don't think that he is leading a delegation to meet the Americans in any way. And I strongly believe that in the next round of negotiations when they do develop. Right now we're seeing a lot of back channeling. And it's important that Adochi is going, that Kolibov will still be there. He has been a key figure in the Iranian system for quite some time. He's been speaker of the Parliament. He was many times a candidate for president. He was mayor of Tehran. He is a known quantity. He is close with the irgc, former Guards member himself. So he is an insider in this system of insiders. And I would just caution readers, observers of these talks and these dynamics to just get their news from reliable outlets. Since the war began, Israeli news sources have been spreading a lot of misinformation and disinformation. And I would wait for verification from the sources themselves.

Roland Oliphant (10:13)

Can I piss you a little bit on your idea seems to be that look, that, yes, there's tactical differences, but they're fairly united in what they want. They do want a deal which moves us forward a little bit. Can you just walk us through what you think that means and how optimistic you are about, I don't know, some kind of concessions being made by the Iranians or either side. How far do you think they are prepared to go to get an agreement to end this crisis? And do you think it's doable then, therefore, in the foreseeable future?

Sanam Vakil (10:41)

I do think that there is a possibility of a deal, but it's not going to be a full submission that President Trump is seeking. If the US Is willing to negotiate, I think that there is room for negotiation. The Iranians have been negotiating with the Trump administration a few times now. All of those negotiations have ended with military conflict. There's certainly scope to make compromises on the nuclear program. Again, it's not going to be Perhaps the full 15 points that President Trump is seeking, but we saw from their talks in Geneva and the reporting that followed that there were serious concessions offered, including a willingness to downblend Iran's highly enriched uranium, firmly commit to no enrichment for a period of time. So these are details that I think can be hammered out effectively. The Iranians need to give President Trump something better than the JCPOA to satisfy critics in the United States, and so that President Trump can see that he was able to deliver a deal better than President Obama's. But that doesn't solve the full problem because obviously, as a result of this war, Iran has struck out at its neighbors in a very dangerous way. They have security concerns about Iran's ballistic missiles and drones, long standing frustrations about Iran's support for proxy groups. And it's unclear if that could be in some way brought into a deal. And then the bigger issue, of course, for the international community is the Strait of Hormuz, which remains blockaded by the Iranians and blockaded by the Americans. And you know, both sides will need to find a solution to step back. That will be very important for the region. Both sides want and need a deal and there is room and scope for a deal. What's problematic here is that the demands are very maximalist right now and there needs to be compromise from President Trump as well as from the Iranian system. Right now we are in a standoff where both sides are backed up against the wall and waiting for the other side to blink.

Roland Oliphant (13:06)

One way to help this along, it seems to be suggested, is to kill people who don't want to make a deal. So Donald Trump, it's not his suggestion, but he reposted a post on Truth Social of somebody saying we'll just kill the ones who don't want a deal. And off the back of that, CNN have reported that U.S. i don't know who's leaked this to them. They seem to have been briefed that the US Military is developing option to strike Iranians undermining the peace talks. The name that's being mentioned here is Ahmed Wahidi, the commander in chief of the irgc. What do you make of that and do you think it might actually help?

Sanam Vakil (13:44)

Definitely not. I mean, I think again, just to reinforce, the United States is like a car dealer looking to sell a car as quick as possible in order to meet the monthly target and get his commission as quickly as possible. Without understanding the psychology of the consumer here, and in this case, it's important to understand the psychology of the people currently running the show in Iran. They have two times now tried to negotiate with the Trump administration. Both times it's ended strikes. They survived the 38 day military campaign. They haven't been defeated. They haven't. They've certainly taken many, many hits, but they remain standing. And you know, by many accounts they have increased their leverage with the Strait of Hormuz. They're not showing willingness to submit. They want a sustainable deal that will protect themselves from further attacks and that will guarantee them some Consistent economic relief. Do you think that killing them is going to get us to opening the Strait of Hormuz and seeing some sort of arrangement on Iran's nuclear program? I personally don't think so. I think this is going to further embed and entrench individuals and bring up new individuals that have no inclination to engage with the United States. I mean, these are not normal ways of handling hostilities. Do you think that killing Hassan Nasrallah helped Israel solve its problem with Hezbollah? I don't think so. Has killing Ismail Haniyeh solved Israel's security problem with the Palestinians? No, in fact, they're all still there now. They have a more endemic hostility with the Iranian system.

Roland Oliphant (15:56)

You seem to imply that the Trump administration is the one under more time pressure here. Definitely, in a way, just. Just because of their own timetable to a degree.

Donald Trump (16:05)

He said, well, don't rush me, don't rush me, Jeff. You know, guys like you, you want to say, oh, so we were in Vietnam like for 18 years. We were in Iraq for many, many years. We were in for all the. I don't like to say World War II, because that was a biggie, but we were four and a half, almost five years in World War II. We were in the Korean War for seven years. I've been doing this for six weeks. And their military is totally defeated. They're outside of the little wise guy ships, I call them the wise guy ships. The little boats that they have running around with guns in them. We'll take them out too, when we see them.

Roland Oliphant (16:47)

So he seems to be pushing back on that at the moment. I'm just wondering what you. I suppose I want your response to that remark, but I'm also wondering whether you think actually that might be wise on his part in a way, because part of his problem is this self imposed, you know, car salesman's want to make the sale right now because I need to get the win. And you seem to be suggesting that that's not the way to approach it. So do you think he's actually kind of quite right to start saying, look, don't rush me, I've got to be patient?

Sanam Vakil (17:15)

Well, yes and no. If he does want to drag this out, there will be implications and the implications will be felt not just by the Iranians, the Iranian system, the region, but the economy. Petrol prices will be going up, diesel fuel prices are going up, jet fuel is going to run out in a number of weeks. The pressure will be on President Trump. Certainly Iran will be on significant amount under a lot of pressure, but there's a massive difference. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a rogue regime in the Middle east that has survived 47 years under sanctions and has time and again shown willingness to repress its own people in order to stay in power. The President of the United States is looking to visit Xi Jinping in Beijing. He's looking to celebrate the 250th anniversary of the US in July. And he's got the November midterm elections hanging over him. I would say time is not on his side. And one more point. He did stand in the Middle east, in the Gulf, in Riyadh, actually, last fall or last May, sorry. Where he criticized his predecessors, those even in the Republican party, like George H.W. bush, for launching forever wars. And he committed to being a different kind of American president, one that didn't support chaos but supported commerce. One that celebrated technology, not terrorism. And the region celebrated his walk back and walk away from forever wars that have failed and devastated the Middle East. And lo and behold, less than a year on, he's walked himself into a quagmire.

Roland Oliphant (19:10)

I'm just wondering, Sanam, you know, is actually quite likely that we're going to see a resumption of combat before, before the peace process or the diplomacy reach a conclusion. I mean, there's two drones apparently hit Kuwait. They were fired from Iraq rather than Iran. But nonetheless, and we have seen these, you know, these, these boardings of ships in, in the Strait of Hormuz. Do you think this current ceasefire is going to hold?

Sanam Vakil (19:35)

Well, like most of the Middle east ceasefires, there are ceasefires in all but name only. The Lebanese Israeli ceasefire is, you know,

Roland Oliphant (19:45)

still, which has been extended by three weeks.

Sanam Vakil (19:47)

But it's not a classical ceasefire where nobody dies and no strikes take place. The same goes for Gaza. And the same, I think, applies here. There will be a waxing and waning of tensions, conflict dynamics, whether it's strikes coming from Iraq to Gulf states, whether it's incidents in the Persian Gulf and in the Strait of Hormuz, and whether it's we go back into full war or not, I can't say for sure. But there is a third aircraft carrier that has arrived in the region. There are over 50,000American troops waiting with the various options still there. In terms of what to do, I definitely think it's a possibility. And in fact, obviously, it looks like a more real possibility than getting to a deal at this point. But there is a huge diplomatic effort underway, led by Pakistan, but supported by a coalition of regional countries from Saudi Arabia to Turkey to Egypt, but to many others who are uncomfortable with the dynamics, need this war to come to an end. Not looking to rehabilitate Iran per se because they've all been impacted by this war and struck by Iran, but recognize that the persistence of conflict and the resumption of war will be even more dangerous for everyone.

Roland Oliphant (21:11)

How will this change the Middle east in the years and decades to come? And I don't know, has the region that you were used to dealing with and studying for years and decades changed in any fundamental way because of what's just happened?

Sanam Vakil (21:28)

Well, I certainly think that this war is going to go down as one of the big inflection points, but I think the region has been going through a fundamental change in the order since October 7, actually, as Israel has launched a series of wars to address its security issues. And that began this process that is playing out now. I'm not terribly confident in predicting what the region will look like as a result of this war because I think it's going to be very much decided based on how this war ends. And that will be very important for the balance of power in the Middle east, which is generally always balanced between two or more states. My expectation is that there will be a balance of power between Israel, between Saudi Arabia, between Turkey and maybe what's left of Iran. Unclear. Depends how Iran is left. But for the region in particular, how this war ends very much matters. If there is a big deal that knits it all up, that would be the ideal situation. Although the region, of course, is very angry and uncomfortable with an aggressive Iran that has, you know, struck out at so many states over the past couple of months. But a weakened, contained Iran that doesn't have economic off ramps, that is prone to internal violence and unrest and could perhaps also fragment over time is equally dangerous for the region.

Roland Oliphant (23:03)

Stam, you were born in Tehran, I believe, so this is not, this is not a merely academic kind of or policy question for you. This. Well, what can you tell us about. I don't know about how it's made you feel or how it's affected people. You know.

Sanam Vakil (23:19)

Well, I haven't been back to Iran since 2009 and that's because of my work and because the system in Iran has detained many friends and colleagues over the years. And in my profession one has to be very careful. I think this war has been very difficult for all Iranians everywhere, but especially obviously those living through the trauma of nightly and daily strikes and the uncertainty. And I think that they're going to be living with that for quite Some time. It's been very stressful and difficult trying to connect with friends and family. The government shut off the Internet on January 8, the night of the brutal crackdown and protests. So it's been a very stressful number of months. And I think everyone I know has been deeply impacted and affected and worried. And then in my job, you're supposed to be sober and analytical and not bring your emotions into it. So it's added a additional layer. And people in the diaspora have been very polarized and very emotional and not fully aware of the strength and resilience of authoritarian states. So it's been interesting to see them become very passionate about political figures abroad. And Reza Pahlavi.

Roland Oliphant (24:42)

Reza Pahlavi, are you saying there's been a kind of a big disappointment then, that there was an expectation that maybe the regime would come tumbling down and. Or a hope that that could happen? That's been disappointing.

Sanam Vakil (24:54)

I understand the hope. I think everyone hopes that there will be a better, more equitable, democratic system that comes to the foreign Iran. I think that's what the diaspora, the analytical community, the activist community, everyone has wanted. But I think what I've been very uncomfortable with is seeing people call for externally sponsored strikes to foster regime change inside the country. I understand that it's a brutal regime and people are desperate, but I don't think that that's what should be the role of the diaspora. I think I take my cues and I take my sort of the pulse of people inside the country. And of course, there have been plenty of people, particularly young people, who saw Reza Pahlavi as an alternative and who are desperate for regime change, and I'm with them. But this regime is very fierce. This regime continues to have a base. And I think part of the reason why this war is so devastating and why I was so opposed to it is because I anticipated, unfortunately, correctly, that it would entrench the regime further. And by killing Ali Khamenei, making him a martyr, it has empowered and emboldened a new generation and taken away that one opportunity for indigenous change inside the country. So I think people will be stuck for another generation.

Roland Oliphant (26:23)

So rather than seizing the moment that January created, it's actually extinguished the possibility.

Sanam Vakil (26:29)

Yes.

Roland Oliphant (26:30)

Sobering thought. Sanam, thank you very much. We'll leave it there. That's a really, really insightful moment. Thank you. Sanam Bakal, the director of the Middle east and North Africa Program at Chatham House there. Going to take a short break now. When we come back, we'll be talking about economics, about the oil Price and insider trading. Welcome back. You're listening to Iran, the latest. With me, Roland Oliphant. Since the war began, of course, the economic impact on not only Iran and the Gulf and the wider Middle east, but the entire world has become more and more pronounced. It now looks like the impact on oil markets might possibly be worse than we've already been told. For more on this, I turned to Hans van Leeuwen, our international economics editor, and began by asking him just which oil price we should have had our eyes on.

Hans van Leeuwen (27:40)

Well, when we write about stories about the oil price, we tend to sort of talk about this one that you will have heard, that's $95 a barrel, $100 a barrel, now it's $110 a barrel. And economists then say, oh, you know, if the oil price stays at $110 a barrel, this is what will happen to inflation, this is what will happen to, you know, petrol prices and therefore the economy and so on. But the trouble is, what we found in the last month or two, quite unusually, is that that price isn't necessarily reflecting the kind of real world oil price that we're actually. That's actually feeding through to petrol pumps right now. There's this. If you want to buy cargo on the spot market, like right now, you need to get some oil and you're looking for a tanker that's got some to put, and you've got a tanker and you want to put some oil on it, you'll do that and you'll pay. If you haven't already locked in a price through the futures market, which is the one I've just been talking about, you'll do it in the spot market, where you're paying whatever the price is on the day, sort of more or less. And that price normally tracks the price we're all talking about, the one that Donald Trump watches very closely, and in the last month and a half, it hasn't. And the price that you'd pay if you want to find some oil somewhere in the world and put it on a tanker right now is up as much as $140. Even when the price we're all talking about is still in the, like, 95, 99 sort of range. The problem is actually a lot worse than we think, in the sense that what that market is telling us, what the spot market is telling us, is that it's very hard to get your hands on oil. And if you want some, you're going to pay a lot more for it than the Brent, you know, price that we were looking at would suggest. And the question then is, well, what happens next? Because the price we're looking at is called a futures contract. It's what everyone thinks the price will be in two months time. And it's lower because everyone thinks we're going to sort this out in the next two months. But what the spot price is telling us is maybe we're not going to sort it out in the next two months.

Roland Oliphant (29:25)

Oh, great. So you kind of took the question out of my mouth. You say they're not tracking each other. Is that in a good way or a bad way? It sounds like it's in a bad way.

Hans van Leeuwen (29:34)

It's in a bad way.

Roland Oliphant (29:35)

Yeah.

Hans van Leeuwen (29:35)

Yeah. You know, the thing about the oil market is what's happened is in, as I think everybody now knows, is that we've lost about one fifth of the world's oil supply. It's locked up in the Persian Gulf, more or less. I mean, there's been a big scramble to kind of, you know, okay, we're not getting this oil. What can we do? A, we can pay a lot more for the rest of the oil areas. We can draw down on the reserves that everybody has and we can send more boats, all the boats that can't get into the Persian Gulf, let's send them all to the US where there's lots of oil and get that. And that sort of helps, but it doesn't solve the problem. And so gradually, if this doesn't, if this, if there isn't a kind of resolution to the Strait of Hormuz blockade soon, you know, we're going to draw down more of those stocks, we're going to exhaust those easy, low hanging fruit options for kind of keeping the oil market moving. And that's when things will get much more difficult.

Roland Oliphant (30:20)

Have you got a timeline for when things get much more difficult?

Hans van Leeuwen (30:23)

I mean, what we're already seeing the numbers for kind of Marchy Aprily, you know, inflation economic indicators are starting to come in and we are starting to see prices tick up. And when inflation rises, okay, this inflation isn't the sort of inflation that usually causes a central bank to raise interest rates because it's what they call a supply shock, which means that, you know, it's a one off thing. And it shouldn't mean that prices stay higher for longer because you know, it doesn't mean that we all suddenly want higher pay increases, which means everyone, companies raise prices, which means we want higher pay increases. It doesn't go into a kind of inflationary circle that you can only choke off by raising interest rates and slowing the economy down. This one is supposedly something we can look through. But the trouble is, you know, the worry is that once the oil prices, if the disruption goes on and the supplies are squeezed and prices are high for longer, everything starts to go up in price and it does start to become the kind of sticky inflation that causes interest rates to go up. So the best case scenario, really, is that it's a supply shock. We all pay higher prices for the next while, and then they come down again and we don't have to have higher interest rates on our mortgages and all the kind of nastiness that that ensues.

Roland Oliphant (31:30)

I mean, the nightmare scenario people are talking about is just running out of aviation fuel and airlines canceling routes. My example is a little bit frivolous. But the other side of that, I suppose, is that if there's not enough oil to go around, do governments have to start asking people to just use less energy? Is that where we're going?

Hans van Leeuwen (31:51)

That is where Asia has already gone. So if you look at Korea or Thailand or Vietnam or the Philippines or Bangladesh or Pakistan, if you look at those countries which don't have the luxury of big reserves of stockpiles of oil that we have, and the ability also to pay large amounts to get what there is still floating around because the prices have been bid up so much, they are introducing those measures and they are struggling with that. In some cases, however, that hasn't translated to Europe and Britain in the same way, because we have more ability to kind of, you know, divert some of those supplies to us at the moment, and we have the stockpile releases that have gone on. So what some people say is, you know what, we might be able to tide this over if there is a ceasefire come sort of May June, it will take a while for things to settle down again. But, you know, and there's also the issue about fertiliser and, you know, what's going to happen to food prices and, you know, how farmers are going to sort of get through this year and so on and so forth, but the optimistic view is that this is a shock that won't kind of endure for too long. The pessimistic view is that, you know, and you hear people say this in the oil market, you know, this is a bit like Covid, you know, what you see in Asia now is coming to Europe. I'm a sort of very reluctant forecaster, but it's tricky because when I'm talking to people, when you hear someone make the positive case, he's sort of like, oh, yeah, that, that. Yeah, of course, you know, the Saudis are getting the oil out through the Red Sea. Yeah. The US Is going to pump more.

Roland Oliphant (33:18)

Yeah.

Hans van Leeuwen (33:18)

And then you'll hear someone say, oh, the US can't pump more because the futures price isn't yet high enough to make it economical for them to drill more yet. And so then you hit. So, you know, that's going to take, like, months. And, and then the more months it takes to get back to normal, the more difficult things will become for airlines, for motorists, for the economy in general. So it's hard to see things ticking back to normal at a pace that will avoid, you know, a good lick of pain.

Roland Oliphant (33:43)

Okay. You've also written a piece out today. The world risks fresh crisis as countries consider copying the Tehran tollbooth. And this is the idea that other people sitting on other strategic waterways might start to charging fees for using them. Are people actually suggesting this?

Hans van Leeuwen (34:00)

Well, it was an Indonesian finance minister who sort of floated this idea, I think is probably the best way of putting it, I must say. It was probably a bit of a thought bubble from him, by the sound of it. It's not really his competence, although I guess he's in charge of finance, so he'd like to see more revenue. And he was kind of slapped down within a day or so by the foreign minister. And the Singaporeans who sit on the other side of the Strait of Malacca from Indonesia, were also very negative about the idea. So it's not like it's going anywhere now. But what people saw as the significance of it was that, like, why are we even talking about tolls on major freight waterways? Because the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is one of the most fundamental, you know, pieces of international law there is. It's the right of passage through international waters for freight without being impeded or, you know, or having tolls charged. And so, you know, Iran has broken the taboo. Donald Trump, in a truth social post, kind of doubled down on that sort of breaking of the taboo by saying something like, well, you know, if Iran's going to do it, why shouldn't we do it? We were the winners. And, you know, we know that Donald Trump's relationship with international law and international norms of diplomacy is not the strongest. And so with that taboo broken, you know, it isn't a kind of thing for now. But the Indonesian finance minister's words sort of suggest that, well, that, you know, we've moved into a new normal where these are things that can actually get discussed. Whereas, you know, at the beginning of 2026, the idea of tolling, you know, major maritime traffic routes was almost, was one of the few unthinkable things in international law. And now it's not only thinkable, it's sayable as well. And you know, there are other straits as well. The Chinese and the US are kind of wrestling quietly in the shadows over the Panama Canal.

Roland Oliphant (35:43)

You do have to pay fees for the canal. No, no, for Suez and Panama, right?

Hans van Leeuwen (35:46)

Yeah, yeah. But it's more the sort of broader point of like there are these choke points and we know they exist now and they're, they're, they're no longer sort of, they can no longer be taken for granted, I think is. That is the.

Roland Oliphant (35:56)

It's interesting, isn't it? I kind of jokingly made this point to Tom Sharp, former Royal Navy commander who writes for us and who's often on the podcast about the English Channel. I mean, you know, the Straits of Dover, why don't we do that? I mean, we've got a. I think it's a 28 billion pound black hole in the defense budget. And I mean, we laugh about it, but you know, if we're in this era of kind of asking the question, it's not implausible. It could be done, couldn't it?

Hans van Leeuwen (36:21)

It could be done, I suppose. I don't know what Sharpe's view of Britain's naval capacity to, to carry out such a kind of enforcement exercise is at the moment, or isn't. But in principle, you know, the English Channel is the world's busiest maritime route and it's one of the narrowest as well. So yes, you know, and here we are saying the unsayable and thinking the unthinkable. That's the sort of world we're in. And it's not only, you know, tolling the choke points, it's also there's people thinking, well, can we avoid the choke points? Can we bypass them? So in the Gulf, I've written recently about how in the Gulf, you know, Saudi's got this pipeline that I mentioned before, you know, and they. All the Gulf states are thinking, can we build more land pipelines like this? Can we kind of like diversify so that we don't rely entirely on the Strait of Hormuz? And earlier in the week the Thais actually said we want to spend some vast sum of money. It was like 20 billion quid or something, building a kind of a road across the Thai peninsula so your tanker could dock on the on one side of the Thai peninsula, you know, get all this stuff freighted the other side and get on another boat so it didn't have to go through the Strait of Malacca. So, you know, all these things are being said and talked about, and, you know, the ultimate result of any of this stuff would be, you know, just things are going to cost more to send places and, you know, and when freight costs more because of, you know, higher insurance and people diverting around the routes that are choke points, we, the consumers end up paying that. So, again, it all comes back to us.

Roland Oliphant (37:37)

I mean, you've talked about, okay, everyone's talking about the futures price and the price of oil that we talk about. That's the wrong one. And actually we should be talking about how much the stuff actually costs on the spot market. I don't know. It strikes me that maybe we've been mystified for many, many years by the kind of world of numbers and masters of the universe and so on, and got divorced from the real things like the amount of stuff there is and how much it costs.

Hans van Leeuwen (38:01)

I think one thing about the kind of very present moment, an investor said to me, you know, I was saying, what kind of effect has Trump really had on, you know, on markets and how they function, you know, in his year and a bit in office? And he said, it's kind of created an environment where speculation has become a much more dominant sort of feature of the market than it was than it normally is or should be, because there's a sort of feedback loop between his kind of constant feeding of the kind of narrative and the kind of oscillations in. In what he feeds into the narrative, which you can trade on. And then, you know, when they, when it gets traded on, everyone thinks, oh, right, we need to pay attention to this. And you develop this kind of sort of cycle of, you know, watching Trump's pronouncements, trading on them, you know, and then Trump pronouncing something else and then trading on that. So his view was. And again, it's. It's above my pay grade, really. But his view was that that the level of speculation in the system has increased considerably in the last year. And I think that's never usually a good thing, except for the people that make the money.

Roland Oliphant (39:02)

I suppose off the back of the question about speculation, there have been these weird allegations of insider trading, of people benefiting from people who know what's going to happen, making trades based on all this. It began at the very beginning of the war. So this is actually from A New York Times analysis on the Friday before, before the war began, an unusual surge of more than 150 polymarket accounts placed hundreds of bets predicting a US strike on Iran by the next day. The Monday that Trump announced a pause in airstrikes. That was back in late March. $580 million in oil futures flooded the market in a sudden spike. Again, this is Axios, roughly 16 minutes before the announcement. What do we know about this?

Hans van Leeuwen (39:43)

Well, what we do know is the trades. So even this week, just before Donald Trump announced an extension of the ceasefire, There was a 430 million US dollar trade in the oil market that essentially allowed someone to make a rather remarkably well timed bit of profit. And over the last couple of months, this has happened in the oil market several times in ways that are a little bit hard to kind of explain as a coincidence. And at the moment there's no sort of sense of where this is coming from, who might be involved. We've had the White House kind of launch an investigation, I think, or at least put out a sternly worded statement to staff saying, guys do not use information about, you know, future events to, you know, to not profit from your office. So they're obviously a bit worried about how it looks. I don't know whether they're also worried about whether it's actually happening from within the White House and who's behind it. The other part of this is the prediction markets. There's been an increasing sort of the popularity of betting on what might happen next in world events has taken off in the last year or two and people are making quite large bets on, you know, Donald Trump will do this or, you know, there'll be a ceasefire on this date or, you know, these sorts of questions. And in that market too, there's been some slightly strange movements to the point where Donald Trump actually overnight on Thursday said he doesn't really like the prediction markets or the event betting. He's not a fan of it, which he said the world is sort of turning into a bit of a casino. And that echoes a view, a concern that quite a lot of people have. So there is this sort of, what that's doing is just creating a sense of, in the oil market, at least not so much in the prediction market, but in the oil market. It's just another sort of thing that's making people think, can we trust these prices? Do they reflect what's going on? You know, is the market broken in some way at the moment? It's those sorts of, it's that it just feeds into that level of that sense that the market might be at a slightly decadent or dysfunctional point.

Roland Oliphant (41:41)

It's extraordinary, isn't it? Fascinating stuff. I'm sure it won't be the last time we speak. Hans, thank you so much for joining us on Iran the Latest.

Hans van Leeuwen (41:50)

Pleasure.

Roland Oliphant (41:50)

Thank you very much. That was Hans van Leeuwen, the Telegraph's international economics Editor. That's all from Iran the latest for today. We'll be back on Monday with our usual updates. Until then, that was Iran the Latest. Goodbye. Iran the Latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph, created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Roland Oliphant and Venetia Rainey. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following around the latest on your preferred podcast app. And if you have a moment, leave a review as it helps others find the show. For more from our foreign correspondents on the ground, sign up for our daily newsletter cables via our website or listen to our sister podcast Ukraine the Latest. We are still on the same email address battlelinestelegraph.co.uk or you can contact us on X. You can find our handles in the show. Notes the producer is Elliot Lampit. The executive producers are Venetia Rainey and Louisa Wells.