A familiar refrain has returned to international debate: China is "causing" global economic imbalances. It is an easy argument, but not a convincing one. Earlier this month, the International Monetary Fund released a dedicated policy paper titled Understanding Global Imbalances, and held focused discussions on the widening of global imbalances and the underlying causes.

国际舆论场上又响起了那个熟悉的论调：中国正在"导致"全球经济失衡。这种说法信手拈来，却经不起推敲。本月早些时候，国际货币基金组织（IMF）发布了题为《理解全球失衡》的专题政策报告，围绕全球失衡加剧及其深层成因展开了重点讨论。

That timing matters. The IMF analysis shows that the world economy has become more imbalanced, and that the reason cannot be attributed to one country exporting too much. Recent data released by China's General Administration of Customs reinforce this point.

这个时间节点值得关注。IMF的分析表明，世界经济确实更趋失衡，但其根源并不能简单归咎于某个国家的过度出口。中国海关总署近日发布的最新数据也印证了这一点。

China's imports grew 19.6 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026 while exports were up 11.9 percent. That imports grew faster than exports is an important detail.

2026年第一季度，中国进口同比增长19.6%，而出口增速为11.9%。进口增速跑赢出口增速，这个细节不容忽视。

It indicates that while global imbalances are widening, it's doubtful that China is "causing" the problem.

它表明，尽管全球失衡正在加剧，但将矛头指向中国是站不住脚的。

The basic flaw in the "blame China" argument is that it takes a conceptual shortcut. Global imbalances cannot be reduced to a simple arithmetic of excess exports from one economy. They are rooted in the relationship between saving and investment, fiscal policy choices, financial structures and the broader organization of the international monetary system.

"责怪中国"论调的根本缺陷在于思维上的偷懒。全球失衡不能简化为一国贸易顺差过大的算术题。其根源深植于储蓄与投资的关系、财政政策选择、金融结构以及更广泛的国际货币体系安排之中。

The IMF's latest analysis makes precisely this point, stressing that domestic macroeconomic trajectories are the main drivers of external balances, while tariffs and trade restrictions generally have a marginal impact on current-account adjustment. That is why reducing the issue to "Chinese overcapacity" may be politically convenient, but it is economically insufficient.

IMF的最新分析恰恰指出了这一点，强调国内宏观经济走势才是外部平衡的主要驱动因素，而关税和贸易限制对经常账户调整的影响通常微乎其微。正因如此，将问题归结为"中国产能过剩"或许在政治上很方便，但在经济学上却缺乏说服力。

Consider the oft-repeated claim that trade with China is the main reason for the industrial decline in advanced economies. Historical data do not support such a simple conclusion.

再来看看那个被反复提及的说法——对华贸易是发达经济体工业衰退的主因。历史数据并不支持如此简单的结论。

In the United States, manufacturing employment has been falling for decades. According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, manufacturing employment peaked at 19.6 million in June 1979 and had fallen to 12.8 million by June 2019, a decline of about 6.7 million.

以美国为例，制造业就业人数已持续数十年下滑。根据美国劳工统计局数据，制造业就业人数在1979年6月达到1960万的峰值，到2019年6月已降至1280万，减少了约670万。

This long-term trend reflects several structural shifts, including productivity gains, automation, evolving consumption and the steady growth of the service sector.

这一长期趋势折射出多重结构性转变，包括生产率提升、自动化普及、消费结构演变以及服务业的稳步增长。

Trade shocks did affect some industries and regions, especially during the 2000s, but that did not create the problem. To say that deindustrialization was caused by imports is to mistake one contributing factor as the only reason for the decline.

贸易冲击确实在21世纪初对某些行业和地区造成了影响，但它并非问题的始作俑者。若将去工业化完全归咎于进口，无异于把众多成因之一当成了唯一原因。

That distinction matters because an incorrect diagnosis leads to bad policy. When domestic structural weaknesses are recast as purely external pressure, the real sources of fragility are left unaddressed. One of those weaknesses is inequality. Federal Reserve distributional data show that in the third quarter of 2025, the richest 1 percent of the US population owned 31.7 percent of the country's total net worth. The next 9 percent owned another 36.4 percent, while the bottom half of the population owned just 2.5 percent.

区分这一点至关重要，因为错误的诊断会催生糟糕的政策。当国内的结构性弱点被重塑为纯粹的外部压力时，真正的脆弱源头便无人问津了。不平等便是其中一个弱点。美联储的财富分配数据显示，2025年第三季度，美国最富有的1%人口拥有全国31.7%的净资产，紧随其后的9%人口拥有36.4%，而底层50%的人口仅拥有2.5%。

OECD adult-skills data point in the same direction: in the 2023 Survey of Adult Skills, 28 percent of US adults scored at Level 1 or below in literacy. In a society with highly concentrated wealth and weak foundations, economic anxiety is bound to intensify. But this anxiety should not be mistaken for proof that China is causing the domestic imbalance.

经合组织的成人技能调查数据也指向了同一方向：在2023年的调查中，28%的美国成年人在读写能力方面处于一级或以下水平。在一个财富高度集中、基础技能薄弱的社会里，经济焦虑感必然加剧。但这种焦虑不应被误读为中国导致其国内失衡的证据。

Another problem in the current debate is the structure of the international system itself.

当前讨论中存在的另一个问题是国际体系本身的结构。

The world monetary order remains centered on the US dollar and is marked by deep asymmetries. The extraordinary depth of the US financial markets and the safe-asset status of US treasuries allow the country to sustain large external deficits for longer than most economies could.

世界货币秩序仍以美元为中心，且具有深刻的不对称性。美国金融市场深度非凡，美债享有安全资产地位，这使得该国能比大多数经济体更长久地维持巨额外部赤字。

This means that today's imbalances are shaped not only by surplus countries, but also by a system that gives the principal deficit country exceptional ...