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I'm Venetia Raney and this is Iran the latest It's Monday 29th of June 2026, day eight of the 60 day deadline to reach a peace deal between the US and Iran and things are looking shaky. Tit for tat violence erupted over the weekend with missiles flying in both directions over the ongoing Iranian attempts to control all shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. On today's episode, we'll be breaking down exactly what happened and what it means for the peace talks. Plus, we'll be getting the view from the Gulf after it was again attacked by Iran and asking why. Despite this, some countries are seeking closer relations with Tehran.
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A short time ago, the United States military began major combat operations in Iran.
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Today, President Trump says Iran's Supreme Leader,
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Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the attacks.
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The Pentagon is weighing a takeover of that island as a way to force the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran begged for this ceasefire and we all know it. This is a historic meeting. Never before has the Iranian and American leadership met at such a high level, can we turn over a new leaf? Can we change relations in the Middle east permanently? Does anyone really think that someone can tell President Trump what to do? Come on.
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So, welcome back. When I left you on Friday, I was talking about this Iranian attack on a Singapore flagged cargo ship, the Everlovely, which happened on Thursday evening. And I explained how it was a sign that Iran was refusing to accept this new southern Omani route that we've been talking about and that the US and others have been pushing to avoid Tehran's oversight and any tolls. Well, on Friday evening after we published, the US responded by bombing Iranian coastal targets. And then on Saturday, Iran did it again, this time sending a one way attack drone that hit Panama flagged Kiku vessel. This was an oil tanker carrying around 2 million barrels of Qatari oil eastwards from Qatar's Al Shaheen oil field to the UAE's Fujairah City. The bridge on the boat was damaged, but it was otherwise unscathed and it did complete its journey out of the strait. And the US responded forcefully, again hitting air defence sites, surveillance infrastructure and other military targets. Trump posted a Early on Sunday morning, United States aircraft just struck Iranian missiles and drone storage locations and coastal radar sites for violating the ceasefire agreement. Again, it is very possible that they will never learn. There may come a point when we are no longer able to be reasonable and will be forced to militarily complete the job that we very successfully started. If that happens, the Islamic Republic of Iran will no longer exist. President DJT so another forceful statement from Donald Trump there. But Iran didn't listen and overnight into Sunday it responded by lashing out at US Bases in Kuwait and Bahrain with missiles and drones. We're going to get more into that shortly with our guest. So things have now calmed down, but technical talks that were supposed to be happening on Sunday between the US and Iran about the nuclear issue, they were cancelled. Instead, the US and Iran are meeting tomorrow, Tuesday to talk specifically about how to solve this Strait of Hormuz knot. This is an almighty mess because both sides essentially want completely incompatible things. Iran wants to keep control of the Strait of Hormuz and sees it basically as its bounty from the war. The US wants a return to the pre war status quo and says anything else is illegal. This is an international waterway. Well, with me to discuss all of this and more is Ahmed Kuzai. He's a leading Bahraini political consultant, writer and analyst. Ahmed, welcome to Iran. The latest Ahmed, can you just talk through what the Gulf thinks about this Strait of Hormuz mess that we have going on, you know, the Iranians have made very clear, both through words and now actions that they are refusing for any shipping to go outside of its control to use this Omani route that we've spoken about on the podcast. The Americans are trying to insist that they should be able to use this route and have been bombing Iran. Where do the Gulf states land on all of this? Who do they think should be able to keep control and how do they think this should be solved?
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When it comes to a natural passage, the international law consists of nobody should pay. That's the legal background of it. Now nobody was paying the right of passage or their right of passage to the Strait of Hormuz until the Iranian said so after the war. Now with that happening, that created a big rubble, now they want to be paid some tolls. The Gulf states, of course, are against it, are still against it, and will be against all of them.
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So all of them are against it. Even for example, Oman?
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Even Oman and Doha lately. Yes. I mean, even if they talk in a different or from a different background, their case is to bring peace to the region. It's not because they agree to it. They want things to de escalate because of basically what the war did to everybody, including them. But when it comes to how we think here in the Gulf, no, nobody wants anybody to pay because that means prices will increase by a minim of 30 to 60%. And here we're talking about taxation that will follow. We're talking about, I mean, increased prices for goods, for services when it comes to shipping as well as insurance. So nobody is going for that. And one of the biggest problems why the Strait of Hormones is still in this turbulence stage, it's because Iran still forces or wants that to happen. The United States and the Gulf states don't want it to happen.
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Do the Gulf states have a view on how it should be, how Iran should be stopped from controlling the Strait of Hormuz as it's trying to do? Are they pushing for US Military escorts, for example? Are they pushing for more attacks on Iran to try and negate their ability to be able to control it from the coast? What would they like to see?
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This is not new to the Gulf states since the reason behind Kuwait having an American base goes back to the 1987 vessel wars where Iran was hiding hijacking the Kuwaiti vessels. Now this happens again, and it will happen again. How the Gulf looks at it is that before the war, the Gulf states managed to find their own status quo when it comes to Iran. Now, the war was imposed on the Gulf and now somehow they are left to face it. I'm not going to say alone, but semi alone. And that creates a big problem. So going forward, the Gulf don't like what has been imposed on them by either Iran or anybody else. At the same time, they're trying to find the same status quo as before or as good as a new one if that could happen. In order for that to happen, we have to understand that nobody is able to reason with the irgc and they are the ones in power. So this seems like an impossible case to solve. So what the Gulf is looking for to cut it short is to de escalate first and see where things go from there.
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But do you think we could also see, and it sounds so counterintuitive, but like a rapprochement between some of the Gulf states and Iran. We've already seen the UAE and Iran have been holding talks. And today Iran and Oman have been holding discussions. The first meeting of the Joint Hormuz Committee was held according to the Iranian Deputy Foreign minister. Are we going to see countries trying to, you know, as you say, they're trying to find a peaceful solution. Is that going to involve them trying to hold Iran closer and create their own agreements?
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Not closer as much as contained nobody. I think this war proved that nobody can be closer than anyone else to Iran. Qatar was close to them. Oman was the closest to them. UAE was somehow trying to manage with them. All of them were heavily hit, including Oman. So history has proven that nobody can get close to Iran. But as we just mentioned, maybe to find the best case scenario with them for now, what comes later I think will be a surprise.
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Yeah, because they attacked again over the weekend in response to being bombed by the Americans, which was in turn in response to Iran attacking shipping coming out of the Strait of Hormuz. Why was Bahrain targeted and what damage was done?
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In order for us to dissect all of that, let's first of all agree that the war since 28 February did not completely stop. It somehow diluted a little bit because of a fragile ceasefire, because of the MoU, some talks. But throughout the war until today, there was not a quiet week. Either Bahrain and Kuwait has been targeted over the past three weeks, or it was Emirates and Oman over the period before that, and then it was Qatar and Saudi at some point. But there was never a quiet week since February until today.
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So why was Bahrain targeted? Why have they been targeted repeatedly over the last Few weeks, as you say,
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the official tagline by the Iranians is that Bahrain and Kuwait host the American bases. Yet what changed since February until today? And why Bahrain today and Kuwait? So Bahrain and Kuwait have exposed the majority of the Iranian cells in these two countries more than anybody else. This is the week of the Shia processions. Muharra. So basically emphasizing on these facts and pushing forward will somehow by the Iranians hoping that this might instigate more, will instigate the Shiites against those governments more than anywhere else. So I think they were trying to set the stage for that. Just like what's happening between the Americans and the Iranians, the more less talks there are between the Americans, the Israelis and the Iranians, you see more people on the streets in Iran. So they were planning to play the same game. It didn't work at all.
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Ahmed that's really interesting because. So what you're saying is that the Iranians, their official tagline is that they're targeting U.S. bases, the Fifth Fleet, which is the headquarters of the U.S. navy in the Middle east. But that you say it's actually to do with a political consideration that Bahrain, which is a country which has a sizable Shia population, I think estimates vary between sort of 40 to 60%. And you probably have more details on that and that hundreds of them have been arrested for being alleged Iranian spies. Can you give us a bit more of the context on that? Because we haven't covered it on the
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podcast, of course, when it comes to the majority or the claims by the Shia being the majority, of course it's not backed up with any evidence. Me coming from such a background as a Shia, I've been looking for these evidences for a long time and I found nothing. So until now there are merely claims. Now when we're talking about why and what's the background of this, this is coming back at least since basically 47 years ago when the pro Iran Shiites. Of course not all Shiites are pro Iran. The pro Iran Shiites staged a coup d'. Etat. It was a failed one in 1981. And ever since they did not stop until today. They're backed by Iran. I'm not saying that they say that themselves. So that has been the background of that non stopping problem. The arrests that started happening in March, as I recall, started because the Shia fragments started pushing harder. Being pro Iran against Bahrain during a time when Iran is attacking the Gulf states and Bahrain as well with rockets and drones. How is that calculated by any country in the world won't be different than Bahrain. You have to stand by your country. That's how you become a patriot. You can't stand with any other country while retaining the citizenship of a country. So when that happened, they arrested. The first wave was between 25 to 30, then another one with 30, then 60. And today it accumulated to be a bunch of hundreds. The basis for these were they intercepted and they have evidences that they have showcased on the national television of intercepted interception calls of people were basically writing on public social media and they are still available on x.com of people talking directly to the IRGC. IRGC agents clearly right there in the open saying that you have to target this hotel. It hosts American. You have to target this hotel. There are Zionists and so forth. So these were the main reason for arrest over the first few weeks. Later on it expanded. They, for example, a month ago or so they arrested a group of 60 people, most of which are religious Shia men. They possess big cash amounts, posters, I think communication records of them being agents of some sort or of some level to external powers, mainly to Iran. And based on that, the arrests were made. That created some grievances. Until yesterday, some members of the Iranian Parliament were criticizing Bahrain for doing that, which is weird considering they basically prosecute people on the streets with no proper legal process. So that's exactly what happened.
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Okay. And we should note that some human rights groups suggest this is a crackdown on freedom of expression. So I guess there's a lot of controversy for some people there. If Iran does continue to keep striking ships that are taking this Omani route though, I mean, what do you think is the solution? We can't keep having this tit for tat violence. Or can we? Is this going to become the new normal for this part of the Middle East?
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No, no, nobody can handle that. And during our previous discussion we discussed that the war is not reaching an end and what happened over the past few days just proven that nothing can restrain Iran. The GCPOA didn. The current MoU didn't. The ceasefire that occurred two months ago or so didn't. So what? Well, I think the only thing that could go forward from here is to put an end properly with fierce power. Without that, they will remain being who they are, not just giving the Gulf a hard time. They're taking the world hostage as well as the Iranian people with fierce power.
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So you think there should be continued military intervention in Iran continued the same way it was?
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No, a proper one. Something that's well studied, something that has a beginning and an end, something with
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boots on the ground. What does that mean?
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No boots on the ground would be difficult. I don't think anybody could achieve that today. What I meant to say is something decisive, something that basically comes out with a result. The operation until today, trust me, nobody sees what's the result. Nobody sees where it began and where it ended. Nobody knows if it ended or it didn't. Everything is basically clouded. What I meant to say is to have a proper operation that has a beginning date and then an end date. Something with clear intention, something with clear goals. And when they stop, they say we have achieved, achieved 1, 2 and 3, rather than what we have on our hands today.
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Is there appetite, do you think, among the Gulf states, among any of them, for war to resume fully?
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Yes. I mean after the talks last week, the mou. The MOU was signed. But do we see any ceasefire happening? No. Do we see any in the facilities as well? No. Is there a regime change? No. Is there a mutual respect? I'm just reading the terms of the mou. Is there a mutual respect? As well known, they're still trashing each other on media and off media. The sanctions and assets they haven't reached anywhere yet. The reconstruction plan? Nothing. Lifting or blockade? Nothing. The Strait of hormones still. As is the nuclear non prolification, Nothing. And ongoing negotiations as well. Nothing. So what have we achieved since the signing of the mou? Nell?
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But isn't that a bit of a contradiction? I mean, I assume the Gulf states, and I'm speaking sort of broadly, and I'm aware there's lots of variation in agendas, political thinking, but they want, as you say, they want things to go back to normal. You know, they got thrive on stability. Their economies need to be back up and running. You don't want pictures like we've had of out of Bahrain over the weekend of a residential building being hit, you know, someone's apartment block being completely created by an Iranian missile or drone. Resuming the war would just kick all of that up to another degree, wouldn't it?
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I totally agree. Let's put things in perspective here. Anything that the Iranians would hit would be of a civilian nature because the troops and the ships of the Fifth Fleet left the bases in Bahrain three weeks before 28th of February. They don't exist in Bahrain. So everything that the Iranians have been targeting ever since are actually of a civilian base or of a civilian nature. And no, nobody wants that to happen, of course.
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But you think it might be some Gulf states think it might be the only solution. Is that your point?
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No. I'm saying that how Iranians are behaving because no matter what we do until today, we are practicing self restraint. We haven't assaulted Iran, I'm going to say officially yet nothing changed. They're still behaving the same way. No matter what's the level of them being hit or attacked by the Americans or the Israelis changed their behavior towards the Gulf. No matter how much they advance the talks with the United States, change their behavior to the Gulf. So let's put that as a scenario. Let's say tomorrow they agree with the United States. Nothing conclusive, but they agree something with the United States and the United States leave the region partially, let's say what's going to happen from the Iranian side, they're going to continue what they're doing. That's why what I'm talking about is reaching, think an end to this situation. How do we do it? I still have no idea.
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Along with most of us, probably. I mean, that's why we're running this podcast, trying to get to the bottom of it all. You mentioned when you were reading through the MoU, you mentioned the financial aspect. I think $6 billion are supposed to be released of Iranian frozen assets from Qatar this week. Half of about 12 billion that's held by Qatar. Do you think that should go ahead given what's happened over the weekend?
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Of course not. Let's remember together what happened the last time that happened. And $5 billion were released three weeks later, 7th of October happened. So what are we trying to recreate here? Because the first step, as you said, it's Qatar, they have some funds with Iraq, they have with China, with the United States themselves, amongst other states. If we talking basically it's the first stage, we're talking about a total of 25 billion overall. Can you imagine what would that do to us if it was going to be directed at the Iranian people? Trust me, I'd be the first one to stand up innovation to it, thanking everybody for doing it because the Iranian people deserve the best for themselves. But it's not going to be diverted or directed at the Iranian people. It will be going towards Hezbollah. It will be for the Houthis, their militias in Iraq, even the ones in Bahrain, as much as as of course, rebuilding their own artillery system.
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We're going to take a short pause now. Coming up after the break, what's the Gulf view on the Israel Lebanon peace deal? Welcome back. You're listening to Iran, the latest with me, Veneesha Rainey and Ahmed Kuzai in Bahrain. We've had Israel and Lebanon signing a deal on Friday. It's historic, it's unprecedented, and yet, as we've seen repeatedly over the last few months, it's not reflected in the reality. On the ground ground, there's this agreement. Part of the agreement is that Israel will withdraw from certain areas and the Lebanese army will move in. The idea being that they will disarm Hezbollah as they go and, you know, the country will be given back to the Lebanese state. The parts that they believe are controlled by Hezbollah will be given back to the Lebanese state as Israel withdraws. But we've seen more fighting over the last few days. I believe Hezbollah has killed some Israeli soldiers. Israel has conducted more airstrikes in southern Lebanon. And the defense minister, Israel Katz, has repeatedly said, we're not withdrawing from southern LE until, you know, we're completely happy that northern Israel will be safe. Is there any point to this deal? Is it actually doing anything? What's actually being achieved here?
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What's being achieved is that Lebanon has been taken hostage, just like the whole Middle East. But we're talking Hezbollah, we're talking Lebanon, we're talking Israel directly in that region. Lebanon has been taken hostage for a long time now. Hezbollah, whatever they're doing, they're doing whatever the Iranians are asking them to do. Which means it's not Hezbollah and the Lebanese state, it is Iran. The bigger picture, it is what Iran wants to do to the region. It's not just the Gulf, what they want to do to the region. It's Iran versus Israel. It's Iran versus the world. What does the Lebanese people have to do with it? No matter what the amazing Lebanese governments are trying to do, they are weakened by Hezbollah. They are weakened by their decisions as much as whatever the lebanese ambassador in D.C. is trying to achieve. She's doing a great job. She's an amazing person. For anybody who met her, she is that kind of person. But what can she do? What can the Lebanese government do if they don't have the final word? They're being hijacked. So why are they hijacked? Because Hezbollah are empowered by the Iranians. So the key to the whole region to be in peace or in constant state of war, the key is Iran.
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And how do you see that particular theater of this conflict evolving? It feels like we're stuck in a real catch 22. Hezbollah brands itself as a resistance movement and says that so long as there are Israeli soldiers in any Lebanese territory, they will attack them. Israel says it will attack Hezbollah whenever it' so, you know we're stuck again in this conflict. It feels like it's going to be frozen. Do you think we're going to see the Israeli presence, occupation of southern Lebanon become permanent?
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Yes, that's a big possibility. Let's just go back few months ago where there was another fragile ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel. Why was it broken? Is it because Israel did anything? Is it because the Lebanese government did anything? Or was it because the Iranians advised Hezbollah to attack in revenge of the killing of the Ayatollah in Tehran? And boom, everything repeats itself all over again.
A
Well, we should also say that there was a ceasefire. So after October 7, 2023, when Hamas conducted the brutal attack on Israel, Hezbollah joined that fight, Israel fought against, back against Hezbollah. And then in 2024, a ceasefire was agreed and Hezbollah stopped attacking Israel. But Israel did continue to attack Lebanon. And this year, Hezbollah joined the Iran war, so to speak, and attacked Israel on behalf of Iran after Iran was attacked by US and Israel. So those ceasefires have never quite been ceasefires, have they?
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That's true. But going back to that day as well, there were small rockets fired from Hezbollah at the north end of Israel. That's one part. Second part, there were lots of threats coming out of Hezbollah, Israel, whether it's right, whether it's wrong. They thought, oh no, they said we have the right to defend ourselves. Look at them, they're saying they'll do 1, 2, 3, so we'll do it before they do it to us. It's a never ending story.
A
What does all of this mean for the Israel relationship with the Gulf states? It's taken a battering, of course, over the last few years. Is there a sense in the Gulf states that. That it's too tricky actually to establish relations with Israel, as we saw during the Abraham Accords, and that all of that will have to take a back seat and the Gulf states need to look after themselves, try and find, as you said, some kind of accommodation with Iran.
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That's a difficult question, but let's put it that way. Just like we said, the reason why Iran said they're attacking the Gulf states is because the Gulf states retain relationship with the west relationship or basically even having or hosting American basically. But then with the Gulf states, they say we started having the because of Iran's aggression against the Gulf. Now the same thing with Israel. We in the Gulf states especially never retained any kind of communication with the Israelis forever until the Abraham Accords were there. Now, when the Abraham Accords started to happen, one of the reasons why we had them was that because the people we're trying to protect Palestinians, and I'm talking about Hamas and the plo, started to have relations with Iran. So it can't be one sided. So for Bahrain especially, Iran been claiming Bahrain for the past hundred years as its own state. So Iran is the arch enemy of Bahrain. Right. So if Hamas and the Palestinians come and retain a relationship with our arch enemy, why is it wrong for us to retain something with Israel who as well as the enemy of Iran to protect ourselves? Isn't sovereignty the ultimate goal for any state? So that being said, yes, the Abraham Accords were not easy to maintain, but it has been a learning curve. Every state has the right to befriend and dear friend any other state they see fit. Bahrain and Emirates saw that. Yes, it's not an easy friendship, but it's an ongoing friendship rather than dealing with somebody who's been firing rockets at us, who's been threatening our sovereignty as much as trying to put us down and claim our countries as their own.
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Ahmed, what do you think we're going to see this week? Look into a crystal ball for us. How are things going to evolve? We know we're supposed to have more talks between the US and Iran tomorrow. They were supposed to hold technical talks yesterday on the nuclear question. Tomorrow they're going to just focus on the Strait of Hormuz and try and find some kind of deconfliction route for that. How do you see this playing out? This is week.
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Just like I read an old verse from the Old Testament, nothing easy is going to happen. I don't have a positive outlook. I'm pessimistic considering whatever happened before. I think the talks won't go as planned. Something is going to go wrong in the middle of it and we'll see some fire, some rockets fired here or there. Then we repeat the same cycle. I don't see something significant significant happening this week.
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That was Ahmed Kuzai, a Bahraini political analyst. And that's all for today's episode of Iran the Latest. We'll be back again tomorrow when we'll be speaking to John Bolton. Is this the end of the neocons in America? Iran the Latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Veneesha Rainey and Roland Oliphant. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following around the latest on your preferred podcast app. And if you have a moment, leave us a review as it helps others find the show. To stay on top of all of our news, subscribe to the Telegraph, sign up to our dispatchers newsletter or listen to our sister podcast Ukraine the Latest. We're still on the same email address battle lines telegraph.co.uk or you can contact us on X. You can find our handles in the show Notes. The producer is Max Bauer. The Executive producer is Louisa Wells.
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Podcast: Iran: The Latest (The Telegraph)
Date: June 29, 2026
Host: Venetia Rainey
Guest: Ahmed Kuzai (Bahraini political consultant, writer, and analyst)
Theme: Deep-dive analysis of the latest escalations between the US and Iran, particularly surrounding attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, the broader regional implications, the challenging path to peace, and reactions from Gulf states.
This episode unpacks a dramatic weekend of tit-for-tat military escalation between the US and Iran, focusing on Iran’s continuing attempts to control all shipping through the critical Strait of Hormuz, US military responses, and what these events mean for ongoing (and increasingly fragile) peace talks. Host Venetia Rainey is joined by Bahraini analyst Ahmed Kuzai to interpret both the Gulf region’s perspective on the crisis and its broader geopolitical ramifications, including implications for Israel-Lebanon tensions.
[02:05-03:30] Venetia recaps the timeline:
“There may come a point when we are no longer able to be reasonable and will be forced to militarily complete the job that we very successfully started. If that happens, the Islamic Republic of Iran will no longer exist.” (03:23, Donald Trump via Rainey)
Impact: Scheduled technical talks on the nuclear issue between the US and Iran are cancelled. Focus shifts to emergency talks on Hormuz.
“Nobody wants anybody to pay because that means prices will increase by a minimum of 30 to 60% ... So nobody is going for that.” (07:12, Ahmed Kuzai)
[09:27-10:28]
Gulf states are not seeking rapprochement with Iran, as history shows proximity brings little security:
“History has proven that nobody can get close to Iran... maybe [they’ll] find the best case scenario with them for now. What comes later... will be a surprise.” (09:54, Ahmed Kuzai)
“You have to stand by your country. That’s how you become a patriot. You can't stand with any other country while retaining the citizenship of a country.” (14:46, Ahmed Kuzai)
[16:15-21:17]
“Nobody can handle that... The only thing that could go forward from here is to put an end properly with fierce power.” (16:40, Ahmed Kuzai)
“No, nobody wants that to happen, of course.” (19:43, Ahmed Kuzai)
“If it was going to be directed at the Iranian people, trust me, I'd be the first one to stand up … But it’s not ... It will be going towards Hezbollah. It will be for the Houthis, ... their militias in Iraq, even the ones in Bahrain, ... rebuilding their own artillery system.” (21:53, Ahmed Kuzai)
“Lebanon has been taken hostage ... Hezbollah, whatever they're doing, they're doing whatever the Iranians are asking them to do.” (23:49, Ahmed Kuzai)
“Every state has the right to befriend and dear friend any other state they see fit... [With Israel] it’s not an easy friendship, but it’s an ongoing friendship rather than dealing with somebody who’s been firing rockets at us, who’s been threatening our sovereignty...” (28:38, Ahmed Kuzai)
“Nothing easy is going to happen ... I don’t have a positive outlook. ... I think the talks won’t go as planned. Something is going to go wrong in the middle of it and we’ll see ... rockets fired here or there. Then we repeat the same cycle.” (29:43, Ahmed Kuzai)
Donald Trump (relayed by Rainey):
“There may come a point when we are no longer able to be reasonable ... If that happens, the Islamic Republic of Iran will no longer exist.” (03:23)
Ahmed Kuzai:
The episode is urgent, clear-eyed, and unapologetic—somber in its recognition of intractable problems, but candid and steeped in realpolitik. Kuzai in particular offers analysis rooted in both personal and regional experience, blending frank warnings with a sense of strategic fatalism.
This episode delivers an in-depth, unvarnished look at the fragile and violent status quo shaping the Gulf and wider Middle East in summer 2026. The US-Iran conflict in Hormuz has upended regional shipping and politics. Despite widespread aversion to open war, leaders see few good options for truly reining in Iran—military force may be the unwanted but only path to lasting resolution. Attempts at peace and stabilization, whether in the Strait of Hormuz or in Lebanon, remain on a knife-edge, hostage to Tehran’s ambitions and regional maneuverings. The outlook for meaningful change, at least in the short term, remains bleak.