← Iran: The Latest
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- [00:04]
Sophia Yan
The telegraph.
- [00:10]
Taryn and Cami
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- [00:37]
Podcast Announcer / Host
ACAST powers the world's best podcasts. Here's a show that we recommend.
- [00:45]
Taryn and Cami
Do you want to know the best part about being married to a woman? That there's no man involved. I mean, true, but I was going to say that it's a sleepover every single night with your best friend. Oh yeah, that part's cute too. I'm Taryn, she's Cami. We're married and staying up is our weekly pillow talk at Out Loud with you. We're giggling, we're gossiping, we're arguing. Classic marriage stuff. Just having fun being wives while we navigate growing up and building a family together. Then our sleepover grows. Our listeners call the Pee Pee Hotline with their own gossip, burning questions, late night spirals, all the stuff they'd only
- [01:15]
Sophia Yan
tell their best friends.
- [01:16]
Taryn and Cami
So it's a private sleepover, but you are invited. Staying up with Taryn and Cami. New episodes weekly follow wherever you listen.
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Podcast Announcer / Host
ACAST helps creators launch, grow and monetize their podcasts everywhere.
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Donald Trump
A.
- [01:37]
Sophia Yan
I'm Sophia Yan and this is Iran. The latest It's 24 June 2026, the third day into a 60 day period to negotiate a long term deal. On today's episode, we'll be discussing Trump's suggestion that Syria could help disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon. Our guest says the idea simply won't work and might even backfire, making Hezbollah
- [01:59]
Donald Trump
stronger a short time States military began major combat operations in Iran today.
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Sophia Yan
President Trump says Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the attacks.
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Podcast Announcer / Host
The Pentagon is weighing a takeover of that island as a way to force the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
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Naomi Ekparigan and Andy Beckerman
Iran begged for this ceasefire and we all know it.
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Podcast Announcer / Host
The question before us now is how much more can we accomplish together? Can we turn over a new leaf? Can we change relations in the Middle east permanently? Does anyone really think that someone can tell President Trump what to do?
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Donald Trump
Come on.
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Sophia Yan
First, a quick look at where we are today. The UN's nuclear watchdog says that it will inspect Iran's nuclear enrichment sites. This comes after US President Donald Trump said Iran had agreed to inspections, though Iran denied that such plans were underway. What to do with Iran's nuclear material has been a sticking point in ongoing talks. This was Rafael Brosi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, speaking on Wednesday.
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Marco Rubio
The fundamental thing I would like to remind you and draw your attention to is that there has been a memorandum of understanding signed by both presidents. This has been signed, has been agreed. Paragraph 8 of this memorandum of understanding says explicitly that the nuclear activities that are going to be carried out with regards to the nuclear material facilities will be supervised by the IAEA in all letters. Whether this happens the day after Tomorrow or in one week or in 10 days, it's important but not essential.
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Sophia Yan
The US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has touched down in Abu Dhabi for a three day trip in the Gulf, looking to present the deal as a win to American allies that were hit heavily by Iran. He addressed the issue of Iran charging fees to transit through the story of Hormuz, plus the ongoing concern that a ceasefire in Lebanon might not hold, thus derailing talks. We'll get into that later on in the podcast. This was Rubio speaking on the tarmac last night.
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Marco Rubio
Well, that's the law. These are. It's an international waterway. No country is allowed to charge tolls or fees on an international waterway. That's existing international law. That's the way it is in international waterways all over the world, and that's the way we expect it'll be. So I don't think we have anybody to convince around here in that regard. I think all the countries in this region would agree with us. I think a careful reading of the MoU will see that when you talk about, for example, a complete end of hostilities in the entire region, well, that's not possible. You can't have the end of hostilities and conflicts in the region as long as Iranian proxies are launching missiles and drones from Iraq and are participating in terrorism like Hamas did and like Hezbollah did. So I do think it's covered by the mou and it is an issue that will be gotten to at the appropriate time. These negotiations, well, that process is separate. It's separate because Lebanon is a sovereign country. It has a government. And when it comes to Lebanon and what's happening inside of Lebanon, we're going to negotiate and deal directly with the Lebanese government.
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Sophia Yan
This comes as a new Reuters Ipsos poll finds that just one in four Americans believe Trump's war was worth its cost. A majority fear truce with Iran is unlikely to last. Trump's approval ratings also dropping. There's growing concern over the unpopular conflict even among Trump's Republican supporters. That's also made its way into Congress. The US Senate voted 50 to 48 to endorse a war powers resolution earlier passed by the lower house of Representatives directing the president to halt the war. And just one last story to highlight today from the story of Hormuz. The UN has begun operations to evacuate 11,000 sailors that have been stranded. Given the conflict, we're taking a short break now. Coming up, could Syria hold the key for disarming Hezbollah?
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Taryn and Cami
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- [06:37]
Sophia Yan
Welcome back. You're listening to Iran, the latest with me, Sophia Yan. Talks between the US And Iran are still ongoing, but one of the main sticking points is the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, a proxy group backed by Iran that's based in Lebanon. A ceasefire in Lebanon is part of the MOU that has already been signed between the US and and Iran. But ongoing skirmishes between Israel and Hezbollah threaten to derail further ongoing talks. One idea floated by Trump is to have Syria get involved militarily to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon. Now, to be clear, this is an American president speaking about the idea of having the leader of another nation go into a third country to disarm a non state actor. It's a very, very complicated proposal to put forward. This is what Trump said last weekend at the G7 summit.
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Donald Trump
The Lebanon peace is something we'll have to work on a little bit. It's a very small piece of the puzzle, actually, but it still makes a lot of noise. The big deal is the Iran deal. That's where the money is, where the power was. But they have Hezbollah and we've got to get that done one way or the other. We'll do it. I think Israel can do a much better job on it. Syria would love to do it. I was very responsible for the gentleman that Syria, that's now the president of Syria, he's done a tremendous job. He's put that country together in a year and a half, sort of like our country, a year and a half, similar size. They said, don't, please don't put him there. He's a very violent man, Al Qaeda. I said, well, I know one thing, a boy scout's not going to work. And he's actually done a very good job. He'd love to go on it. You know, Hezbollah is an enemy of his. And he'd go on any, but he wouldn't knock down buildings. Every time he hears of somebody, he'd just go and get them with precision. But I don't know that people want that. Maybe they don't. Maybe Lebanon doesn't. We have to be guided a little bit by Lebanon.
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Sophia Yan
Syrian President Ahmad Al Shara has firmly rejected this idea. His remarks at a conference were carried on Syrian state media, making clear that he has no intention of doing so of going into Lebanon to deal with Hezbollah as Trump has suggested. I'm joined now on the PODC by Ahmed Sharawi. He's a senior research analyst specializing in the Middle east at the foundation for Defensive Democracy is a D.C. based think tank. So Ahmed, just talk us through this idea. Is this really a solution that should be considered?
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Podcast Announcer / Host
My only explanation is he's fed up with the lack of progress in Lebanon and that he's thinking of creative solutions. It's not as shocking as a lot of people see it, mainly because of Shara's hatred for Hezbollah. I think what's important here is President Trump is looking for creative solutions to dealing with the Hezbollah problem. But I think it's the wrong move at this moment and it can really empower Hezbollah in the long term.
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Sophia Yan
Can we talk through the history of Syria and Lebanon? Just take us through a little bit of why this is so problematic from a historical standpoint. Because for a lot of Lebanese, they're hearing this and they're very worried that Syria might actually consider this. I mean, of course Syrian President Ahmed Al Shra has now rejected this. But even still, the idea of it is something that for many Lebanese, it's a huge fear that they have.
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Podcast Announcer / Host
So let's go back in history for 40 years. In 1975, the Lebanese Civil war started between Palestinian factions. They were allied with some Lebanese factions against Christian militias in Lebanon. And in 1976, the Lebanese government and some of these Lebanese Christian factions asked Syria to intervene to support them against the Palestinian factions. But what happened is Syria stayed from 1976 until 2005, basically occupied Lebanon, took over all the political decision making, assassinated any political opposition. There was multiple Lebanese prime ministers assassinated by Syria. The most famous one was Rafiq Al Hariri, who was killed in 2005 by Syria and through its proxy and partner in Lebanon at that time, Hezbollah. So there's a memory in Lebanon, and that goes across all sectarian and ethnic groups, that the Syrian presence in Lebanon was an occupation. I'm sure a lot of Lebanese remember the checkpoints that the Syrians had put on and the torture of political dissidents and the arbitrary arrests. So a 29 year occupation created a sense of memory and trauma for many Lebanese. And that's what they're saying right now. They're saying that a potential Syrian incursion into Lebanon, and let's not forget the background of this new Syrian government and that a lot of ethnic groups in Lebanon are skeptical of Damascus and what it would do against ethnic minorities just because of the violent episodes that Syria experienced over the past year and a half with the Alawites and the Druze. So for the Lebanese, they're not confident about this solution being a viable one and being one that would provide them with safety. Just because of that history, just because of that background of this new government
- [11:38]
Sophia Yan
in Damascus in those years of occupation. This was under the former Assad regime in Hezbollah and Syria, under Assad's leadership, they were working together. That changed with the Syrian civil war. Hezbollah fighting on the side of Assad against rebels like Al Shirah, who's now the president of Syria. So why do you think the Syrian president is rejecting this idea? I mean, this is a chance perhaps for him and for the rebel fighters that helped to propel him to power and to topple the Assad regime. I mean, this is a chance for them to go up against people who were against them before. So why not take this opportunity if there is one?
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Podcast Announcer / Host
It's a good question. And I think the way Shara looks at it, I mean, again, Shara is no ally of Hezbollah. He is not rejecting this because he supports Hezbollah or wants them to be strengthened. Again, as you correctly stated, Hezbollah allied with Assad. They intervened on his behalf in 2012, massacred a lot of Syrians. They were basically the cornerstone of his strategy against a lot of the Syrian people who were killed during the war. They still are part of Iran's proxy network and were part of Iran's ambition to safeguard the Assad regime and strengthen it. And so Shara himself was fighting against Hezbollah since 2012. But I think the way Shara looks at it, and I think that's a policy that he has adopted to all these contexts around him, that he's pursuing a policy of non intervention and that he wants to start with stabilizing Syria first and not focusing on foreign adventures, that would really weaken him internally. And I think he understands that a Syrian incursion into Lebanon would create tensions at home, especially at a time when he does not have full power and has not consolidated power over all of Syrian territory. So the way he looks at it is Lebanon is a mess. There's a lot of sectarian sensitivities. Hezbollah also understands the geography. It has a support base with the Shia community that border Lebanon in eastern Lebanon. I don't think he has the capability of taking such action. I know President Trump mentioned that Shahra can be more surgical than Israel, but I mean, the fact is the Syrian army, 85% of its military capabilities have been destroyed. All they have is ground troops and a few tanks that remain from the Assad regime. It's really hard to take a mission to dismantle a group that is entrenched again, that has underground complexes full of missiles, command structures all across Lebanon. It would be really hard for, again, a state that has not consolidated power, that has an undisciplined army, an army that is still not professional, and again, as we saw, areas with sectarian sensitivities. And I think Shara is taking the cautious approach of not doing that. I think his proposed alternative is continuing to prevent Hezbollah's rearmament. And we've seen multiple interdictions over the past year and a half trying to stop weapons going through Syria into Lebanon to arm Hezbollah. And again, just to point out that Hezbollah relied a lot on Syria during the civil war to arm itself to get, I mean, for recruitment, to get new weapon systems from Iran and Iraq. And the fall of Assad regime really prevented that from happening. It's still continuing, but on a much lesser scale than previously.
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Sophia Yan
Yeah, I'm interested in this question about the professional side of the Syrian forces now. How much control can Shirah really have over his men? I mean, there are people who are unhappy and they've expressed discontent with how he's taking the country, where he's taking the country. And they might also want to go up against Hezbollah. Is that a risk? And if so, how would you characterize how much of a risk that really poses for this current situation?
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Podcast Announcer / Host
So one big issue with the Syrian army when it was consolidated or unified, is that it was a group of militias that were integrated into full on divisions and the leaders of these militias were given leadership roles. So, for example, the Syrian army is also composed of former Hay et Tahrir Sham, the group that Mohammed Al Shara led. But there's also groups that are backed by Turkey. I mean, these weren't part of HTS before the fall of the Assad regime, but are now commanded by militiamen that are very close to Turkey. So this question of loyalty and taking orders remains an unanswered question in Syria. And again, we've seen episodes in which the Ministry of Defense would put orders to prevent any civilian casualties. But then we'll see that the members of the armed forces committed some of these massacres. But that happened last year. And I think Shahra and his commanders have really tried to professionalize the army in the past year to create some sort of conduct to follow orders by the military leadership that are already there and are basically the ones that are supposed to be giving these orders. The Kurdish led sdf, we saw fewer massacres and fewer abuses, even though some of them existed, but not to the extent as we saw with the Druze and the Alawites. That's a slight improvement, but again, it doesn't warrant an incursion into Lebanon, a foreign country. Again, with more sensitivity. But to your question about Sharah's rejection, and I think the focus in the past year was professionalizing army to take direct orders. I think a lot of Syrians and especially Syrian commanders understand the risk that entering Lebanon would weaken them internally. And I think that's the card that Shara is playing with some of his commanders that might be hesitant in terms of rejecting a move against Lebanon because they understand that entering Lebanon would empower other groups in Syria that are seeking to exploit the focus on Lebanon to consolidate power. There are still areas in Syria that are not under government control, be it in the south with Sweden and the Druze militias. I think they would probably take advantage. Damascus focuses elsewhere. I think other groups as well. So I think the focus right now is stabilizing and preventing rearmament by focusing just on Syrian territory and not taking again any foreign adventures.
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Sophia Yan
Yeah, that's the case too, with the Islamic State. They've been targeting the Assyrian security forces more and more because they want to sow that sort of chaos within the country because to them that's actually beneficial. It's more of what you're saying, that this might be an opportunity for other actors. I'm interested in focusing in on what you said earlier about how this might actually help Hezbollah. Can you explain why?
- [17:51]
Podcast Announcer / Host
Absolutely. Let's start off with Hezbollah's support base, the Shias. I think Hezbollah's really tried to fear monger among the Shia community since the fall of the Assad regime, that this new government in Damascus is extremist, it's jihadist. It's a takfir group. That's a term used for groups like ISIS that they see other Muslims as apostates. So they've created this fear that Shara's ambition is to take over Lebanon to kill the Shias. It's not just in Lebanon. The Iraqi popular mobilization units and the Shia groups there also use the same rhetoric against this new government, against Damascus. So my point here is that at a time when Hezbollahs, I wouldn't say they're losing their support base, but there's a lot of criticism because of their decision to enter the war, because of the evacuations from southern Lebanon, because a lot of these people cannot go back to their homes. A lot of their homes have been demolished. Hezbollah would take advantage of an incursion into Lebanon by strengthening its cause within the Shia community, that it's a resistance movement, that its weapons are used to fight off against external actors, and that this guy coming from Damascus seeks to slaughter them. So support us and let us have our weapons so we can defend you. But what I think is more dangerous, and I alluded to this point earlier about the memory, is with communities in Lebanon that are anti Hezbollah. And here I talk about the Sunnis and I talk about the Christians and I talk about groups like the Druze. Hezbollah might use the Syria card to invoke the memory and trauma of the Syrian occupation. And if they portray that as the Syrians coming back 29 years, I mean, the irony is Hezbollah was allied with the Syrians in that occupation and in that trauma. But Hezbollah can use that card and that trauma to convince some of these communities. I wouldn't say all of them because I think all of them understand the risk that Hezbollah is basically an Iranian actor and it acts on behalf of Iran and that the Lebanese interest is not the primary interest. But a lot of them would buy Hezbollah's argument that it's defending against, again, a group that, especially with the Druze, killed their brethren in Sueda last year and that Hezbollah seeks to protect them. And I think that's a dangerous development and one that would not only set us back to, I mean, before the military degradation that Hezbollah has faced, but if Hezbollah is able to gain popular support with anti Hezbollah communities, be it the Christians, that will really strengthen its grip on the Lebanese domestic stage and it would really weaken the Lebanese state's argument that it's the sovereign and that it needs to maintain the monopoly on power. So this will only complicate the disarmament process and will only empower Hezbollah more in the long term.
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Sophia Yan
Yeah, I mean, this is a page from the Iranian playbook in general. Right. We're under siege, so we must band together, sending that message. And that's something that Hezbollah would.
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Podcast Announcer / Host
It's a rally around the flag moment. And this is what they need to be. I mean, they can't have that because, again, it will really empower them.
- [20:59]
Sophia Yan
The other interesting part about all of this is that essentially this could become a proxy battle between Turkey and Israel. You were speaking before about groups in Syria that were backed by Turkey, which was very instrumental in the rebel coalition and their success to push out the former dictatorial regime. If Syria does get involved in Lebanon against Hezbollah, doesn't that then pitch Israel against Turkey because of Turkey support for Syria?
- [21:26]
Podcast Announcer / Host
Absolutely. And I think even the Israelis are fearful of a Syrian incursion because of that. Again, Turkey maintains huge influence over the Syrian army. I think there's a number of more than three dedicated divisions within the army that are manned by militias that were previously loyal to Turkey. And there are no indications that that loyalty does not exist anymore. So it would be a huge mess. But what's interesting about the Turkish angle, and that's according to Israeli reporting, that Turkey does not want Syria to enter because it doesn't want to weaken Hezbollah, because they see Hezbollah as a pressure point against Israel. They don't want Shara to take on a mission to weaken a group that could be of potential use in the future against Israel. If push comes to shove between Turkey and Israel and things escalate. I mean, I don't think we're close to an open confrontation. I think what we're seeing is a war of rhetoric and narrative. But there's also strategic interest in the Levant. Erdogan was very clear two weeks ago when he said that Beirut and Damascus and Aleppo are in his sphere of influence, basically, and that it's part of Turkish national security. And I think that's a message to Israel that he also seeks influence in these areas. And that would be a big mess if the Syrians entered because of that rivalry between Turkey and Israel. If the Syrians are asked to go in by Washington, then the goal would be to disarm Hezbollah, which Israel wants to see, but the Turks don't want to see. And it's a very complicated issue. But what's clear is that the Syrians have rejected this. And it seems like no one's on board except President Trump at the moment.
- [23:00]
Sophia Yan
Yeah. And he keeps saying it over and over. So it is worrying that that's the idea that he's got in his mind. If this is not the approach, then what are other options that you think could work? Because, as you said earlier, the Lebanese government, I mean, there was already a plan to disarm Hezbollah. It didn't proceed as planned. Fighting continued. This has been an issue for a long time. And the Lebanese army also facing challenges in terms of bringing Hezbollah under control. I mean, what can they really do it if they're left to their own devices? The Lebanese government, the Lebanese army.
- [23:32]
Podcast Announcer / Host
I think there should be a serious reevaluation of some of the Lebanon provisions within this broader agreement with Iran. And I think linking Iran to Lebanon was a mistake. And if implemented, and one that would tie Israel's hands, would be another mistake. The problem here is if Israel is forced to withdraw from southern Lebanon, it cannot use the military pressure to gain concessions from either the Lebanese and Hezbollah. It will not add the pressure that is needed for the Lebanese state to act. And I think if the Lebanese state does get a ceasefire and then Israeli withdrawal, even though they set this as a precondition for starting disarmament, then they will start coming up with more excuses about disarming Hezbollah and that this would lead to a civil war. So what is needed at the moment is continuing to degrade Hezbollah's military capabilities until the group and the Lebanese state reaches a point in which the solution is disarmament and that Hezbollah's continued existence as a military faction within Lebanon becomes risky for the Lebanese state. But on the Syrian angle, and I think what's important and what's been missing from the diplomatic track that is being pursued in Washington between Lebanon and Israel, a lot of these talks have been focused on what this mechanism is, the creation of pilot zones where Israel withdraws and the Lebanese army fills in the gap. I think this is all positive if implemented, but there is no political will outside of the Lebanese state. And here I talk about the complexities of the Lebanese political system is that despite the president and the prime minister agreeing to a plan, you still have powerful actors that are disagreeing. And here I talk about some of the Shia leaders in Lebanon. For example, the Amal Party leader, Nabih Birri, who's been the speaker of parliament since the early 90s, he basically rejected that plan. He ties Hezbollah's disarmament with Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. But then Israel does not feel that its northern communities are safe to withdraw. So we're seeing a lot of issues arising from this approach. But what I think is important here, and if Israel is forced to leave southern Lebanon, that there should be a serious attempt to thinking about the day after this deal. And here this is, I focus on the prevention of Hezbollah's regeneration and rearmament. So Hezbollah took advantage of the ceasefire between November 2024 and March 2026 to rearm to start building these first person view drones that they've been using against Israel since March 2026. And I think that's why there needs to be a serious consideration of parallel dialogue between Israel, Syria and the United States in order to formalize an intelligence sharing mechanism to prevent Hezbollah from getting weapons, to prevent Hezbollah from using Syrian territory, to get new weapon systems that can be used in the future. And then you can discuss the Lebanese option and how they can disarm Hezbollah. But I think the focus should be on both things at the same time. Disarmament and the prevention of rearmament. Because if Lebanon increases the pressure on Hezbollah internally, then what happens to the weapons that are still flowing? What happens to the weapons that are flowing through Syrian territory, through the Syrian Lebanese border? There aren't enough men to patrol the border. It can be very complex in some areas. There's a lot of local smuggling routes, There's a lot of people that benefit from the smuggling. So these are broader issues that really need to be tackled along with the disarmament issue.
- [26:48]
Sophia Yan
You said earlier that you think it was a mistake to include Lebanon in the overall discussion. Now do you mean that's a mistake for the US to have allowed Iran to do that?
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Podcast Announcer / Host
I think the US allowed Iran to link the Iran ceasefire with the Lebanon ceasefire. And that's where we might lose our leverage with disarming Hezbollah and fighting against the group again. Iran controls, maintains command structure within Hezbollah. It tells it when to attack and when not to. They will use this if the talks don't go as they want them to see going. We've seen this over the weekend. Hezbollah attacked a tank and killed four IDF soldiers. The deal was almost collapsed. So we will see more of this in the short term. We will see Iran using Hezbollah to antagonize Israel for an Israeli response so they can create some sort of tension in the talks and the deal and to get more concessions from the U.S. but that's a trap that we shouldn't fall in. We need to understand that Hezbollah is not just a partner of Iran and Lebanon. It's an extension of Iran's regional strategy. It's an extension of Iran's irgc. And they tell them when to attack and they tell them when not to. And they will basically utilize them in the short term and in the long term to get more concessions from both the United States and Israel.
- [28:01]
Sophia Yan
Is there a chance that Iran tries to link Hamas to all of these talks? The foreign minister from Iran, Abbas Haraqi, had a call. He spoke with a senior political bureau official from Hamas, Bassem Naim. Is that a risk that they try to bring even more fronts into the overall negotiations that are happening with America?
- [28:21]
Podcast Announcer / Host
I think the focus on Lebanon was because of that, again, foundational link between Hezbollah and Iran. Hamas was not created by Iran. It is Iran backed, it receives Iranian guidance. Iran received Iranian weapons, but it's not an Iranian. The group was not founded by the irgc. The relationship between Iran and Hezbollah is much more natural. And there's the Shia component that is important here. And I think what Iran seeks to do with its linking of the Lebanon ceasefire with the Iran ceasefire is also to signal to the Lebanese, to the Shia community in Lebanon, that yes, you can rely on us, we will protect you, Hezbollah can protect you, but also Iran as the protector of the Islam. In the rhetoric, it's not just the Shias, but they talk about all Muslims. But I think Khalibaf, last speaker of the Parliament and the chief negotiator, Mohammed Baqar Khalibaf, said that the ceasefire in Lebanon is to protect the Lebanese, Shias and the Muslims in Lebanon. And again, that's just signaling that Iran still maintains its regional ambitions of influencing all these societies and creating that illusion that in a world where the west and Israel and all these countries, I mean, they would even label some of the Arab countries that are allied with the US that Iran is protecting them and that Iran has their back, has their primary interests. So I think with Gaza, I think it's a different case. They could have had the chance to do this from the beginning, but they didn't. And even their choice of attacking Israel in retaliation for attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon, we did not see that in Gaza. And I think that's a testament of the relationship and how strongly they feel about Hezbollah and its survival.
- [29:55]
Sophia Yan
That was Ahmad Sharawi, a Middle east specialist at the foundation for Defense of Democracies, a D.C. based think tank. That's all for today on Iran. The Latest. Goodbye.
- [30:09]
Vanish Charaney and Roland Olyphant
Iran the Latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Vanish Charaney and Roland Olyphant. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following around the latest on your preferred podcast app. And if you have a moment, leave us a review as it helps others find the show. To stay on top of all of our news, subscribe to the Telegraph, sign up to our Dispatchers newsletter or listen to our sister podcast, Ukraine. The latest we're still on the same email address battlelinestelegraph.co.uk or you can contact us on x. You can find our handles in the show notes. The producer is Peter Shevlin. The executive producer is Louisa Wells.
- [30:53]
Podcast Announcer / Host
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