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- [00:04]
Sophia Yan
The telegraph.
- [00:10]
Pura Advertiser
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- [00:25]
Elizabeth Cherkov
Acast powers the world's best podcasts.
- [00:29]
Roland Oliphant
Here's the show that we recommend. I'm Kai Wright.
- [00:33]
Sophia Yan
I'm Carter Sherman. Welcome to Stateside with Kai and Carter. We're a new show from the Guardian.
- [00:38]
Roland Oliphant
We're talking to big thinkers and the best journalists just trying to understand the world through smart conversation and honest reporting.
- [00:44]
Sophia Yan
We don't have billionaires telling us what to say.
- [00:46]
Roland Oliphant
Stateside with Kai and Carter will come out three times a week, Monday, Wednesday and Friday starting May 13.
- [00:52]
Sophia Yan
Subscribe on YouTube or wherever you get your podcasts.
- [01:01]
Elizabeth Cherkov
Acast helps creators launch, grow and monetize their podcasts everywhere. Acast.com. I was kidnapped by idiots because they're really deeply ignorant about the world. Don't know the tradecraft of what they're supposed to be doing. A short time ago, the United States military began major combat operations.
- [01:31]
Sophia Yan
Today, President Trump says Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in the attacks.
- [01:42]
Elizabeth Cherkov
The Pentagon is weighing a takeover of that island as a way to force the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran begged for this ceasefire and we all know it.
- [01:53]
Roland Oliphant
Does anyone really think that someone can tell President Trump what to do? Come on, Sophia.
- [02:00]
Sophia Yan
I'm Sophia Yan.
- [02:02]
Roland Oliphant
And I'm Roland Olliford.
- [02:03]
Sophia Yan
This is Iran, the latest. It's Friday, 30th May, 91 days since the war began and 51 days since the ceasefire was declared. Later in this episode, we'll be speaking with Elizabeth Cherkov, a senior non resident fellow at New Lines Institute, a US Think tank. She's a Middle east expert. Her work has spanned a range of topics from the Syrian civil war to human rights. And she has a unique perspective on Iran's proxy groups having been kidnapped in Baghdad back in 2023. More from Liz later. First, some news.
- [02:35]
Roland Oliphant
Potentially very momentous news. The US Blockade of Iran is over, or so says Donald Trump, writing on Truth Social just at the very last moment we could possibly get it into this podcast. He has announced that ships caught in the Strait due to our amazing and unprecedented naval blockade, which will now be lifted, may start the process of heading home. Say hello to your wives, husband, parents and families from me, your favorite president. The enriched material, sometimes referred to as nuclear dust, which is buried deep underground with virtually collapsed mountains caused by our powerful B2 bomber attack 11 months ago sitting on top of it will be unearthed by the United States, which it is agreed is the only country, along with China, with the mechanical capability of doing so in close coordination and conjunction with the Islamic Republic of Iran, plus the International Atomic Energy Agency. And destroyed. No money will be exchanged until further notice. Other items of far less importance have been agreed to. I'll be meeting now in the Situation Room to make a final determination. Thank you for your attention in this matter. Is the war completely over? It very much looks like it could be. And this follows two sets of leaks, rival leaks, first from the Iranian and then from the American capital over the past couple of days about a memorandum of understanding that seemed to be getting close to some kind of agreement. What we know about those documents and the latest leak came from Washington, was initially reported by Axios, but has been confirmed by US Officials in the hours before Donald Trump put out. That tweet essentially said there was going to be a deal to reopen the strait. The ceasefire will be extended by another 60 days. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz would be unrestricted with no tolls or harassment. And Iran will remove all mines in the water in days. And a little bit of his truth Social post, Donald Trump also talked about the removal of mines. The United States, in exchange, would lift its naval blockade in proportion to or at the same rate as commercial traffic resumes. If Donald Trump is saying that the blockade is over right now, maybe that means the Iranians have agreed to end their blockade straight away as well. Lastly, the US Would then issue some sanctions waivers to allow Iran to sell oil freely. So these are the details that were released to the American press yesterday. They aligned in some ways quite closely with a similar leak that came out of Tehran a few days earlier, but with significant differences. The Iranian draft that was put out by Iranian state television said that Iran would retain control of the strait. America had agreed that Iran would charge service fees on ships using it and that the US had promised to withdraw its forces from the region. Also made no mention of the nuclear issue that seemed at the time a little bit far fetched. So there we have it. The war may well finally be drawing to a close. One word of caution at the moment, and I'm speaking about 45 minutes after he wrote this or posted it, we only have Donald Trump's account of this. We don't have a response from the Iranians at the moment. So we don't necessarily know whether they're going to turn around and say, oh no he's got the wrong end of the stick and we're not agreeing to this. This followers of this show and anybody who's been worrying about this war for the past several weeks will know that is we've been through that cycle several times. Nonetheless, a very big moment indeed. And we'll be watching this. Well, we'll be watching over the weekend. We'll give you many more details on Monday. But we have a very interesting guest, Elizabeth Cherkov.
- [06:27]
Sophia Yan
She is a researcher who specializes in the Middle East. She's worked on a whole range of issues and today we're speaking to her about Iran and its proxy group network, the Axis of Resistance, how they operate in the region, how they're changing in fabric and perhaps direction as the balance of power has shifted with Iran given this particular war. As I mentioned earlier, she has a really interesting insight to share about these groups, particularly Kataib Hezbollah, an Iran backed militia based in Iraq. Because Liz was kidnapped in Baghdad in 2023. She was conducting her research, doctoral candidate at Princeton University and was held for 903 days in captivity. She was released last September. And our conversation with her today will focus on Liz's insights as a researcher who's just spent so much time in the Middle east studying these group. Yeah. Liz, thank you so much for joining us today. You know, your work has focused in the Middle east for so long and in a range of topics. But you are also a specialist on Iran and Iran proxy groups. And I was hoping that today we could talk pretty broadly about where you see these groups, you know, how you assess how they've behaved through this particular war compared to past conflicts.
- [07:57]
Elizabeth Cherkov
Yeah. So the conduct in the 40 day war was substantially different from the 12 day war. The 12 day war was very highly targeted and signaled before it began and while it was being carried out that this is a war on Iran's nuclear program and missile capabilities. And therefore there wasn't the sense within the Iranian regime that this is an existential struggle. And unlike the 40 Day War, the goal stated quite clearly by Israeli officials in particular, but also by President Trump on at least one occasion was regime change in Iran. And therefore Tehran sensed that this is an existential fight and it needs to pull all the brakes and use all the tools at its disposal to try and influence the cost on the adversaries to stop this war. What is notable in the case of the Iranian backed militias in Iraq is that they barely participated in the 12 day war. They launched about 40 drones at Israel at the time and caused no effect. 99.9% of the drones that were fired at Israel at the time, there were about 1,000 such drones didn't hit anything. And the Trudeau that did hit something didn't cause any casualties. But in the case of the 40 day war, the Iranian backed militias in Iraq were activated early on. They were supplied before the war as it became clear that the likelihood of conflict is quite high. And Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps personnel was in charge of ferrying these drones and missiles, overseeing the deployment, the execution of attacks, most of them operating out of the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad. And the militias were highly active in targeting US targets inside Iraq. So particularly the US Embassy in Baghdad, the US Consulate in Erbil, and also the US base in Al Harir near Erbil. Also targets of Kurdish Iranian militias that are based in Iraqi Kurdistan, whom Israel intended to use to kind of launch a ground invasion into Iranian Kurdistan. And very notably against Arab Gulf countries and Arab countries. Jordan as well was targeted by these militias. They would fire drones and missiles at those countries. So this included Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other countries to a lesser extent. And very notably, while these Iraqi militias did launch a few drones in Israel that didn't cause any damage, they never claimed these attacks. The fact that they're attacking was confirmed to me both by Iraqi security sources, but also by the IDF spokesperson. They told Fox News that indeed, and also to Israeli media that indeed drones were launched from Heraq at Israel. But overwhelmingly the attacks focused on what the Iranian regime perceived to be softer targets, which are Arab Gulf countries.
- [12:02]
Sophia Yan
Why do you think the activity was more pronounced in this current war compared to last June? I mean, there was really no activity from the proxy groups then.
- [12:11]
Elizabeth Cherkov
It was definitely this sense of threat that basically the Iranian regime needs to, it knows that it cannot, you know, go toe to toe with with Israel in the U.S. you know, the U.S. is the strongest military power in the history of humanity and Israel is, is quite a strong force. Iran has, you know, owing to sanctions, owing to a multitude of factors, has quite a backwards, you know, military capabilities overwhelmingly focused on missiles and drones. And therefore the Iranian strategy early on was basically to exact a cost on the adversary. And the Iranian strategy itself was very heavily focused on firing at Arab Gulf countries in part because simply limitations on its arsenal basically of long range missiles that can reach Israel, their number is smaller and the number of the launchers available to them is smaller than shorter range missiles that can reach the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other countries. But also the belief that these countries are the soft underbelly, their Economies are very much interlinked with the global economy. They're producers of oil and gas, et cetera. And this is why the Iranian backed militias in Iraq were activated very much to target Gulf countries. Over half of attacks, for example in Saudi Arabia, I believe this was reported by Wall Street Journal, were actually originated from Iraq. And many other attacks on other Gulf countries originated in Iraq by these malicious, commanded and supplied by the irgc. And we also saw the activation of Lebanese Hezbollah. The activation of Lebanese Hezbollah was particularly notable given the weakness of the militia after pretty much losing the war in 2024 that included the assassination of its entire leadership as well as the activation of the pagers and the walkie talkie that were sold to Hezbollah by the Mossad. And afterwards, after that war concluded, Israel basically continued to strike and kill hundreds of Hezbollah militants throughout the period of this one sided ceasefire between the end of 2024 and until the start of the 40 day war. And also the lack of reconstruction of southern Lebanon and as a result a great deal of displeasure among the Shia community and of course Lebanese society as a whole about Hezbollah's decision to enter this war. So despite, despite the fact that it was clear that this decision would be very costly for Hezbollah politically and also militarily because it cannot, you know, really fend off Israeli attacks or inflict significant damage to it, still this decision was made to activate Hezbollah again due to this sense of threat to the regime, due to the desire to augment the barrages of missiles that Iran would fire at Israel. The barrages of rockets in the 40 Day War were significantly smaller in terms of the number of missiles fired each time. As a result, it increased the ability of Israel to intercept these missiles and therefore the Hezbollah and, and the Iranian regime would sometimes launch volleys at the same time trying to somehow overwhelm the Israeli interceptor systems and cause damage this way.
- [16:30]
Roland Oliphant
I was just wondering to what degree the degradation of, of Hezbollah, who've long been seen as the kind of jewel in the crown of the Iranian proxy network, what that meant for the activation of the Iraqi militias. I was speaking to one Western security analyst who, who said to me that the Iraqi militias have long been kind of lower down the pecking order within the so called kind of axis of resistance and that within the Iraqi militias there was a sense that this was an opportunity to demonstrate their usefulness to Iran. Partly just because, you know, the Big Brother was slightly out of the game. Is that something you recognize? Would you go along with that?
- [17:11]
Elizabeth Cherkov
Hezbollah in Lebanon was the crown jewel. It is On Israel's borders. It received very significant support from Iran starting in 1982, which is quite different from most of the groups in Iraq, which are much newer creation of the irgc, with the exception of the Badr Corps, which originated in the Iran Iraq war. So I think that the use of the Iraqi militias stemmed from the desire to use all tools at the disposal of Iran. And it could be also due to the desire to offset the weakness of Hezbollah. But I think that if, if Hezbollah had not been damaged severely, you know, due to the 2024 war, still the Iranian regime, when it feels backed up against the wall, it wants to use all tools at its disposal. The, the Iraqi militias. It is very true that militarily they are unimpressive. And even during this conflict, they definitely caused damage to infrastructure. But for example, in their strikes, multiple strikes on US targets in Iraq, they failed to kill even one person. So their military capabilities are definitely lacking. And nominally, these militias, the pro Iranian militias within, you know, within Iraq, formally number about 100,000 fighters. The number of fighters who can actually be deployed, you know, to fire drones or do whatever is very, very limited because the overwhelming majority of the fighters within these militias are just, you know, basically bodies. You know, they're just people to sit at checkpoints, do parades. And many of them are tens of thousands of them who collect salaries from the Iraqi state through the Popular Mobilization Forces Directorate are fake. They're basically ghost soldiers. The militias collect their salaries and they're not even showing up anywhere. The main use of the Iraqi militias is to sustain the Iranian regime economically and bypass sanctions. It is to smuggle dollars into Iran. We know obviously that the protests in Iran that kind of led us to the war were sparked by the collapse of the Iranian currency. The Iraqi militias did their best to prevent this collapse by smuggling dollars for years, billions of dollars into Iran to prop up the ailing Iranian currency, also smuggling oil out of Iran, mixing it with Iraqi oil to hide the origin. And this is why during the 12 Day War, Iran itself did not want these militias heavily involved because it did not want to trigger an Israeli counter reaction. And because the main use of these militias is an economic one. And it was reported, for example, in Ashar Kil Awsad, that the Iranians themselves did not want the Iraqis to be involved in the 12 day war. They want them preserved for their, for their economic purpose. And this desire to preserve them, to basically keep the Iranian regime afloat economically and bypass sanctions, is also the reason I believe that they, these militias did not target Israel significantly and never claimed these attacks. Now for these militias whose resin detritus resistance against Israel and their occupier, et cetera, et cetera, why wouldn't you claim attacks against Israel? You would do that because you're terrified of the Israeli counter reaction. They don't want Israel to focus heavily on these militias because they are crucial for the preservation for the economic preservation of of the Iranian regime. And this is why they were used against US targets. Because the US at the end of the day operates along certain rules of the game. Its policy is essentially self defense, whereas Israel can go crazy and is unpredictable and against Gulf regimes that largely do not retaliate.
- [22:06]
Roland Oliphant
Coming up, Liz tells us what it was like to get the rather unwelcome but extremely useful field study opportunity of being captured by the people you are studying.
- [22:25]
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- [23:23]
Sophia Yan
Welcome back. You're listening to Iran the Latest with me, Sophia Yan and Roland Oliphant here on the Iran the Latest team. We're thinking about starting to cover defense, geopolitics and foreign affairs around the entire world again. We've received some communications from regular listeners saying that they miss our former iteration, Battle Lines. We do have a lot of new listeners here who've been following along with our coverage of the war in Iran. Just to explain, we were previously the Telegraph's general defense and foreign policy podcast, Battle Lines, and we covered everything from Chinese war games to American politics to the war in Sudan to Arctic defense pacts.
- [24:02]
Roland Oliphant
We pivoted on February 28th when this war began to cover it daily and in depth because of how significant it is. But it feels like the time is right or soon approaching to start covering the whole world again. What do you think? How much would you like us to focus on Iran and the wider Middle east versus other conflicts and regions? What subjects have we missed while we've been so focused on Iran? We'd love to hear from you. The email is battlelineselegraph.co.uk hit us up on social media. Our handles are in the show Notes or comment below this episode wherever you are listening.
- [24:40]
Sophia Yan
We've been speaking with Elizabeth Cherkov and she's telling us about what it was like to spend so much time in captivity with an Iran backed militia, a group that she had studied as an academic for a very long time. Where do you see the future of these groups? I mean, this Iran conflict, this war now it's, it looks like it's going to reach some sort of conclusion or impasse of sorts and the proxy groups are weakened to a certain degree. How powerful do you think they can continue to be after this war? I mean, if Iran is maybe not where it was before too, and not able to back them and support them in the same way, where does it all go, this axis of resistance?
- [25:19]
Elizabeth Cherkov
It is too early to tell because we don't know the outline of the final deal and we don't know to what an extent Iran will receive financial relief as a result of whatever deal is reached and we don't know what will be the conditions basically of the agreement. Right now the information that is coming out from the US and Iran concerning the content of the agreement is quite contradictory, with possibly each side highlighting the elements of the deals that are beneficial to their side. But what is very clear is that the Iranian regime genuinely feels that it won the war and so do its proxies. So the war could actually have an emboldening effect to the axis. Now with regards to actual Iranian ability to help its proxies, that would depend on both the extent of economic relief that they receive and basically sanctions removal that they receive as a result of whatever deal is concluded. Finally, not the Memorandum of understanding only, but also the final deal and also the prioritization of the Iranian regime. Because we know, for example, that according to the US administration, according to special envoy Barak, he stated that during 2025, at a time when the Iranian regime was suffering economically in a very substantial manner, it still funneled $1 billion to Lebanese Hezbollah to reconstitute its capabilities. So therefore, you know, the current leadership of the regime, particularly Mushtaba Khamenei, appears quite radical. The IRGC is clearly quite dominant decision making. So they obviously you guys have been reporting and discussing on the podcast the Economic situation in Iran, it is very, very dire. But this is not a regime that appears to care very much about the suffering of its population and may prioritize despite this extreme economic strain and despite the need to reconstruct infrastructure, et cetera, to still continue pumping money to Lebanese Hezbollah. Now, in the case of the Iraqi militias, they're not taking up resources, on the contrary, they're supporting the Iranian regime. So in the case of the Iraqi militias, it's really quite easy to continue to replenish their capabilities. These militias control the border crossings, the entire border area between Iran and Iraq essentially there are wide areas there, there are no go zones for the Iraqi state, so they can continue to smuggle weapons there non stop. And these militias continue to play a significant role within the Iraqi state, continue to control key positions through which they embezzle Iraqi state resources to the benefit of the commanders of these militias and to the benefit of the Iranian regime.
- [28:43]
Roland Oliphant
I know you didn't want to really get into your own experience of being held hostage by these people, but you have as a result spent a lot of time around them in close proximity with them. I was wondering if you could tell us something about the people who make up these militias. Who joins, who are they? What, what motivates them? Is this guy a typical member? Is he a kind of royalty and a bit of an outlier? Who are these Iranian backed Iraqi militias? Where do they get their manpower from? Who is your typical kind of member and why do they join?
- [29:17]
Elizabeth Cherkov
Basically these militias, early on when they were established by the irgc, drew a mix of people, some of them genuinely ideologically committed to Iran, to the idea of Willayat al Faqih, et cetera, but also criminal elements and individuals who wanted to enjoy a good salary. Basically. ISIS was defeated as a territorial entity by 2017. And at that point the militias making up the Popular Mobilization Forces, which was this umbrella group of these different militias, some, some of them are pro Iranian, some of them are, for example, the rebranding of Jaysh Al Mahdi of the Mahdi Army Sarai, others nationalist Shia groupings that are operating under the leadership of the Grand Ayatollah Sistani and even non Shia militias. So the number of fighters in 2017 within the ranks of these militias was about 60,000. However, now their numbers is over 230,000. So basically once the fighting against ISIS stopped, these militias to basically gain popular loyalty and gain votes because they started running a parliament, basically pressured the state to significantly expand the ranks of these militias. Two, we create these large Patronage networks which people join. These are not individuals who are willing to go and die for the sake of the Iranian regime or their commander. They're individuals who joined for a salary. And these are most of the people with whom I've interacted in my captivity. They're just there to collect a salary. They're overwhelmingly poorly educated individuals, some of them straight up illiterate. I know this because I tried to communicate with some of them in writing because I had medical problems and I was trying to get medical assistance, and they simply could not understand what I was writing because they're illiterate. So these are overwhelmingly. The militias are turning to recruiting young men from deeply rural backgrounds. So not in cities that have are of rural origin, but straight up villages, areas where people are very poor, they have very few opportunities. They're usually not on social media, so their faces are not known. And they're desperate and also used to carrying out kind of hard labor in the fields, et cetera, and don't have too many independent ideas. And this is something that, you know, speaking to former members of these militias, this is definitely something that their leadership wants, basically people who will just obey. And they're essentially seeking out individuals who are not particularly sophisticated, who wouldn't have any kind of ideas independent of their leadership. So those are the types of people who are recruited into these militias overwhelmingly. And my article in the Atlantic about my experience in captivity was entitled I Was Kidnapped by Idiots because they're really. They're just deeply ignorant about the world. Don't, don't know the trade graph of what they're supposed to be doing. So they don't know basic things about intelligence information that has been published. It's not secret. For example, they would come into a room where they would torture me with their smartphones. Now, the Israeli ability, or the ability of a private Israeli company, nso, to hack any phone and turn it, any smartphone and turn it into a listening and recording device has been published, I think, in 2011. So. And they had no idea about this. All sorts of things that just indicate complete ignorance of the world.
- [33:34]
Sophia Yan
Can you explain how the funding comes about for paying these salaries of the 230,000 members of the militia that you've spoken about?
- [33:42]
Elizabeth Cherkov
They're operating under the popular mobilization forces. The 230 number is the latest one that has been reported. There is not a great deal of transparency in this regard. There's absolutely no reason to expect that their numbers shrink. If anything, they grow all the time because you want to include more people inside your patronage networks to get them and their relatives to vote for you. So, yeah, so the salaries, they vary according to rank, but basically a starting salary is about $1,000. So it's quite a decent salary. It's paid obviously in Iraqi dinars, but it's quite a decent. Iraq is relatively expensive compared to the Arab world because of all the oil wealth, but it's a decent salary. You can definitely live on it and support a family. And in reality, 230,000 people do not receive the salaries because some are personnel who do receive a salary, but many are ghost soldiers. And their salaries are basically collected fake
- [34:39]
Roland Oliphant
names on a register that allow us, the commander to collect.
- [34:42]
Elizabeth Cherkov
Exactly. They're usually actually real people, but they're just not the ones collecting the salary. And it's basically withdrawn en masse from the, the key cards, which is the way the system used in Iraq to pay their salaries. And basically it goes into the, into the pockets of the leadership of the militia to allow them to buy more houses and fill up their bank accounts in Dubai and Turkey and Iran even more and build new castles and marry new wives, et cetera. These 230,000 are part of about 1 million strong security services of Iraq. So this includes the Iraqi army, the different intelligence agencies, the federal police. So they make up about 1 million people, which is by share of population the, I believe the fourth largest military force per population in the world. They follow Israel, Ukraine and North Korea. And all of them have conscription because they're, you know, they're in the state of war in the case of North Korea, you know, crazy dictatorship. So Iraq is the first country that doesn't, it's in the fourth place following North Korea, Israel and Ukraine. And it is the only, it's the country, it doesn't have conscription and it's not in the state of war. But basically the security services are so bloated, it's a way to distribute patronage and earn the loyalty of the soldiers you hire, the policemen, the officers and intelligence agencies. Positions that are like officer positions are sold for at least $10,000, sometimes 20, sometimes $30,000, because it provides you with an opportunity to access credit from banks that get very cheap mortgage and also an opportunity to profiteer. Oftentimes. So you have this over bloated public sector and within it over bloated security sector that is actually doing a really terrible job at keeping the country secure. Israel established two military bases inside Iraq. The state does not control its borders with any country. There are constantly security incidents of all sorts. So obviously there Are militias running around disobeying the orders of the prime minister?
- [37:14]
Roland Oliphant
From what you're saying, you have a chunk of the armed forces who are actually loyal to another country.
- [37:20]
Elizabeth Cherkov
Yeah, exactly.
- [37:21]
Sophia Yan
This is why Iraq is such a mess.
- [37:24]
Elizabeth Cherkov
It is.
- [37:24]
Roland Oliphant
You're an academic, obviously, and you study these groups and you know, you spent, was it. You ended up spending 900 and something days in, in captivity and it must have been horrendous. I'm just wondering, and don't take this the wrong way, it might sound a bit flippant, but I mean, from the point of view of research, from an academic point of view, was that actually in a weird way, quite useful?
- [37:46]
Elizabeth Cherkov
It was definitely useful. Obviously I, I wouldn't have paid this price willingly because of the long term consequences to my health and my family and everyone who loves me, but it was quite useful. My research in Iraq was focused on the sad risk movement and to understand the sad risk movement is actually very useful to speak to members of groups that split off from them. But I stayed away from these guys because they're dangerous. So I, even when people, you know, friends offered me, you know, I could connect you to this guy used to be with them, now he's with a different militia, you know, a pro Iranian militia. No, no, no, I'm good. I don't want to come near these guys. So obviously once I was captured, I was actually obviously able to observe and to have some interactions with my captors. But also two of them, I got oral consent from them to conduct interviews with them and those were useful and will be part of my dissertation.
- [38:50]
Sophia Yan
Were they, I mean, is Katai Hezbollah? Were they what you imagined? I mean, in the time that you spent in captivity observing them? Is this group what you thought it was?
- [39:02]
Elizabeth Cherkov
Well, no. The extent of their ignorance surprised me because I thought that the propaganda that they push out through their telev channels, through social media, through public rhetoric is something that is just for public consumption for the rank and file, but that these guys know the truth and basically make decisions based on reality and not based on weird conspiracy theories. But no, they genuinely, with the exception of one senior commander with whom I interacted in captivity, everyone else, including an IRGC officer who questioned me and commanders who were involved in kidnapping and torturing me, genuinely believed these weird conspiracy theories that Masons and Zionists controlled the world. But at the same time, despite Zionists being all powerful, the Jews needed the help of Saudi Arabia to establish the state of Israel because they also hate the Saudi regime because it's, you know, it's a Sunni regime that is, you know, anti Iranian or, you know, anti Shia, militancy, etc. So. So that was surprising to me that they genuinely believed this stuff and also just how simple these guys were. You know, I mean, obviously the. The state of the education system in Iraq is. Is very poor. You know, since the 1990s, it has been under sanctions, and I've interacted with Iraqis from all sects and all regions, you know, while living in the country and conducting research. So I observed obviously, the horrible, you know, ramifications of the destruction of Iraq's, you know, you know, schooling system. And still it was surprising to me that these guys would be recruited particularly to positions that, you know, had some importance. You know, I was. They perceived me to be highly valuable. They genuinely believed, most of them, that I'm really a spy, a double spy, both for the CIA and Israel, and therefore they could extract a huge ransom to get me out. And despite this, they put quite simple, illiterate people to be surrounding me. So that was definitely surprising. It was also somewhat surprising to me the extent to which they really didn't care about the Palestinian cause, which is what they claim to care about, because they didn't ask for the release of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for me, they consistently asked for a huge ransom. And then in 2024, in late 2024, when Israel captured multiple Hezbollah POWs during the war, the ground invasion, they asked for them to be released and also a ransom, but just to reduce ransom. I was confident, particularly after October 7th, that they're going to demand Palestinian prisoners and that Israel is not going to give them any, and therefore I'm going to get stuck. But apparently they didn't really ask for them.
- [42:32]
Sophia Yan
This is interesting. How independent do you think Katayb Hezbollah might be going forward? I mean, Iraq has its own unique political environment, and the militias are a very powerful part of that. And from what you're saying, they sound really more pro Iran than anti Israel. Like, that takes more precedent in why they exist and why people might join, but it seems like it's in a way taking its own direction. If they've exploded like this in terms of numbers in recent years, of people who, for whatever reason, decide that this is the thing that they want to spend their time on, is there a risk that the group starts to then get more and more diluted away from Iran and it becomes its sort of own entity with its own interests and its own agenda?
- [43:14]
Elizabeth Cherkov
I think it is true already to a large extent. You know, the way they're conducting themselves inside Iraq is very much dictated by their own interest and mostly, you know, the desire to profit. So actually they have tens of thousands of people in the ranks, but they're not using them really for combat of any kind. There are these smaller networks that number in total maybe a few thousand people, maybe in the high hundreds, individuals who are directly commanded by the IRGC and highly loyal to them. And then you have basically economic offices that play a very important role in what is really kind of the main focus of these militias. Not just Qatar Hezbollah, but also other groups of basically self enrichment and penetration of the state through appointments of different kinds of. So their focus is increasingly on capturing the Iraqi state and benefiting from it financially rather than kind of being this kind of ideological vanguard, also enjoying the power that they have within their community, abusing their power, scaring their neighbors. Often these are individuals from very simple backgrounds and therefore are looked down upon in society. Having this weapon. Being part of these militias that are known inside Iraq to be essentially lawless gangs that operate above the law gives them a great sense of satisfaction, an ability to lord over their neighbors. So this guy may have been kicked out of school in the fifth grade, but he is now more powerful than his former teacher who may have kicked him out of school. School, Right. Even though this. The. His teacher may have a bachelor's degree or even a master's degree.
- [45:23]
Sophia Yan
Can we move to Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah? I'm just curious where you see that going. Israel's been striking more into Lebanon and Iran in these talks with the US to end this war. Did say that they wanted a blanket ceasefire across the region, but that seems to have fallen off the table now. I don't see much discussion of that at the moment because I suppose because it's been so hard to get to any point of agreement. Where do you see the Israel Hezbollah conflict going after this particular period of whatever happens in the ceasefire negotiations?
- [45:55]
Elizabeth Cherkov
It seems to me that whatever is decided on with this memorandum of understanding, it will be very hard to actually cease fire, because the way Israeli officials are talking about this ceasefire is that basically Israeli forces will remain inside Lebanon, so they will remain an occupied force. And Hezbollah has vowed to continue resisting if Israeli forces maintain their presence inside Lebanon. And I think it would be very costly and contrary to Iranian interest to try and impose a ceasefire on Hezbollah while Israel is occupying Lebanese territory. So therefore, Hezbollah will continue resisting, and Israel would then. Then strike back and go back to the current situation that we're in.
- [46:45]
Roland Oliphant
And I mean, you're in Israel, obviously. What's the sense there about this imminent memorandum of understand? There is, there is kind of reporting that, you know, Netanyahu is somewhat peeved that he may be forced into agreeing to something like at least a nominal ceasefire by the Americans. Is there a sense of a rift between the Israelis and the Americans on this inside Israel?
- [47:12]
Elizabeth Cherkov
I mean, the displeasure started even when the US decided to stop the war. Israel wanted to keep going and wanted to continue escalating to destroy Iranian energy infrastructure, et cetera. The hope of the Israeli state or Israeli political leadership, not necessarily the people or my own position, was that the negotiations will collapse and we will see a return to war and basically Israel and the US will be to inflict additional damage to Iran and secure therefore a deal under better conditions. If a ceasefire or a memorandum of understanding is reached, this is definitely something that Netanyahu will be displeased about because whatever agreement would be acceptable to Iran is inherently unacceptable to Israel because it would include something other than total capitulation, which is what Israel wants.
- [48:10]
Roland Oliphant
The Russian Israeli academic Elizabeth Zerkov, speaking to us there.
- [48:14]
Sophia Yan
For more about Liz's powerful story and her experience as a hostage, we'd like to point you to an essay she published in the Atlantic magazine. It's titled I Was Kidnapped by Idiots, and she's also given earlier interviews where she speaks about her experience in depth. We'll link those in her short notes. That's all for today on Iran the Latest.
- [48:34]
Roland Oliphant
We'll be back on Monday. Until then, that was around the latest Goodbye, Goodbye. Iran. The Latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Roland Oliphant and Venetia Rainey. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following around the latest in your preferred podcast app and if you have a moment, leave a review as it helps others find the show. For more from our foreign correspondents on the ground, sign up to our new daily newsletter Cables via our website or listen to our sister podcast Ukraine the Latest. We are still on the same email address battlelinestelegraph.co.uk or you can contact us on X. You can find our handles in the show Notes. The producer is Peter Shevelin. The executive Executive producers are Venetia Rainey and Louisa Wells.
- [49:31]
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- [49:46]
Elizabeth Cherkov
Acast powers the world's best podcasts. Here's a show that we recommend.
- [49:54]
Alexander Fairweather
I'm Alexander Fairweather, raised by one of the world's great creative geniuses, John Chamberlain, on his famous foam couches. Now I'm on the couch again with today's boldest creative minds for conversations that will spark your creativity and give you the courage to create something new. On the couch. Launches May 19 with John Gray of Ghetto Gastro, whose food will make you rethink who belongs at the table. Season 1 Daniel Arsham, Alexander Wang, Annabel Selldorf and more. Subscribe wherever you stream and follow along at John Chamberlain Estate.
- [50:33]
Elizabeth Cherkov
ACAST helps creators launch, grow and monetize their podcasts everywhere. Acast.com.