US sends Marines to Strait of Hormuz & why Iran can still fire missiles

Summary

Podcast Summary: Iran: The Latest

Episode Title: US sends Marines to Strait of Hormuz & why Iran can still fire missiles
Release Date: March 20, 2026
Host(s): Vinny Sharaney, Roland Oliphant
Guests: Peter Apps (Reuters, defence commentator & author), Fabian Hoffman (Missile expert, University of Oslo)

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Overview

This episode provides a deep dive into the third week of the US-Israel-Iran war, focusing on the escalating crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, the US deployment of Marines, ongoing missile exchanges, and the war's spillover effects on global strategy and allied nations. Veteran correspondents and expert guests analyze recent military moves, energy security tremors, and the resilience of Iran’s missile arsenal. Special focus is given to how these developments impact allied interceptor stocks and the broader global security picture, including implications for Ukraine and Taiwan.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Situation Update: The War’s Third Week

• Main Developments (02:00 – 07:20):
  • Israel bombards Tehran overnight; death toll in Iran surpasses 3,000 (02:30).
  • 21-day internet blackout in Iran—longest in its history.
  • Iran striking Gulf energy infrastructure—hits to Kuwait, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain—but not Qatar, following US warnings after the Raslafan/Qatar facility attack.
  • Qatar’s Raslafan gas plant (world’s largest) severely damaged; repairs to take five years.
  • Saudi Arabia threatens retaliation if Iran keeps targeting oil facilities.
  • Israel, per PM Netanyahu, halts attacks on Iranian gas fields at Trump’s request and denies dragging the US into war.
• Quote:

  “Well, I'll say two things. Fact number one, Israel acted alone against the Slowiya gas compound. Fact number two, President Trump asked us to hold off on future attacks and we're holding on…Does anyone really think that someone can tell President Trump what to do? Come on.”
  — Benjamin Netanyahu (04:40)

2. US Marines in the Strait of Hormuz & Coalition Efforts

• US Actions:
  • Low-flying jets and Apaches strike Iranian vessels/drones to reopen waterway.
  • Deployment of approx. 4,500 sailors and Marines; arrival in Middle East in two days (06:10).
• International Response:
  • Joint statement by UK, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Japan, Canada signals “readiness” for a coalition—so far, only planning and no assets committed (06:55).

3. Expert Analysis: Peter Apps on Geopolitics & Military Moves

(07:36 – 26:41)

a. Energy Crisis & Strait of Hormuz Blockade

• Iran’s Tactics:
  “The Iranians have always had the ability to close [the strait]…they could do it with missiles and suicide speedboats and of course now drones…”
  — Peter Apps (08:05)
• Outcome:
  • Iran “prepared to do this for six months,” also targeting Gulf energy infrastructure.
  • Some ships (Indian, Chinese, Greek) getting through, possibly with Iranian coordination (09:39).
• US Marines’ Role:
  • Multiple options: “They can seize ships, seize islands, reinforce islands, evacuate embassies, or destroy infrastructure” (10:05).
  • Presence as a “threat” to influence Tehran and provide diplomatic time.

b. Saudi Arabia’s Position

• Quote:

  "The Saudis are not going to join on behalf of the US and Israel. They get to join on behalf of themselves.”
  — Peter Apps (11:45)

• Analysis:
  • Saudi moves aimed at sending regional messages.
  • Retaliatory options are limited due to mutual vulnerability of oil fields.
  • “Game of Thrones”-style deterrence and signaling (14:30).

c. US/Israel Strategic Objectives & Broader Geopolitics

• US/Israel goals: Remove Iran’s nuclear/missile capabilities, regime change debated, maintaining deterrence.
• China’s Calculations:
  • US’s strategic flexibility proven—able to shift forces to the Middle East while China remains hesitant on Taiwan due to military underperformance and leadership upheaval.
  • Next danger window: 2028 elections in the US and Taiwan (18:00 – 19:54).

d. World War or Not?

• Quote (On “Is this World War III?”):

  “I think this may or may not be a world war, but it’s certainly a battle for the world…this is long game history.”
  — Peter Apps (20:23)

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4. Space Force & Modern War-Fighting Domains

(21:29 – 24:37)

• US Space Force's Role:
  • Personnel embedded in combatant commands, not just a standalone branch.
  • Space Command handles military operations above the Kármán line.
  • Militarization of space: surveillance, GPS jamming, “hunter-killer” satellites.
  • Space rivalries with China and Russia intensifying, civilian and military objectives overlapping.
• Quote:

  “We are now looking at a space race that is in some ways the beginnings of the age of discovery in the 16th century. This is a really exciting period of history. Except…hundreds are children.”
  — Peter Apps (23:37)

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5. Regime Rallies and Domestic Iranian Dynamics

(24:37 – 26:41)

• Effectiveness and Optics:
  • Regime rallies mostly organized, but US/Israel intervention by force would likely backfire.
  • Lesson from Libya: supporting uprisings militarily can yield long, costly civil wars.
• Quote:

  “If the Americans do not wish to produce the same result that the Iraqi air force flying up the Thames would have yielded in 2003, they probably are going to be very careful.”
  — Peter Apps (25:01)

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6. Missile Warfare: Degradation and Interceptor Shortages

(29:51 – 49:00)

Expert Interview: Fabian Hoffman (Missile Specialist)

• Degradation of Iran’s Missile Arsenal:
  • Missile/drones launched by Iran have dropped 80–90% since initial days—but haven’t stopped.
  • Capability reduced, but not eliminated; slight uptick in launches recently (30:15).
• Why Iran Can Still Fire Missiles:
  • Mobile launchers and covert infrastructure are hard to destroy.
  • Drones easily launched from converted trucks—hard to target (31:22).
• Estimated Stockpiles:
  • “Thousands” of ballistic missiles before the war; more short-range than medium-range (32:30).
  • “Thousands, perhaps tens of thousands” of long-range drones—easier to produce than missiles.
• Bottlenecks:
  • Launch platform shortages (transporter erector launchers) may be more acute than missile shortages.

Impact on Defending Powers

• Interceptor Stocks:

  • US, Israel, Gulf states have robust but finite stocks (36:06).
  • If Iranian barrage had continued past initial few days, Gulf stockpiles might have run out.
  • Israel’s stocks “likely not at comfortable levels” after heavy usage in 2024–2025.
  • Interception needs: multiple interceptors per incoming projectile.

• Effectiveness of Defense Layers:

  • Israel’s Arrow (against medium-range), David’s Sling (shorter-range), Iron Dome (originally for rockets/artillery but now used for some missiles).
  • Iron Dome “a very impressive feat”—successfully intercepting even some ballistic missiles.
  • 100% interception not possible; redundancy and offense remain critical.

• Innovative, Cheaper Interceptions:

  • Fighter jets, helicopters, and counter-drone technologies are increasingly important against drones (38:25, 41:54).
  • Main threat: saturation—large salvos may allow a missile or drone to slip through.

• Strategic & Logistical Implications:

  • Prolonged conflict strains global supply of interceptors, complicates support for Ukraine (47:19).
  • “There is more competition on the global market” for missile defense stocks.

• Key Lesson:

  “What this conflict really has demonstrated is that there is a huge capability gap…in terms of long range drone defense…long range drone threat has almost proved more challenging and in many ways has caused more damage than the ballistic missile threat.”
  — Fabian Hoffman (48:14)

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Memorable Quotes & Moments

• On escalation and deterrence:

  “This is how grown up states do business in the 21st century. It is alarming. It does kill people. ... It’s Game of Thrones type stuff, right? ... This is just what history looks like.”
  — Peter Apps (14:30)

• On the US strategic ‘window’:

  “…Chinese have just discovered none of their equipment works and they've fired all their generals. That has created a window of opportunity…”
  — Peter Apps (16:14)

• On the limits of missile defense:

  “No matter how much we invest in missile defense, it will be very, very difficult to make sure that no enemy projectile… finds its target. Right. At 100% success rate. That is very, very rare.”
  — Fabian Hoffman (40:32)

• On the intersection of space and modern warfare:

  “We now have almost certainly hunter killer satellites in orbit that can grab other satellites.”
  — Peter Apps (22:55)

• On the risk to Ukraine and global supply chains:

  “Gulf states have to order a lot of Patriot interceptors… it’s no longer straightforward that the supply constraints of Patriot will ease in the coming years.”
  — Fabian Hoffman (47:19)

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• Opening & Situation Recap: 01:55–07:20
• Peter Apps Interview – Hormuz & Geopolitics: 07:36–26:41
• Space Force Discussion: 21:29–24:37
• Missile Warfare Explained (With Fabian Hoffman): 29:51–49:00

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Overall Tone & Takeaways

The tone is analytical and occasionally wry, balancing technical expertise with a recognition of the human and strategic stakes. While the episode covers grave developments, both experts and hosts intersperse historical reflection, reminders of uncertainty, and warnings against easy analogies or enthusiasm for war. The key message: this is a slow-motion, multi-domain, and highly unpredictable conflict whose ripple effects are already reshaping regional alignments, global defense industries, and the logic of deterrence.

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For listeners, this episode is a vital primer on the intersection of military force, energy security, technology, and diplomacy in today’s high-stakes Middle Eastern conflict, with global ramifications.

Transcript

[Vinny Sharaney]

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[Peter Apps]

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[Peter Apps]

Those Marines are trained in landing for small boats. They can seize ships, they can seize islands. They can reinforce islands.

[Pete Hegseth]

A short time ago, the United States

[Fabian Hoffman]

military began major combat operations in Iran.

[Pete Hegseth]

If you kill Americans, if you threaten Americans anywhere on Earth, we will hunt you down without apology and without hesitation, and we will kill you.

[Peter Apps]

We were not involved in the initial strike strikes on Iran, and we will not join offensive action.

[Vinny Sharaney]

Now today, President Trump says Iran's Supreme

[Syrian President Ahmed Al Sharar]

Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in the attacks.

[Roland Oliphant]

I'm Veneesha Rainey and this is Iran. The Latest. It's Friday, March 20, 2026.

[Vinny Sharaney]

Well, it's the 21st day of the war and on today's episode, we'll be taking a step back to look at

[Roland Oliphant]

how the war is going.

[Vinny Sharaney]

Three weeks in, I'll be joined by

[Roland Oliphant]

Reuters global defence commentator Peter Apps to talk about the Strait of Hormuz, American boots on the ground, and China. We'll also be doing some crucial missile how degraded are Iran's missile capabilities? How much longer can the Gulf and Israel defend themselves with interceptors? And what does all of this mean for Ukraine? I'll be speaking to a missile expert to find out. Today is normally a day of celebration. Across the Middle east, people are marking both Eid Al Fitr, the end of Ramadan and Nowruz, the Persian New Year. I know the shadow of war is hanging over all of that at the moment, but I still want to wish Nowruz Mubarak and Eid Mubarak to any of our listeners who are marking the day, whatever your views on this war. Now, let's whiz through the latest updates. At the time of recording in Iran, Israel has been hitting the capital Tehran, with airstrikes overnight. The US Based human rights activist news agency has issued an update on the death toll in the country, which it says has reached more than 3,000 people since the war began. Internet blackout in the country has now been in place for 21 days, according to monitoring group NetBlock. That's now the longest recorded blackout in Iran's history, surpassing the one imposed during protests in January. In the Gulf, Iran has continued to bombard energy infrastructure despite calls for it to stop. It's hit Kuwait, the uae, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, perhaps tellingly, though, not Qatar. And that's not since the devastating attack on Raslafan facility yesterday, which happened after Israel struck Iran's South Pas gas field. You'll remember that Trump warned Iran to stop hitting Qatar or else he threatened he would destroy South Paul's gas field completely. We've also had an update on the damage caused in Qatar to Raslafan, which is the world's largest natural gas plant. Qatar's energy minister says it will take five years to repair and will cost the country billions. Qatar is one of the leading players in the global natural gas market and the knock on impact is mainly in Asia, but also on Europe. The continent as a whole has become increasingly reliant on Middle Eastern gas after turning away from Russian imports in the wake of the Ukraine. Iranian war significantly also from the Gulf. We've heard Saudi Arabia threaten to strike back at Iran if it keeps attacking its oil facilities. And we'll get onto that in a bit more depth later with Peter Apps. In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a press conference last night. He said Israel would hold off any future attacks on Iranian gas fields after being asked to do so by President Trump. He also rejected accusations that he dragged Trump into the war in Iran. That's a whole debate going on in America. We mentioned Joe Kent's letter, the guy who resigned earlier this week, accusing Israel of dragging the US into the war. So that's Netanyahu denying that that's the case.

[Benjamin Netanyahu]

Well, I'll say two things. Fact number one, Israel acted alone against the Slowiya gas compound. Fact number two, President Trump asked us to hold off on future attacks and we're holding on. And I want to close these opening remarks with one other fake news, and that is that Israel somehow dragged the US Into a conflict with Iran. Does anyone really think that someone can tell President Trump what to do? Come on.

[Roland Oliphant]

He also set out Israel's primary war goals again. Removing the nuclear threat, removing the ballistic missile threat, and creating conditions for regime change. He claimed Iran was weaker than ever and also said that a ground invasion might be necessary to bring about regime change because revolutions from the air were not possible on the ground in Israel. We've also heard loud thuds of interceptions throughout the night in Jerusalem. And the Israeli army has said that it struck military infrastructure in southern Syria, apparently a command center with weapons. We interestingly had Syrian President Ahmed Al Sharar gave a speech last night. He said he didn't want Syria to get involved in the war.

[Vinny Sharaney]

I know we've mentioned that a few

[Roland Oliphant]

times on the podcast this week, but it's interesting to hear from the President himself. I'm just going to read out a short quote. He said. What is happening now is a major and rare event in history that we haven't witnessed since World War II. We're carefully calculating our steps and working to keep Syria away from any conflict so that it can maintain its path of development and reconstruction. I think Syria's role in all of this is one to keep an eye on. So interesting to hear from him there. In the Strait of Hormuz, the US has launched an offensive to reopen this vital waterway. Washington is deploying low flying jets and Apache helicopters to strike Iranian vessels and drones near the shipping lane. The US had been planning to send warships, but they decided that would just take too long. Washington has also accelerated the deployment of around 4,500 sailors and marines from California who should reach the Middle east within two days. That's the story that Roland was referencing yesterday and we'll talk more about that shortly. We also heard yesterday from the uk, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Japan and Canada issuing a joint statement where they expressed their readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. But I think really notably that statement does not include any commitment to send naval vessels or any other resources to help actually make that happen. So just words at the moment. I should mention that according to Axios, the UK has sent military officers to centcom's headquarters in Florida to help with planning for a straight up Hormuz coalition. So there is stuff going on in the background there.

[Vinny Sharaney]

So let's bring in our guests to discuss some of that and look at

[Roland Oliphant]

how the war is going more broadly at the end of its third week. I've spoken to Peter Apps, Reuters global defence commentator and author of the Next World War. Here's our conversation.

[Vinny Sharaney]

Let's just start with this escalating energy crisis that we're seeing in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has been attacking More energy infrastructure across the Gulf overnight, although not Qatar, which I think is interesting given Trump warned Tehran off doing that. The Americans are deploying more Marines. We saw quite a limp wristed statement from the, the European nations as well as Canada and Japan that they would form a coalition but no actual resources deployed. What do you think it's going to take to reopen the Strait of Hormuz? What do you make of the action that Trump is trying to take here?

[Peter Apps]

I mean it's fairly clear ever since Trump bombed the Iranian nuclear program last summer that what they're really trying to do is not that dissimilar to what they were trying to do in Venezuela, which is to make the Iranian regime stop doing things. Firstly, obviously refining uranium and now much more urgently stop blocking the straits for muzzle. So the Iranians have always had the ability to close that. They did it in the 1980s. We've known for the last 20 years that they could do it with missiles and suicide speedboats and of course now drones and other things. So it's about having an impact on the leadership in Tehran and that is starting to happen, although not for American or Western shipping. And we know that because the Indians are starting to get shipping through homos, firstly starting with lateral gas carriers and tankers, bulk carriers and so forth. So it is about the Iranians deciding to stop. And the Iranians are playing hardball. They've said they're prepared to do this for six months. They said they're happy to see the oil price go up to $200 a barrel. And of course they're also now striking energy infrastructure in Qatar, the UAE and elsewhere. They have not launched an all out assault on things like the Saudi oil fields, which they could do if they wished, in which case we would find out how good the air defenses were at the Saudi oil fields. So the Iranians are signaling with individual strikes on ships that they're not prepared to open and that the Americans are trying very hard to change the Iranians minds through a mixture of threats and presumably a bit of diplomacy behind the scenes.

[Vinny Sharaney]

Yeah, I was reading this morning that about 100 ships have got through and as you say, some Indian, some Tehran, some China, some Greek and some ships

[Roland Oliphant]

have been taking a sort of circuitous

[Vinny Sharaney]

route outside of the main shipping lane

[Roland Oliphant]

but closer to the Iranian coastline. So clearly there is coordination going on with some countries to enable some people to get through the Strait of Hormuz.

[Vinny Sharaney]

Just to be clear, you don't think then the additional presence of about 4,000 Marine sailors to take Carg Island, Kesham island, some kind of off mainland territory

[Roland Oliphant]

perhaps will help to reopen the Strait.

[Peter Apps]

Well, I think it will help in the sense that it's a threat. To quote Douglas Adams, as Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, threats can be terribly effective if you do them right. That Marine Expeditionary Force has got enough personnel with it to do several things. Yes, they could probably seize Kharg island, but the Americans are more likely to destroy the energy infrastructure on Carg Island. Frankly, the one thing US Marine Expeditionary Forces are really good at is evacuations. So, for example, that force is potent enough, once it's close enough to evacuate every European and foreign embassy in Tehran. Those Marines are trained in landing for small boats. They can seize ships, they can seize islands, they can reinforce islands. So, for example, there are Emirati and Saudi and Omani bits of territory that they could help protect. They could seize Iranian shipping. They could drop protection packages, including electronic jamming onto other tankers, and help them get through. So that the US Marines can do an awful lot of things. They're referred to as Uncle Sam's miscreant children for a reason because they're all quite tough. But having an extra 3,000 of them is exactly what I would want if I needed a bunch of options in a hurry. And they are probably several days sailing time away. And the Iranians will know that. And that gives the time for diplomacy to take at least a degree, of course.

[Roland Oliphant]

What do you make of the Saudi

[Vinny Sharaney]

foreign minister, Prince Faisal Bin Fahan, coming out last night, Thursday night, and saying that Saudi Arabia is considering military options? I'm just going to read the exact quote he said.

[Roland Oliphant]

This pressure from Iran will backfire politically and morally. And certainly we reserve the right to

[Vinny Sharaney]

take military actions if deemed necessary. That would be quite a significant intervention

[Roland Oliphant]

if the Saudis joined on behalf of US and Israel, wouldn't it?

[Peter Apps]

The Saudis are not going to join on behalf of the US And Israel. They get to join on behalf of themselves. And we know that Saudi Arabia has a higher appetite for military action because they bombed Yemen just after Christmas and they destroyed a bunch of Qatari vehicles. So again, really, precision strike. There's no news coverage that they killed any Qataris, so they conducted a strike that may have killed people almost. It didn't kill Qataris, but destroyed Qatari kit in Yemen. We also know from things like the Khashoggi killing that the Saudi Arabian state traditionally has a variety of things that it's prepared to do. So if they decide that they want to go into Iran. They will do that because they believe that they want to be the first Gulf state to do so. And that's a decision that they wish to send a message to everyone in the region, including the U.S. including the Qataris, including the Emiratis, including the Iranians and the Israelis, that they are prepared to act when necessary. And also, don't forget, they are unlikely to strike the Iranian oil fields because the Iranians could return the favor by demolishing the Saudi Arabian oil fields. So we're talking about messaging to an extent. It's all Israel is doing. You're looking at Israel having a dialogue with force with a bunch of countries that expects to stay around. Israel expects Iran to remain a major power in the Middle east because Iran has been a major power in the Middle east four or five thousand years. It is attempting to message that it is prepared to share the Middle east with Iran, providing Iran doesn't have a nuclear weapon. And of course, what Saudi Arabia is signaling very, very quietly is that if Iran develops a nuclear weapon, then Saudi Arabia will develop a nuclear weapon. Everyone is working on the assumption that they are grown ups. I think one of the mistakes we make in the UK is assuming that the US is not a grown up power. In fact, regardless what you think of Donald Trump, the Pentagon is staffed by extremely clever, extremely experienced people who have wiped blood off their boots, buried their own soldiers, and do intend to do so again. This is how grown up states do business in the 21st century. It is alarming. It does kill people. It's probably killed about a thousand people so far, this war in Iran and Lebanon, and I think about a dozen or so U.S. personnel, no British personnel, luckily, because we're not that involved. But this is what the world looks like now. And it is both scary and reassuring because people are really, really, really moderating the amount of violence that they use. This is essentially the way that gangland groups do business. So to switch wildly to a different venue, some of you will be aware of the gang warfare that took place in Essex in the 90s. So what you're seeing is Israel in particular saying, and America saying, we will kill some of your decision makers and we're prepared to do so. And we are confident that you can't kill ours because Iron Dome is good enough. The US at the risk of stating the bleeding the obvious, can defend Washington D.C. against Iranian assassins relatively well. So we're saying, just as Trump said in 2020 when he killed General Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Quds Force, in assassination in return for killing one US contractor, that if you cross our lines and we're a bit vague where our lines are, we will kill your decision makers. So that is still going on. The Israelis have always done this. They've always killed atomic scientists. They were attacking German scientists in Egypt in the 60s to stop Egyptians getting long range missiles. So nothing has really changed. But we are seeing lethal force being delivered by Israel and the United States in roughly the same way that we saw gangs in Essex delivering very, very, very occasional killings in the 1990s. So that's what we're looking at. This is. It's Game of Thrones type stuff, right? It's Game of Thrones. It is Essex boys. It is how quite grown up people who don't mind killing sometimes do business with the whole of the world's energy infrastructure and finance going on at the same time. It's like the Middle Ages. This is just what history looks like.

[Vinny Sharaney]

How do you think the war is going from the American and Israeli perspective? We've heard military objectives sort of restated and have changed a bit, but I think more or less we can talk about destruction of missile capabilities, destruction of their nuclear program, destruction of their navy, and regime change as a goal comes and goes. But Netanyahu mentioned it again last night. So how do you think the war's going?

[Peter Apps]

I mean, I'm very sorry, but to quote General Allenby in the film, what happens in the Middle east isn't just a sideshow. It's a sideshow on a sideshow. The big picture here is about the confrontation between the US and China. And in that sense, this has been a good war for the US in that they have demonstrated their capability. It has been an okay war for the US in that they've demonstrated they can move lots of forces to the Middle east and pull them out of Asia without China invading Taiwan. This is largely because the Chinese have just discovered none of their equipment works and they've fired all their generals. That has created a window of opportunity in what absolutely no one is calling the global Ajax moment after the famously ineffective British armored vehicle. But essentially what has happened in China appears to be that Xi Jinping has been told by his generals that the kit they've just spent an unbelievably large amount of money on isn't actually quite good enough to defeat the Americans to take Taiwan. So that is the big picture that has created a window of opportunity where the Americans can pull forces to the Middle East. They didn't have a lot of choice because The Israelis were going to do this anyway. And the Israelis have been limbering up for this since at least the 2000s. And don't forget, if you're thinking about the Israeli Mossad and the Israeli kind of that came out the Holocaust. So all the people who founded those bodies came out of places like Auschwitz saying, never again. So this is big picture history. This is 2000, 3000, 4000 year confrontations between the Persians, the Israelis, the Arabs happening in real time in the age of social media, with cryptocurrencies and gold and particularly energy in the middle.

[Vinny Sharaney]

On that China point. So you don't subscribe to the view that this is opening up a weakness

[Roland Oliphant]

for America in the Indo Pacific in

[Vinny Sharaney]

that their depleting munitions will take a while to replenish and that China might

[Roland Oliphant]

seize on that moment to try and take Taiwan?

[Peter Apps]

That depends on whether any of the Chinese missiles work. And slightly awkwardly, given that they just fired all their generals, I assume that Xi Jinping isn't trusting that they do. I think this is advertising an obvious weakness in that the US cannot fight a simultaneous war in the Middle east and the Pacific. It could do it with its allies, but so it doesn't want to. I think it's also signaling an awareness on behalf of the Americans that they don't expect China to do anything this year or next year. And the reason for that, and I always segue abruptly to Taiwanese politics at this point, is that Taiwan has elections in 2028. And those elections are an opportunity for the Chinese to pressure Taiwan. And they're still pressuring Taiwan militarily in the hope that the Kuomintang, what used to be the dictatorial government of Taiwan from 1947 onwards, and now the opposition party that gives a window for the Kuomintang to win elections and begin to move towards reunification peacefully. Now, I think it's quite unlikely to happen in 2028, but I don't think the Chinese want to go hot between now and then. Firstly because they think Trump might go nuclear in response, either metaphorically or really. Don't forget, the Americans have just shown they can kill Ayatollah Khamenei. That means they might be able to kill Xi Jinping with a stealth bomber. The Chinese are not in a hurry to find out whether that would work. So we are in a two or three year moment. So there's going to be elections in the US in 2028, going to be elections in Taiwan in 2028, and then we will get a new US president in 2020. 9. And that is very dangerous because that is the moment that we might get a war.

[Vinny Sharaney]

I think that brings us neatly onto listener questions because we've got one about whether this is a world war.

[Roland Oliphant]

As you mentioned, you've wrote a book

[Vinny Sharaney]

about the next world war, and the

[Roland Oliphant]

last time we had you on the podcast, we had an extensive discussion about

[Vinny Sharaney]

why you think we're not in a world war at the moment. This was pre Iran and what you think a world war would actually look like. Doug in Auckland asked, it seems the world won't label this as World War III until Belgium or Poland. Poland has invaded.

[Roland Oliphant]

Until then, they'll spend time thinking of any other phrase.

[Vinny Sharaney]

Do you think we're in a world war?

[Peter Apps]

I have gradually realized I have to give up on this question. I got myself in trouble the other day by saying that World War Three was the Cold War and this is now World War Four. And I've got in trouble with historians who say the Napoleonic wars were the First World War. Anyway, so the Great War was the Second War. The second and the Third War were the same thing. So there are various ways you can number world wars. The strap line that I'll probably put on the paperback of my book when it comes out in paperback in September, I think will be, has the next world War started or are we trying to stop it? Either way, this is the book you need to read because I think this may or may not be a world war, but it's certainly a battle for the world. And actually, if one translated that into any other language, say French or Chinese or whatever, you would end up with the word the same. So this is a battle for the world. The truth is that we are playing long game history here and we're also playing long game history that includes space, because we are also looking at a Chinese and a Russian and American race back to the moon and beyond. Of course, there's a lot going on. I don't know whether it's a world war or not, and I don't think it's actually the right question.

[Vinny Sharaney]

Fair enough. Well, you mentioned space. We've had another question from Wendy saying this is the first major conflict that the new military branch of the American military, the Space Force, is in. Can you tell us what they're doing in this war and how they might

[Roland Oliphant]

be working to jam Iranian satellites, for example?

[Peter Apps]

So I think there's one thing that's really important to realise, which is the Space Force and U.S. space Command are two different things. So the U.S. space Force provides the people and they Wear a particular type of camouflage and they wear that slightly weird Star Trek sort of logo on them. They provide personnel to all of the U.S. combatant Command. So there'll be Space Force personnel in U.S. central Command who will be helping do space stuff. So Central Command covers the Middle East. European Command covers Europe. Indo Pacific Command covers the Indo Pacific. US Space Command, which is generally commanded by a Space Force or U.S. air Force officer, is the Combatant Command for everything above the Karman line. It is the point at which air breathing jets don't work anymore. So it's the edge of space. And Space Command is responsible for everything for that level out to infinity. The US Military divides up a planet between its Combatant Commands and Space Command does everything else. And that includes satellites. So they'll be very busy delivering surveillance for everything else. So the satellites to look down, they're almost certainly involved in some of the GPS jamming, although most of that will be done from the surface. They are involved in negotiating with Elon Musk over launching satellites. They're involved in signaling to the Russians and Chinese where the Hunter killer satellites are. So we now know, just like you have Hunter killer submarines under the sea, we now have almost certainly Hunter killer satellites in orbit that can grab other satellites. All of this takes place quite secretly. So we don't know about this. We can only see it when it comes into sort of plain sight, when someone reports it or talks about it. So yes, I mean, they are active in a way they never have been before. And of course, NASA, the civilian space agency, is currently trying to rebuild its Artemis rocket so it works so they can send people back around the moon. So all of those are happening at once. And China's space program is essentially run by the People's Liberation Army. So it's much more militarized than the American one. Although the American one is pretty militarized because everyone, a lot of people are serving. The US Military is also racing to get back into space and they're both racing to get drones to both the moon and Mars. So this is really big stuff. We are now looking at a space race that is in some ways the sort of beginnings of the age of discovery in the 16th century. This is a really exciting period of history. Except of course, when you realize that what actually goes wrong when the AI doesn't quite work is you end up bombing a school in Iran, which the Americans did. Of those thousand people dead, hundreds are children. And that is the very, very, very, very opposite of being funny or enjoyable. So it's really Important particularly for men who get a bit carried away with this and like listening to defence podcasts to remember that actually at the sharp end people are dying, particularly people who really, really, really do not deserve to die, like children and people who are genuinely very innocent.

[Vinny Sharaney]

One final question from Chris in Western Australia. I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on the role these Iranian regime rallies play in propping up the regime. Should they be understood as genuine public

[Roland Oliphant]

support or is this carefully managed optics?

[Vinny Sharaney]

And if so, should American Israel be

[Roland Oliphant]

trying to disrupt them in some way,

[Vinny Sharaney]

buzzing jets over them or even firing

[Roland Oliphant]

tear gas for example, to scatter the gatherings?

[Peter Apps]

In Libya we tried to support a popular uprising with military force and the result has been a ghastly civil war in Libya that has gone on 15 years. I think everyone is very keen not to do that in Iran and I think that probably includes Trump and it certainly includes the Pentagon. Yes, the pro regime rallies are obviously organized by the government, but then remember at Sunday events in Britain are organized by the government and we don't get too holy in the loud about it. Governments are allowed to organize rallies saying don't bomb us, we're our country. And they always do. Iran is a really interesting thing because it is both quasi democratic and quasi sort of run by religious leaders who some people would refer to as religious lunatics, the Israelis in particular, but also the Americans have abilities to influence and shape the anti regime protest that we saw. And we saw that under the Obama administration. We saw it in the Arab Spring, we saw it in 2009. I think it would be incredibly difficult to use US kinetic military force to support protests because not least you would be flying very low. It would have been a bit like some of you remember the anti Iraq invasion protests here. The protest against the Iraq war here would not have been helped by Saddam Hussein flying the Iraqi air force low and loud up the Thames. Indeed, that would probably have made everyone go home and say maybe we should invade Iraq immediately. If the Americans do not wish to produce the same result that the Iraqi air force flying up the Thames would have yielded in 2003, they probably are going to be very careful.

[Roland Oliphant]

That was Peter Apps, Reuters global defence commentator. Coming up after the break, I speak to a missiles expert about how much longer Iran can keep going for.

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Wait. Chris.

[Fabian Hoffman]

Yes.

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[Roland Oliphant]

Welcome back. You're listening to Iran the latest now. Yesterday, Thursday, Secretary of War and Defence Pete Hegseth gave another characteristically bombastic press conference about the U.S. s goals in the conflict and how they're going.

[Pete Hegseth]

Our objectives unchanged, on target and on plan. Destroy missiles, launchers and Iran's defense industrial base so they cannot rebuild. Destroy their navy and Iran never gets a nuclear weapon. Our objectives from day one.

[Roland Oliphant]

Destroying Iran's missile capabilities has been repeatedly brought up by both the US And Israel as a war goal. But given Iran is still firing missiles, I wanted to know how well are they actually doing? There's also been lots of talk about Israel and the Gulf running out of Interceptors. I wanted to know, can that really happen? And what is the knock on impact of all this munitions usage of on Ukraine.

[Vinny Sharaney]

To find out some answers, I've spoken

[Roland Oliphant]

to missiles expert Fabian Hoffman. He's a doctoral research fellow at the University of Oslo and writes the Missile Matters substack. Here's our conversation.

[Vinny Sharaney]

Fabian, welcome to Iran. The latest one of the big aims of this war, clearly stated by the Americans and the Israelis. Among the most clearly stated aims is to get rid of Iran's missile capabilities. What's your read on how that's going?

[Fabian Hoffman]

In the beginning it appeared to be going pretty well. I mean, arguably it still is. So what we saw was that when the war initially started, Iran was able to launch a pretty significant number of ballistic missiles and long range drones. Not as much as it did in 2024 and 2025 given that its arsenal likely was already degraded. But then this dropped very significantly after the first two days. And since then I would say the, the number has somewhat plateaued and is actually slightly rising again. So it's, it's probably 80 to 90% less compared to where it was on the first two days, but it also hasn't dropped to zero. And over the last two to three days we've actually seen a slight increase again in the number of missiles that Iran was able to launch. Also long range drones. I mean overall there is no doubt that Iran's ballistic missile capability as well as its ability to launch long range drones has been degraded significantly, but it has not yet been fully destroyed.

[Vinny Sharaney]

And why do you think that is?

[Fabian Hoffman]

It's pretty difficult to get to some of these storage facilities to destroy comprehensively the infrastructure, but also the launcher systems that you need for these ballistic missiles and long range drones. So especially for these long range drones, you can basically launch them from a civilian truck, right? Something that is a bit larger than your average car, maybe like, you know, 5 to 6 meters in length, 5 to 6 shy type drones easily fit into that. And you know, hunting these things, first of all, discriminating them of course from targets that you do not necessarily want to engage, hunting them and also engaging them, that can be quite tricky, especially because there are many, many potential routes, right, along which they can disperse many potential targets along those routes. And hence this is quite difficult process.

[Vinny Sharaney]

Obviously the exact number of missiles that Iran had before this war was closely guarded secret. But what's our best educated guess as someone who specializes in this for what their stocks were like before this war? And can you talk us a bit through what kinds of missiles they had?

[Fabian Hoffman]

Yeah, no, this is exactly, this is extremely difficult to estimate without access to classified information. What we very confidently can say is that they very likely had access to thousands of ballistic missiles, including short range ballistic missiles at medium range ballistic missiles. So that is defined Basically everything below 1000km in range is defined as a short range ballistic missile. And if it has more than 1000 km becomes a medium range ballistic missile. The latter you need to strike Israel, right, Because that is quite far away from Iranian territory. Whereas those Gulf states, those neighbors, they can also be struck with short range ballistic missiles. And Iran, they still had a lot more likely a lot more short range ballistic missiles left than medium range ballistic missiles. Given that the medium range ballistic missile arsenal was quite heavily degraded and used up already in 2024 and 2025 during those conflict episodes. Then Iran, they also have access to a growing cruise missile arsenal, although probably far smaller than its ballistic missile arsenal, perhaps a couple hundred of those. And then we of course also have the long range drones, right? Those shy type drones, other types of long range drones, and here again that's probably thousands, perhaps even tens of thousands. But there's again great uncertainty. And of course, when it comes to production facilities and the capacity to produce these systems, it is much easier for Iran to produce these long range drones as compared to ballistic missiles also during this war. Given of course that the supply chain for a ballistic missile is much more complex and also difficult, right, to put into different dispersed places, as you know, a small workshop that builds long range drones.

[Roland Oliphant]

Okay?

[Vinny Sharaney]

So drones will be easier for them to produce more of basically than the big missiles. So knowing those rough numbers and knowing how many have been fired and intercepted and impacted, roughly how much do we think their stocks have been depleted? I mean, can we put a ballpark figure on it?

[Roland Oliphant]

25%, 50%?

[Fabian Hoffman]

The United States and Israel, they're going after those stockpiles that are stored somewhere, often, you know, not above ground. And then even if you know where such a stockpile is stored, and then, you know, you allocate these specialized penetrating munitions to it in order to destroy them. There's another issue here, that given that it's underground or inside a mountain, it's very difficult then to confirm the damage that you have done. Right? I would say, you know, broadly speaking, probably for Iran, the number of available missiles is less of a bottleneck than the number of launcher vehicles. So this is especially the case for ballistic missiles, right? So I think Iran, they are much more likely to run out of these what we call transporter erectile launchers, the launcher vehicles for ballistic missiles of which they likely only had a couple of hundred in the beginning of the war. And many, many of those have been destroyed. So they're likely running out of those first before they start running out of ballistic missiles.

[Vinny Sharaney]

Okay, that's really interesting. And then even if they've got these missiles in a bunker wherever, if they

[Roland Oliphant]

can't launch them, they're effectively useless.

[Vinny Sharaney]

How does that compare with American and Israeli firepower? Is there any suggestion that they're starting to run low on missiles, or are there any crunch points there on the

[Fabian Hoffman]

side of the Israelis, of the Gulf states and Americans? We, of course, are looking at the interceptor, the arsenals, right? So those missile capabilities that you need to take down the enemy's incoming missiles, especially those ballistic missiles, those are again, highly specialized and very expensive. So especially, you know, for Patriot Thaad on the Israeli side for Arrow. So these ballistic missile defense systems here, the ballistic missile defense interceptor arsenals, they're very critical. They're also not infinite. You know, at least on the American side. I mean, they can, they have deep reserve arsenals, but they don't want those reserve arsenals to get too low because they are, of course, always looking towards China and preparing for a contingency in Asia. Whereas for the Gulf states, they're working with a limited number of interceptors. Depending on which Gulf state we're looking at, there could be a couple of hundred some of them. So, for example, Saudi Arabia, they also had over 1,000 Patriot interceptors, for example, the UAE, around 1,000, and others less than that. So I would say right now they're not on the verge of running out. It would have been very critical. So those numbers of launched Iranian ballistic missiles that we saw in the first two days, if those numbers had been maintained for a week or perhaps longer, then I think we would have gotten to a point where the Gulf states could potentially have run out quite fast of interceptor capabilities. But given that Iran's ability to launch ballistic missiles has been degraded so heavily, I don't think they're on the verge of running out right now. They're probably quite far from that. That being said, the longer this conflict goes on, the more problematic the interceptor availability situation in the Gulf states may become.

[Vinny Sharaney]

We spoke to a Gulf analyst, I think, last week who was saying that he thought the whole discussion around interceptor stocks running low is completely overblown. Because even if they did start to run low of the fancier sort of Patriot TAD systems that you mention, they have other ways to intercept missiles. You know, they've fitted helicopters with missile launchers or, you know, you can use counterattack drones can you just talk us through how interception works and what is needed to intercept. For example, a ballistic missile versus something else.

[Fabian Hoffman]

Yeah, exactly. That's really critical, this, this differentiation. So I need very different things to intercept the ballistic missile compared to a long range drone. So for a ballistic missile approaches from a very high altitude, depending on its range, that could be well outside the atmosphere, so well over 100km above the ground that it descends onto the target and then also intercepted fairly high up in the altitude. This is why I need these specialized interceptor capabilities and essentially using those, right. For example, the PAC3MSE, it works by kinetically colliding with the incoming ballistic missile projectile. So some have compared it basically with hitting a bullet with a bullet, just in many ways more difficult because the ballistic missile can be maneuvering and we know that Iranian ballistic missiles, they do that. So basically your interceptor, your incoming or your outgoing bullet that you try to shoot the other bullet down with, also has to maneuver to compensate for what the other projectile is doing. And so to take out these ballistic missiles, yes, we have a limited stock of specialized interceptors that is not available in unlimited numbers. For long range drones, it's in theory, it's much easier. Right? So these fly well within the atmosphere at fairly low altitudes during mid course trajectory, probably around 2-3 km in altitude. They are pretty slow, they're not very stealthy. So the moment I point a radar at them, there will be a big return. Fighter jets, right, Helicopters can be used to take them down either with their machine guns or with air to air missiles. So here potentially I have a lot of options to take them down and also to take them down cost effectively. Right? Because I don't want to use a very expensive interceptor missile. That's why they're really trying to take them out with these cheaper alternatives. And in the vast majority of cases this is also working. But given the large number of these long range drones that can theoretically be launched, right. It becomes a question of saturation. If I launch a critical number, then there is always a certain possibility that one or two of those drones may slip through. That's the nature of missile defense. Whether it's against ballistic missiles or long range drones, it is extremely difficult to take down every single incoming threat. This is also a good lesson for us here in Europe. No matter how much we invest in missile defense, it will be very, very difficult to make sure that no enemy projectile, ballistic missile, cruise missile or long range drone finds its target. Right. At 100% success rate. That is very, very rare. And therefore you need these other tools. That's why the American and Israeli air campaign to go after the launchers, the stockpiles, the production capacities is so, so critical because you would not be able to fight this war by just relying on missile defense. We're actually seeing that in Ukraine right now. Right.

[Vinny Sharaney]

I want to come back to Ukraine in a second because I think that's a really important, broader point, knock on impact from this conflict. But just to look for a second at Israel, which has a very multi layered complex missile defense system, Arrow 3, Iron Dome, which is one most people hear about, and David's Sling, can you talk us through those different layers and how well they've been working through this war?

[Fabian Hoffman]

ARRW basically is the uppermost layer of Israel's integrated air missile defense system. And it is optimized to take out medium range ballistic missile threat threats and actually outside of the atmosphere. So as we talked earlier, right. Like these ballistic missiles, they can approach from well outside the atmosphere. An arrow, if it succeeds, it takes out the ballistic missile even before it re enters the atmosphere. The next lower level, that is David Sling. And this one is optimized technically to engage short range ballistic missiles, but it has also been used to successfully engage medium range ballistic missiles that have re entered the atmosphere, either perhaps because they were not at all engaged by arrow or because arrow missed. But again, there is no perfect ballistic missile defense. The interceptors will miss once in a while, even if they generally work very well, which arrow does. And so this is then basically another layer of redundancy. Right? So if your uppermost layer fails, you have the second layer and an Iron dome. This is really, really interesting because, because Iron Dome was conceptualized and deployed as a missile defense layer really against these lower tier threats. Rockets, artillery, perhaps cruise missiles, but nothing like a ballistic missile, at least originally. Yet we have seen already in 2025, but also now in 2026, we have seen Iron Dome interceptors successfully engaging incoming medium range ballistic missile warheads very low in the atmosphere. And that is a very impressive feat because Iron Dome originally was in no way optimized to deal with these threats, and yet it has proven capable in some instances of actually dealing with them.

[Vinny Sharaney]

How exactly does Iron Dome work? Because you have to fire up several projectiles to deal with one projectile, is that right?

[Fabian Hoffman]

Ideally, that's what you want to do, right? So we call this the probability of kill that is associated with an individual interceptor. And you know, depending on the complexity of the threat that we're dealing with, that probability may be 60, 70 perhaps 80% right below 100% by nature. And so if I want to get very high intercept probabilities, I then necessarily have to allocate more than one interceptor to each incoming projectile. Right. And so, yeah, Iron Dome works like most other missile defense systems. It works with a radar that provides early warning. Right. So it looks at the sky. Depending on, you know, how much I'm scanning, the range may be larger or smaller, but it looks up in the sky, scans for incoming threats. Once it detects those threats, you will basically try to allocate a second suitable interceptor capability. And that interceptor is then originally or the first instant, queued by the radar. And for some interceptors, as it gets close enough to the target, it may also use its own small either a radar or a small camera to home in on the incoming threat.

[Vinny Sharaney]

What do you make of the reports that we've had this week that Israel's interceptor missile stocks are also running critically low? Israel has denied this, we should be clear, but they're facing an average, I read, somewhere of 10 missiles per day being fired from Iran. We know that their stocks, again, are very closely guarded secret, but what can you tell us about how credible you think it might be that their stocks are running low?

[Fabian Hoffman]

Yeah, I think that's certainly a credible proposition at the very least. I mean, we know that they used hundreds of interceptors in 2024 and 2025. So by the time this conflict started, their arsenals were probably far away from a point that they would consider comfortable. And, yeah, Iranian ballistic missile launch capacity has not been reduced to zero. So they're dealing with a ballistic missile threat on a daily basis that they then often have to try to intercept. Iran is now also launching them, not at smaller military targets where you could also say on the Israeli side, which they have done, for example, in these previous conflict episodes. But now the Iranians, they're launching most of their ballistic missiles against Israel directly against population centers. And here, of course, a single ballistic missile landing can cause a lot of damage and potentially a lot of cost a lot of human lives. So that's why you probably would want to then try to intercept it always. And that means, yeah, Israel is faced with a constant depletion of its interceptor arsenal. Now, it's very difficult for us to make estimates, you know, how low they are. But what we have seen in recent days is videos now showing intercept attempts on the Israeli side. The often depicted individual interceptors moving up towards the target. And as we discussed earlier, ideally you would want to allocate more than One interceptor, Right. So why are they then only using one? Well, probably because you are running low.

[Vinny Sharaney]

Let's get onto Ukraine. Because there's a bigger picture here, isn't there? To what extent is this war sucking the global supply of interceptors and strike missiles for the West?

[Fabian Hoffman]

I mean, it could be quite disadvantageous for Ukraine and potentially Europe following this conflict. Right? Both the United States, but also the Gulf states, they will try to replenish their depleted interceptor arsenals. That simply means there's more competition on the global market. The critical question is, does supply the increasing supply, will it outpace the increasing demand? And now if all these Gulf states have to order a lot of Patriot interceptors to replenish their arsenals, this may not be entirely likely, right? At the very least, it's no longer straightforward that the supply constraints of Patriot that they will ease in the coming years.

[Vinny Sharaney]

Is there anything else that struck you about this conflict that you don't think people are paying enough attention to from your field?

[Fabian Hoffman]

What this conflict really has demonstrated is that there is a huge capability gap for these Middle Eastern states in the Gulf region in terms of long range drone defense. Right. They highly optimized for the ballistic missile threat coming from Iran, which to be fair, everyone agreed is the highest priority threat, while you know, somewhat ignoring this lower level threat of long range drones. And they knew that this was a danger. But the procurement processes, they were just too slow, right? By the time the war started, they were not yet ready. And as a result, the long range drone threat has almost proved more challenging and in many ways has caused more damage than the ballistic missile threat. And I think this is a good lesson for us in Europe.

[Roland Oliphant]

That was Fabian Hoffman of the University of Oslo.

[Vinny Sharaney]

That's all for today's episode.

[Roland Oliphant]

We'll be back again on Monday. Until then, that was around the Latest. Goodbye.

[Vinny Sharaney]

Around the Latest is an original podcast from the Television created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Vinny Sharaney and Roland Oliphant. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following around the latest on your preferred podcast app. And if you have a moment, leave us a review as it helps others find the show. To stay on top of all of our news, subscribe to the Telegraph, sign up to our Dispatchers newsletter or listen

[Roland Oliphant]

to our sister podcast Ukraine the Latest.

[Vinny Sharaney]

We're still on the same email address battlelinestelegraph.co.uk or you can contact us on X. You can find our handles in the show. Notes Notes the producer is Peter Shevlin. The executive producer is Louisa Wells.

[Men's Wearhouse Advertiser]

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[Chris]

What? I won floor seats.

[Men's Wearhouse Advertiser]

You did?

[Chris]

I've been calling for 13 months.

[Men's Wearhouse Advertiser]

Wait. Chris.

[Fabian Hoffman]

Yes.

[Chris]

I finally did it.

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What are you gonna wear?

[Chris]

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Don't want to stick out.

[Chris]

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[Chris]

Not a chance.

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[Peter Apps]

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[Fabian Hoffman]

Here's a show that we recommend.

[Syrian President Ahmed Al Sharar]

Chicago 2011. A cop is murdered. Police and prosecutors swear they have the trigger man. He swears he didn't do it. How far will each side go to prove they're right?

[Vinny Sharaney]

Like, it's just one bombshell after another. You know, you're like, what?

[Syrian President Ahmed Al Sharar]

The story of a PlayStation, a brain eating amoeba, and the relentless pursuit of justice. Off duty. Out now. Listen wherever you get your podcasts.

[Fabian Hoffman]

Acast helps creators launch, grow, and monetize their podcasts everywhere. Acast.com.