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A
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B
Hi, Eli.
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C
Hey, Bob. How are you?
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B
I'm good. How are you doing?
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C
I'm good, I'm good.
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B
Let me introduce us. I'm Robert Wright, publisher of the Non Zero newsletter, which I encourage people to check out. This is the Non Zero podcast. You are Eli Lake, longtime sparring partner of mine and also writer for the Free Press, host of the Breaking History podcast, contributing editor, commentary. You and I have had conversations in the past, often about the Middle east, sometimes about Iran. We've tended to disagree about Iran, but possibly never as clearly as we're going to disagree now. At least that's my guess because we're in the middle of this war with Iran that was started by the US And Israel. I think it was a really bad idea. You think it was a good idea? I think you can start out by correcting me if I'm wrong. I'd love to be wrong about that.
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C
But I think that Iran has been, I think the United States and Iran have been at war since 1979. And I think that the current kind of battle, the hostilities certainly began on February 28th with the decapitation strikes of the regime and Trump's 3am message.
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B
Okay. So that maybe that obviates a question I was going to ask if you think the war's actually been going on since 1979. What I was going to say, I was going to bring up a subject that seems to matter a lot more to me than to the average person who talks about foreign policy in America. That's international law. I was going to say, I assume, okay, you're not bothered by what seems to me a clear cut violation of international law here, but maybe you don't think it's. I was gonna say, do you think it's not a clear cut violation of international law for us to have attacked Iran, or do you just think international law shouldn't be of overriding importance?
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C
Well, if you mean that international law says that you need a UN Security Council resolution for one sovereign state to attack another.
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B
Well, or at least that you should only attack in self defense, which I don't think you can argue that the US Was you, that this was an attack we launched in self defense. And that's what the UN Charter says. Yeah, yes.
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C
So I'm in agreement that the UN Charter and says that and that this was done outside of it. However, my caveat would be that, you know, I think international law is in a pretty sorry state right now in the world and states like Iran kind of exist outside of international law in many ways by their tactics. So, you know, I, I, yes, I concede that the letter that yes, clearly the UN Charter says that you need to have UN Security Council resolution and the United States did not obtain one. It's certainly not the first American war. It's not the first recent war. We have a lot of examples where, you know, this kind of basic of the UN Charter has not been observed. There are some international relations theorists that said, you know, it was never really in effect, but I would say it's really eroded a lot. But yeah, there's a huge difference. I mean, I'm willing to concede that. I mean, the different, I mean, Colin Powell and George W. Bush and Don Rumsfeld, that administration more than 20 years ago tried very hard to get a UN Security Council resolution and ultimately relied on a kind of weird argument that there were other UN Security Council resolutions that were in the breach. We don't have to rehash that now. But yes, we now are living in a different era. But I would also say that, you know, there have been a lot of wars that did not, you know, have the UN Security Council had nothing to do with, I mean, you could look at the Russian invasions of Ukraine. You could look at the US Intervention in Kosovo, you could look at the war in Libya. I mean, there's just a lot that's happened where it just feels a little bit like the UN Charter is pretty quaint, especially if you look at, but
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B
it is, it is a treaty commitment by the United States. It's a treaty we ratified. So are you saying that we really, we don't necessarily have to comply with our treaty commitments?
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C
No, I'm not saying that you don't comply with the treaty commitments. What I'm saying is that the, the status of the United nations in general, I feel is kind of approaching League of Nations territory. There are aggressive states in the world, there are rogue states. And that I think that there's a sense here where, I mean, if we move to a slightly different issue, which is the constitutional question about should Trump have gone to Congress? I, even though I guess I'm on the hawkish side of it, I would say I think he should have. But again, that's another norm that's been violated, and that was violated before Trump as well. I just think that we're just in a different kind of period at this point, and that my vision of an international system that could work would be one with fewer members, but, you know, clearer kind of understanding that, you know, we are all agreeing to these sets of norms, but at this point, we don't really have that world. So, I mean, that's, that's where I'm at on that. So I'm not. I, I know, I know the UN Charter, as you do this violated it.
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B
Yeah. And I mean, the last thing I'd say on that is I think you said no, you do think we should comply with treaty commitments, but we should have violated the UN Charter in this case. And I, I don't understand that, because this is a treaty, it's a ratified treaty. And, and by the way, you mentioned that this violates the US Constitution, because.
- [06:31]
C
No, no, I'm not saying it violates the U.S. constitution. I think that it violates the spirit of the War Powers Act. But I think that's another norm that has been, like, eroded over time. And I'm not a fan of multilateral treaties, I should say, so I like treaties with other governments. But I just think the problem here is that if you have a world where you have lots of, you have a number of states that just simply live outside of international law, it creates, I think, a problem to the, you know, sort of a danger to the commons when, and it's an overall danger if you sort of have some states that you expect to follow international law and other states like Iran, that exists outside of an international law that you, you know, at, at a certain point, you know, I think they've relinquished their sovereignty. I wish there was a process, and I don't know how it would work necessarily, because I think that, you know, its allies are, you know, China and Russia would have, you know, are permanent members of the, of the, of the Security Council, and they have a veto. But I think there should be a kind of process where a state like Iran under the Islamic Republic regime would kind of relinquish its sovereignty, which is to say they've, they've violated so many things. At a certain point, you can come in and do something about it. But that's not, that is not how international law works. But maybe if there was, in my ideal world, that's how I would have it.
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B
Okay. I mean, one more point in the Constitution, the Constitution Also says that the ratified treaties become, quote, the law of the land. So I would argue that violating the UN Charter, as you and I agree we did, is actually a violation of the U.S. constitution. But you're using the word norm. It seems to be kind of interchangeably with laws. There is a difference, but I would agree with that. Compliance with the law is a norm. Right. It's like there are lawless societies where people routinely violate laws and in that case, the norm hasn't taken hold. I would say I agree with you. Right now in international law in the world, the norm of complying with the UN Charter has eroded. You seem to think that Iran led the way or something. I would say no. The U.S. if you look at the post Cold War world, which is the world that offered a chance to kind of restore the significance of the charter and the UN and everything, because suddenly there were things the US and the Soviet Union or then Russia could agree on and in fact did agree on the Persian Gulf War was authorized by a vote that included China and Russia. If you look at that world, that new start we had with the first Bush administration, I would say it's the United States has led the way in the violation of the charter. The Panama invasion under Bush 1, as you mentioned Kosova. Yes. We violated the UN charter before Russia did. And we had more normative power than any other country. We had more potential to restore and uphold the norm of compliance with the UN Charter than any other. And I would say we squandered it. I'm not, I don't, I mean, if we're talking about the chart of the part of the chart, it's about trans border aggression, which I think is the heart of it. I don't, I'm not sure what, what violations on Iran's part you're talking about, but we have committed a lot of them, including the Iraq war in 2003, of course.
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C
I mean, I. Iran is responsible for hollowing out the state of Lebanon by arming, funding Hezbollah. It's responsible for the Yemen civil war, the latest one, by arming and funding the Houthis. It's responsible in part at least for the horrors of the Gaza war because of its long standing relationship with Hamas, although it was strained because Iran also then supported Bashar Al Assad when he was in the middle of his horrific slaughter, the use of chemical weapons against his own people. Iran is kind of a serial violator of international sanctions. Until the jcpoa, it had illegally pursued clandestine nuclear programs.
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B
That's not, that's Not Israel.
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C
Israel's not a member of the.
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B
Start at the beginning. Go ahead and finish and we'll get to nuke.
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C
All right. Well, I'm just saying, I mean, Iran in every definition is a rogue state from its very beginning. The Islamic Republic, the revolution is, you know, we see within a few months, they hold the embassy hostage, they send out assassins to kill the first interim prime minister. They have, we know from court documents, they tried to hire killers to try to assassinate Donald Trump when he was out of office, not to mention Masi Alinejad. They have. And you're against.
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B
You're against assassinating heads of state. Right. You would not support any country that would do such a thing.
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C
Well, I celebrated the ending of Khamenei and his various henchmen.
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B
That's kind of my point. Yeah.
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C
Well, except I'm saying that like this, for Iran, this is a behavior that goes back a long way. And part of the reason why I celebrate Khamenei's demise is precisely because of, you know, their rogue and despicable kind of state behavior. I mean, there's a whole series of things, Bob. I mean, I don't want to have to go through everything, but like, you know, that, like, you know, the Iranians were behind the assassination of like, Kurdish dissidents in Germany and in Austria, on and on. It's like this whole list. They, Henry Kissinger, when he was alive, had a. Had a. Had a great kind of quip about Iran, which is it has to decide whether it wants to be a country or a revolution. And it has tried to spread, you know, an Islamic revolution, which I think is an authoritarian kind of debased ideology that in general is kind of hostile to things that I care about and that we haven't even discussed how it treats its own citizens, which is despicable. So I just look at everything that Iran does and I really don't put it in the same category. In the case of Panama, you had a short war to remove, you know, Maduro, a drug running dictator. In the case of Kosovo, you had a bombing campaign that effectively.
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B
I'm sorry, Noriega. Sorry.
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C
Go ahead, Noriega. And you had a bombing campaign that effectively halted Slobodan Milosevic's efforts to cleanse Kosovo of its Albanians. I do think that. And I just want to make one other point that's kind of related, which is that we sometimes get caught up in this. But international law, as you know, it's not the same as a domestic law because it relies to. I mean, who enforces international law. And the United nations does not have its own army. It relies on the United States to, you know, to kind of carry the load. And so I just don't really look at international law in this sort in the same way, just because I think, I think in that sense it's more ephemeral. So that's why I reject your effort to try to say we're the number one rogue state. And even in a case like Iraq, leaving aside that there was an effort to try to bring on the UN Security Council, I mean, in Iraq, it was not equivalent of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. There was not an effort to, you know, kind of occupy Iraq indefinitely and make it the 51st state. It was an effort to.
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B
But we did occupy it.
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C
Well, yes, but what do we do when we, what did we do when we invaded Iraq? And I would note that there's, I don't think there's any plan for like a serious.
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B
I don't want to get off on Iraq.
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C
What do we do? No, no, what we did was we helped them write a constitution and they've had successive elections. That's not what like Russia's doing in Ukraine. Russia's. I mean, I don't want to get,
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B
I mean, yeah, we had elections that we kind of tried to put our finger on the scale of and that's what Russia might do if they did ever seize control of Ukraine. But anyway, the, the. Let me, let me skip at the beginning. So you've said a lot of things about things Iran has done in the context of international law. I think some of the things you mentioned are not covered by international law. Let me say what I was trying to focus on was the core of the UN Charter, the bedrock of international law, the trans border aggression. And you started out by, in your list of Iranian crimes by saying they hollowed out Lebanon by supporting Hezbollah. Well, as no doubt you know, Hezbollah's origins begin with Israel's invasion of Lebanon, trans border aggression and violation of the UN Charter. Hezbollah begins as an organization of resistance against Israeli occupation. Does Iran see the opportunity to develop a junior ally? Absolutely. And we can talk about that. But it's just kind of ironic to me that the beginning of that episode is a clear violation of international law by Israel.
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C
Why, why did Israel feel the need to invade Lebanon?
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B
Because the PLO had found a home there.
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C
But, but, and the PLO was, was conducting a number of cross border raids and was threatening, I mean, like the PLO was using Lebanon as a base to attack Israel.
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B
Look, maybe it's, you know, it's conceivable that there's a stronger argument against my claiming that that was a clear cut violation of law than I, I appreciate, but I would say Hezbollah's origins lie with the invasion and occupation of Lebanon by Israel.
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C
From the very beginning, the Iranians were there with a mission much the way the more aggressive, you know, sort of side of Soviet foreign policy.
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B
Well, do you agree that.
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C
And we were trying to promote an Islamic re from the very beginning. You're right. Hold on. I want us to say, yes, you're right. That it started as a insurgency against Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon. However, from the very beginning they were also an instrument of Iranian statecraft. I mean, there's a reason why this big scandal the Reagan administration involved sending arms for hostages is because the Iranians were getting the arms and instructing its clients to release hostages that it had taken. So I think that that shows something more than just sort of an organic group that Iran saw a moment of opportunity and most scholars of Hezbollah today acknowledge that it is an extension of Iran. And as such, Iran gave it 100,000 or more missiles aimed solely for the destruction of Israel, which is like, you know, it was basically creating an Iranian kind of border with Israel. So that is what I mean. But more importantly, like, what is that? I'm saying that to me, all of their activities basically sponsoring an organization that is committed to the Iranian regime's goal, which is destroy Israel, that places the security of Lebanon, the delicate political balance in great danger. And finally we have a situation which is, which is finally the case where you see leading members of the Lebanese government in the last three or four weeks have now finally said Hezbollah as an outlaw organization, they have expelled the Iranian ambassador. I mean there's a reason why you're seeing these other Lebanese politicians finally saying enough is enough because Iran basically, I would say kind of had what a sort of stealth or proxy invasion of the country.
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B
Okay, let me say just a few things in, in serial here. The, you know, when you say Iran gave them weapons solely for the destruction of Israel, I, we can save this argument for later in the conversation. I'm sure you're aware of the view that actually from Iran's point of view, these, you know, so called proxy groups, I think in some ways that's the most leading term. But in any event are have a largely deterrent function. That is to say their ability to threaten Israel was supposed to keep Israel from attacking Iran. And indeed we saw that once Hamas and Hezbollah were completely Degraded Israel proceeded to start attacking Iran. So it seems that's not a crazy idea. We can save that argument for later. You brought up the nuclear issue in the context of international law. That's kind of confusing to me because Iran has not violated, I mean, the nuke, the non Proliferation Treaty, which Iran is a party to, does permit you to enrich uranium. We had a nuclear deal with Iran that allowed us a degree of transparency that no other nation has in terms of monitoring and surveillance. We knew what was going on there. Trump decided to pull out. Israel wanted him to pull out and that helped get us where we are today. But the point is it's not a violation of international law for them to enrich. And by the way, if they want to develop a nuclear weapon, all they have to do to do that in compliance with international law is give whatever it is, three months, six months notice that they're getting out of the non Proliferation Treaty and they do that. And in that case they would have exactly this status in international law that Israel has, which is, it has nuclear weapons and it's not a party to the npt. So that, that is not, I think, a serious international law issue. And I would say a lot of people ask like, wait, why does Israel get nuclear. A lot of people in Iran ask this, why does Israel get nuclear weapons if Iran doesn't? I'd be delighted with a regional like nuclear free agreement with intrusive inspections that, that and you know, Israel, let's go their nuclear weapons and there's no nuclear weapons in the region. That would be great. But I think a lot of people ask why Israel gets, is, is entitled to get them, whereas if anyone else wants to get them, even in compliance with international law, Israel gets to just bomb the shit out of them in flagrant violation of international. The last thing is on this assassination thing, I mean, come on. I mean, first of all, I'm not. The various things you listed, some of them, I'm not conversant in. Some of them I am conversant in. I'm not acknowledging that there was any kind of, that all of the assassination plots and, or actual assassinations happened. I don't know in some cases. But I will say that surely you would agree no nation has done more to normalize assassination. Broadly speaking, heads of state, everybody else than Israel. Right. I mean, that's kind of what the movie Munich is about. You've seen the movie, right? Like after the Olympic, the Black September thing in the Munich Olympics, you know, they, these terrorists killed these Israeli athletes. It was A horrible thing. But Israel, you know, decided CIA and
- [21:47]
C
the KGB killed an awful lot of people. I mean, I don't know what to say. I mean, okay, listen, I don't want to get caught up. I find that to be a pretty
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B
all that was before. So you're saying yes, it was normalized,
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C
but before I didn't say that Iran was the only country that ever. I was listing all the things that Iran had done that in my view make it a rogue state. But let me just go back to the nuclear thing because I think you've got some of it a bit jumbled. Israel became a nuclear power before there was an NPT and has declined to join the npt. Israel is also not a declared nuclear power. And the big concern that as a result of a sort of secret agreement in 1971 or 1970, I forget exactly what year between the US and Nixon and Golda Meir was that Israel would not become a declared nuclear power. And as a result it kind of worked because there wasn't a proliferation cascade in the Middle East. Everybody knows Israel has nuclear weapons, but only Iran has sought nuclear weapons. But I want to get back to the npt. You're right.
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B
What do you mean? First of all, they were not seeking. I mean they abandoned a nuclear weapons per SE program in 2003.
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C
I want to like, before we get there, I want to just explain how Iran is a violator of the NPT because Iran violated the NPT by building secret industrial size enrichment facilities without declaring it to the International Atomic Energy Agency. This was the crisis of the first year of the Obama administration when the US discovered Fordeau. Before that there was the discovery of Natanz. Now the way the NPT works is that you're supposed to be up, up front. You're not supposed to build them in, in underneath mountains. And as Israel had learned when it found the secret archives of the nuclear program, and as the US Intelligence and the IAEA learned later, there was a much bigger, you know, there were plenty of these sites that were for a nuclear program that were never declared to the iaea. So you wouldn't say that is that, that itself is an enormous violation. But let's just take a step back from that. Iran is a fanatic regime that is based on a, an ideology that is seeking to spread an Islamic revolution. That is what that. And they every day death to Israel, death to America. So there's a difference between a country like that acquiring a nuclear weapon and a country like Israel or America or France having nuclear weapons. And So I don't like the fact that Pakistan has a nuclear weapon, but I would say the prospect of the Iranians getting a nuclear weapon is even like worse than Pakistan, which has a shady Islamist security force. So that's where I just think that, like, you're kind of glossing over things. And finally, I think, I do think it's very important. And so that's why when you sort of make this comparison, Israel develops a nuclear weapon before there's a non proliferation treaty, they obviously decline to sign the nuclear. Non proliferation treaty. Iran signs the nuclear, and then, you know, is trying to cheat that nuclear proliferation treaty. So I mean, that's where I would say it's apples and oranges.
- [25:11]
B
As for Israel, I'm not, I'm stipulating that Israel is in compliance with international law. My only point is that Iran can develop a nuclear weapon in compliance with international law if it gives the three months or six months notice of withdrawal from the npt. That's all I'm saying.
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C
As for Russia, I don't want Iran to get a nuclear weapon. Do you?
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B
I'd rather they didn't. But that was under control. We had that under control. And then Trump, Israel's active support got out of the Obama deal and with which Iran was clearly compliant. And you support. Did you support withdrawal from the deal, which had this incredibly intrusive inspection and
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C
monitoring, if I'm being honest. At the time I said that Trump should use the leverage of the threat to withdraw to get a better deal. But now in retrospect, I'm in favor of it, in retrospect. But at the time I wrote columns saying that it was an opportunity that, you know, to use American leverage to try to get a much better deal than what the. And I would just argue that I don't think that the Obama deal in any way got us out of the woods, because what it was relying on was a kind of promise. I mean, like a good deal would have been to basically pursue the policy that we have that we were. What was US Policy up to then? Which is that you can have nuclear power, but you cannot enrich the power in your own country. And that was called a 1, 2, 3 agreement. That was what the United Arab Emirates basically agreed to. It's what a lot of other countries had agreed to. We make an exception to this kind of understanding because of Iran, that it already, as I said, built up a massive industrial kind of enrichment capability. Now, my problem in the simplest terms with the nuclear deal was that it left that massive industrial enrichment capability in place so Iran could become effectively a threshold nuclear power and still be in compliance with what was the Joint Comprehensive Framework, whatever the JCPOA agreement. So that's the issue that we were basically at the end of the process relying on the Iranians to just keep their word, which I think would have been a bad idea.
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B
Well, no, I mean, the deal. The thing about it was. And first of all, I mean, enriching it on their own soil, I don't think was. I mean, that was like a normative thing, right? Like, that wasn't a violation of the NPT per se. But in any event, Obama, I'm agreeing with you. That's all declared. And it was so transparent that, yes, I do think Iran wanted to, for strategic reasons, remain a threshold state. They thought that that might help, for example, you know, defend against Israel, I think. And although I can't read their mind, who knows what they wanted? But the point is, we would know if they were breaking out and went on a headlong rush thanks to the Obama deal, we would have known, and it would have been months and months before they could develop an actual nuclear weapon. And you would know.
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C
Even Obama acknowledged at the end of the deal it would be a matter of weeks. So that's not true. Months and months.
- [28:36]
B
Oh, I don't think that's true. To put it on a warhead, to put it on a. Well, anyway, listen.
- [28:43]
C
I mean, this is. It gets a little technical and my head spins from it, too. But I'm saying if you go back and you look at what, the warehouse of archives that the Israelis liberated from downtown Tehran, you find that they had everything in place pretty much. And I don't buy the. I mean, I think that the 2003 assessment, by the way, that they were not. They had chosen to abandon their path for a weapon is based largely on a fatwa from the late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. And I would just point out that they probably would have stayed to it. But the thing about, you know, fatwas and the Shia faith is that they die with the Ayatollah and.
- [29:23]
B
Well, yeah, and maybe you shouldn't have killed him. But anyway, well, okay.
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C
He was like. But my point is that I just think that the plan was to have everything in place and then either become a threshold nuclear net. But this gets to, like, a deeper point, which is that, again, I would like for there only to be one country with nuclear weapons, America. But there's a difference between Israel or England having nuclear weapons versus a country like Iran, which, I mean, you don't
- [29:54]
B
know, this is where I disagree. And I think you have to understand a lot of people do disagree. And I would just say, I would say at a minimum, it's far from evident that there's a clear cut difference between the two. And I would say that I think in general, what we've seen here is that you see such an obvious kind of moral distinction between Iran and Israel that it's just we have no compliance to act as if Iran, we have no obligation to act as if Iran is a normal state. But I, I think you need to at least understand the perspective that that's not obviously true, that if you were like this impartial observer on Mars, I mean, look, like right now you would look down and say, look, wait, Israel is, at the moment, maybe you'll disagree with this terminology, but ethnically cleansing Lebanon, ethnically cleansing Gaza, ethnically cleansing the West Bank, a shitload of violations of international law, they bomb Syria at will even after a friendly regime takes over, and so on. And I would say that if you go back a long way even, and first go over the list of terrible things Iran has done and we go through them all and figure out which ones are well substantiated and which ones aren't or whatever, a lot of people would still go back and say, look, Israel has been committing what used to be considered atrocities for decades, like these assassinations and so on. I'm not even, and I want to emphasize I'm not really taking that view right now. I mean, I think it has its appeal. But my main point is I'm not sure you appreciate how from just a fairly remote vantage point, it's just far from clear, especially in the wake of the last two years, but it's far from clear that Iran is a bad guy and Israel's good guy. Now, I know if you're the average American, you take that for granted. I would argue that that's because our perception of Iran has been mediated by a media in America that is biased. And look, happens all the time. I would say the same thing about the Ukraine, Russia war. Ukraine's our ally, Israel's our ally. This slants our coverage of what.
- [32:24]
C
I'm sorry, there's a lot you've said, okay, go ahead. And I guess I would respond like this. It feels to me like the argument that you're making. And at one point you said, I'm not even saying I. But you're saying a lot of people
- [32:36]
B
are saying, well, for present purposes, I'm Just trying to get you to step back in some ways.
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C
I want to address the people who think that Israel's the bad guy or Israel's the terrorist.
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B
I'm not even saying they're the bad guy. I'm saying it's not self evident to a lot of people, including me, that Iran is a clearly worse actor than Israel. That's not clear to me.
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C
All right, well, it's very clear to me, but let me just explain what I think the error is in your kind of telling of recent history or the current state of things when you talk about, first of all, let's just start with Gaza. Israel withdraws from Gaza in 2005. And as soon as Israel withdraws, there's this one sort of an interim period, there are elections and Hamas wins for the legislature. And then eventually Hamas conducts a kind of coup of the Palestinian Authority presence, the security presence. Well, wait a second, I'm getting to it.
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B
Yeah, okay.
- [33:40]
C
And as soon as Hamas takes control of Gaza, it begins launching a series of rocket wars. And those rocket wars then compel Israel to effectively close its border and try to monitor things that are coming in because they don't want the people, the sovereigns of Gaza to have those rockets. Egypt also closes the border. And in that process, Hamas continues sort of treat the population of Gaza as a kind of human sacrifice because it's more important to Hamas to destroy Israel than to build anything approaching a state for the Palestinians who are so cursed to live under them. And ultimately it culminates in October 7th, which, you know, was a kind of, I would argue, almost a national suicide mission because of the utter brutality of that rape and murder spree in the case of Lebanon, you know, and I think there is room to argue about, you know, the taxes and the strategy and there's all kinds of things. But on just a sort of moral level, it's not that Israel out of the blue is deciding to do that. Israel is responding to hundreds of rockets that are being missiles being fired by Hezbollah. And where do they fire their missiles and rockets from? They fire them from homes. This has been, this has been documented over and over again. But it's basically kind of almost a mafia like operation where they say, you know, we need you to put this in your garage or whatever. And when the time comes, so that, that is a reality that Israel has to deal with. So when they, when they are going in, you know, I don't know how much of the ground for how long that ground force is. But, and I, and I would concede that Israel Katz is a terrible kind of international spokesman for the state of Israel, their defense minister. But, you know, there's a reason why they're going in and they're saying, we've got to make sure that this whole area south of Latani is cleared, because that has been a staging ground for these missile attacks, which basically makes the northern part of the country uninhabitable. You know, so that's. For me, I just think it's. It's kind of a chicken and egg thing, which is to say Iran is committed to destroying Israel.
- [36:00]
B
It's.
- [36:00]
C
It says, I don't think it has the capability of destroying America. It's a, It's a core part of its, of, of the regime's identity. And I'll go one further, which is that I actually think that they are. I mean, I think we've seen, because there's been so many uprisings in Iran, you know, since 1999, but I don't think that what the Islamic Republic offers, which has prioritized its pursuit of revolution and pursuit of the negation of the Jewish state, I think it's an anomaly in Iranian history. I think it's kind of un Iranian. And that's why I don't think that that regime has legitimacy. But that's what Israel is kind of dealing with. So you can understand that it's very different than just a random state having a nuclear weapon. It's a state that is committed to Israel's destruction trying to get a nuclear weapon. And the reason why I would say that the JCPOA was inadequate and a bad deal was because it basically allowed Iran to keep its industrial nuclear industry. It allowed Iran. It lifted any sanctions. So they were allowed to build up their conventional missiles, which go hand in hand with the threat of a nuclear weapon. And it infused it with cash, with all the sanctions relief, plus the cash bribe for the release of dual national Americans who had been unfairly held in Iranian jails. So it's like, that's why I don't want Iran to get a nuclear weapon, because the nature of that regime is very different than these other. Now there are foreign policy realists, that's a school of thought, as you know, who think that the ideology or of a particular government or regime is immaterial. States pursue their interests. I don't buy that. I just think that. That. I think there's a huge difference between a state that is organized like Iran is today versus a kind of a normal nation state. So that's how I would put it
- [38:06]
A
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- [38:37]
B
okay, a couple of things. For starters, in your Hamas narrative, when I said you left something out, I would encourage people to find a piece I wrote a couple years ago now, a non zero. I think it's on the right column of the homepage because it was relatively, it had, it was relatively favored by readers or something compared to my other stuff. And it's called the Truth about Hamas. And one thing it details. I'm sure you know, the basics of the story is that before the coup you talked about the, what happened was America said let's hold elections for a Palestinian government.
- [39:16]
C
Yeah. Oh, I see. Okay.
- [39:18]
B
As it happened. Okay, so Hamas won the election. I mean, they didn't win a majority of the vote, but because of the way it worked and various things, they wound up in control of the legislature. And it was very, it was, I wasn't, it was kind of a quasi parliamentary balance, you know, system where, where there was, the prime minister was going to have a lot of, you know, the legislature had a lot of power. So. Well, we decided, you know, when we said, we said explicitly, yeah, it's fine for Hamas to run. It's an election. But we didn't say, we didn't say they could win. So once they won, we in effect sponsored a couple against Hamas. And that led to this whole civil war. And there was this moment when it was being the civil war, there was mediation going on in Saudi Arabia when the leaders of Hamas were saying some pretty damn moderate things. The truth is neither the United States nor Israel, I think wanted to follow up on those. So they didn't really get pursued. We'll never know what happened if we had tried at that point to nurture moderate elements. But anyway, I'd encourage people to read the piece, look into that.
- [40:25]
C
Moderate elements of Hamas.
- [40:27]
B
Well, I'm just saying they were saying, they were saying things. They were saying a two state solution was okay. I mean, they weren't. Well, look at what they said. Read my piece.
- [40:36]
C
Okay, I'm happy to look at what they said. But Bob, Bob.
- [40:38]
B
Yeah.
- [40:39]
C
Let me offer a note of comity with a T. It was a massive error on the part of The Bush administration.
- [40:49]
B
Mm.
- [40:49]
C
And also the government of Ariel Sharon. Or maybe it was Ehud Omar when the election happened, Hamas should have never been allowed to run in the elections, full stop. And the reason I would argue they should not have been allowed to run in elections is because they were an armed faction and that we also.
- [41:12]
B
So were the people we supported in the.
- [41:14]
C
Well, okay, but. And then I'll say another thing.
- [41:16]
B
In fact, we gave them some of the arms.
- [41:17]
C
They also shouldn't have run because we knew they were not committed to the democratic crime. And by the way, now that's not a question of speculation. How many elections have there been since then? How many elections has Hamas held? None. So I am not one of these people. There's an argument that Israelis, some Israelis have made, which I disagree with entirely, which is that, well, you know, the people voted for Hamas. I say, no, the people voted for Hamas 20 years ago once, and they haven't had a chance to correct their error. And therefore, I see the Gazans as victims of Hamas. And I've written a couple things on this myself where I've said this is a terrible situation for the average Gazan because they're double victims of both Hamas and the Israeli war. So I think that the empathy that we should have for Palestinian suffering should compel you to pursue real regime change. And one of the problems with the war, fight the wars, the rocket wars that led up to October 7th is that they were always. The theory of the Israelis was that we would just hit a bunch of things and bomb them, and that would be a deterrent. I don't think you deter, you know, religious fanatics, authoritarian fanatics, that way. I think that especially since for them, and at least in terms of the battle space of public opinion or narrative battle space, the suffering of the people they purport to rule is a bonus, and we know this of how they decide, how they have chosen to fight, and how they have built the tunnel networks that they don't allow their citizens to entry into, you know, after they conduct the horrors of October 7th. So my point here is only to say that we are in agreement insofar as they should have never been allowed to run an election. They're anti democratic forces.
- [43:17]
B
No, I didn't say that was my view. So we're not necessarily in agreement there. I think if you're gonna have an election, the outcome should be respected and you should give the winner a chance to rule and see whether they're gonna deliver on their promise to rule decently. We didn't Give a vote.
- [43:30]
C
Let me put it like this. I agree that the Bush administration created a problem, and they should have. The mistake was allowing Hamas to run in the election. Election. I think the mistake in general was thinking that there was a way to moderate political Islam by allowing political Islamists to have power. I think we have to just come to terms that, like, political Islam is. And I hope that at the end of this conflict with Iran, there is no more Islamic Republic in that country and it is relegated to the thus bit of history. But I think we have to, like, recognize that the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam as a movement is a vicious and foul ideology that really does deserve to be, you know, in the same, you know, landfill as communism, Nazism, et cetera. And that's really. I think it's. I think that was a big delusion. And I remember coming on the show after I was, like, in Egypt, and I remember saying, like, you know, because I'd met, you know, under Hosimu Barak, the old dictator, I'd met members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and they were charming, they spoke English, they understood politics. There were a lot of things I liked about the moderates that I met. And then if you, you know, kind of continue to follow the story, what you found is none of those moderates were part of what happened once they finally won an election. No, they were going full steam ahead. So my point is that we have to just understand that political Islam, the. The ideology of Sayyid Qutb and Hassan Al Banna, you know, has run its course. And we really need to kind of move on. And we've already seen the Gulf monarchies have moved on. You know, I hope the Egyptians will move on. I think they basically have. Although it's not a democratic country under Sisi, but
- [45:16]
B
could have been, but we didn't.
- [45:18]
C
Yeah, but that's the problem. This is the hustle. This is the scam that the Islamists play. They pretend when they're out of power to, like, democracy, and then once they get power, they hate them.
- [45:30]
B
We can't have that argument. But I certainly don't think the problem with Egypt before the coup that we implicitly supported, I certainly don't think the problem was that the Muslim Brotherhood leader was showing that he just couldn't live with democratic constraints. But in any event, let me. So. Okay, okay.
- [45:51]
C
I don't wanna get it. Yes, he was. He was absolutely.
- [45:53]
B
Okay, I'll let you say yes, he was. And that'll be. That's worth the. The. So we've been doing this for close to 50 minutes. Now we're going to go into overtime. This is the. You know, that's available to paid subscribers to the Non Zero newsletter. Before we do that, I want to do a couple of things. Well, three things, probably. I want to remind people that your stuff can be found at the Free Press, which I am not going to call a Barry Weiss propaganda outfit because that would be totally unlike me to treat any guest with that kind of discourtesy. Okay, so do I get credit for not saying that?
- [46:29]
C
You sort of said it, but okay.
- [46:33]
B
Actually, that reminds me, we could talk about her in overtime. Let me write that down. The. The also end your podcast, Breaking History.
- [46:42]
C
Yes. Where it's. It's not a we. We're. We're filling in with some interviews, but when we get back to our regular seasons, we're gonna do two seasons. It's a narrative podcast, so it's.
- [46:51]
B
I do a lot of. It was very highly produced under its previous name, which I forget. But anyway, it's back and there's a. People can check out your conversation with Andrew Sullivan. It appeared on his podcast, but on his podcast you run into a paywall. It's kind of like this podcast, except you run into it earlier. You, in contrast, pirated the entire thing and put it on your feed.
- [47:14]
C
Well, with the blessing of Andrew. Okay, yes.
- [47:18]
B
So then the other thing I wanted to do is I'm gonna. I'm gonna give a. A few kind of bullet point replies largely by way of foreshadowing what I want to pursue in overtime, then give you a chance to do your bullet point replies. To my bullet point replies, I reserve the right to say, okay, that bullet points over in the middle of your bullet points. If they start seeming like paragraphs.
- [47:41]
C
Fair enough.
- [47:43]
B
Okay, so let me say I was delighted to hear you say, use the phrase chicken and egg. It's kind of a chicken and egg thing. I may have not understood the context, but I think that is true of this whole thing. Israel, Palestine, and so on. If you're trying to say, well, one guy is the bad guy and the other is the good guy, it just depends on where you start the history. Because both sides, whenever you say you did this horrible thing, they can say, okay, but right before that you did this horrible thing. And it really is a question of where you. You start this story. I think the same, much the same can be said between Iran is. And Israel. You. You, I think don't. But that's something I will pursue. Quick point on Lebanon. This is a little Maybe a little cheap, but. But there, there, in addition to invading, you've probably read or familiar with the book Rise and Kill by Ronan. Is it Bergman?
- [48:44]
C
Yes.
- [48:44]
B
You know, it's just because you. I say this only because, you know, you make a big deal of all of this horrible stuff Iran has done. One thing Israel did was they started this campaign. They created this fake group that was supposedly a Lebanese group of some kind. And then Israel, like, they would, like, plant a bomb that would go off in a parked car and kill people and attribute it to this group. Then this fake group would come out and say, we did this. No, Israel did it. And I'm just saying, like, you got to go back.
- [49:21]
C
I'm not familiar with that part of the book. I haven't read in a while, but I'll.
- [49:25]
B
Oh, you should check it out. Well, the issue I want to get to about Hamas ultimately is. Well, the generic issue I want to get to is the meaning of the term proxy. I mean, Trump has talked as if Iran. I think he thinks. I mean, who knows what's going on in Trump's train? I think he thinks Iran actually did October 7th. Like, it was Iranian troops, I think October 7th. Well, let me just say the generic point is that prox, you know, proxies always have an agenda of their own that, you know, is what largely motivates them. There is some convergence of interest with their sponsor, and sometimes they do things at the behest of their sponsor, but sometimes they just do things because they want to do them and there's. And their sponsor maybe doesn't try to stop them or whatever. And I think there's a tendency to, on your side of the argument, Eli, to look at everything Hezbollah or Hamas has ever done and treat it as if it were an Iranian initiative when it's not always. And I think that's an important thing to keep in mind. You mentioned, you said, you know, Iran is. They're religious fanatics. Well, a lot of people would just say, well, wait, look at the current Israeli cabinet. Come on, this is getting out of hand. You have true crazy religious fanatics, Ben GVIR Schmotrick, and. And they're doing horrible things. That would at least be the reply. Anything else in my. Well, I think there's an issue of kind of essential. I am more optimistic about the, the chances of changing the character of any political group over time than you are, but that's philosophical. Okay, sorry. Do. Do your bullet points quick.
- [51:16]
C
Bullet points. Okay. I, I know it's the case in Lebanon, but I think it's also the case in Gaza that there is. Israel has found and killed pretty senior Revolutionary Guard Corps officers who were there kind of giving on the ground guidance and then also the weaponry.
- [51:38]
B
Wait, you mean guiding October 7th?
- [51:40]
C
Well, I'm just talking about. You have a pretty. It's not just a. You know, we write a check every year.
- [51:48]
B
No, it's a true. It's a true. Yeah, right.
- [51:50]
C
Okay. Okay.
- [51:51]
B
It's a true sponsor, you know.
- [51:53]
C
Right.
- [51:54]
B
In the sense that America, Israel is sponsor, client, kind of. But they do shit we don't want them to do.
- [52:00]
C
Go ahead again, because the non 0 formerly blogging heads is not a television debate show where everybody just kind of. I will concede that what we basically know is that the planning for October 7th was, I think, largely kept in house and was a surprise to I think even Hamas leadership who were in Qatar. Although that may change as we like, learn more. But my understanding is that that is the understanding now. But I'm less inclined to. I see your point that sometimes proxies can do things without the knowledge. I mean, so I concede that. I mean, I don't think Khamenei knew that October 7th was in the offing, but they certainly celebrated. But more importantly, I mean, like, Hamas would not have the ability to do that had it not been for years and years and years of nurturing, guidance, et cetera, from Iran.
- [53:00]
B
Okay.
- [53:00]
C
And then Ben GVIR and Smotrek. Okay, yeah, there's a. Let me just say there's very. There's very important difference. I'm not going to defend Ben GVIR and Smotrek who have important positions in the Israeli cabinet. I've said this many times before. I think they are Judeo fascists in the same sense. But the difference is that there was a. Israel has elections. That Israel's government can change Iran for. They have kind of elections, but they don't really matter because the power resides with the supreme Leader. Even their parliament, their majlis can be overruled by a council of experts, the Guardian Council. And there is a much longer kind of history that if you read Khomeini's book Islamic Governance, that, you know, the structure of the Iranian regime is such that there was no opportunity for somebody who might be more moderate on these issues to gain actual control over their armed forces, Revolutionary Guard Corps, et cetera. So that's where I think that your analogy fails.
- [54:10]
B
Okay. With that, we can head into overdrive. I want to discuss this, the question and the higher level, more abstract version of that is like, is Iran or is it not a rational actor? In a way, I think.
- [54:26]
C
Yeah, I saw you wrote something on this, and I. Yeah. All right, so why don't you start off and make your.
- [54:30]
B
Okay, so thanks, everybody who stuck with us this far. The way you can listen to the rest of this is by becoming a paid subscriber to the Non zero newsletter. And, yeah, now we can continue. Where should we begin? It's too bad there's so much to talk about because I'd also like to talk about this current state of play in the war, but because we should say, I mean, we're taping this, who knows where Trump, where we're going to be in 36 hours, depending on Trump's commitment to his latest deadline. You know, it seems to me in many ways Iran has been a very carefully calculating, rational actor. Again, it's far from clear to me that a kind of a viewer from Mars would go, oh, yeah, Iran's the country that's out of control. I mean, as you may recall, when we assassinated Suleimani, the response was, you know, they kind of, they lobbed missiles over to a base, made sure they, I think, indirectly gave us a heads up so there wouldn't be any soldiers there and didn't kill anybody. They did much the thing, and I think some in Iran now regret this, but they were similarly moderate in response even to the June thing. Now, of course, in response to the Israeli attack in June, you know, they fought, they fired missiles toward Israel, as I think, you know, any country would have. But as far as America, even after America joined in the bombing, and perhaps because America didn't actually kill anybody, I don't know, but they can find their response to another pretty tepid response, almost designed not to kill anybody or anything, you know, a few missiles toward a military base. And in general, I would say, even in the current war, given especially how degraded you might think their command and control structure is, by now, they've, you know, it seems to me there has been a clear logic behind the escalation. It hasn't been, okay, this is it, we're going to blow our top. It's not like Trump. It's like, you know, the, okay, you're going to hit this kind of target, we're going to hit that kind of day. It's been very graduated. So I don't know where, and I would say, and this is another case where we get into the kind of chicken and egg or where do you want to start? But again, neither of US thinks that October 7th was an Iranian initiative. It was something done by, by a client or whatever you want to call it, of, of Iran's. And in general, I would say, I think if you look at Hezbollah and Hamas for the most part over the last decades, you know, whenever there's been an escalation, each side has had a plausible story about what, who started it and who escalated too much and so on. It's pretty damn rare, I think, that, that if you look at it closely, just, oh, out of the blue, missiles started coming into Israel. I mean, sometimes it would be a response to what was considered a really unwarranted infringement on say, Palestinian rights at the Dome of the Rock or something. But it's pretty rare, you know, that it was truly gratuitous. Again, I mean, October 7th was its own thing, but that we don't think that was Iranian sponsored. So I'm kind of hard pressed to see. I mean, again, you can on both sides point to these seemingly atrocious things, assassinations, car bombs, killing civilians. But I don't, it's just not clear to me what is the basis for saying that Iran is this irrational actor. And of course this is in the context of the question of nuclear arms. I don't welcome them getting a nuclear weapon, but the, the assumption seems to be that if they had one, the first thing they do is blow up Israel, which I think is crazy. They wouldn't.
- [58:42]
C
Well, I think to answer the last question first, but it gets to the point you were trying to make, which is that Iran had, and let's, you know, with you mentioned Qasem Soleimani, I mean what he'd done is he built up a massive network of these proxy militias whose sole purpose was to, or it's, its prime directive was to try to destroy Israel.
- [59:09]
B
I disagree with that, but go ahead.
- [59:11]
C
Okay, but what I'm saying is that I don't think that they, that like Hezbollah, the Houthis, the Iraqi, well, the Iraqi militia is a little different, but you know, because they, they, they were Iran, Iran was working with the Iraqi militias from the very beginning of the Iraq war. But then they really kind of go in overdrive because of isis. But all of these groups, I mean, I'm just saying if you look at Hezbollah, Hezbollah does not care about Lebanon. They are, their, their, their prime directive is, is attacking and destroying Israel. And in the process it became more powerful than any other faction within Lebanon. Thankfully, that's not the case right now. So they, they had the ability and they've done it many times to bring Lebanon into war, even though the rest of Lebanon would not want to provoke a powerful neighbor in Israel. Ditto for October 7th. Now, again, we are agreeing that it's not like Iran gave the order for October 7, but that it, the, the, the, the little demon machine that had built, that helped nurture and build in Hamas and Hezbollah and everything, that was sort of the purpose of these things. They're like little windup toys. So we didn't know when they were going to go off. We didn't know when they were going to do it, but they, that was what they were doing. So that's why I look at it as the Iran, Iran itself. And by the way, you see this with the democratic movement inside of Iran. One of the slogans that you started seeing even going back to the mid 2010s was I, you know, for Iran, not for Gaza, not for Lebanon, but for Iran. Which is like the idea being that this is a regime that has used its wealth and used its power and used and endangered and brought misery to its population and endured sanctions because it is pursuing this kind of crazy fantasy goal of an Islamic revolution and destroying Israel. And that is why I don't want them to get a nuclear weapon, among other things. But that's why I consider Iran to be the aggressor in all this, because that's the key fact. Israel does not sponsor militias that do cross border raids into Iran. That's just not a thing. I mean, there is an old relationship between Israel and the Iraqi Kurds, but that's not the same thing.
- [61:35]
B
And they've been assassinating people in Iran forever. Nuclear scientists. I mean, what's the, what's the huge difference?
- [61:41]
C
Because they don't want Iran to get a nuclear weapon. That's exactly right.
- [61:44]
B
Well, I mean, whoever is, you know, shooting, they all have their motivation.
- [61:50]
C
But you could, whatever that, that's the
- [61:55]
B
point is that, like, you identify with Israel's motivation. You think it is critical to assassinate Israeli nuclear scientists, just as people in Hamas think it's critical to fire rockets into Israel. Whatever you think. I mean, this is, See, this is the value of international law is it's in this respect, impartial. It just says these things you can't do. Okay, we don't need to like, do the, do all of this grievance assessment. It's just you can't do it and both of them are doing it. And you know, but I don't, I
- [62:35]
C
don't really see what international law has to do with it because again, Iran doesn't care about international law. This is not, it's not saying Israel does.
- [62:44]
B
Who does? Israel does. No, you're not going to say that
- [62:48]
C
Israel, Israel cares about, you know, Israel, I think believes that the United nations is a, is a kind of hopeless institution at this point, as I do. And I think most Americans probably leave the institution aside.
- [63:00]
B
Transporter aggression is a thing. They just did it and they do it all the time.
- [63:05]
C
Well, but I'm. Why did they do it? Why do they do it? They did it because, because Iran has, has had a single mission. It is supported these militias with a single mission to destroy the state. And it was pursuing nuclear weapons. And eventually what's, that's going to, you know, Israel has a choice. It can follow international law and do nothing and hope negotiations work out and trust the promises of the Ayatollah and that you get to keep, you know, the capability to build an industrial sized nuclear weapons program. But we accept your promise not to do it. It could do that and then cease to exist or it could decide to deal with the threat. And I think that in that respect, even though of course October 7th is a horrible tragedy and if I could go back in time and prevent it, of course I would. But October 7, I think was the kind of a clarifying event for Israel in the sense that it was like, all right, you know, they, you know, as if we didn't get the message before they mean it, they want to destroy us. And so in part, now I think there's also a thing here too. Iran knows it sponsors Hamas. Right, Bob? It could have the way that at least the Khatami president did after 9 11. And we saw a number of Iranians who happen to be very Pro American after 911 express remorse for the terrorist attack. It could have said after October 7. This is not what we have in mind. We're announcing that we're cutting off all funds to Hamas. We don't believe that this kind of thing is acceptable. They could have done that.
- [64:37]
B
And I think it's not what they had in mind. But a lot of times allies don't say things. European allies aren't saying the actual truth about how they feel about Trump launching this war. Happens all the time. But let me say.
- [64:50]
C
Okay, so what I'm saying is that, I'm saying you gotta get back to the driving kind of purpose of the Iranian regime. Okay, I question which is not to build a prosperous Iran in. It's not to make Iran a great country, which it should be because of its resources. The talent of its people, its rich tradition, et cetera, it's to destroy Israel. It's death to America. And in that respect, it's like it practices a kind of proxy imperialism. And that's what I'm getting at. So it's like that's what they want to do. So that once you understand that, then you understand why Israel would take such extreme measures to make sure Iran does not have a nuclear weapon. This episode is presented by JP Morgan Chase. For over 225 years, JPMorgan Chase has believed one of the greatest investments they've ever made is in America. Because this country's value lies in its people progress and potential. Now, through their security and Resiliency Initiative, JPMorgan Chase has announced a 1.5 trillion dollar 10 year plan to support the infrastructure of American possibility and help strengthen the energy grids and supply chains that drive American ambition and the manufacturing that builds legacy. They're investing in the AI and quantum computing that create progress and in the defense and cybersecurity that protects it all. By supporting these critical industries, JPMorgan Chase is helping to see secure the future and fuel intervention across the country. Because when companies like JPMorgan Chase invest in America, they know the returns are limitless. Learn more about their impact@jpmorganchase.com America well,
- [66:40]
B
I understand that Israel believes that and that actually leads to something that I think is important. And I would like to now step back and spend some time just kind of giving you Iran's side of the story, so to speak, or the side that would have to be added to what you've been saying to yield what I think would be a more kind of objective perspective about how things are perceived on the other side. So first of all, I assume you will agree that one thing that happens not infrequently in world affairs is that one nation sees things another does, whether in the way of military preparation or even actual attack, and attributes entirely offensive motivation to it. When from the point of view of that side of that nation, there is at least some degree of defensive motivation. And, and I, I assume one thing you'll, one case that you'll agree fits that model is that I assume you'll say a, Israel thinks that the war, what it is doing now in Iran, which looks to me like trying to induce state collapse, it includes bombing civilian infrastructure, it's several thousand civilians have been killed and so on. I believe the average Israeli believes that is ultimately defensive. But Eli, surely you can see how many, many people in Iran would refuse to believe that this is a sheerly defensive measure. Do you just. I don't want to argue about what it is. I just want to say you acknowledge that A, this is a common theme in geopolitics, this asymmetry of perception and that B, the current war is probably a good example of it. Right.
- [68:19]
C
Well, let me just say about state collapse.
- [68:24]
B
Okay, but forget that. I withdraw that. No, no, I want to get you to address the point. I withdraw state collapse. I'm just saying can you see how the, a lot of Iranians would look at what's happening and say, you can't tell me this is defensive? Are you kidding?
- [68:40]
C
I think a lot of Iranian, of the Iranian people are delighted that the, their oppressors are finally getting what's been owed to them. I think that, I think the Iranian regime, I think they're propagandists. Like.
- [68:54]
B
Okay, so you don't concede the point.
- [68:56]
C
Probably would, would, would, would say that, you know, okay, I don't know, Israel's a pedophile cult, that is, that wants nothing.
- [69:04]
B
But let me ask you this. So you don't, you, you just don't see any kind of plausibility to a perception that is certainly widespread in some parts of the world that this just couldn't be a surely defensive operation on Israel's part. It's just, it's just too, it's an onslaught. It was unprovoked, ostensibly, at least and. Okay, you don't buy that. Okay, fine.
- [69:29]
C
Well, no, no, I, you, I, I concede because I have eyes to see and ears to listen that lots of people, including in America think that America and Israel are the aggressors in the war and Iran is a victim of this aggression. I mean, sure. So people think that.
- [69:49]
B
And it happens a lot, right? I mean, in, in, in, you know, World War I was a good example. I think both sides saw the preparation, military preparations as offensive in nature. Both sides saw the preparations they were making as largely defensive. It happens a lot. But what I want to say is I'm going to give an Iranian side of the story that I think in my mind helps me understand how they could view a lot of the things that they do that are called offensive as defensive. You said death to America. And they of course, famously, Iran backed militias in Iraq have killed American soldiers and so on. So let's, you know, I'll just, you know, most of this stuff and a lot of people do, but just to kind of put it in one place, so to speak, you know, in 1953, Britain and the US play some role in supporting a coup that opposes a democratically elected.
- [70:53]
C
I'm gonna. I wanna finish, but I'm gonna check in on that. Okay.
- [70:57]
B
Didn't America. You're going to say America didn't support it, or.
- [71:02]
C
There was something called Operation Ajax. There was a CIA officer by the name of Kermit Roosevelt.
- [71:06]
B
Okay.
- [71:07]
C
He did go to Tehran, and he wrote a book the same year as the 1979 revolution that claimed credit for saving the Pahlavi dynasty. But his. He's an unreliable narrator.
- [71:23]
B
Okay.
- [71:23]
C
And the historians. No, no, no, no. I want to. This is a very important point.
- [71:27]
B
But the main point is the Iranians believe it. Okay?
- [71:29]
C
No, no, no, no, no, no. In fact, the people who run Iran right now, because I believe in 1979, Khomeini and his goons stole the revolution, which was much broader than the Islamists who ended up seizing power. But at the time, the reason why Mohammad Mo was eventually forced to relinquish the presidency was because the speaker of the Majlis, who was also the Grand Ayatollah in Qom, named Ayatollah Khashani, he turned on Mosaddegh. He was part of a nationalist alliance, and he withdrew his support. And why did he withdraw his support? Because as the president of Iran, Mossadegh was dangerously consolidating power to the point where he dissolved the Majlis itself. He'd fired the Supreme Court. He purged the military of its generals. And this gets into the weeds a little bit. But the Iranian constitution in 1953 had a role for the Shah. And the Shah was technically supposed to appoint the prime minister and had the power to fire the prime minister. What effectively Roosevelt did was Two things. The CIA, part of the MI6. What they did is they. They had a pressure campaign on a very reluctant shah that was almost exiled himself and asked him to exercise his constitutional prerogative and fire Mossadegh because all of his. Many of Mosadda's supporters were terrified that they had kind of created this monster. And I have a great respect for Mossadegh, I should say, for most of his career as a reformer in Iranian politics. But when he gets power and he ends up nationalizing the oil, which I think was a good thing for him to do, but after that, he is faced with a kind of British boycott and takes a series of incredibly undemocratic actions which alienate his own natural coalition. So the idea that it's outside 53.
- [73:30]
B
Eli. I'm just going to stipulate that I commit myself to go learn more about this.
- [73:36]
C
May I recommend a book by Ray Takei? Call him. Sure. I know I've read the Other side of it, the Kurtzer book, and there are a lot of people who've written it, but I'm just saying that I've dive on this over the years.
- [73:47]
B
Let's skip it and pick up the narrative later, which is the US So the Shah is ushered in via this coup. The US Is a big supporter of the Shah. The Shah, you will agree, was brutally oppressive, right? His secret police, the Savak, tortured people and so on and on, blah, blah, blah.
- [74:02]
C
And the rebel, you're yada yada over a couple things that I just want to make.
- [74:07]
B
Well, I can't. Okay, but let me finish.
- [74:08]
C
No, no, no. I'm not going to spend a lot of time on it, but I just want to spend.
- [74:10]
B
No, don't spend any. Okay, just tell me at the end what I got wrong.
- [74:13]
C
Okay, fair enough.
- [74:14]
B
Because the Savak. I talked to Iranians at the time who were terrified of the SAVAK in the late 70s.
- [74:20]
C
I'm not going to disagree. The SAVAK was a brutal organization and
- [74:23]
B
the Savak were the Shah's people. The Shah was supported by America. That definitely became part of the Iranian narrative after the revolution. You know, they of course took some people hostage in the embassy, some students or quote students, I don't know what which. It happened. It wasn't totally gratuitous. They had their demands. I mean, we had given safe harbor to the Shah for one thing. They wanted the Shah back. I don't support hostage taking to get people returned to your country. Although I'd actually, just as a thought experiment, which again, I want to put in parentheses, don't want to respond to. Now I wonder if, you know, if the coup had magically ensued a few weeks ago and the Iranian people had deposed Khomeini and he took refug in Russia and some. Some Iranians took hostages in the Russian embassy and demanded that he be returned. I wonder how many. How many Americans, possibly including you, Eli, would. Would really object to that in a big way. But in any event, that was. So it wasn't a totally gratuitous thing. Let's just take some. And, and. And I would just say death to America didn't come out of nowhere. Moreover, as you know, the Iraq war starts. Iraq invades Iran shortly after the revolution. America supports Iraq and.
- [75:45]
C
And Iran later.
- [75:47]
B
Well, kind of. But on balance, selling.
- [75:50]
C
Selling Iran.
- [75:51]
B
We. We.
- [75:51]
C
The TOW missiles were given to Iran specifically because they couldn't have. They needed anti tank and anti aircraft weaponry. I mean, that's absolutely true.
- [76:01]
B
Again, the.
- [76:02]
C
Okay, no, I'm not, I'm not denying it. Yes, Saddam was supported Iran.
- [76:07]
B
In any event, the Iranian narrative is what matters as much as anything. So they go and meanwhile, yeah, Iran is doing stuff now that America is the enemy. We all know about the barracks bombing in Lebanon, blah, blah, blah. But you get up to the Bush administration and after 9, 11, the Iranians are actually helping us with the, our invasion of Afghanistan. Of course it's out of common interest. They don't like the Taliban or whatever it was, but clearly we saw the potential. And yet within a couple, you know, for alliance out of common interest or cooperation, within a couple of months of that, I'm sure, much to their surprise. In fact, reportedly much to their surprise, Bush declares Iran part of the axis of evil right before invading and occupying Iraq. Now if you're Iran and there's this history and, and right before the war, Bush says we're, you know, Iran is like, there's two countries in the Middle east that are part of the acts of evil, Iran and Iraq, and they invade and occupy Iraq, which is your next door neighbor. Yeah. If you're Iran and you're a rational actor, you do whatever the fuck you can do to get America out of Iraq. And if it includes sponsoring Shia militias who blow up American soldiers, that's what I would say pretty much any rational actor could do. So it's like these things you associate with religious fanaticism, like death to America. It's true that you've got an Islamist regime, you've got a religious regime, they're going to be put in religious terms, but they didn't come out of nowhere, they didn't come out of the Quran or something. And you know, why would it, I
- [77:53]
C
mean, death to America couldn't come out of the karate. It was written in the, in the, in the 8th century. I mean, of course it didn't come out of the Quran. Okay, okay, then we agree.
- [78:02]
B
But my point is, my point is I'm still waiting to see a reason that Iran shouldn't be considered a kind of fundamentally rational actor. Which is the premise of this war kind of is like not only, not only can they not be allowed to have nuclear weapons, but they can't be allowed to have a ballistic missile arsenal. I mean, as you know, Eli, this is the reason, a big part of the reason that Bush got out of the deal. He wanted something longer and stronger. Stronger meaning we don't just limit nuclear weapons, we limit ballistic missiles because these guys are crazy. Actually there's no evidence that they use their ballistic missiles in a crazy way or a suicidal way or anything else. So I, I, and you know, they're
- [78:54]
C
firing ballistic missiles at hotels and I mean any number of energy facilities and so forth.
- [79:00]
B
But well, how much civilian infrastructure, how many residences has, has Israel destroyed in Gaza, in Iran? Well, I mean, come on.
- [79:08]
C
Okay, let's take that in a couple ways. I would argue that you still had in Iran they played a double game, which is to say that the families of Bin Laden and Zawahiri did escape to Iran and they harbored Saif Al Adel who was able to kind of orchestrate some of the activities for Al Qaeda in Iraq. They had a kind of on off relationship at times and they were interested in, I think if you look at the other things that those Shia militias did, in addition to going after the United States, they also fomented, you know, a kind of sectarian civil war and a lot of what the worst of
- [80:01]
B
the, which we did in Syria, I
- [80:03]
C
mean, you know, that's, no, what I'm saying is that you had an opportunity in Iraq had Iran not played the kind of role that did to come to some sort of, you know, accommodation under a new. And, and there was a bit of quiet after the success of the counterinsurgency in the late 2000s. But the point is that I think Iran was much more interested in, you know, kind of taking, using the opportunity of the Iraq war not, not for their own defensive purposes because they were afraid of the axis of evil speech and the evil Americans. They, they were interested in becoming the regional hegemon.
- [80:47]
B
And as Israel is right, you would
- [80:49]
C
agree, Israel wants to become. Let's, let's, let's, let's, let's table that for just a second. So that, and that is custom. Soleimani said this himself. This was his entire strategy in this period. So it wasn't. And, and then we saw that they went well beyond Iraq. They went to Yemen, they went, they went to, you know, of course they continued and doubled down in Lebanon. They then become the, the sort of, along with Russia, they prop up Bashar Al Assad after, you know, he's, you know, in a war that slaughtered hundreds of thousands of civilians where, you know, Assad uses chemical weapons. I mean, you've got a pretty awful actor that is, I think, motivated by far more than just simply, you know, their concern that they might be next on the axis of evil list. Or something. Add to that another factor, which is that I want to get to what, your point about rationality. I think that Iran is rational within the context of its revolutionary agenda. It makes rational decisions. It has very. I mean, Soleimani was a widely respected by America's best generals as a really brilliant military thinker and planner. So there's a rationality to it, but it's a rationality to what end? You know, Vladimir Lenin was a rational person, and so was Joseph Stalin, but they were rational to, again, what end? And so that's, to me, the important distinction, which is that it's not that Iran just wants to be left alone, that Iran just doesn't want to be invaded. Iran doesn't, you know, it's that Iran wants to spread this Islamic revolution because it is committed to this ideology. So that would be my response there. And if I could just make a brief point on the Shah, because I think it's lost, I would agree with you that the savak, for a lot of its history, was brutal. And I don't want. So I'm not denying any of that. And let's add to. Among his other many sins is that there was a vast chasm between the elites and the rest of the country. So there was a huge wealth gap. And, you know, Muhammad Reza Shah was, you know, notorious for living a luxurious and good life, but he also was responsible for a lot of reforms that basically ended, you know, the peasantry sort of, you know, the arrangement for a lot of the rural farmers. I mean, he enabled for the first time in Iran's history really, for people to own their own land and get out of kind of, you know, subsistence poverty. He introduced women's rights. He introduced literacy programs. That's not an excuse. I'm not making an excuse. I think that you got to take the good and take the bad. But Khomeini himself, as a figure in Iranian politics, you know, for the entire reign of the Pahlavi, you know, for most of the time, he's agitating against women's suffrage. He's agitating against the land reform. He's what was known as the white revolution. And that's ultimately what got him exiled, was his.
- [84:06]
B
I'm not making a brief either against the Shah on behalf of Khomeini. I'm talking about the role, how America came to play this role in the Iranian.
- [84:16]
C
But that said, I will say that in 1979, the Shah was hated and he was seen as an American client. So I think initially you're correct. What's interesting to me is that today, if you look at some of these protests in Iran that have been in the last few years, you find people sounding Javid Shah. Javid Shah. Because the situation in Iran is so bad, they want to go back to whatever was before it. That's not a scientific poll. There was one that was conducted in 2024 which showed that one of the most popular of all the people who were asked in the survey by a fairly serious group, although you can trust polls in Iran. But it's interesting that Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed shah, got, I think, 17% or 20%, whereas no other figure was. Every other figure was at the single digits. That was interesting. But again, that to me is not data that he should lead. And I wrote a very long piece with a free press kind of a profile of him that sort of questioned whether he could do it. But my point going back to it is that the situation now is such that where not in 1979 when there, I think, was widespread popular support for getting rid of the shah, where in 2026, where I believe that the vast majority of the country with the, I'd say there's a 20% kind of group that still supports the regime, everybody else sees that it's led to ruin. And that is the story. Another part of the story of the Obama diplomacy was that they were promised this infusion of cash and they were hoping they were going to get prosperity. And, you know, that's the moment that Iran decides to enter the Syrian civil war on the side of Assad. That's the moment.
- [86:01]
B
And we entered the civil. We funneled arms into that and turned it. But okay, so let me just say a couple of things in response to that. I mean, as for the deal, per se, of course, even the deal didn't provide full sanctions relief. In any event, I think we kind of slow walk some of the reliefs that was supposed to happen. And in any event, of course, Trump got out of it pretty soon, so we'll never know. And I will say this is one of, I think many times we have undermined Iranian moderates. I think you'll agree the moderates supported that deal and we undermined them. I think maybe you won't agree with this part by seeing to it that the deal just didn't work out. Out.
- [86:44]
C
Can I, can I respond to that? Because I think quickly, please. Because I want to get very aggressive very quickly. I've been to Iran once. It was the end of 2002, on the eve of the Iraq War I. This was Doran Khatami, who was the only reformer president they've ever had. And I witnessed, well, I should say I watched on Iranian television, but I was there with a lot of the student opposition at the time and I saw the show trials that were broadcast throughout the country of Khatami's closest advisors. So I would argue that the reformers, the people who might have been moderating, were purged long before we had Obama and his deal and Javad Zarif and Hassan Rouhani. I would never call them moderate. What I would call them are pragmatists. And they just had a different theory as to how to advance like Iran's regional and Islamist.
- [87:36]
B
Yeah. Underlying this is kind of differing views on how possible it is for the character of any regime or any group of people to slowly change over time. And I think we just remember in
- [87:48]
C
2009 the protests were because they'd stolen the election for Ahmadinejad, who at the time was a hardliner, oddly has now emerged as one of the fiercest kind of critics of the regime. To give you a sense of how bad things have turned. But every. The times in which people, the Iranian people wanted to kind of inject reform minded, more moderate people into the system, at every time they were kind of turned away and purged out of it. So that's what that just, I think is very important point to make about
- [88:19]
B
the character of the regime. I just think I can point to a lot of times, well, in the history of Israel's interaction with various actors and America's where we could have supported moderates. I certainly think the Iranian nuclear deal was an opportunity. We'll never know for sure what would happen if we had stuck with the commitment.
- [88:43]
C
Let me get off the other side. Executions peaked under Rouhani's presidency, not the other way around. So they killed more people, they hung more people from cranes under Rouhani than they did under.
- [88:57]
B
I don't know the history well enough. I do know that the relative extremists point to what they call the failure of the deal rhetorically to. At the expense of the people that you're saying weren't very moderate but are considered the relative moderates. Now on the, you know, when I, when I, when I said, you know, you said Iran wants to be a regional hegemon, I said Israel wants to be a regional hegemon, you kind of bribed. Let me just say something about that. I think that's a perfect example of what I said, what I meant when I said that you know, one person's defense is from the point of view of their adversary or enemy offense. Now, I think, yeah, they both would like to exert their influence in the region indefinitely. Nations tend to want to do that if it seems possible. But I would say that in both cases, there are particular reasons you would expect them to view that as part of a defensive strategy. In the case of Iran, again, to get back to the Iran Iraq war, it's worth remembering they had basically zero allies, except for Syria. Syria was the one ally. No Arab nation supported them. America was opposed to them. So they had, in the wake of that, which I think you'll agree was a pretty traumatic experience, hundreds of thousands of Iranians were killed.
- [90:23]
C
Horrible work.
- [90:24]
B
And they didn't start the war, so they emerged from that. Yeah, they would like to maximize their regional influence. And if Syria was the only country that gave them any support, they're not going to get too picky about Syria's human rights record. And let's face it, America doesn't get picky. Israel doesn't get picky. We are all.
- [90:42]
C
Fundamental human rights record. What are you talking about, Bob, Come on. That was a horrible, disgusting example of like, massacre after massacre. He's dropping chlorine bombs on villages. You know it and I know it. It's not a matter of like, he
- [90:55]
B
was supporting the Iraq Iran war. So was Iraq.
- [90:58]
C
I think. I think it was. By the way, I'm not like defending our relationship with Iran.
- [91:03]
B
No, I'm not asking you to.
- [91:04]
C
I'm just saying, by the way, the proper way to say it is that after, after the Iran Contra scandal, America was actually arming both sides of the war because of the hostage deal with the Iranians.
- [91:18]
B
You know, in any event, in my view, all Israel, the U.S. i mean, look, Egypt, Egypt, you know, military coup installs Sisi, he right away, to make a point, takes peaceful, purely peaceful, demonstrators, guns down. A thousand kills a thousand.
- [91:42]
C
Yeah.
- [91:42]
B
And the US Is like, you know, life is hard. Is this, Is this, Was this a coup? No, we're not going to deem this a coup. No, come on. We're not. We're just all. We're all, you know, all these powerful nations.
- [91:53]
C
Of course it was a coup. And, but we didn't say it.
- [91:56]
B
The US government refused to say it
- [91:58]
C
because there are legal reasons they can. I understand.
- [92:00]
B
I'm saying. Don't.
- [92:03]
C
600,000 perished in the Syrian civil war, and that did not start, contrary to
- [92:10]
B
some narratives, perished in the civil war. Half of them were killed with weapons. We fucking Provided.
- [92:15]
C
Oh, please, that's not true. But more importantly, the reason that that civil war began was because during the Arab Spring, Syrians got the crazy idea that maybe they should have democracy. And Bashar al Assad, how did he respond? Okay, now.
- [92:29]
B
And he's doubling down, litigate the civil war in Syria. I mean, you know, what is there? He was a brutal dictator. His father was a brutal dictator. All this is true. I'm just explaining how if Iran had, coming out of the Iran Iraq war, said, you know, Syria is the only country that gave us any support in this existential event, that was almost the end of us, but still, we're not going to latch onto them as a safety line because they're really bad guys. Almost no country would have done that. That's all I'm saying. If you want to disagree, hold off on the disagreement. Because my main point is that, like what you call a quest for hegemony, regional hegemony, which, yeah, can fairly be called that, I would say Israel, by almost anyone's reckoning, is currently seeking regional hegemony. I mean, they've just displaced a million Lebanese. We know what happened in. In. Well, leave that aside. In the case of Syria, after a regime took power, the current regime that was, you know, clearly going to be pretty friendly to Israel was willing to be by historical standards. Israel nonetheless took the opportunity to bomb the shit out of Syria just to wipe out any military hardware, because you never know. Flagrant violation of international law. This is what I. This is why people look at Israel.
- [93:56]
C
Well, also, there was. Israel intervened to save a Massacre of the Dragon Ruse podcast.
- [94:01]
B
That was a different matter. That was a different matter to bomb military hardware all over the country. The. The. But my larger point is this is why any, any, you know, everyone looks at Israel and says, well, apparently the current strategy is regional hegemony. Yes, it is. But, Eli, I don't doubt that they view it as a defensive strategy. Seems crazy, but they do. And I'm just saying, I mean, seems crazy to a lot of people, but they do. And when I say they, who knows? I mean, I think most Israeli people view all of this stuff as fundamentally defensive. How cynical is Bibi? To what extent is it like a way to keep him in power? Who knows? I don't know. But I think it's fair to say that a lot of Israelis at the grassroots and elite level consider what seems from a distance to be relentless offense is, in fact, defensive. And I'm willing to concede that. And I'm just saying that's the thing you seem not willing to concede on the part of Iran that all these things. And I'd like to move, if you have time, to the specific death to Israel, they want to destroy Israel line that is related to all this. But this is a big part of my point is that what looks to you like irrationally offensive intent is from the point of view of a lot of Iranians, what is necessary for national security. And I can see that Israel looks at things the same way, crazy as it seems. You know, when you look at what happened in Gaza, I literally find it almost hard to believe that these people think of that as defensive. But I know they do, the Israelis do. So that's what I'm asking of you is like symmetry of perspective. How am I doing?
- [95:50]
C
No, I'll just reject. I know. I mean, we just have a fundamental disagreement here. I just think that the state of Israel is organized around the idea that there should be a Jewish homeland and a safe haven for the Jews. That is its animating kind of. That's its mission statement, if you will. And ever since the first Zionist settlers came to what was then known as Palestine, they have been, you know, the. Not ever since I would say really it starts with Haj Amin al Husseini in 1920. 19. Yeah, 1920. And the Abu, the. Oh God, I'm going to forget the name. But there was a series of riots that kind of invoked. But I mean, listen, the thing with Israel is that from its very inception, from its very founding in 1948, its neighbors have tried to kill it. Now it is in an interesting position at this point where its traditional Arab foes have largely accepted its existence, but sort of taking up that mantle of trying to destroy the Jewish state has been largely Iran. And it's tried to accomplish this through series of proxies to the detriment of its own population. And the only other thing I would correct is you say a lot of Iranians. I don't think most Iranians who have to live under that regime share the enmity towards Israel that its masters do. And that is the point is that it is a revolutionary ideological project. Whereas I would say that Israel basically just wants to have a secure homeland and the world's only Jewish state. Those are two different kinds of things. And from there that's how you kind of explain it now.
- [97:37]
B
But can you.
- [97:38]
C
Is Israel perfect? Does Israel kill civilians in difficult wars? Of course they do civilians.
- [97:44]
B
Are they ethnically cleansing the west bank right now?
- [97:47]
C
Okay, on the ethnic cleansing, because I don't like the idea of, I don't want to dodge that. And I recently saw somebody sort of make this point about, oh, you know, people who defend Israel never want to talk about the West Bank. I think what we're seeing in terms of settler violence for the most part is absolutely despicable. And I don't defend it. And I would like to get back
- [98:05]
B
to, well, the state defends it. The state in effect, defends it.
- [98:08]
C
Slow down, slow down, slow down. I would like to get back to what was the status quo of only, I would say, maybe a few years ago where, you know, violent settlers would be tried and punished. And if the fact that they are not being punished right now, I think is a real problem for Israel. So I'm not going to defend the settler violence at this point, but I also think that the activities of the settler violence and they have patrons in the government with Ben GVIR and Smotrick, and I think it's a real moral failing. So in that respect. But I don't really compare that to Gaza. I mean, there are certainly people on the extremes of Israeli politics who think that Israel should resettle Gaza, but I don't think that is going to happen. And certainly that's not what Netanyahu's position is. And I don't think who eventually replaces Netanyahu.
- [99:01]
B
Do you think they're going to let the Gazans back into the 51% or whatever that Israel currently occupies?
- [99:08]
C
I think that's entirely contingent on the dismantlement and disarming of Hamas. I think the problem is that you cannot have. It's like if Hezbollah didn't exist, Israel would not be sending ground forces into Lebanon. The reason that they're there is because of the hundreds of rockets that are being fired every day since this Iran war started. That's why it's happening.
- [99:33]
B
We could get back to how these tit for tats turn into this. I would say that I think it's basically policy of Israel's to engage in disproportionate response. And that makes, you know, conventional structures of deterrence hard. But that's another issue.
- [99:53]
C
Let me, let me get back to. Isn't that is what deterrence is, that you respond disproportionately so it doesn't happen again.
- [100:00]
B
When deterrence works, it often rests on a calibrated incremental escalation on both sides. And Israel's philosophy is kind of they do any, they, they, they, they step over the line, you fucking beat them to death, and eventually they'll just Surrender. I don't think Israel does engage in incremental escalation. No, I don't. I think they're probably disproportionate response.
- [100:28]
C
We've covered a lot of ground. So I have a question for you. You wrote a piece a few weeks ago that you basically made the argument that you hope Iran wins this conflict.
- [100:36]
B
Oh, I didn't put it quite. I mean, what I said was, can I actually. I encourage people to go look at that.
- [100:43]
C
Yeah. Why Americans should root for Iran.
- [100:45]
B
Exactly. Because the short answer, I want to get back to the short answer is I think Iran actually wants after this war to have a stable Middle east more than Israel does. That's what I think. But we can argue about that, and I think that would be better for the world. But, but I want to quickly just, just make. Because at the bottom of all of this is your.
- [101:07]
C
Let me know my objection to that. I don't think Iran wants. Okay. I don't think Iran wants a stable Middle east. And I think that if Iran got a nuclear weapon, it would further destabilize the Middle East.
- [101:17]
B
Well, again, look, them getting a nuclear weapon isn't the issue. If Trump wanted to keep them from having nuclear weapon, he could have done that diplomatically even after he got out of the deal.
- [101:25]
C
Okay, all right, But.
- [101:26]
B
But he didn't. He didn't because he wanted to follow the Israeli longer and stronger. Whatever. So, but, but on this underlying point of Iran wanting the destruction of Israel, now, I, I'm really not an expert on all of the. Everything's been said. I know a couple of things. You know, first of all, I do think there's a tendency in American media to, in general give heavier play to the incendiary things that Iranian leaders say than to the moderating things. So, you know, a kind of example. This. Well, this is. This is a different kind of bias. You know, you're familiar with the famous claim that President Ahmadinejad of Iran, in echoing Khomeini, said Israel must be wiped off the map. I'm sure, you know, that turned out not to be a strictly accurate translation. And I'm not saying the accurate translation is one I would welcome, you know, is a statement I would welcome if I were Israel. I'm not saying it's not threatening Israel, but it is different. And what the actual translation was is the regime. I don't know. First of all, it wasn't Israel the country. It was either the Zionist regime or the regime that occupies Jerusalem or whatever must pass from the pages of Time or something like that. And the main thing I want to say there is like, why don't, why didn't the actual translation in American media ever catch up? Like I just asked perplexity today as an experiment, what has Iran said about the continued existence? And it coughs up this false translation. Israel must be wiped off the map. That's just embedded in the national memory.
- [103:15]
C
I would also say, why are we splitting hairs? Why does it matter?
- [103:20]
B
Let me finish.
- [103:21]
C
Okay.
- [103:22]
B
I also know that Iranian leaders, when they've been pressed, saying like, what do you mean when you say things like this, like the regime must, blah, blah, blah, blah, they say, well, we just mean the regime. And they've even, I think Khomeini said, we're not against a one state solution in which Jews live in peace with Palestinians and so on. That's what they said. Now you may doubt the legitimacy of it, but you know, the, the. So the point I want to make is twofold. First of all, these kinds of qualifying things never catch up with, you know,
- [104:03]
C
why, why are you clinging to this? What? First of all, the pages of crime is like, what, what are we talking about?
- [104:11]
B
Because if, if what they are saying is we do not want a Zionist regime, we want regime change. I object to that if they mean it violently. But I would say Israel has said the same thing about them. We do not want this Islamist regime. And the difference is Israel's actually done something about it. They assassinated the leader, they attacked the country massively. So you tell me what, if you accept what they actually say at face value, which is we want the regime gone, we're opposed to a Zionist regime as I don't endorse that. I don't endorse what Israel just did. But I want you to explain the difference to me between Israel saying we do not want an Islamist regime and we're going to kill everybody in it and then actually doing it, and Iran saying something that seems to me kind of comparable,
- [105:06]
C
I'm like, I don't even know where to begin with this. I mean, Iran has openly stated its desire to end Israel since Khomeini took power.
- [105:19]
B
And what do they mean by end Israel when you ask them?
- [105:22]
C
I kill all the Jews.
- [105:24]
B
And no, I don't think that's what they say. I don't think that's.
- [105:27]
C
Well, okay, listen, listen, that's my point. There's a famous clock that was put up by Khamenei a few years back about the end of Israel. The countdown or whatever. It's a huge part of their state ideology. Robert Elon Musk harping on the mistranslation of an Ahmadinejad quote and assuming it was mistranslated. And I don't even really understand the difference between pages of time versus wiped off the map, but.
- [105:54]
B
Okay, well, I know differences between saying regime and saying Israel. But there is a difference. There's a difference between the regime must change over time, must be replaced by a new regime, which Israel is trying to do in Iran. Look, come on. Wiped off the map means we bombed the fuck out of them and kill them all. You know that. And it's not what was said, first of all.
- [106:16]
C
Okay, that is what they want.
- [106:18]
B
Well, you can say that, but it's not what they said. So if you're asking why am I making Iranian regime.
- [106:23]
C
They like killing Jews the way that Hamas does. That's what they do. I mean, it's a big part of their ideology.
- [106:30]
B
Well, you know, Israel seems to like killing Iranians and Palestinians.
- [106:33]
C
Please, listen, this didn't come out of nowhere, as you acknowledge. I'm glad that you. I understand that. But the reason why Khamenei was killed in the opening strikes of this particular. Of this latest war was because of the entire prehistory leading up to it that Iran has devoted so many resources to supporting groups that would attack Israel and then having the ultimate deterrent so that Israel couldn't do anything about it. So I kind of agree, like, I don't know that it was certain that Iran would use a nuclear weapon as soon as they obtained one against Israel, but they would use a nuclear umbrella to protect all of these proxy groups, which that's. They do. They. They attack Israel. I mean, listen, just. I mean, we know from their state behavior, I'm sure you remember many years ago, the Kyren A that was sent for the Palestinian was an arms shipment that was just in the beginning of the intifada when there was still an effort to try to maybe bring back peace negotiations. That's been their policy. They wanted to support the people, support organizations whose job it is to try to destroy Israel.
- [107:49]
B
I'm not endorsing. Well, that's what you're putting.
- [107:51]
C
And that's why, by the way. And that's ultimately why Israel, after developing a huge thing, is saying we cannot allow this regime to get a nuclear weapon. And I mean, I think everybody can kind of understand why. And that's ultimately why it led to this. So that's where we are. And I hope. I mean, my hope is that it ultimately will succeed in a Color revolution. I mean, we're running out of time now. But I do think that, you know, I should say I wrote a column today that said, Mr. President, do not attack civilian infrastructure. Because my, my, I believe that there is an opportunity to the end of all of this, replace this regime that again stole the 79 revolution and has lost its democratic legitimacy internally and is just a menace to the region. I think once you get Iran knocked out, I don't think you're going to see Israel laying claims to Kuwait or wherever. It's not going to be supporting like Jewish terrorist groups that are, you know, going to try to hollow out Syria or something. That's not in the cards.
- [109:00]
B
That leads us back to my, my article which you cited. I mean, I did want to say quickly like, you know, back to the. Yeah, they send arms to these proxy groups. Part of my point about coming out of the Iran Iraq war with only one nation having supported them is it makes it seem plausible to. That, yes, they would look around and go, well, look, you know, there's this Palestinian cause and none of these Arab states are really supporting it. This is a real opportunity for us to gain influence by supporting these groups. That would be a great deterrent. Doesn't seem crazy to me. But in any event, the, the on, on my article. Yeah, it's like I do, you know. Well, part of it is this. I assume you agree that Israel would consider this war a win if it just leads to the collapse of the Iranian state, chaos, civil war, whatever. To Israel that is better than a coherent state that has the capacity to become a strong state unless, unless there is regime change, in other words. I mean, that's, well, all the evidence points to that. And I'm saying that I don't think Iran really sees its security as entailing it. It's sending it collapsing whole states. And in any event, I don't think it, it thinks it has the realistic aspiration of doing that. Resist.
- [110:32]
C
Do you think they would love to collapse the Israeli state?
- [110:35]
B
They don't consider it.
- [110:36]
C
I just don't think they were outfoxed. I think, as I said, I think it's, it was a duel for many years and I think Israel is coming out on top and I just don't see what the problem is. I think Israel is fighting for its survival, basically.
- [110:50]
B
Yeah.
- [110:51]
C
And I think by the way, that Iran is going to be better off hopefully when the regime falls. Now I will acknowledge the following. I don't know that Donald Trump or I'm not, I mean, I think that if you believe Netanyahu's rhetoric and Trump's rhetoric, there are times when they say you have an. The Iranian people have an opportunity to get their country back. And that's the part I like. But when he, you know, Trump says many things, he also says he'd like to cut a deal with, you know, a Delsey Rodriguez figure in Iran, which would, you know, I think that could be an interim phase. But I'm worried that, you know, I worry that I don't want the regime to survive, but it would be better if the person in charge of Iran was at least corrupt and not a true believer in their ideology.
- [111:43]
B
Well, I think I'm far from alone in looking at Israel now and see it, you know, taking big swaths of Lebanese territory, doing what it's doing to the west bank, doing what it did to Syria, doing what it did to Iran, and saying, wait a second, this looks an awful lot like a rogue state. And I don't think it's good for the region or for the world to lack a counterbalance.
- [112:06]
C
Do you think that Israel wants to. Wants to, like, indefinitely occupy southern Lebanon? I don't. I think we know exactly why.
- [112:14]
B
I'll bet they never.
- [112:15]
C
They're trying to clear the area so they can go in house to house and get all these missiles that are hidden in with. Among the civilians, which, by the way, is also a war crime, to launch missiles and hide missiles among where civilians live, which is a constant problem. If you want to know why Gaza looks like a moonscape, which is a terrible tragedy, it's because Hamas again decided to conduct a horrific raid and a massacre and then hide under a tunnel system it had built for 20 years almost, that was interspersed with all of the rest of Gaza. And we know that that wasn't for the civilians because they wouldn't let the civilians in. So it's like, you know, this is what this is.
- [112:55]
B
So Israel had to kill the civilians.
- [112:57]
C
Well, Israel, I think has. Well, the number is around 60 to 70,000. There have recently been pretty good studies of how many of those were actual fighters. And you get to this, there are a lot of civilians that were killed. It's a terrible tragedy again. But Hamas started the war. They wouldn't let civilians leave when Israel was warning them. There's a reason as to why Israel did it. It wasn't just to conquer Gaza. You know that. You know that Israel didn't do the war to conquer Gaza. Hamas started the war. Israel was trying to wipe Hamas out. And Hamas, because of its nature, you
- [113:38]
B
mean Hamas was trying to wipe Israel out?
- [113:41]
C
Israel was trying to wipe Hamas out after. In response, Yes. I mean, I think that that's right, yeah. I mean, ideally, if we could go back in time, ideally, maybe there would have been a better strategy to empower local Gazans and give them small arms and hope the they would take their. To take out. I mean, I'm not just, I'm just saying I don't know. And we might come up with. I would say that it's possible that you could sort of say when the war is analyzed, you said, well, there were other options that could have gotten that. But anyway, I just, I. Maybe we could sort of leave it there. But I'm just saying that there's a difference. It's not like they were. That the war was not to conquer Gaza, it was because they were attacked and they said we have to end Hamas.
- [114:35]
B
Such is my graciousness that I'm going to give you the last word there any other last words you want?
- [114:39]
C
No. Bob, it's always good to talk and I appreciate it. This, I thought was a constructive conversation. It was, you know, let's do it again.
- [114:45]
B
In these troubled times, we are a paragon of civil discourse, Eli.
- [114:48]
C
No, and I really, I say this every time we do it, you know, but, but it's very important to me, especially in the ghettoization of our discourse, that we have this space because it's rarer and rarer these days. I hope to come back soon, Bob. Maybe we can have another topic where there would be more agreement and we can maybe talk about that offline.
- [115:10]
B
But, you know, yeah, I'm sure we can find something. We'll come up with something. We'll come up with something. We agree on. We agree on some, some aspects of Trump, I believe. Anyway, thank you so much.
- [115:24]
C
Thank you.
- [115:24]
A
Bye now. Finding a doctor is a little less challenging. UnitedHealth Group is investing in tools that make it easier for patients to navigate health care and pay less. These transparency tools help patients find providers. And this is the big thing. Compare costs up front. The big picture, more transparent pricing, benefits everyone. These tools from UnitedHealth Group can help patients save hundreds of dollars annually. Learn more@unitedhealthgroup.com commitment
- [115:55]
B
and we'll see you next time.