Program transcript:

Grant Reeher : Welcome to the Campbell Conversations, I'm Grant Reeher. In America, we seem to pay attention to only one international issue at a time, and lately, that's been the conflict with Iran. But the war in Ukraine carries on. And with me today to bring us up to date on that and also deepen our understanding of it, is Oxana Shevel. She's a professor of political science and director of the International Relations program at Tufts University. She's also the coauthor with Maria Popova of, "Russia and Ukraine: Entangled Histories, Diverging States". Professor Shevel, welcome to the program.

Oxana Shevel: Thank you for inviting me.

GR: We really appreciate you making the time. Let me just start with a basic question for you. What's the current situation in Ukraine? Where do things currently stand?

OS: The current situation is not that different from where it has been some months ago, and in some way even a year ago, when, of course, President Trump was thinking or saying that he could end this conflict very soon, like, you know, absolutely one day. But the conflict obviously still continues. And, in a way, Ukraine continues to resist Russian invasion, Russia continues to insist on maximalist aims. And this is why, I'm sure we'll get to the details, but this is ultimately why there is no settlement, because the demands and the interests of the two sides remain irreconcilable. And that has to do, again, with Russia wanting to subjugate Ukraine and Ukraine wanting to be a free state. And, you know, maybe the only sort of recent difference, and that's of course, was the war in the Middle East. The price of oil changing in a way that benefits Russia, so that's a concern. And at the same time, the weather improved in Ukraine and Russia has been freezing Ukrainian population with the strikes on the heating infrastructure through the coldest winter in recent history. So that's in a way, you know, a positive change in Ukraine that spring is here. But other than that, the conflict is pretty much where it has been for some months and years.

GR: And when you say, this is an obvious point but I want to make sure that our listeners are all on the same page with you, when you say that the war in Iran has helped Russia because of the oil, you mean because they are able to sell it for a better price and there's a higher demand for their oil, correct?

OS: Yes. There is high demand for the oil. Some sanctions have been eased. And again, you know, this war is very costly for Russia. They have been projecting an image of, you know, and I think in a way, some Western observers, including political leaders, are kind of buying this narrative that, you know, one way or the other, Russia has to win because it's bigger, stronger and so forth. But in a way, you know, Russian economy has been suffering with the sanctions and all of this. And the price of oil is very important for the war effort because, you know, certain prices projected as too they have to sell oil for at least that much. And now this price has been up a lot. So, in that sense, that's what that meant. Yes, that the increase in the price of oil helps Russia.

GR: And when you said that Russia is hanging on to its maximalist aims, just explain what maximalist means there in this context.

OS: Yeah. This is essentially what Popov’s and my book is about. That we have wrote this book, we were motivated to no small extent by trying to push back against the narrative that has been very prevalent in certain circles. This is sort of this realists take or perspective on the conflict that basically says that, well, you know, it’s bad that Russia invaded, but ultimately they invaded because they felt threatened by NATO expansion. And that's really what the conflict is about, that, you know, Ukraine had a change of government in 2014, it was going to enter NATO, it is threatening Russia and Russia invaded. And that's kind of what the root cause of the war is, right? But, you know, those who study Ukraine, who have studied Ukraine and Russian relations, who studied Ukrainian and Russian history as we have and many other experts in Ukraine have, do not buy this argument. And then again, the question becomes, what are the root causes of the war? And as we argue in the book, the root causes of the war is Russia's desire to not let Ukraine slip from its grasp. And we're not talking about just geopolitically, you know, of course, I mean, Ukrainian membership in NATO was never realistic and if it were ever was, Russia would look like it. But that's not really the main, neither necessary nor sufficient condition, we can say. And what it really goes down to is Russia not being able to accept Ukraine that is sovereign, that does its own thing in all sorts of policy areas, from historical memory politics to cultural development to economics. And again, we see this history of Russia becoming increasingly unwilling to accept this kind of Ukraine. And that's ultimately what this war is about. And so even if we look at specific, you know, disputes over, say, the territory in the Donbas, like I think some in America would say, and I think, again, that's part of the view in the current administration that there's some bunch of, you know, almost destroyed territory, what's the big deal? You know, just give it to Russia and then the war is over. But in Ukraine, nobody believes this because what ultimately it would mean that this is heavily fortified territory. If Russia were to take this territory, just opens the way for new aggression. And we've seen this since 2014, first Crimea, it's on the Crimea. Well, it wasn't on the Crimea because then there Donbas. And then sort of Donbas why it's not really because when they invaded in 2022, they go straight for Kiev. Why go straight for Kiev to decapitate the government if you are supposedly protecting Russian speakers in the east? Which, by the way, are the ones suffering the most from the bombing. So again, sort of in the same irreconcilable position, it ultimately goes down to Ukraine being determined, increasing this whole since ‘91 and especially since 2014, to have its own past, to be oriented to Europe, to be sovereign country, to not be under Russian dictate and Russia increasingly unable to accept that. And that's really why we have the clash of irreconcilable objectives, which have been there in ‘22, in 2014, and they’re here in 2026.

GR: So, I want to ask you a question about the United States for a moment, and then I want to come back and follow up on some of the things that you just said. Do you think that in the United States, the public attention on this war in Ukraine, despite the fact that it's the largest war in Europe since World War two, do you think that Americans are kind of suffering from an exhaustion of sorts with their waning attention or do you think it's the war with Iran has sort of pushed it out from people's attention span? What's your sense of that?

OS: Yeah, I would maybe mention two things here, because first of all, I think when we look at the opinion polls and, you know, if the American public believes that, you know, Ukraine should be supported and deserves U.S support, we still see substantial support. So this is, you know, this notion that, you know, Americans are tired. Actually in Ukraine there are memes about tired Westerners, like who should really be exhausted. It's not the westerners, but Ukrainians. But sort of that aside, first of all, there is still support, right, so even if, say, the administration is less skilled and less eager to support, I think the public understands, again, like this is, you know, very kind of the story that the smaller countries attacked by bigger country, by right and wrong. And this is really the conflict with right and wrong is very clear. There are many wars around the world, and when conflicts have lasted for generations where, you know, it's sort of confusing. Like who are the good guys? And I think here it really isn't confusing. But then again, you know, as you opened this program saying that the only one foreign policy issue seem to be kind of dominating the headlines. So, I think this is part of that, right? So again, we have a new conflict, obviously media attention has turned to that conflict. And then there is just less front page space, right? For everything else. And of course, you know, so I think in some sense it is understandable, but on the other sense, of course, it is also something to say, like, is this all media? Or to the working, you kind of latch onto whatever is in the news right now. So, I think both of these things are going on, as I said, the thing that is still substantial support and that's important to realize, but also the way the media prioritizes what to cover, something that is new and happening now and this sort of, you know, big and consequential in that way dominates the coverage.

GR: I'm Grant Reeher, you're listening to the Campbell Conversations on WRVO Public Media and my guest is Tufts University political science professor Oxana Shevel. And her recent book is titled, "Russia and Ukraine: Entangled Histories, Diverging States". So, let's talk a bit about this entangled history part of your argument and your book. How are the histories entangled and why is that so important?

OS: Yeah, I think this is very important. And this is why we chose the ‘entangled’ as opposed to ‘common’ or ‘joint’ or something like this. Because even to say that countries had like a common history i...