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Sophia Yan
The telegraph.
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Andrea Ghiselli
China's messaging was very straightforward. Taiwan. Taiwan. Like that was the core. They say, like this is the biggest obstacle in US China cooperation.
Unnamed US Military Correspondent
A short time ago, the United States military began major combat operations in Iran.
Sophia Yan
Today, President Trump says Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in the attacks.
Roland Oliphant
The Pentagon is weighing a takeover of that island as a way to force
Andrea Ghiselli
the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
Roland Oliphant
Iran begged for this ceasefire.
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Sophia Yan
Welcome to Iran. The latest. I'm Sophia Yan.
Roland Oliphant
And I'm Roland oliphant.
Sophia Yan
It's Friday 15th May, 77 days since the war began and 37 since the ceasefire came into force. We are seeing now the conclusion of a big summit in Beijing between Trump and Xi, between the US President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping. China has pledged that it will not be sending any military equipment to Iran. This is something that China said many times before. We'll have more on that later with our guest today, Andre Giselle. He's a China Middle east expert and a lecturer at the University of Exeter. But first, the news. Roland, will you take us through?
Roland Oliphant
Yeah. So, the latest out of the Middle east itself. I know you've had a very interesting conversation today, Sophia, about China and the Middle East. I'll try to skip that. But as you said very quickly, Donald Trump told Fox News last night that Xi Jinping assured him that China would not be sending weapons to the Middle East.
Unnamed US Military Correspondent
The issue, and you've been asked about it and you've spoken about it, and that is China's support of Iran. How big a discussion was that today? We discussed it. I mean, when you say support. They're not fighting a war with us or anything. No. He said he's not going to give military equipment. That's a big statement. He said that today. That's a big statement. Said that strongly. But at the same time, he said, you know, they buy a lot of their oil there and they'd like to keep doing that. He'd like to see Hormuz straight opened. I said, well, we didn't stop it, they did it. Then we stopped them. You know, sort of interesting, he joked. He said, you know, sort of they stopped it, then you stopped them. But they'd like to see it opened. But they actually closed it. He didn't like the fact that they're charging tolls. I don't know if they are or not. I don't know who would pay them. I mean, where do they put the money? The country's decimated, you know, they're charging tolls. Where's the money going?
Roland Oliphant
Although he's fairly non committal about what else they talked about on that topic in the Middle east itself. So what we might call kinetic events there have been Israeli strikes in Lebanon again. Israel says that it launched strikes against Hezbollah sites in Tyre in the south of Lebanon. The military told residents of five villages earlier to immediately leave ahead of those expected attacks. Reminder that there were talks in Washington between Lebanese and Israeli envoys yesterday. And the ceasefire that is not really a ceasefire, the heavily violated ceasefire that is meant to be enforced there expires officially on Sunday also in Iraq. And I raised my eyebrows when I saw this Safiyyah, because I know you mentioned on yesterday's podcast that we don't talk about it much, but there is no ceasefire in Iraq either. Two drones targeted the headquarters of an Iranian Kurdish opposition group north of Erbil in Iraqi Kurdish Kurdistan on Friday. Those security sources talking to Reuters. So another confirmation that in Iraq we don't talk about it much, but there has been and continues to be combat operations in that theater. Circling back to what I was saying about Lebanon, a US official talking about those talks between Israel and Lebanon said they were positive and that they would continue for a second day. That means today we had a full day of productive and positive talks that lasted from 9am to 5pm A senior state Department official said we look forward to continuing doing them tomorrow. That's today, Friday, when you're listening to this, I hope we have more to share then. So some hope of some kind of diplomacy is working or happening on the Lebanese front, at least. The Israeli military says one of its soldiers died in combat in southern Lebanon. That brings its total losses since that particular war began in early March to 2020. Israeli soldiers killed fighting Hezbollah since then. That's kinetic activity. A little bit more diplomacy now. So we mentioned yesterday that Abbas Arakchee, the Iranian Foreign Minister, had been at the BRICS summit, the summit of BRICS nations in India, the kind of club of emerging economies where he had, he'd called on them for support against American attacks and so on. He framed it as you would expect the Iranians to frame it. That has now concluded the Indians have put out a Chairman's final statement which merely notes in quite laconic fashion that there were differences, there were different opinions amongst the delegates about the war. And one obvious reason for that is because BRICS is no longer simply Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, who obviously different countries, different views. Several other members, including the United Arab Emirates. So Abbas Arachu was in the same room as the UAE Foreign Minister. Uae, as we noted yesterday, very much on a. On a more hawkish side of this war, on the other side of the war, essentially. And they intend to strengthen their ties with Israel and the United States in the aftermath. Just sticking in the Gulf. A very interesting piece in the, in the FT today, actually. This hasn't been officially confirmed by the governments they're talking about, but it's sourced to Western and Gulf diplomats and they say the Saudis are leading an initiative to draft basically what sounds like a non aggression pact. So when this war is over and you know, we know there's a ceasefire on, but there is still a war, technically they're reporting accordingly after is to come up with a mechanism based on the 1970s Helsinki process that was designed to ease tensions in Europe during the Cold War. As the region, this is from the ft, as the region anticipates a post war Iran that's weakened but still poses a threat to its neighbours. Now, the Helsinki Accords were signed in 1975 by the US, European countries and the Soviet Union and its allies to address security issues and foster greater cooperation between those rivals. It's not the first time that's been suggested as a model for the Middle east, at least according to the ft, European capitalist institutions are getting behind this Saudi idea. They cite an Arab diplomat who says, I'll read you the quote here. It all depends on who's in it. In the current climate, you're not going to be able to get Iran and Israel in the same club. Without Israel it could be counterproductive because after Iran they're seen as the biggest source of the conflict, the diplomat said. He said, but Iran's not going anywhere and this is why the Saudis are pushing it. So quite an interesting, I think an interesting element of regional diplomatic initiatives. And finally, for those who watch these kinds of things, oil prices are reportedly rising again as another weekend approaches with no prospect of return to normal oil flows. Price remains well over $100 a barrel. And on that economic note, the International Monetary Fund has issued its own bleak warning, saying that the global economic outlook is moving towards their word is an adverse scenario. Much in keeping with our own reporting on this podcast.
Sophia Yan
Trump's already spoken in an interview with Fox News about the summit and these talks that he had with xi. There was some discussion of Iran and what might happen next with its stockpile of enriched uranium.
Roland Oliphant
Can you take us through one of the key issues? Of course, as we all know in the talks is this stockpile of 460kg of 60% enriched uranium. And if, if you've been living under a rock for the past several months, I will repeat that 60% enriched uranium is one enrichment step away from 90%, which is generally regarded as weapons grade. The concentration of uranium that you need to build a nuclear weapon. Iran is believed to have about 460 kilograms of that stuff, which depends who you talk to about how many bombs you can make from that, but a few. So the Americans have been maintaining that the Iranians need to give up whatever happens. They've got to give all that up. They've got to hand it over or let the Americans mine for it or it's got to be destroyed or vaporized or something. But Donald Trump asked about this by Sean Hannity on Fox News last night. He said he was running out of patience to reach a truce. And he said, you know, I'm not going to be much more patient. They should make a deal. Any sane person would make a deal, but they might be crazy. But then he also said, when asked about the uranium, he seemed to suggest that his demands about uranium were actually mostly just for optics. I'd just feel better if I got it, actually. But I think it's more for public relations than it is for anything else. He told Mr. Hannity. So quite a. I don't know, I mean, maybe you could see some progress in talks if the Americans are going to soften on that demand. I will add, just before I came into the studio, I was seeing reports that the Iranian rejection of the American 14 point plan, that would kind of formalize what we'd already reported last week. And as we know, the Iranians have several demands. Their red lines are off the top of my head. There has to be a ceasefire in Lebanon. The blockade must be lifted. They want reparations and they want sanctions relief and they want their right to enrichment to be recognized. I think that's pretty much it.
Sophia Yan
Thank you very much for the updates, Roland. We'll be back after the break with our conversation with Andrea Gasseli. More on what happened between Trump and Xi in Beijing.
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Roland Oliphant
Welcome back. You're listening to around the Latest with me, Roland Oliphant and Sophia Yan. As Sofia was saying before the break, she had a very interesting conversation earlier today with Andrea Casselier, an expert on Chinese Middle Eastern, about the outcomes really of this summit that's finally wrapped up. We talked a little bit in the first half of the podcast about Donald Trump's claims, I suppose about what President Xi told him in private conversation about Iran. I'm not sure the Chinese have confirmed any of that. But anyway, without further ado, here is their conversation.
Sophia Yan
We have now seen Trump depart Beijing after his summit with Xi. Not too much has been announced in terms of business deals between the US And China. The statements that have come out are bit different and what they're focusing on. I'm just wondering what you make of this two day meeting. I mean, there was so much writing on it. Some people have called it the most important meeting of the year. What do you think of what we've seen coming out of this?
Andrea Ghiselli
On the one hand we've seen the, I think the, I guess what usually Happens in the aftermath of such kind of summit, their relationship usually gets a bit more stable than before. This main purpose of American and Chinese heads of state meeting, both sides recognize it. So I think we saw that the visit was quite smooth. There were no particular hiccups, no particular incidents. The two sides did not deny each other statements. So on that I think was positive. Right. But as you said, what really caught my attention was the difference in the agendas of the two leaders, which was reflected both in the statements by again the two leaders and officials before the visit as well as after the visit in the readouts that was quite really in your face, we can say, because China's messaging was very straightforward. Taiwan, Taiwan, like that was the core. They said this is the biggest obstacle in US China cooperation, especially to achieve what they call now constructive relationship between the two sides. Whereas Iran was definitely a big part of course of how the Americans went in. There was this old fashioned language about opening China to business. So yeah, pretty different. And we saw these also playing out in the readouts. Right. If you look at that, the Chinese redoubt, it was really all about the bilateral relationship and Taiwan. Then there was business and then really regional issues. At the very end, Iran was not even mentioned directly. We saw this reference to the Middle east situation in the Chinese without. Whereas the American one mentions Iran much more. It refers to the agreement on opposition to nuclear Iran. Opposition to told for the passage in the Strait of Hormuz. So again, the two sides did not deny each other statements, which I guess it's important, but it's not really anything new, especially if we look at the Chinese side and especially over Iran. Opposition to a nuclear weapon is lumpy in China's position that they oppose atoll in the Strait of Hormuz. Not surprising. They made it clear before. So. So no big concessions on that. We will see what happens. Of course, this was just the meeting in a way. I would imagine that if there was ever some kind of bargain or exchange would not immediately be in the news. Probably two sides would try to delay it, especially as There is this 14 billion-arm package that is waiting for Trump's approval. So we will see. But again, no big achievements, but no real damages to the relationship in any form or shape. We will see what happens in the coming weeks and months, especially to see if anything meaningful was produced for the
Sophia Yan
US perspective on Taiwan. Do you think that this meeting between Trump and Xi could have any impact on whether the US moves forward with that arms package on Taiwan?
Andrea Ghiselli
I mean, it's very difficult to Tell I think everyone is asking this question from leaders in Taiwan to congressional leaders. Of course, different officials and former officials in Washington have been saying that they don't want in any case a change in the US Position over Taiwan. Trump was, I think, a bit more ambiguous, although I would not overread his words. He said he was going to have that conversation with Xi Jinping, referring to the arms package. Of course, Trump knows that he is opposed to that. I would be very surprised if there's actually there is a change in there. Again, the arms package, as it would be quite a big concession made by the United States in that case, especially if it's delayed for a very long time or somewhat rediscussed. That would be really big. And I think even Trump would face resistance or in a case, opposition within the administration and in general among American political elites. So I think again, there is a potential for some kind of softening of Trump position, but I wouldn't take it for granted.
Sophia Yan
So far in the US Readout, they don't mention the issue of Taiwan. They don't push back on what China has said, saying that it's the biggest obstacle in the bilateral relationship. And they've made clear that this could be something that the US And China could come to loggerheads. They could be an opposition over. I mean, this is something that China said for a long time. They always make clear Taiwan's existential. It's a red line. You know, it is strong. And it is worth noting that they say it directly to Trump at this point. I mean, it's beyond just like a state media editorial, but that Trump hasn't said anything in response and that the White House didn't address it in their readout. What do you make of that?
Andrea Ghiselli
There can be a number of explanations. One can be again that by non contradicting the Chinese statement, they're making implicitly a concession to or at least acknowledge they defer a bit to the Chinese position, which is not unprecedented in Sino American relations. The idea that, well, we can have different position but we're not going to undermine each other, that's the way it can be, read another one. Especially given what seems to be a quite hectic process within the White House. Maybe simply they didn't want to prioritize it, but it doesn't mean a policy change. I think that's an equally plausible interpretation of this. So this is why I'm saying that if something really will change, I think it will take some time to materialize. If China made some kind of more Concrete opening over Iran, maybe. But I would be surprised if the American side bought these very contentious statements on the Strait of Hormuz and nuclear Iran as something that, okay, we got something, so we'll give something back. I would be very surprised.
Sophia Yan
What kind of communication or influence do you think China might have when it comes to Iran after this meeting? They've agreed with the US they have a similar stance, like you said before, to ensure that Iran doesn't have nuclear weapons, that trade should be allowed to flow, that vessels should be able to go through the Strait of Hormuz. This is something that Beijing has said before. But do you think on the back of the summit, do you think that there's any change in how the Chinese might approach the Iranians to move toward that kind of resolution?
Andrea Ghiselli
No, I don't think so. The Iranian foreign minister was in Beijing just last week, I believe. I wouldn't be surprised if this was somewhat negotiated and agreed between the two sides. I think the Iranian foreign minister went there specifically for that, to know in advance a bit what to expect. And I think the Chinese said, well, we're going to say these kind of things again, there's no cost really for anyone on the nuclear side, of course, when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz. I mean, the Chinese have repeated this before. And again, I think you might argue that there is a clash of interest a bit over the toll in the Strait of Hormuz between Iran and China. But of course, China's preference for no toll at all is not uniquely Chinese. I think many countries wanted the same, and it's in natural interest for China not to have a toll boost there. And so even if they didn't want it, probably they just have to accept that it's not going to happen. So, yeah, I don't think these marks in any way change in China's approach to Iran. I mean, I think it's important to say, on the one hand, China of course wants the crisis to be solved, but at the same time, it doesn't want Iran to come out as a loser.
Roland Oliphant
Right.
Andrea Ghiselli
So this is why, again, I wouldn't be surprised if these statements were agreed and negotiated between the two sides before Trump's visit. Even the idea that Iran cannot have nuclear weapons, it's how to say, at the moment, we know it doesn't have in any case, so it doesn't really impose any restriction on Iranian behavior at the moment, as far as we know. So I don't think we should expect a major change, at least between China
Sophia Yan
and Iran, you've just come back to the UK after quite some time in China. In fact, I think you've been in China the whole time of the Iran war. Can you take us into what it has been like to be in China at a time when the world has been so geopolitically in turmoil and with China involved and everyone looking to China to try to influence Iran? I mean, what has it felt like?
Andrea Ghiselli
Fuel prices have gone up a bit. We know that inflation started to rise again after a long period of deflation. There's of course concerns about the direction of this crisis, of this war if you talk with experts there. But it seems to me two things are important. One is that it's clear for most people I talk with that this is the US fault. There is, there are limits to what China can do. China is already doing something. This is what most people always say. But again, it should be the US and Iran to find a solution to that. So of course there's a big caveat here that even a lot of experts are not fully aware what actually the government is thinking or is doing. So it should be taken with a pinch of salt, like these statements. With a pinch of salt. I guess like everyone, people in China are waiting, they're waiting for news to know what's going on, what will happen.
Sophia Yan
Can you talk a bit about the media environment? There's so much censorship in China. So how much knowledge and information has been going out through state media within China to the general public about what's going on in Iran?
Andrea Ghiselli
The war is discussed widely. Of course, there's a lot of discussion about that in the media. Of course it comes with a specific frame, right? Like this is the United States attacking Iran. The United States and Israel of course, attacking Iran. So there's always this kind of. And we can attempt to square the cycle, right? On the one hand, they condemn American actions and they say, well, of course it's important to protect the sovereignty and security of Gulf countries. But they don't say against whom. So this very ambiguous stance we can buy this way. A lot of experts of course comment on this and quite interesting also in English language media we see Chinese experts featuring action more prominently than before, which I think is quite an interesting development. They said again, I think there are one of the issues that even experts know pretty little about what the government is thinking. They know what the government is saying, of course, and they're familiar with the logic of how Chinese speaking decisions are made. But the Chinese system is very compartmentalized. I mean, some people Making the same observation when it comes to, for example, nuclear doctrine and so on. But I think this can be expanded to any kind of issue. There may be a few people within the system, within academia, that really know or have a more or less precise idea of what is going on. The others know the system, but they do not know specific government actions. And so even their statements, I think they should be taken mostly as a bit mirroring the general narrative by foragomeros their personal honest opinions. So yeah, I think that this how the Chinese debate at the moment should be read. There's a lot of uncertainty. I think in many ways very similar to the debate outside. I mean, take all things considered. There's so much that we do not know and they do not know as well. It seems to be that many believe that China somewhat reached the limits of what it can do at the moment.
Sophia Yan
There's also the question of how much China is willing to do. Right. On the issue of Iran, I mean, how would you gauge Beijing's interest in trying to find a way forward or to talk to Iran to influence an outcome? They're hurting too, like you said, economically.
Andrea Ghiselli
So I think over this, the Chinese are trying to balance different interests. At the same time they might nudge Iran into doing something that goes against its, let's say, secondary interests, for example, the tall booth in the Strait of Hormuz. But they don't want again to have Iran losing. They don't want it. And so I think we can see this quite clear hierarchy in their interest. At the very top, of course, this is the relation with the United States. So they want to insulate and separate it from whatever happens. Then of course they want to preserve their survival of their closest partners, which of course include Iran, but also like Russia, North Korea, which of course are very different regimes, very different geographical locations, very different tools and instruments of power. But they all share the general anti Western liberal orientation and they want to preserve that. They want to preserve those countries and then their economic interest, which in the case of the Strait of Hormuz and the Middle east in general, the size of their interest just changes over time because it was the beginning was just energy and petroleum products. So which has a huge impact on many industrial sectors. But then of course we know that there would be an impact on agriculture and so far and so on because of different products that are produced or shipped through the Strait. This to say that at the moment I think they still see the priority and stabilizer issue of the United States preserving Iran as it is. And at the same time, they're doing their best to kind of prepare themselves to absorb the shock that will end up. I mean, what we are seeing now is just the very beginning. I think in China and here as well, in the UK and elsewhere, we actually have not experienced the real shock yet, but it will come. And so I think the Chinese are preparing themselves for that. If you look at oil, they have the SPRs, the Strategic Petroleum Reserves, but for other things, things about helium, right, that is produced during the extraction of natural gas, there are no reserves, for example, and helium is critical for chip making, for example. And you can imagine other things simply because never happened to be a need for storage. They might be more vulnerable or less vulnerable. So this to say it's very difficult to know precisely how much they're hurt. We know they're hurting much like, like other countries, how much they can tolerate is difficult to tell. But we definitely know that in certain ways they're a bit more prepared or much more prepared than others. Like for example, if you look at the level of dependence on Middle Eastern oil, between compare it China, Japan, South Korea and India, for example, you see that China has been, despite the absolute import of oil from the Middle east, has increased a lot over the past two decades. It's actually the percentage of its imports, every mint stable around 50%. Instead, if you look at Korea, South Korea and Japan, for example, we're easily looking at 70, 80, 90% of dependence. So you can say, well, China's been doing much better, it's been much more prepared on oil, but on other things, maybe different.
Sophia Yan
The Trump Xi meeting was scheduled for earlier in the year, but then postponed because Trump was busy. What was the vibe in China when that, that was delayed and what was the vibe now in China with this particular meeting? Like leading up to it, was there a lot of excitement and interest in the fact that he was coming over?
Andrea Ghiselli
Yeah, I think in general, every US Presidential visit to China is always a big event, of course, not just for the government, of course, but the country in general. It's a huge event. And Trump and as well as some members of his delegation, I'm talking about Jensen Huang or Elon Musk have their own following in the country. You can see it in Chinese social media. There are a lot of videos of like Jensen Huang going to eat the jajangmian in Beijing. Right. These typical noodles in Beijing. When the visa was first postponed, I think there was, I imagine get difficult to tell really what the government thought about it. I don't think it was their Preference, let's put it this way, again, the messaging between the two sides, at least the official level, are so different. One is kind of heavily scripted, very much coherent in a way in how it's presented. I'm talking about the Chinese side, I think can be seen in this, in Xi Jinping, for example, talking about the Thucydides trap, which in a way is a very old fashioned expression by now, is an American relations. It reminds me a bit of the Obama era, really. So it was interesting to hear Jinping mentioning it. Whereas on the American side, the messenger was a bit all over the place with Fox News on the street ordering sausages and coffee to robots. But again, I think it was all part of the show, I think, of the visit. I think Trump said that China has ordered 200 aircraft from Boeing. I read that analyst expected 500. He said he expected 150. So who knows? But beyond that we will see. I think at the moment, again, it's okay. I believe China's going is quite okay, that everything went pretty smooth.
Sophia Yan
Who do you think comes out on top after this meeting? I mean, which side looks better basically
Andrea Ghiselli
going forward, just by the look of it? I think China looked better in many ways. I mean, they looked better before the meeting in a way, but by the look of the statements and positions, I think they perceive themselves being a stronger position, which is of course a continuation of the, let's say, confrontation that happened over rare areas earlier last year. Right, when there was this proposed change in regulation for the export of rare earth, which clearly sent a strong signal to the Americans because it was the first time that China had that kind of really significant leverage on the United States. And so that kind of set a bit the mood that was the kind of the foundation for China's position since then. And especially going to the meeting as it's clear that Donald Trump needs an off ramp in the crisis, that domestically this war is very unpopular among voters and consumers. And of course internationally, there's a lot of backlash against the United States. So all in all, you can say China was in a stronger position, but also the United States was in a particularly weak one. Right. And looking at the statements and the videos that we've seen from the meeting, I mean, a lot of people, and I agree with that and comment on the fact that there was a lot of Trump's praising for Xi Jinping. I read somewhere saying it was like a Trump Cabinet meeting in reverse with him praising the leader. So I mean, again, I wouldn't read too much into that because Donald Trump is very like that, extemporaneous in it. I don't think he prepared in a particular way, but just by the look of it, that was how it looked that Trump was in a more kind of supplicant position. He didn't help himself. I think just today in a truth post where he someone must have told him about the succijides trap and he said, oh, then when Xi Jinping was referring to the United States as a declining power in this lucid trap, he was talking about Joe Biden, not Today's United. I don't think he helped himself going, no kind of revisiting these episodes. So we will see, but that's it. I wouldn't be surprised if there's no change in American policies. And we see it right while the visit was going on. At the same time, we had other officials and other departments of the US Government still pushing out policies and proposals and making statements that were kind of old school containment kind of policies and so on. There's, of course, appreciation that the war in Iran in the state of Hormuz is, has damaged American preparation in East Asia. But that said, I mean, the mood, I would say among a lot of officials remains that China is our adversary and we should prepare for that.
Sophia Yan
Andrea, I'm wondering what you make of what the Chinese have said. They have said out of the summit that they won't be selling any weapons to Iran through the war. And over the years between China and Iran, there have been a lot of questions of what kind of support, material support the Chinese may have given to the Iranians. What do you make of what Beijing has had to say about that now?
Andrea Ghiselli
Yeah, so there was a shout out to the Jamestown foundation on this day. They published a very good piece some time ago on this, essentially saying that technically the Chinese statements that they do not provide weapons to Iran is correct. I mean, if you have very strict interpretation of what it means, China hasn't sold weapons. That said, there is this gigantic network of companies in China that sell stuff that can be turned into weapons or that can be used to produce them or can be used in war in any case. And there's always the question of how much this is about the Chinese state closing one eye on them or not being fully aware. Because a lot of times these companies, for example, they get sanctioned, so they close and then reopen the same day under a different name. So of course it's very difficult for American legislators to deal with them. But I would imagine that if there's, for example, a Small company in Shenzhen producing frames for drones or the engine. A lot of this engine can be also for mount loaner, for example. And then they change like every six weeks or so they change the name and so on. I would imagine that even for it could be quite difficult to track now the Chinese system, actually sometimes the Chinese custom system can be terrific in its efficiency on blocking things. There are cases in the past, so in theory they could do this again. There's always this ambiguity and honestly Trump seems just accepting this. The Chinese will provide something as long they don't provide big weapons is kind of is part of the game. He made similar comments over espionage. Oh yeah, they spy on us, but we spy on them. So let's not make a big fuss out of it. On the weapons side, I think it's a bit different. There have long been talks about China providing weapons like manpads or others, not directly to Iran, but they sell to other countries and then they find their ways in the same way Chinese manpads found their way in Ukraine. There were pictures of Ukrainian soldiers using them. I don't want to be the devil's advocate, but one could make the point that, for example, over satellite imaging, the Chinese sold this satellite to the Iranians and this satellite is controlled from Beijing. It's difficult to imagine that no one knew about this at the same time. They sold it in 2024 while China gave that kind of access, which is of course important. Russia, for example, was providing much more precise targeting coordinate. So when we look at China's support on the military side, Iran, I think should be seen also as complementary to what Russia is doing, which is actually providing selling weapons and providing direct intelligence to Iran. So whether or not there is coordination between China, Russia and Iran, who knows? I mean, Putin will be in Beijing very soon and of course Lavrov and why you have been constantly talking with each other. So I think it's in the real possibility there's some kind of coordination over this. But I mean, we know something is happening. But how, why and to what extent I think is much more difficult to pinpoint.
Sophia Yan
That was me speaking with Andrea Giselle. That's all for today on Iran the Latest. Our team will be coming back to you on Monday.
Roland Oliphant
Until then, that was Iran the Latest. Goodbye, Goodbye, Iran. The Latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph, created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Roland Olyphant and Venetia Rainey. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following around the latest in your preferred podcast. And if you have a moment, leave a review as it helps others find the show. For more from our foreign correspondents on the ground, sign up to our new daily newsletter, Cables via our website or listen to our sister podcast Ukraine the Latest. We are still on the same email address battlelineselegraph.co.uk or you can contact us on X. You can find our handles in the show. Notes the producer is Peter Shevlin. The executive producers are Venetia Rainey and Louisa Wells.
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Xin Yi Pai
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This episode centers on the recent US-China summit in Beijing between President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping, focusing particularly on China’s reiterated promise not to send arms to Iran. The hosts and their guest explore why this assurance is unlikely to significantly alter the trajectory of the conflict involving the US, Israel, and Iran, given China's broader strategic interests and the realities on the ground. The episode blends analysis of diplomatic developments, regional military updates, and expert commentary on Sino-Iranian relations and their impact on global security.
On China’s Arms Pledge
“Technically the Chinese statements that they do not provide weapons to Iran is correct…but…there is this gigantic network of companies in China that sell stuff that can be turned into weapons or used to produce them or can be used in war in any case.”
— Andrea Ghiselli (34:12)
On US and China’s Differing Focuses
“China's messaging was very straightforward. Taiwan, Taiwan, like that was the core...this is the biggest obstacle in US China cooperation.”
— Andrea Ghiselli (13:47)
On Trump's Approach to Iranian Uranium
“I'd just feel better if I got it, actually. But I think it's more for public relations than it is for anything else.”
— Donald Trump, as recounted by Roland Oliphant (09:21)
On Diplomatic Reality
“No big achievements, but no real damages to the relationship in any form or shape.”
— Andrea Ghiselli (13:47)
On Chinese Domestic Sentiment
“It’s clear for most people I talk with that this is the US fault. There are limits to what China can do. China is already doing something.”
— Andrea Ghiselli (22:03)
On Who 'Won' the Summit
“China looked better in many ways…by the look of the statements and positions, I think they perceive themselves being [in] a stronger position, which is…a continuation of the confrontation that happened over rare areas earlier last year.”
— Andrea Ghiselli (30:56)
Key News Updates & Context
[02:47] — Middle East regional developments, Israeli-Lebanese conflict, Iraq
[04:01] — Diplomatic efforts, ceasefires, broader regional diplomacy
US-China Summit Analysis
[09:07] — Trump’s comments on uranium, ceasefire and negotiations
[13:22] — Background and first impressions of the Trump-Xi summit
[13:47] — China’s and the US’s starkly different agendas
China’s Influence on Iran: Expert Interview (Dr. Andrea Ghiselli)
[16:43] — US arms sales to Taiwan discussion
[19:36] — China’s genuine leverage over Iran, prospects for influence
[21:43] — Chinese domestic atmosphere during the global crisis
[23:02] — Chinese media messaging and information ecosystem
[25:15] — Beijing’s priorities, economic strategies, and preparedness
Summit Optics and Geopolitical Winners
[28:52] — Reactions inside China to Trump’s visit, soft power dynamics
[30:52] — Who gained more from the summit; perceptions of American and Chinese strengths
Shadow Networks and Arms Transfers
[34:12] — Why China’s “no arms” pledge is technically true but practically limited
| Issue | China’s Position | US Position / Action | Practical Impact | |--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------| | Arms to Iran | No direct sales; ambiguous about dual-use exports | Accepts ambiguity, focuses on big-ticket items | Limited; grey market continues | | Focus of Summit | Taiwan as red line, bilateral stability | Iran and WMD priorities | No big breakthroughs | | Influence on Iran | Pressures Iran only up to point of regime loss | Seeks to pressure China for cooperation | Marginal influence | | Global & Domestic Impact | Prepares for economic shock; blames US in media | Seeks off-ramp from Iran conflict | Both facing inflation, volatility |
China’s renewed pledge not to send arms to Iran at the Trump-Xi summit is best seen as a diplomatic gesture rather than a substantive lever for ending the war. China is primarily focused on insulating its US relationship, managing the risk of regional escalation, and preserving Iran—not undermining it. Meanwhile, on the ground, the regional conflict continues, and both sides remain guarded and divided in their priorities. Despite public displays of unity, the summit revealed the considerable, persistent gulf between US and Chinese objectives in the Middle East.