BONUS: David Albright on Iran’s Nuclear Program

Summary

Breaking History: BONUS Episode Summary – David Albright on Iran’s Nuclear Program

Release Date: June 19, 2025

In this bonus episode of Breaking History, host Eli Lake engages in a comprehensive discussion with David Albright, the esteemed physicist and president of the Institute for Science and International Security. Albright's extensive experience as a former weapons inspector and his authoritative stance on nuclear non-proliferation make this conversation particularly insightful regarding the recent developments in Iran's nuclear program and Israel's strategic interventions.

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1. Introduction to David Albright's Expertise

Eli Lake opens the conversation by introducing David Albright as a "legendary figure in terms of nuclear non-proliferation" (00:45). Albright's role in leading a reputable think tank and his critical viewpoint on Iran's nuclear advancements set the stage for a deep dive into the current geopolitical tensions surrounding nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

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2. Comparison Between Iran and Iraq’s Nuclear Programs

Lake draws a parallel between the current situation with Iran and the 2003 Iraq War, questioning if the ongoing efforts to dismantle Iran's nuclear capabilities resemble a "redux of the 2003 Iraq War" (01:15).

Albright Clarifies:

"Not at all... there was nothing to be found with Iraq in 2002, 2003, there was a lot to be found in Iran." (02:04)

Albright emphasizes that unlike Iraq's dismantled nuclear ambitions, Iran possesses substantial, partially concealed nuclear infrastructure, particularly the Natanz enrichment facility. This distinction underscores the unique challenges posed by Iran's persistent and evolving nuclear program.

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3. Progress and Impact of Israeli Operations Against Iran

A significant portion of the discussion centers on the effectiveness of Israeli actions in degrading Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

Albright Details:

"They are converting its stock of 20% into 60%, as if... priming itself to be able to rapidly make weapon-grade uranium." (04:13)

He highlights the dual-track approach of Iran’s nuclear program:

• Public Track: Enrichment of uranium to 60%, nearing weapon-grade, signals aggressive advancement.
• Secret Track: Efforts to develop the nuclear weapon itself, with ongoing clandestine activities despite international scrutiny.

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4. Discrepancies in U.S. Intelligence Assessments

Lake references a statement by Tulsi Gabbard, indicating that U.S. Intelligence did not assess Iran as having made a definitive decision to build nuclear weapons.

Albright Responds:

"Fundamentally, the United States is an outlier... And Tulsi just epitomized why that assessment is so wrong." (07:03)

He criticizes the U.S. intelligence narrative for underestimating the proximity of Iran to achieving a nuclear weapon, attributing this to flawed analysis and a binary "on or off" perspective that doesn't capture the nuanced reality of Iran's advancements.

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5. The Strategic Importance of the Fordow Facility

Fordow is portrayed as a critical and vulnerable component of Iran's nuclear infrastructure.

Albright Explains:

"Fordow originated in this crash nuclear weapons program... it could make weapon-grade uranium starting with 5% enriched uranium." (24:39)

He underscores that disrupting Fordow could significantly delay Iran’s ability to produce weapon-grade uranium, thereby extending the timeline required to develop a nuclear weapon. The facility's robust design, situated deep underground, poses both a strategic advantage and a potential target for further operations.

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6. Future Prospects and Diplomatic Implications

The conversation navigates the aftermath of military actions against Iran's nuclear sites and the possibilities for future diplomacy.

Albright Insights:

"This case shows that sometimes you really do have to use military force to enforce... the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." (34:15)

He draws parallels to historical precedents, suggesting that decisive military intervention can reinforce the integrity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, he cautions that lasting solutions depend on subsequent diplomatic engagements to ensure comprehensive inspections and limitations.

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7. Risks Associated with Military Strikes on Nuclear Facilities

Addressing concerns about collateral damage, Albright discusses the environmental and health risks of targeting nuclear sites.

Albright States:

"We're lucky... uranium is not very radiotoxic." (40:07)

He differentiates between uranium and plutonium, noting that while uranium poses chemical hazards primarily due to uranium hexafluoride, the radiological risks are significantly lower compared to plutonium. This assessment aims to mitigate fears regarding widespread environmental contamination from such strikes.

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8. Contingency Plans in the Event of an Iranian Regime Collapse

The discussion concludes with a contemplation of the potential consequences if Iran experiences a regime collapse amidst heightened nuclear tensions.

Albright Advises:

"You want to have a coherent government in order to negotiate... you don't want a disintegration of society." (46:14)

He warns of the dangers posed by unsecured nuclear materials falling into the hands of malicious actors during political instability, advocating for proactive measures to secure nuclear sites and materials to prevent proliferation in a power vacuum.

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Conclusion and Final Thoughts

Eli Lake wraps up the episode by acknowledging the gravity of the situation and the critical role experts like David Albright play in navigating these complex geopolitical landscapes. Albright remains cautiously optimistic, suggesting that military interventions against nuclear facilities, if followed by robust diplomatic efforts, could pave the way for strengthened non-proliferation regimes and regional stability.

Albright Concludes:

"This attack could actually have a bright side... avoiding that is itself a great thing." (48:09)

His final remarks resonate with the show's overarching theme of breaking down historical contexts to understand and address present challenges, emphasizing the delicate balance between military action and diplomatic negotiations in preventing nuclear proliferation.

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This episode of Breaking History offers a nuanced examination of the intricate dynamics between military strategy, intelligence assessments, and diplomatic efforts in addressing the persistent threat of nuclear proliferation in Iran. David Albright's expertise provides listeners with a deeper understanding of the stakes involved and the multifaceted approaches required to navigate these critical international issues.

Transcript

[Eli Lake]

Hello listeners, this is Eli Lake and we have another bonus for the Breaking History feed. On Wednesday, I sat down with the president of the Institute for Science and International Security, David Albright, a physicist and former weapons inspector, and we discussed how much progress Israel was making currently in its war to demolish Iran's nuclear program. It's a great conversation and if you like this kind of content, we will be back with our normal Breaking History episodes in two weeks. I should also note that this was recorded as a Free Press live stream. To catch up on all of our live streams, subscribe to the fp.com hello David.

[David Albright]

Hi, how are you?

[Eli Lake]

Very good. I just want to give our listeners and viewers just a quick David Albright is probably sort of a legendary figure in terms of nuclear non proliferation. He's a former weapons inspector, he is a physicist and he heads, in my view, one of the most reliable think tanks in terms of assessing things like Iran's nuclear program, which is the Institute for Science and International Security. So thank you so much for coming on the Free Press Live. David, thank you.

[David Albright]

Thank you for the kind word.

[Eli Lake]

Let's get into it. Yeah, I want to start with a sort of macro question, which is we've heard that this is redux of the 2003 Iraq War where we learned that the assessments that the Bush administration had of the nuclear program for Saddam Hussein were wrong. You were one of those dissident voices at the time who was warning that the predictions of the Bush administration were off about the Iraqi nuclear program. Do you think that right now, 2025, we are seeing a kind of Iraq war redux when it comes to the Iranian nuclear program?

[David Albright]

Not at all. I mean it. In fact, I remember while I was engaged in criticizing the Bush administration's assessments on Iraqi nuclear fantasies, essentially we were, I was working with my institute and we were finding of a vast enrichment plant that Iran had not declared that it hidden. And it is the Natanz and uranium enrichment plant. And so there is very concrete evidence that while there was nothing to be found with Iraq in 2002, 2003, there was a lot to be found in Iran. And after that revelation about the Natanz enrichment plant, the whole rash of discoveries of secret activities that Iran was forced to admit to, not everything was found by any means, which is even troubling us to this day. And in reality, what this situation reminds me of more is the Iraq in 1991 there was a war. It was done differently. It was Saddam had invaded Kuwait, he was kicked out and he was forced to accept a very intrusive inspection regime that had a mandate to dismantle his nuclear weapons programs along with the chemical weapons programs and other WMD programs. So that's more of what it reminds me of, that here you have a pretty large nuclear program, portions of which are secret and dedicated to being able to make nuclear weapons. And now there's a war where one side is clearly winning the battle. And now we do in the end have to face what is going to happen when the bombings stop.

[Eli Lake]

So let's get to those bombings right now. What would you say were the main nodes of the Iranian program before Thursday evening and now what remains in your view?

[David Albright]

Well, you have to think about on two different tracks. One of which is widely discussed in the public, is and is known because of the work of the international inspectors, is the effort to enrich uranium and in particular the decision of Iran to be increasing the enrichment level, in a sense working up a ladder that would end at weapon grade uranium. Iran stopped at 60%, but that's 99% of the way to the weapon grade uranium. And for the last six months at this underground site fordow, it's been converting its stock of 20% into 60%, as if, you know, it's priming itself to be able to rapidly make weapon grade uranium as much quantity as it can in as few centrifuges. And that didn't escape people's attention. So it's a very provocative act and not something you would do in a civil program. The other track is much more secretive and harder to to determine it. And the IAEA spent six years trying to flush out some of it. And it has to do with Iran's efforts to make the nuclear weapon itself. And Iran's program has been around a long time and it's gone through ups and downs for the last 15, 20 years. It's been from our point of view, my institute, a program to prepare itself to build nuclear weapons. It's kind of a nuclear weaponeer's point of view is if the leaders said we want to build a bomb, for whatever reason, you want to be prepared. And so it's a program that's been working while there's been no decision to build a bomb, but working to shorten timeframes, overcome bottlenecks. And that program has been a target of the Israelis who show a remarkable ability to know what's going on in Iran. I mean, they surprise me almost every day what they know about.

[Eli Lake]

Well, I want to kind of ask you about this because in March Tulsi Gabbard, the Director of National Intelligence, told the Senate and the House that there was. The assessment of the US Intelligence community was that there had not been a decision to go for a weapon. On the eve of this operation, this new war, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that they saw unprecedented steps towards nuclearization. Can you just explain me, explain that discrepancy. Could both of them be right at various points or how do you interpret that?

[David Albright]

Iran had a very large crash nuclear weapons program in the early 2000s and they ended it partly because the United States was next door and was saying that after we conquer Iraq, attack Iraq, we're going to turn and go after Tehran. So if you remember, it was part of the axis of evil and also Saddam was defeated and that motivation for nuclear weapons was gone. They also, the inspectors were almost daily finding new sites. And I think Iran was scared that if they found the weapon, this crash nuclear weapons program, then they would get invade and so they shut it down. But they didn't end their nuclear weapons program. And that's the discrepancy. Fundamentally, the United States is an outlier. I mean no other country believes this. Germany, France, Britain, Switzerland, I could go through all kinds, Japan, certainly Israel. But the United States locked itself into what I would call a light switch model. It's either on or off. And if it's on, it's like what it was in this crash program. Otherwise it's off. And that's not how it's been played out that you. If what the United States believed was true, then why did they spend all this time learning how to enrich, enriching to 60% and making weapon grade uranium? Their answer is, well, we don't consider that part of the weapons program. It's safeguarded, but pretty obviously it is. And so I think the United States has had a very flawed analysis, at least the way they manifested publicly. I know behind the scenes it's a much more robust debate and people, people have been. The assessments coming out recent days have contradicted that. There's been the statements that Iran is shortening the steps to be able to build a nuclear weapon. And that's more in line with what we've been believing and other countries that it is. Yes, Iran hasn't made a decision to build a bomb, but it's shortening the steps to do that. And the most visible step is their effort to be able to make weapon grade uranium, which is the long pole in the tent of making a nuclear weapon. During the crash program, they made tremendous progress on the Weapon itself, building the weapon itself. So that is their central challenge. Now, at some point you're preparing, and I think it's accepted in the US I know has this information. The Iran accelerated its preparatory effort, as I'll call it.

[Eli Lake]

And when did they do that?

[David Albright]

Starting about a year and a half ago. And it accelerated within the last half year to nine months. And at some point, and this is the dilemma Israel's facing is because it's their existence at stake, we live comfortably far away. Is that how can you tell the difference between a program preparing and a program building when the preparatory program has shortened the timelines down to a matter of a couple months or three months or four months? And when it's down at that point, you have to worry, will you detect the decision to build the bomb in a timely manner, or will it come after they're mostly done? So we're at a very tricky point, and I think the public part of the intelligence community, it is really deeply flawed in what it says publicly. And Tulsi just epitomized why that assessment is so wrong. I would say misleading, because I told you I agree we don't think Iran has made a decision to build nuclear weapons. But that's almost irrelevant in trying to figure out what to do now because they are so close to being able to make it. I'm sorry. So close to having one after they make a decision to do so.

[Eli Lake]

So, I mean, I don't know if you want to speculate as to. Why was Toll trying to. Was that putting a thumb on the scale? I mean, going back to 2003, I don't know. It was very politicized intelligence that you helped expose. It's ironic that you're kind of exposing it or not exposing it, but you're dismissing it, criticizing it.

[David Albright]

And I've been criticizing. I sat with a senior British official at a dinner the night it goes back to a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate that was made public. And again, just parts are made public. I have no idea of the maybe there's a very rich debate in the classified version. But I was sitting with a senior official who's fully read in, and he was just dismayed that the US Government would come out and say that the program ended in 2003 and has not been restarted. So it's actually, that's the problem, that that's what's locked up the US Intelligence community. This idea has not been restarted. And Tulsi was mimicking that kind of incorrect assumption. And even the IA has criticized it. That they're caught in a verbal struggle. They want to call the old program structured and they're not sure what to call the other one. Unstructured. An unstructured nuclear weapons program is. I don't think they really want to be saying that.

[Eli Lake]

Okay, so David, I want to ask, maybe just explain what the day after looks like if Iran becomes a declared nuclear state.

[David Albright]

You mean if there was no attack?

[Eli Lake]

I'm saying, yeah, if there was no attack. And Iran would say, okay, we have a weapon now maybe. I mean, this is a very basic question, but like you mentioned, you kind of hinted at it earlier. It's an existential question for Israel. But what does that mean? Like, what are the implications of Iran getting a bomb?

[David Albright]

Well, let me start by recounting what one of the founders of the nuclear weapons program, Dr. Abbasi Devani, what he said on TV a couple weeks ago. He said that, look, you don't need a missile delivered or a plane delivered bomb to get it into your enemy's territory. And he was referring explicitly to Israel and by implication the United States. And he also said in that interview that Iran can build a bomb and he would work on it if he was tasked or asked. So Iran could very well approach first trying to get what we'd call a non missile deliverable weapon, but it could deliver it by unconventional means into our country or in Israel's country. And that's what they're thinking about. Avasi Devani is a very influential figure and it's one of the reasons he was one of the ones killed.

[Eli Lake]

I was gonna say, is he still alive?

[David Albright]

And he, they tried. There was an attempt to kill him back in about 20. I forget 2010, 2012. And he by luck survived.

[Eli Lake]

That's right. He was the one who understood. He heard the click.

[David Albright]

That's right.

[Eli Lake]

There's, there's a. The magnetic bomb is on my. So that, that actually gets us into. I mean, let's talk about the damage at this point. What. I mean, we had hard, solid information from Rafael Grossi, the head of the iaea, that's the International Atomic Energy Agency, that it looks like Natanz is finished. Is that correct?

[David Albright]

That it's been a struggle to figure out. I mean, it turns out it's hard to find evidence of an earth penetrator because you don't know what happened underground. And, and, and so I know we like the IA looked at the satellite imagery, saw the electrical, electrical systems were taken out. The pilot enrichment plant has about 700 centrifuges and, and was making 60% enriched tranium too. That was destroyed. Yeah, but it just looked like everything was normal above the underground side. And, and it took a couple days to actually remember finding a tiny little thing that looked like a crater. And, and, and we were able to build from that, found three of those spots. And, and then that was. There were rumors coming out of Israel that it had been destroyed. But I'll tell you, the rumors were aimed at what, how much damage has been done. And it was clear the Israelis didn't know. So I think we're all in that position where it looks the best. The underground halls were hit. We can identify three entrance. I don't know what to call them, entrance wounds. And, and, and, but we don't really know what happened. But it's, it's possible there was quite a bit of damage done.

[Eli Lake]

And so at this point. Yeah, at this point, maybe walk us through what's been hit. How much, how much of that, how much of the program has been taken out at this point?

[David Albright]

The, I mean the main, on the enrichment side, the main facility hit has been Ford. And it's kind of the workhorse of the enrichment program because if you're going to make weapon grade uranium, 70% of the effort is to make 5%. And it's all done at this underground site. And it had it for, I'm sorry, at Natanz. And so, and that underground Natanz site has about 15,000 centrifuges. And where you can see you need a lot fewer is that the pilot plant, they were making couple kilograms of 60% a month in essentially 300 centrifuges. So and at Fordow they were making it in a very small number of centrifuges, relatively just about the same number. And they were taking the 20% and making 30 kg of 60% a month. And a bomb's amount is about 40 kg of 60%. So they were rapidly increasing. And that capability at Fordow has not been eliminated. I mean, we looked at satellite imagery yesterday and looked at, we call change detection. Has there been any disturbance in the soil at all? And the analyst who did this didn't find any. So it's confirmation that the site has not been attacked with some kind of earth penetrator. That leaves little.

[Eli Lake]

So let's leave Ford out for a second. Let me finish one thing.

[David Albright]

That's the enrichment site on the weaponization side. There more has been hit. What I should mention, centrifuge manufacturing sites have been hit. The two, two centrifuge manufacturing sites. And I'LL come back to that, but that's very important. On the weaponization they hit there was a place that makes metal, uranium metal, enriched uranium metal at it's called Sfahan and it is a formal nuclear site safeguarded by the inspectors. But it was an anomaly to have a place to make enriched uranium metal. And that's part of really part of a weaponization track because if you're going to use, have a nuclear weapon, you have to have a weapon grade uranium metal. And so you've got to, it comes out of enrichment plan as a chemical form that's different and you have to convert it into metal. And so Israel took out that capability at Esfahan and then it's been taking out. The headquarters for the nuclear weapons program lies in what we call spnd. It's a military organization. Its former head was Mohsen Fakrazati and they attacked the headquarters, they attacked a complex of buildings that's not too far away, that's associated. I assume they've attacked some of the other SPND facilities that are out in the countryside. And so that part I think has been the weaponization side of this question has been advancing more quickly. And I think I and others are starting to think that the, that the Israelis have extended the time Iran would need to build a nuclear weapon by several months. And our baseline is six months. So if you can get it up to a year, that's a good accomplishment because it gives you quite a bit of, it takes them quite a bit of time to build this non missile deliverable weapon.

[Eli Lake]

Okay, so one of the things that we've heard now for 20 years is that there's no military solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. Meaning that even if you succeeded in taking out all of their facilities, the knowledge was still there. And yet one of the things that Iran, that Israel has accomplished through I guess extraordinary intelligence is it's taken out I think a dozen of the top scientists.

[David Albright]

Yeah, we can, I think it's more like nine. Yeah.

[Eli Lake]

But it's okay, so nine, right.

[David Albright]

Yeah. It's a nuclear weapons a wheat.

[Eli Lake]

Okay, so my question is like does that somehow does that, how does that address this sort of long standing criticism of a military solution to the Iranian crisis?

[David Albright]

One is intelligence is Israel's intelligence is phenomenal. The other is weapons are very different now. What weapons can do now is, could only be dreamed of 20 years ago when some of this thought was, was developed. Because remember this has been going on a long time. I remember participating in debates around 20 2005. You destroy the enrichment program. But it's changed a lot since then and Israel is showing that it can be done and we have to see what they do with for now, but that they are able to learn where all the pieces of this are located and shown a persistence. So for example, they don't know. Well, we don't know for sure, but Iran's made a lot of centrifuges. It hasn't deployed at Natanz and Fordo. Where are those? Iran recently announced it was building a new centrifuge plant or have built one actually. And, and, and in essence showing it was violating another part of the safeguards agreement. But they must have made centrifuges because they said they were going to deploy them there. So where are those? And so what Israel has to deal with, but I think it is capable is it has to get more intelligence about where Iran has been hiding these things. And I know in the inspection effort in Iraq, that was part of, that was a great part of the, what had to be done. And, and you can do it with time. And what you count on is, is essentially insiders who decide they don't want to be inside anymore and they want to reveal things. And so I, I hope that Israel is trying to recruit people in these programs with either with money or a ticket out of Iran or whatever it is, or they do it, they do it out of good cons or being a good citizen and international citizen and they reveal these things. So Israel, in order for Israel to play this out, it needs time that this in my mind is not a couple day event, that or even a week long event. And part of it is to hunt and find and destroy.

[Eli Lake]

Hey there, it's Eli. With a constant barrage of alarming headlines, wars, a warming planet and high stakes politics, it might feel like we're teetering on the edge, but the world contains a lot more good news than you hear on mainstream media. If you're looking for another show that questions the status quo, then I recommend what Could Go Right, the twice weekly news podcast hosted by Zachary Carabelle and Emma Varva Lucas, recently nominated for best politics or opinion podcast at the Ambi Awards. What Could Go Right provides a balanced view of what's going on across the globe, even during difficult times. Each Wednesday they sit down with leading minds like best selling author John Green and environmental reporter Emily Atkin to discuss today's biggest challenges with nuance and insight. And on Fridays, they highlight the latest progress reports from around the world. From life changing medical advancements to groundbreaking efforts to Combat change.

[David Albright]

Climate.

[Eli Lake]

Climate change. If you need a place to start, check out their recent episode with economics expert Matt Stoller, who breaks down the 100 year war between monopoly power and democracy. It's an enlightening conversation that's perfect for breaking history fans. So fight the urge to doom scroll, tune in to what could go right wherever you get your podcasts.

[David Albright]

We're being used. Jews are being used on Israel on antisemitism and for other purposes. And that puts us in a dilemma. If it was Jews qua Jews, it's one thing to stand up. But now when Jews are being used on immigration issues, on woke issues makes it a lot more difficult when to say something or not say something. On the most recent episode of Identity Crisis, Yehuda Kurtzer speaks with Abe Foxman, longtime Anti Defamation League leader and Holocaust survivor, about the relationship between major Jewish organizations and those in power and to understand when and how to speak up for the Jewish people. Join us as we take on the issues facing contemporary Jewish life on Identity Crisis from the Shalom Hartman Institute, wherever you get your podcasts.

[Eli Lake]

So let's talk about Fordo. Why is Fordo the kind of crown jewel? Why, why does so much depend on this? I mean, maybe just talk about this facility that is built under a mountain. You know, it's like a fortress.

[David Albright]

Yeah. I think you have to be careful it doesn't, it's only one piece and it's a vulnerable piece. Believe it or not, it's a vulnerable piece. I worry more about, you know, do they have 4, 3, 4,000 centrifuges hidden away that they could set up at yet a fourth centrifuge plant that they're thinking through now? And so, but, but Fordow originated in this crash nuclear weapons program. It was called the Al Ghadeer project. We know that from this nuclear archive that Iran seized, I'm sorry, that Israel seized in Iran in 2018. There's all kinds of designs for what we now call the four dial enrichment plant and all kinds of plans of how they were going to make weapon grade uranium and using low enriched uranium produced in the Natanz plant. They had a formal agreement with the Atomic Energy Organization to transfer enriched uranium, but they were slow on building it and they continued building it after the Ahmad plan closed. And that's one of the, I think the chinks in the armor of the US intelligence assessment is they, they, they, they can only, they can't incorporate the idea that this secret project, undeclared enrichment plan continued while they're saying There is no nuclear weapons program in Iran and it wasn't found until or exposed publicly to 2009, at which point Iran had a strategy. If caught, call it civilian and they put it under safeguards. So it was billed as part of a nuclear weapons effort. And the Iranians must be getting some kind of satisfaction that this is the plant where they've actually just rebuilt in some ways in the last year or so so it could make weapon grade uranium, starting with 5% enriched uranium. So they in a sense have. The Al Gadir project has come to fruition and they designed it to be 80 meters underground. They started building it around 2003. It does have vulnerabilities. It has a ventilation shaft that we've watched. We went back and looked at old image and saw how they were building it. A facility that deep has to have good ventilation. You can't. And you also, you can't run like generators. If they're using fossil fuels in a facility like that, you may use batteries, but those, if you knock out the electricity to the plant and that can be done, they may run wires from, you know, several miles underground, but still there's an electric station that can be taken out, that can, that can make the lights go out there and in which case they can't operate it. And you can destroy tunnel entrances, you can destroy the tunnels themselves going toward and there's. You destroy the ventilation, the system. So you can do a lot to put it out of operation. And there's nothing to keep Israel from coming back. So the, so I think the. It doesn't need the United States to come in with these big bunker busters and drop it on top of the mountain and destroy it. I mean, that would hurry the process. But I think Israel can do it on its own. But I think it's hesitated and I don't know the reason why, but I don't think it's because they can't make it inoperative.

[Eli Lake]

Well, that's interesting. I mean, do you think part of the hesitation is because originally Donald Trump seemed to suggest that Iran could come back to the table. The foreign Minister has sort of hinted that in recent days, as I've reported in others. Is this a way of maybe saying, you know, kind of giving an out to the Iranians to end the war, you think?

[David Albright]

No, because I don't think Ford is negotiable. I think it has to go under any reasonable position. It's just too dangerous to allow to exist. I'm thinking more maybe if the Israelis did make it inoperative. The United States would say oh, thank you, we don't have to do it. Or they have intelligence that they know that weapon grade uranium isn't being made there. Now perhaps it's non mandatory. We look at the old Ahmad nuclear weapons development sites, some of which have been reactivated in the last year and a half and, and a surprising lack of cars in the parking lots. So I think it, you know, I think the, the, the SPND people, enrichment people are staying home. I mean they don't want to be here when a bomb drops. So it's not, it's not even clear to me that for now is operating right now. And I think the, I think the Iranians are, have really become dismayed and, and disorganized and, and, and I think that what, why Israel wanted to attack with a great deal of surprise. I mean it makes it very hard for Iran to think about building the bomb. Now. If you walk away now, of course they will, they'll, they'll try, they'll be delayed, they'll take longer just because of the weaponization side and the losses they've taken on of things. And it could be much more extensive than we know publicly because I have found Israel is not really revealing a lot of what it's doing.

[Eli Lake]

And so, yeah, so we're going to find out much more later. You know, we might find it.

[David Albright]

Yeah. And so it is an answer to your question is today, because of Israel's abilities, you can't set back a program to the point where it's not worth restarting and that and that, and I think that's what Israel is driving toward when it says this is going to.

[Eli Lake]

Go on for a while.

[David Albright]

So I think the idea that they'll immediately build the bomb or it'll just make them build the bomb, Israel is showing that it's not true in this case.

[Eli Lake]

Okay, so this gets to a question from one of our viewers, Bernie, who asks what is the end point of the war? How does it end with Israel having met its strategic goals? And I think you were kind of getting at that. So maybe just expand like what do you think the end point would look like?

[David Albright]

Well, I think there's, there's many and I think, and again, I'm not talking to the Israelis about any of this. And so I'm just really just speculating. I mean one that isn't particularly desirable is Israel becomes, you know, has done what met its goals. It could be year to build the bomb itself. It got rid of the stocks of 60% maybe there's still some 20%. It eliminated Fordow as an operating centrifuge plant, tons, we think is already out of, out of operation. And they, and they go and say, look, we'll come back if you, if you rebuild. And, and, and then we don't know what's going to happen. We don't know if what the regime will do. Another is, is that if, if, if President Trump is able to step in later, not now, but later, and impose a stringent deal which would include no enrichment and would include intrusive inspections. And those inspections may be just letting the IA free to do its job and Iran cooperates. And if Iran doesn't cooperate, then military actions could restart or take place. So I think, you know, that to me would be the, the ideal solution. Whether Iran would agree, I don't know. But it, but I think that we can't just go back to a, a situation where Iran agrees to limits, you know, 10 years, 15 years, then they're gone and they, and they jerk around the inspectors to keep them away from their secret activities. And so I think even a deal just to end enrichment unless it's verified and, and there's some belief that the IA has, that there isn't a secret nuclear weapons program, that, that, that kind of deal would, would be very bad. And so I think you do want to.

[Eli Lake]

Well, you know, so you're, that is a reference directly to what was known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or the jcpoa. That was the great achievement of the Obama administration in his second term. You were, I think, a principled critic of that at the time. But I want, this gets to a larger point going forward. Has this military operation, this war opened up the prospect of potentially better nuclear diplomacy down the line? And what I mean by that is the credible stick that was actually used in these negotiations was economic sanctions. That was what led to the jcpoa. And it was in the context of like, well, you know, if we find a violation, there'll be snapback. And there was all that. But now that Israel has proven that it can, you can effectively take out an industrial sized nuclear weapons program, what does that mean going forward in terms of strengthening the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and you know, maybe deterring or ending the prospects of other rogue states from.

[David Albright]

Acquiring nukes, I think it could bring back some optimism. I mean, it's a little bit controversial what I'm saying, but for me it does remind me of what happened in 91. I mean, Iraq had a huge weapons program that escaped detection by the inspectors and, and the breadth of it escape detection by, by all the major powers. And, and yet you had after the war, you know, forced disarmament verified. And, and it was going along with the end of the Cold War, South Africa had given up its nuclear weapons program. And so there was this idea that, yeah, you could entice people to give up nuclear weapons in these programs like South Africa and also Brazil, at least in Brazil, give up a program. And, and then if they don't like Iraq, then you have military means to do it backed by at that time by the UN Security Council, which was united on this. So, so, you know, this case shows that sometimes you really do have to use military force to enforce in a sense the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. And in my mind it opens a door to some potential opportunities to strengthen the nuclear non proliferation regime. But a lot will depend on just how it plays out and where does it end and does it end in an agreement that enforces or ensures the absence of a nuclear weapons program in Iran or does it kind of just stall out and then this whole question will need to be revisited by Israel again six months from after it ends or a year. So I think it's to be seen. But I do think there's an opportunity here and I hope the President Trump seizes it and moves at the right time. And I think now is not the right time.

[Eli Lake]

Okay, what do you think the right time would be? What would have to be destroyed?

[David Albright]

I think Fordow certainly has to be inoperative in a very, in a very significant way and destroyed would be even better. More of the nuclear weaponization program has to be destroyed. There needs to be clarity on the number of centrifuges Iran has that are not deployed anywhere but could be deployed. Certainly the stocks of 60% have to be found and neutralized and we don't know how many. I mean some could have been. There were several, four buildings that damaged it at this Esfahan site. I mentioned one that was involved in enriched uranium metal production, but there were others. And one traditionally had large stocks of 20% and 60% stored there. They don't keep it at the enrichment plan necessarily, but they could have moved it. So you don't know, but it, but Israel Proud may have known something. It may know where other some of the, some other locations of these stocks, but that's where I think they have to go into kind of a hunting and finding mode and that's where I think they certainly need more time is to find out where these hidden items are. And then there's a whole rash of items that the IA pointed out that there was a site they wanted to called Turkish Abad that was filled with shipping containers of equipment from the crash nuclear weapons program. And Iran learned that everyone knew about it and dispersed them and then acts as if they were never there in the first place. In the sense of typically refusing to cooperate. Iran is hiding those things and Israel is probably searching for where that equipment is hidden. And it's a lot of dual use equipment related to making nuclear weapons.

[Eli Lake]

So you expect there'll be some time. But there is an end point at which you think you could say, all right, we know where the 60% enriched uranium is and we've secured it. Fordow is either inoperable or destroyed. And enough of this equipment and other centrifuges and so forth have been found and neutralized. And then at that point you could begin to sort of see an end of the war.

[David Albright]

Yeah, and I think you have to set realistic goals. I mean you can't eliminate nuclear weapons program because in the end there are people left and you know, you combine stuff. But so you want to, you want to have a realistic goal. And I, and I would. And again, I don't know what Israel's thinking, but if it would take Iran a year to make it kind of a. Well, unfortunately their design is quite sophisticated, but it took him a year to make a non missile deliverable warhead. That may be enough. I mean we have.

[Eli Lake]

Right.

[David Albright]

And particularly if, if there's robust inspections and then I think you want to create a situation where either they're not enriching or if they are going to have an enrichment program, it's going to take them, well, at least a year or maybe even longer to be able to, to produce enough weapon grade uranium for a bomb. So I think, and that to me are more realistic, others may pick different lengths of time, but I think trying to work toward that kind of world is doable and it may be all Israel can do anyway. So I think how long that would take I don't know. But, but it's measured in weeks and not days.

[Eli Lake]

Yeah. Okay. Well this question from Dave, and it's one I actually have as well, which is what are the risks of radiation exposure from military destruction of facilities that are producing highly enriched or even for that matter, low enriched uranium.

[David Albright]

Yeah. Well, we're lucky. It's, it's a uranium based program. I mean it's not a plutonium based program. And so we're very lucky. And uranium is not Very radiotoxic. I mean again, I don't want to be cavalier about it, but I remember as a boy scout when I was a kid we went up to Canada in the uranium mines and we could take all the yellow cake we wanted home. And I had yellow cake which is uranium oxide from a purified after a mine in, in my bedroom for years. And so I wouldn't do that with, I wouldn't do that anymore. And I, the Canadian mining industry doesn't open up their minds to you know, 14 year old teenagers anymore either. And so, but, but it's just not that radiotoxic. And, and, and, and also most of it is in the form of what's called uranium hexafluoride. That's the working material that's used in a centrifuge plant. And, and you know what's very dangerous is the fluorine. And, and Director General GROSSII@ the IA recently said, you know, you really have to be careful going into the buildings where, where that have been bombed that have uranium hexafluoride, whether enriched or natural, but outside the building it's fine. And so okay, you, it, it's the chemical threat that is the most pressing because fluorine will just rip your lungs apart. I mean it's really reactive. Yeah, but it, but it, but when it's the uranium particles combined with various amounts of fluorine tend to fall out pretty quickly and so they're locally contained. So I think there isn't much risk at all. And you know, the Iranians will try to tell you different and they're going to try to scare their own people and scare us, but we've actually gone through some of their, the studies they've sponsored and it's just bogus science. And I used to being very much involved in dispersion of plutonium and uranium from former, well, nuclear weapons sites in the United States. And, and plutonium was a real problem, I can tell you, but uranium got out in large quantities and was, did not pose a serious risk of the local population.

[Eli Lake]

We're coming to the end here, but before we do, I want to ask you this because I think it's a real possibility, although there's a lot we don't know. So if there was a regime collapse and there was anarchy in a country of 90 million people and no monopoly of violence, what would need to happen in terms of a crash program to secure nuclear facilities, nuclear material, nuclear equipment? I mean, it's strike me that that would be a kind of nightmare scenario. That certain things could get in the hands, very dangerous actors, and those actors.

[David Albright]

May be armed and determined to find some of this stuff for.

[Eli Lake]

Yeah, that's what I'm so, so just. I know. So is a regime collapse from a kind of perspective of the prospect of, of, you know, the leakage of nuclear material, which is something we spend, you know, years on trying to solve this problem after the fall of the Soviet Union. What does that look like? What do you think the United States would have to do in terms of trying to secure this material if there was.

[David Albright]

And again, I know many people posing the regime, Iranians, Americans who supported Europeans, I mean, would like to see the regime collapse, but from a strictly kind of nuclear perspective, I don't think that should be a goal. I mean, it could happen. And I think the Israeli military probably on board with me is that you want to have a coherent government in order to negotiate sort of the end, what comes after the war. And we had a little bit of this in Iraq. I remember was working with journalists when the United states invaded in 2003. And, and the army was pretty. Despite all the preparation, they, they were not that well prepared. And, and they, they took over the main nuclear research site called Tuatha, south of Baghdad. And, And I got a call from a journalist and said, well, here we are in this facility. That's huge. And what is it? And, you know, I could tell them it's a nuclear site. In the military, the army people didn't even know that. And it had been. The Iraqis had run off and they had large amounts of uranium stored there. And there was one site a little bit outside the main complex that had tons of uranium. It was in blue barrels, blue plastic barrels. And the journalist told me, God, there's uranium all over the floor and there's some barrels. And what had been appealing was to the people who looted the place because it was left unprotected were the blue barrels. So we were lucky in that case. Someone could have carted off tons and tons of. Of. Of natural uranium in this form of yellow cake. And so that's what you could face in Iran, that just suddenly important stocks of nuclear material would be just left abandoned to whoever finds them. And it may be people who are more clever more and more.

[Eli Lake]

And unlike Iraq, there are no boots on the ground. Yeah, there are no American boots on the ground. I don't think there are Israeli boots. There are Israeli slippers. There's really like, you know, like. But you know what I mean? They have obviously, you know, very Dangerous.

[David Albright]

Terrorists in the neighborhood. So, yeah, it is a problem. And you're right, the U.S. in this case, I could call the State Department contact I had and they could energize the system to protect the nuclear material. Yeah, but in Iran, there wouldn't be anything. So. Yeah. So from that point of view, I mean, but it, it could happen and we probably should at least think about what would be done that. And it.

[Eli Lake]

And so what. What could be done if that happened in the case of a sudden regime collapse? And we don't know. I mean, we know that, that Khamenei is in a, in some secret location that Trump has said, for now, we're not going to hit you. But, you know, I don't know, like, things are, you know, dicey right now.

[David Albright]

Yeah. No one you'd want to move to try to work toward a stable government, replacement government. And I don't know what that would mean, but you don't want a disintegration of society. Now, the Iranian society is very advanced and yearning for freedom. And it may be that, that they'll find something, but it could be that it becomes chaotic. And I think the powers that be, probably led by the United States would have to organize things to try to find the material and season and maybe they'll have certainly assistance of Israel. But what it does say, though, and this again is an argument don't end this too soon. Let Israel try to find and destroy the key components of the enrichment program and the nuclear weapons program, and then they won't. If there is chaos, there won't be much there.

[Eli Lake]

Okay. Well, David Albright, thank you so much for taking time out of your day. Couldn't think of a more important person to talk to on this momentous times that we're living in. So thank you again.

[David Albright]

I wish, I wish I saw myself that way. I feel fighting a battle that is struggling to gain a foothold. But, but I. This, this maybe, maybe things are going to get better. That this, what you mentioned, that this attack could, could actually have a, a bright side.

[Eli Lake]

I think it has a bright side. I mean, if Iran went nuclear, it's pretty clear that Turkey, Saudi and maybe even Egypt would then crash on their programs and we would, I mean, another genie would come out of the bottle. And so avoiding that is itself a great thing. And we have to see how it goes, because the devil's gonna be in the details if it can end in an agreement. I think you're right that that would be better. And then once the program is kind of secure and diminished, then let's focus on a democratic transition. And I think that's for the Iranian people.

[David Albright]

Great. I agree.

[Eli Lake]

Thank you.

[David Albright]

Thank you.