Sophia Yan (2:41)

I'm standing in Iraq, just a few miles away from the border with Iran. If you look behind me at these mountains, the ridgeline you see at the top is the border between Iraq and Iran. And this is the border that Iranian Kurd fighters would have to cross if they launched a ground invasion into Iran with or without US Support. Now, Trump has flip flopped in the last few days about whether or not he would offer backing, perhaps in the form of air cover or weapons. He's now saying that he's not going to consider it.

Sophia Yan (3:13)

The idea would be to use the

Sophia Yan (3:15)

Kurds as a proxy ground force into Iran because neither Israel nor the US want to put their own boots on the ground. The Kurds have their own aims, however, in all of this. They are amongst the world's largest cities, stateless ethnic groups currently split across four countries, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. And so their aims are to fight for greater freedoms, greater autonomy. They have experienced varying degrees of discrimination over the years in Iran. They have suffered under the current regime, the Islamic Republic, as well as the monarchy that preceded it. So they see this current moment as an opportunity to exploit, to try to move forward in their aims for a greater self determination. And they may very well choose to go in even without US support. They have said that they would welcome US support, especially support from the skies, to make sure that all obstacles that might be put up by the Iranian security forces would be clear. But one separatist commander I interviewed, he claims that a newly formed coalition has 10,000 armed fighters ready to go in. So that feeling is really very strong. There's a challenge here in the sense that what the Kurds want and what Trump might want don't necessarily align. Trump has also flip flopped on whether he would like to see regime change in Tehran, whereas the Kurds seem to think that regime change may be the only way forward for them to have greater freedoms. Now, experts think that the only way a Kurd offensive could potentially be successful is if Iranian security forces began to defect, if there was a popular uprising that was sparked, and if other ethnic groups also joined in to support the Kurds. Whether that can happen remains to be seen. Iran is a richly diverse nation of 90 million people, and the sentiment for Iranians is very strong. They have a very strong nationalist sentiment. And if there's a sense that what the Kurds are doing might break up the country, that may not play well with the entire population at home. This particular situation has put Iraq in a very difficult position. Iraq in the north plays host to these separatist groups from Iran, and they've been happy to have them here because they share a heritage. They are all Kurds. All this has put Iraq in a very difficult position. It's the only country in the SWAR to be getting hit by both sides. It's thrown the country into turmoil. So Iran and Iran aligned groups have been hitting the Kurds in what appear to be preemptive attacks and they're also attacking US Embassies and consulates here in Iraq, US interests such as oil fields. There's also threats to foreigners staying at hotels. So the hotels have also been hit in these attacks. And so it's a very widespread list of targets that Iran and its proxy groups are trying to attack. At the same time, the US And Israel are also bombing Iran aligned paramilitary groups here. So all of this has put Iraq's domestic internal security at risk, and also it puts the country squarely in the middle of this much broader geopolitical situation.

Roland Oliphant (6:31)

Well, communications aren't amazing in that part of the world right now, but I did manage to catch up with fear shortly after she sent that dispatch. This is what she told me about the general atmosphere on the ground there.

Sophia Yan (6:44)

So being here for the last four or five days, it's been interesting to try to parse through what's real and what's not, especially when you're dealing with the Iranian Kurd militias. They are separatists, separatist groups with armed wings.

Sophia Yan (6:58)

So there's always interest for them to talk a big game.

Sophia Yan (7:01)

So how imminent is a ground invasion? Would it really work?

Sophia Yan (7:03)

Should bring the regime to its knees.

Sophia Yan (7:05)

Would there be support coming from the

Sophia Yan (7:07)

US Or Israel, and what would that look like?

Sophia Yan (7:09)

Now, these are all the questions coming in.

Sophia Yan (7:13)

And after a couple of days here, it seems like the idea to use

Sophia Yan (7:17)

the Kurds was really pushed solely by the Israelis, as sowing maximum chaos in Iran helps them.

Sophia Yan (7:22)

And perhaps Trump considered that idea to a degree.

Sophia Yan (7:26)

Now, Trump has since said that he's ruled it out, that he doesn't want to get the Kurds involved. It remains to be seen, though, whether the Kurd groups will choose to go in themselves later on. It would be by some accounts quite suicidal. They only have guns, they've got light weapons.

Sophia Yan (7:43)

But that may not matter to them

Sophia Yan (7:47)

for their own personal aims of self determination. And we may still very well be in the early days of this war. So there might be an opportunity for the Kurds, as they see it, to push for greater self determination and autonomy and whatever might come next in Iran in terms of physical safety. From this perspective, it has been pretty harrowing. Northern Iraq does not have air defenses. They rely on the US presence, which is very much here, to protect the US military and diplomatic personnel.

Sophia Yan (8:18)

And Iraq, I would say, is really very concerned about what's going on.

Sophia Yan (8:21)

They're getting hit by both sides. So they're getting hit by Iran for hosting these Iranian Kurds separatist groups. They're getting hit by Iran because they've got the US military here, but on the other side, they're being hit by the US and Israel because they have those Iran aligned groups here.

Sophia Yan (8:40)

So it's a delicate balance for Iraq

Sophia Yan (8:42)

when it comes to a domestic security perspective. One thing I'll add is that at this moment, as the war escalates, foreigners are not a popular site. They are not a welcome site for northern Iraq. A lot of hotels, for instance, are not taking foreign guests. There have been security warnings circulated from the US government, also other European governments, about a heightened risk in terms of the threat level toward hotels that are popular with foreigners. Now, these are places within Erbil, for instance, or in other cities like Suleimania, where diplomats, military personnel, military contractors, for example, would typically be staying. And some of these locations have been hit in this first week or so of war, that threat is there. And there is a sense that foreigners in a larger group anywhere would make that place a target. And so this really underscores the sense of nervousness that Iraq feels in this moment.

Roland Oliphant (9:47)

That fighting on the Iraqi Iranian border that Sophia was reporting on is just one of the many sub conflicts that have already in the past week spilled out of the war in Iran. But how much further could it spread? Clena Rawley, the CEO of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Organization, which tracks conflicts around the globe, fears that this could be the conflagration which draws in the great powers themselves. I asked her why she thinks that this war, of all of the conflicts that have broken out over the past few years, could lead to World War 3. You have your own podcast, and I believe on the acclad podcast you were saying, if this isn't World War three, you're not quite sure what to call it.

Kleena Rawley (10:38)

Yes, I mean, would you agree?

Roland Oliphant (10:42)

I mean, I would. I mean, I've been saying we're in World War three for years, but I'm a curmudgeonly, curmudgeonly old man losing his hair who I'm not sure many people agree with me, but yeah, no, I would agree, but lay that out for me.

Kleena Rawley (10:54)

Well, besides the fact that I'm also a grumpy old lady who just thinks that, you know, things are getting a bit out of hand. So it is the conflict that has the most diffusion. I think about 16 countries have become involved to some degree in the last week. But then even today, you had both Russia and China making on treaties on the part of Iran in order to both accept the leader, but also suggest that there is an alternative way forward. Both Russia and China have a number of different benefits and drawbacks to this conflict continuing. There is really no sign that the region can return to any sort of normalcy, even if there was a ceasefire. And my sense is that the way in which it engulfs many of the power centers of this world suggests that it is the most significant conflict certainly in my lifetime. And I would go so far as to say it certainly matches what we're seeing in terms of world wars in the past, which of course have been Europe based. But this is, I fear, the conflict that brings into direct confrontation Russia, China and the us.

Roland Oliphant (12:07)

There's two things that occur to me after what you said. One is you're saying this is the most important conflict in your lifetime. In that case, you're saying this is more important than the war in Ukraine. And I'd like to ask why you think that. Why does the war in the Gulf outweigh the strategic, the geopolitical earthquake in Ukraine?

Kleena Rawley (12:29)

And I'm not dismissing the importance of the Ukrainian war, I think certainly for European security or the balance of power in that region. What I suppose I would say is that war is becoming involved in this one rather than of course the Ukrainian Russian conflict involving other middle powers. We have been thinking for the last few years, especially since the change of government in the US that this is a period that there has been a steep rise in the authority and presence of middle powers. Almost all of the significant middle powers are involved in this conflict. And indeed, even when we think about ways in which the economy is being super shocked by a conflict like this because of the basis in oil and other resources, we can look to ways that people are trying to resume normal economic functioning is going to create or is going to influence conflicts in other parts of the world, which is not the case in Ukraine. Let me give you an example. Across Saudi oil transport area is going to rely on the use of the Red Sea and very significant barriers to that trade that are present there. But Ethiopia was hoping to launch some sort of, let's say, military attack in the north of the state and potentially into Eritrea in recent days. And that's going to be affected by the decisions of the Saudis which are now being affected by the decisions of this conflict. And there is knock on effects to this conflict that is totally different and I would say larger for global impact than those of the occurrences in Ukraine. As important as that conflict is, of

Roland Oliphant (14:14)

course, I suppose the west and the east, putting it in those big old fashioned boxes, have been quite obsessed about deconfliction in the Ukraine war, about stopping this from turning into a Russia on NATO war, stopping it from becoming a war in which China owns directly involved. Are you then saying that perhaps actually those efforts have been relatively successful there?

Kleena Rawley (14:36)

It's certainly been contained. One of the classic characteristics of the Ukrainian war is that it's contained in such a tight strip of land that its influence is, is mainly borne by the people in the militaries fighting right there rather than further afield. The one element that I think has had global impacts is the rise in defense spending and of course the availability of military hardware more broadly, which has had a super surge as a result of the Ukrainian Russian conflict. And we're seeing some of the effects of that today. In fact, about last year, I was worried that the US was, was sending signals about Ukraine and about no longer supplying the Europeans with military hardware for the Ukrainians in order to redirect it towards a conflict like the one we're seeing today.

Roland Oliphant (15:32)

Donald Trump announced that the war is very nearly complete after a conversation with Vladimir Putin on Monday afternoon. And after that conversation, the Kremlin also announced that, and I believe the Iranians confirmed that the Kremlin is putting forward proposals for ways to end this war. We don't know the details of those proposals. I'm interested in what you make of that. And secondly, of course, and perhaps most significantly, I'm really interested in your assessment of the Chinese view of this conflict and their role in it.

Kleena Rawley (16:04)

So this is going to be total speculation, of course, especially on the Chinese front. But I will say that Russia presented, I believe it was some sort of resolution at the UN Security Council, so we'll see how far that gets. But it was calling for a halt in military operations in the Middle East. It has been cautiously engaged with the Iranians by all accounts. Unfortunately, I would imagine some of that conversation between Trump and Putin was about whether or not the Russians were giving geoprecision assistance to the Iranians to hit US bases and US equipment. The Chinese have a slightly different problem in that the US has now, both with Venezuela and Iran, cut short its oil supply very, very, very significantly. If this was intentional, I'll have to give some credit to the Trump administration. It was done in a way where it was a bit like two birds with one stone approach to military engagements. But China is not in a position to benefit from this really at all unless they can weaken the US but at the moment, it would look from the Chinese and Russian perspective that the Trump administration is trying to use different conflicts in order to strangle their abilities in different ways. Although Russia does look like it might benefit from this far more so than the Chinese would from the surge in

Roland Oliphant (17:37)

the oil price and the surge in

Kleena Rawley (17:38)

the oil price people turning to Russia, especially given the limitations on oil exports elsewhere. Ukraine now being being involved to support the US and Israeli fronts, meaning that they will have less for their own front.

Roland Oliphant (17:55)

You said something really striking a few minutes ago. You said, you know, this is the conflict which where you could finally see great powers being drawn into fighting one another, which would be World War iii. How close are we to that?

Kleena Rawley (18:11)

I don't think that we're close. But then again, time is accelerating a lot with not just conflicts in general, but this one. If we were just to step back and say what's happened in the last week with international relations and this conflict. Iran has attacked many of its neighbors and there has been an attempt by those further afield to try to reorganize their own domestic or potential conflict situations in response to the fact that people are distracted. And the Chinese and the Russian response has been to mildly but certainly back Iran. Now there's some discussions of boots on the ground. There's also some discussions that this conflict's going to be over in a week. I would certainly probably defer to the first rather than the second. And if that were the case, you have the US continuing to attack, if not arrive in a country that is a ally of Russia and China and who have a lot to gain by taking on the US through alternative means rather than directly. So I would say that it seems to me that this is the perfect situation for it to occur in. And I can't think of another case that would bring together all three in this way. I hope I'm wrong, right? But I, I mean listen this, we're 10 days in and the amount that has happened to date is quite shocking and that's on top of the rest of the world that has shocking developments simultaneously. So I think that we need to be prepared for things to become quite accelerated and very.

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Kleena Rawley (21:06)

Oh no. My coffee. Brawny here.

Roland Oliphant (21:11)

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Kleena Rawley (21:14)

Wow. Got a clean shirt. Do you wear plaid?

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Roland Oliphant (21:26)

Welcome back. You're listening to Iran, the latest from the Telegraph. I'm Roland Oliphant and I'm joined today by Kleena Rawley, the CEO of the Armed Conflict Monitor, acled. What does accled's data tell you about this conflict so far?

Kleena Rawley (21:43)

So there's a few key things about the conflict in terms of the data that has been accumulated to date. It's obviously a missile heavy or an air heavy conflict. It is also the most diffuse conflict that we've ever recorded. And what I mean by that is from its central point of Iran to all of the areas across the region, and of course, both Israel and the US Getting involved, it has the largest footprint of any conflict in the shortest amount of time. In fact, it was almost day two, really, when many of the neighboring states were involved in some way. And so I would be cautious, but I might say I think it might be the most quickly diffusing conflict recorded, not just by us, but in general. But this conflict has some unique, it has a unique signature, if you will, and its potential to go on is somewhat unlimited.

Roland Oliphant (22:41)

Tell us a bit about that today.

Kleena Rawley (22:43)

There's been some discussions about whether or not Iran does or does not want to cease fire, et cetera. And then yesterday after President Trump press conference, there was some question about how long he's willing to stay in the fight. But I think it's important to recall that Iran can't win this war. They can just exhaust the capabilities of others to continue fighting it. The scenarios then that are available as to what might happen include the regime falls and there's chaos. The regime stays. And then there's actually quite a bit of dissension, if you will, around, well, there's kind of radicalization if it stays without a policy shift. There's regime change which would involve the active participation of Iranians, of course, and then there's a change in the regime with some shift in policy. And what we're seeing at the moment is that Iran is not considering any of those potential outcomes. And to be honest, the US and certainly Israelis, I think only looking at regime collapse as the option. But of course there are others.

Roland Oliphant (23:55)

So Donald Trump said late last night the war is very nearly complete. We had the Israeli ambassador to France has also said that we're ahead of schedule. The markets have responded quite favorably to that. Oil has come down from a worrying peak. But you're saying you don't really see that.

Kleena Rawley (24:12)

I think that the point of those statements was to make the oil price return to what is a more favorable place. It certainly wasn't to give an accurate indicator of how the war was likely going to end, which was that somehow Iran, in the space of, let's say the next week would exhaust its own supplies and then what? Collapse and then what?

Roland Oliphant (24:37)

I was wondering if we get into the kind of the details, the data that you're, that you're collecting from the war so far. There's a huge amount of kind of information you put together in your reports about how many strikes, what's going on on the ground and things like that.

Kleena Rawley (24:54)

So I think that we have at least 711 strikes on Iran since February 28. Almost 700 of those have been successful with some intercepted. But in retaliation, of course, Iran has launched, I would say close to 250 successful strikes throughout the region at least again targeting Israel, of course, Iraq and the uae. I will say that there's a difference in what's being sent to which country and what the successful interception rate is. So there was some questions earlier about whether or not UAE or Israel have received many more missiles. And to be honest, in the very beginning UAE was getting a lot, they were getting really pounded. But increasingly now the focus is on Israel with much more dangerous missiles.

Roland Oliphant (25:48)

Is there anything you can tell us about the dynamics of the kind of weapons being used there and whether we've seen an increase in proportion of missiles versus drones, for example, because you'll be aware that a large part of this conflict and the large part of the reporting around it revolves around this question of how long Iranian missile or drone stocks will last and how long Israeli, American and Gulf states interceptor missile stocks will last. Is there anything you can say about the trends that you can observe there?

Kleena Rawley (26:20)

There were a number of threats because of Iran's kind of mid range ballistic missiles. It's one of the reasons that Israel had spent quite a lot of time in the first week of the conflict trying to destroy missile launchers in particular in order to prevent the destruction caused by that particular Typhoid weapon across the region they believe to destroy 300, although, and again this is just a total estimate, I don't think anybody knows for sure, but one to 200 are left. There has been an acknowledgment that the Iranian strategy could very well have been to try to use small drone, et cetera, and mid range missiles early on in the conflict in order to exhaust the interception rates of other countries. And of course targeting key military or as they would see it, infrastructure, but also US bases throughout the region. And then yesterday there has been an increasing concern that much more sophisticated weaponry is being used by Iran. Now whether or not that was part of a strategy or it's indeed part of a, we need to start using these if we have them response by Iran is, is really unknown at this part. But I will say that the Iranians seem, of course, they seem to have a slightly renewed confidence in the last few days and it could in fact be because they are about to take out some of their much more sophisticated weapons. The interception rate is relatively good. I would say, for example, across the UAE there have been 28 strikes by Iran. The interception rate is 17. And as of yesterday there were three fatalities, although there are more today, I believe. And in those cases what we're effectively seeing is that there is no protection against a barrage of Iranian weapons, especially some of the low cost and very plentiful drones that are also being used closer afield.

Roland Oliphant (28:16)

I wanted to look at what's going on in Iran and the strikes there. And one of the, of course one of the big controversies I suppose, about any war is this question of civilian casualties we've all seen. Terrible story about the school in Minab. What can you tell us about the level of civilian casualties in Iran and how that compares to other wars?

Kleena Rawley (28:38)

I believe, and I'll have to check on this, but I believe the Iranians have claimed close to a thousand civilian deaths in these last 10 days of the conflict. To be honest, I think there's a thousand deaths and potentially 10,000 injuries, which sounds very plausible. There was, of course, as you mentioned, the tragic events with the girls school being attributed to the US rather than anybody else at this point. So what I guess I would say is that that's an extremely low number.

Roland Oliphant (29:09)

Okay, so you're saying the American Israeli targeting seems relatively successful, that the numbers of dead civilians that we know about so far are relatively low for an aerial campaign of this scale. Is that fair?

Kleena Rawley (29:22)

Yeah, that is quite fair. And I think that they are at this moment relatively accurate. Iran is also reporting what might be considered in comparison to other conflicts, a relatively low civilian death count.

Roland Oliphant (29:37)

When you say it looks like the Israelis and Americans are being strategic, the number of civilian casualties is relatively low. Do you think they're behaving better than they behaved in Gaza?

Kleena Rawley (29:50)

Oh, yes, in part. This is important that the objective of the Israeli military in Gaza was not to go after security infrastructure alone or military infrastructure, but it was also something that the Iranians have not been able to copy with regard to how Hamas operated, which is that Hamas had a very typical insurgent tactic of blending their military and civilian infrastructure together in order what they believe to protect them. And the Israelis no longer saw that distinction, which is why you saw such massive destruction of civilian infrastructure in Gaza.

Roland Oliphant (30:31)

You say in your latest update, looking at the first week of the war that you'd been able to record, I think it's something like 145 protests in Iran against the regime. I haven't seen that anywhere else. Could you tell us about how you're sourcing that data and what these look like? Because of course, one of the big questions in this war is whether the regime cracks, whether the public turn against the regime, as the Americans and the Israelis seem to expect, but which we haven't yet seen. What can you tell us about that?

Kleena Rawley (31:00)

So I will say that the protests, especially the anti regime protests, followed very early on, followed the death of the Ayatollah, although just yesterday, of course, there were many rallies by supporters of the Islamic Republic organized to express support for the new leader, Mojitaba Khomeini, and even opposition groups supporting his placement as Supreme Leader. What I would say is that the impression that the Iranian population, who by and large do not support the regime, but the impression that the Iranian population is somehow going to rise up to challenge the sitting members, especially the military establishment, is a total fiction. It's not going to happen. They don't have any means to do so. So and for many, they've already paid with their children's lives or their brothers and sisters lives for coming out against this regime. It's far too much to expect them to have a sustained protest movement, especially post the establishment of a new authority. So I would expect to see fewer protests going forward. But the moment that the Ayatollah was acknowledged as deceased was in general a

Roland Oliphant (32:14)

high protest period, talking about internal dissent. So I was on a briefing call with a fairly senior Israeli kind of strategic thinker yesterday and he said, look, he seemed to echo what you said. The idea of a regime Change of the regime, just collapsing the people rising up doesn't seem very realistic at the moment. He said the goal is therefore, rather than to bring down the regime, than to undermine it. And asked about this question about the US or the Israelis arming Kurdish groups, he said, look, the goal is not to fragment and cause disintegration of Iran, but we want to undermine the regime. And anything that distracts and diverts the security forces would be welcome. Which makes it sound like they may well be, considering that. At the beginning of this podcast, we had a dispatch from our reporter on the Iraqi Iranian border, and she's been talking to Kurdish militias there. I noticed in your latest report you noted the emergence of two new armed groups on the other side of the country in Balochistan. What could you tell us about the potential role of ethnic militias, armed groups inside the country, and whether or not they have emerged to make themselves felt yet in this war?

Kleena Rawley (33:35)

So they have not emerged to make themselves felt, in part because I think that they are fragments at the moment, if they're ever going to be active at all. So there's an opportunity here. If you're a militia stationed across the border from Iran, whether it's Pakistan or Iraq, there's an opportunity here. This might be kind of the big time, right? But the challenge in front of you is almost insurmountable. So I think that there's a lot of reluctance when it comes to the hard, cold reality of incursions into Iran. As you can see, after last Friday, when there was a lot of talk about the potential Kurdish incursions, there was a united front by many of the Kurdish groups and in fact, an umbrella organization formed that said, whoa, just. Just hold the phone a bit, right? We're not going to be the ones to somehow give birth to this new insurgency within Iran. And that's for a number of reasons. One, the Kurdish leadership have memories of being promised things by the US and others, and then, of course, none of that coming to pass. Two, the Kurds have been on their own political change journey, if you will, in the last few years. The Iraqi Kurds, which are the strongest in, in many senses, have a good relationship with Turkey, and they are certainly not going to abandon that in favor of a potential very, very difficult and ultimately fruitless attempts in Iran. There is no indication, in fact, I would actually say there's almost a negative indication that Iranian citizens are going to somehow be motivated or encouraged by a Kurdish invasion in the country. There's attempts by the Israelis to remove the ir, irgc, bases and security infrastructure in the northwest to make it somewhat easier for the Kurds to come in. I think that a regime like Iran only changes through the irgc, so it only fragments or is weakened by weakening that fundamental structure, which is, I believe, what you were saying. Your Israeli military strategist was also noting it's not going to come from people power in the protests.

Roland Oliphant (35:55)

You're saying it's not going to come from people put on a protest, but you're saying it's also not going to come from other individual armed groups?

Kleena Rawley (36:00)

Most certainly not. It's going to come from the fracturing of the IRGC solely.

Roland Oliphant (36:05)

That's a really good, a really good thing to focus on, I think, and we'll bear that in mind. Clyna Roli of Accled. That's all for today's episode. We'll be back tomorrow with the next edition of Iran the Latest. Until then, do keep an eye on telegraph.co.uk.com for the latest news developments. As we all know, this is a conflict that moves particularly fast. Until then, that was Iran the Latest. Goodbye Iran. The Latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Roland Oliphant and Venetia Rainey. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following Iran the Latest formally Battle Lines on Iron, your preferred podcast app. And if you have a moment, please leave a review as this helps others find the show. To stay on top of all our news, subscribe to the Telegraph, sign up for our Dispatches newsletter or listen to our sister podcast Ukraine the Latest. We're still on the same email address battlelinestelegraph.co.uk or contact us on x. You can find our handles in the show. Notes the producer is Peter Shevlin. The executive producer is Louisa Wells.

Kleena Rawley (37:21)

Oh no, my coffee.

Roland Oliphant (37:23)

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Kleena Rawley (37:29)

Wow. Got a clean shirt. Do you wear plaid?

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