Program transcript:

Grant Reeher: Welcome to the Campbell Conversations, I'm Grant Reeher. The war in Iran continues to occupy the political attention here in the United States and around the globe. And here with me today to provide some deeper context and understanding of the situation and how it might develop is Mehrzad Boroujerdi. He’s one of the leading experts on Iranian politics, and currently serves as the vice provost and dean of the College of Arts, Sciences and Education at Missouri University of Science and Technology. For many years prior to that, he was on the faculty at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. Among his many publications is a massive compendium of the biographies of all the political leaders and elites in Iran. It's titled "Post-Revolutionary Iran: A Political Handbook." Dean Boroujerdi, welcome to the program.

Mehrzad Boroujerdi: Thank you, Grant, for having me.

GR: We really appreciate you making the time. So let me start with something I heard you say the other day. It really caught my attention, and I wanted to get you to talk about it again. I've heard you argue that the Hamas attacks against Israel on October 7th, 2022 are essential in understanding the decision making regarding this current war with Iran, it really provided a turning point. Explain that briefly.

MB: Sure, my pleasure. Yes, so, October 7th really became significant in the sense that, you know, that terrorist attack by Hamas convinced Israel that, you know, they want to go and try to really subdue Hamas once and for all, right? And therefore, we have had this ferocious war, you know, for the last few years, even though supposedly, you know, a peace deal has been reached, there are conflict and killing, it still continues on that front. What was significant about that was that Israel then decided, all right, not only am I going to be going after Hamas, but also I want to try to weaken Hezbollah because of its attack from the Lebanese, you know, land, right? And then, you know, they went ahead and did that with a great deal of success. And then the question was, well, you know, while we are on it, why not go after the puppet master, which is Iran, right? Because of Iran's support for those two entities. Therefore, Netanyahu, who as we know, you know, has been the longest serving prime minister of Israel. And from the get go, you know, he has been dreaming about, you know, a regime change in Iran. I think he managed to really use the weight of the October 7th events and, you know, convince President Trump that this was really the time to go after Iran. So, as a result, we had the 12 day war of 2025, right, where, with US help they really managed to, you know, destroy a good chunk of Iran's nuclear capability. The fact that it was such a one-sided event, right, you know, led President Trump to declare victory. However, for Netanyahu, this was an unfinished job, because if his endgame is regime change in Iran, right, calling it quits after 12 days, they feel that they still have some unfinished business. And therefore, my sense is that, you know, he really did his best to try to convince Trump once again that we can go and this time bring about regime change, right? So that's how President Trump, you know, was declaring things such as, we do the bombing, then the Iranian masses, you come out and you take things into your own hands. Of course, this is happening after the, you know, December-January uprising in Iran, where, you know, millions of people express their opposition to the regime, right? So, they felt it's ready, the situation is ready. And yet I think they perhaps underestimated the resilience of the Iranian state in terms of staging a fight, right? And I think that's why we are now, you know, into whatever day, you know, for the fourth week of this conflict, right? Imagine Grant, you know, we're in 2003 when the US toppled Saddam Hussein, it took three weeks. So, this conflict is already, has taken longer than the 2000 war with Iraq. In 1991, when the US went to get Saddam out of Kuwait in that Gulf War, that thing also took 41 days, right? So, we are approaching that type of a, you know, time limit where U.S. military excursions have lasted, you know, 4 or 5 weeks, etc. but there is really no end in sight right now that this is going to pan out the way Netanyahu and Trump were envisioning it.

GR: Really interesting comparisons to previous US involvement there in that region. You've anticipated a couple of my other questions here, I wanted to draw on one of them. One thing that I have heard in the criticisms of the Trump administration and this war is that it has been overly influenced and perhaps even duped, depending on who's making the criticism by Israel. It sounds like you are saying, well, let me ask it this way, would you go that far in that account of why we're here?

MB: Yeah. I wouldn’t go really that far to say they were duped, because, you know, my exposure to the US government has led me to believe, right, that this idea of regime change and, you know, confronting Iran dates back, right? Many, many decades even, right, because of the hostage crisis and everything that that happened with Iran. So there have always been contingency plans, you know, by various US agencies, you know, to think about, you know, what might happen in Iran, right? But I think this time the forceful personality of, you know, Netanyahu, perhaps President Trump's lack of experience with the Middle East, the fact that he dispatched two real, inexperienced negotiators, right, to carry on the conversations with Iran, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, etc. I think all these elements and what they were seeing in the streets of Iranian cities led them to this false assumption that this is really the moment to do it. You see, what is fascinating is that Iran, since 1979 really, has been sort of the Bermuda Triangle for various US presidents. I mean, think of Jimmy Carter, right? What happened to him? Lost the election as a result of the Iran hostage crisis. President Reagan, the Teflon president, right? His reputation got damaged because of the Iran contra, you know, affair and so forth and so on. You know, Clinton tried to deal with Iran, you know, his secretary of state apologized for the 1953 coup in Iran, etc., hoping that, you know, there will be reach, but it didn't happen. And now I think this is the last chapter, right? President Trump really getting involved in a military confrontation that, of course, is going to, you know, leave an indelible mark, right, in the lives of ordinary Iranians for years and years to come, because the damage, even, you know, four weeks into this conflict is already more than the eight years of war between Iran and Iraq, right? Because the Iraqis could not really inflict that type of damage on Iran's infrastructure the way U.S. and Israel have been able to do over, you know, 13,000 strike points so far.

GR: Yeah, really interesting points. I'm Grant Reeher, you're listening to the Campbell Conversations on WRVO Public Media and my guest is the Iranian politics expert Mehrzad Boroujerdi, and we're discussing the war in Iran. So, what has been Iran's kind of master counter strategy to these attacks? How is it seeing what it's trying to accomplish or trying to avoid?

MB: Right, so, I think from the Iranian perspective, it's important to realize that they feel, you know, that they are the morally right party. Meaning what? Meaning that, you know, it was President Trump that in his first term got out of the nuclear deal with Iran, the JCPOA, right? So, they feel, you know, they remain faithful to it, it was Trump that left the thing. Then they feel that they were negotiating twice. One in 2005 and now in 2006 with the US administration and then all along, right, the next day, the US attacked them along with the Israelis, right? So, from their perspective, they say, you know, we've done some wrong, we do not trust this administration, all right, we are not going to be fooled and, you know, get involved in a third round of, you know, negotiation only to be bombed again, etc.. President Trump might be buying time for orchestrating yet another attack for us, right? So, they are coming at this, you know, with that type of a mindset. Now, it's also important to realize that these guys have a realistic sense of their capabilities. They know that they are not really a match for the combined power of Israel and the United States, militarily speaking. Yes, they have, you know, an adequate supply of drones and missiles, right, that are, you know, indigenous to Iran. They made these things because, remember, Iran, a country of 92 million, has an enormous human capital, a highly educated, technically savvy population. And, of course, the government over the last four decades has concentrated a lot of its, you know, energy and money into building up its military industry, right? So, the Iranian strategy is that, okay, if we cannot be a match for the US, you know, Air Force, Israeli Air Force, what it is that we can do? Their thinking is that, all right, we will fire as many of these missiles and drones that we have as a way of doing a number of things, inflicting political pain in Washington and Tel Aviv so that these folks will rethink their decision about continuation of the war. But parallel to that, they think that by closure of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most, if not the most important choke point, right, for global economy, they realize that they can...