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- [00:00]
Jordan
Abs my mayor Muslim, my bagel Jewish fable is fried. Nixon 5. Congratulations to the New York Knickerbockers in the city of New York on their first championship in 53 years. And a hearty perhaps message of concern for the Trump administration's Bureau of Industry and Security and Commerce, which has been taking care of America's lead about as well as de' Aaron Fox took care of the basketball over the past two weeks. To describe why Trump took Fable offline, what's going on with chip AI loopholes and what this all means for the future of AI development in America and beyond, we're joined today by native New Yorker and longtime State Department and White House civil servant covering AI chips and whatnot. You know him, you Love him. Chris McGuire, welcome back to the show.
- [00:51]
Chris McGuire
I've been a Knicks fan much longer than I've been any of those things, so that's the most important thing right now. But, yeah, had to, had to wear, at your urging, had to wear the jersey to celebrate. So won't be taking it off for at least a week or until it smells.
- [01:07]
Jordan
Okay. So just a brief recap. We recorded a model talk on Thursday or Friday of last week where we were all talking about our Fable impressions, Anthropic's latest model. Now, we have a nice little note when you go to Claude AI saying, Claude Fable 5 is currently unavailable. Now why is that still sort of unclear? But the, the facts that we know is at some point on Thursday, Andy Jassy gets on the phone with someone in the Trump administration and says, hey, this, there's something fishy about this whole Claude model. We found some jailbreaks which can do something to have you get access to some capabilities which Anthropic didn't want the world to have access to. There was some sort of communication between Anthropic and various corners of the Trump administration. And then at 5:21, we get a new export control in which I hand over the reins of this narration to Chris. So what did that, you know, what did, what did Commerce put out and what were the implications?
- [02:22]
Chris McGuire
Yeah, so there was a is informed letter that was some of the details are still, you know, not publicly reported, but basically is informed letter. So it was a private letter that was sent to Anthropic that one way or another regulated seemingly the export of the model, the remote access of the model or the, you know, the ability to access the model via an API from other countries or from foreign nationals inside the United States. So of these, you know, obviously the Commerce Department has regulated the export of models before in the Biden administration. The Trump administration actually, interestingly is not enforcing those particular export controls, but now is introduced these. The authority to regulate foreign persons is called a deemed export control. It's something that in the Biden administration we actually generally exempted most of the emerging tech controls from deemed export controls because of concerns on how it would impact business in the United States. But you can say that a foreign national inside the United States requires a license for, to receive a good that is controlled for export outside the United States. And then it's a little bit unclear how all this fits together in a way that actually regulates API access there. There's probably ways that you could do it, but without seeing the letter, it's a little hard to tell. But the net result is that it was illegal to export the model, use the model by any foreigner either outside or inside the United States, which obviously made it very hard to serve the model partly, you know, even in the United States, because you would have to verify who end users were. Presumably they're actually probably employees at Anthropic who are foreign nationals who all of a sudden are restricted from accessing the model that they work on. So this obviously kind of put the, the, the use of it to a stop. And then now seems like there's discussions going on today to try to resolve this one way or another.
- [04:33]
Jordan
So first off is Andy Jassy, the Jeremy Sochan of this story. Jeremy Sochan of course, famously were drafted by the spurs, worked there for three years, got cut, shows up to the Knicks and wins a championship by spilling all of their internal workings and secrets.
- [04:53]
Chris McGuire
I don't know. I mean, I don't know what the motivation. It will be interesting to see on the Knicks side how of a behind the scenes role Sochan played in the championship and how much we had all the, all the intel due to a crafty signing mid year.
- [05:10]
Jordan
Or did the Knicks get access to Mythos during the glass wing window, use it to hack, you know, Wemby's email, like get all the dirt on him in order to like whisper, you know, disturbing things when he was taking free throws? All right, well, would not be the
- [05:26]
Chris McGuire
first time a sports team has hacked another one for competitive advantage. But yeah, I don't think it happened here.
- [05:32]
Jordan
All right, so clearly there is an overlay of like bad blood or at least no love lost between this administration and Anthropic. But the sort of more remarkable piece to this story from my perspective is you had this administration talking for two years about how, you know, they wanted capitalism to run free, that, like, AI shouldn't be regulated. This is. This is something that was, like, important to American development, at least leadership and sort of those safety nicks in the Biden administration really were overreacting. And then you go from that to having an executive order, which was going to be not all that tight, be watered down even more when it came out two weeks ago, to all of a sudden, over the course of apparently 24 hours, them deciding that the most powerful model in the world, which is like a, you know, instantiation of America's lead over the rest of the world, needs to no longer have access. Users can no longer have access to. So, Chris, I'm curious for your reflections on that arc and maybe what it tells you about the future of AI policymaking.
- [06:55]
Chris McGuire
Yeah, I mean, look, the particulars of this individual incident aside, the administration very clearly has fundamentally changed its policy on AI over the last few months. I think that Mythos, the Mythos release, really did kind of cause a sea change in Washington on AI policy. The policy has not been let it rip, let the private sector rip for four months or so. I think you saw the culmination of that in the AI executive order that put forward a voluntary licensing regime, but ultimately a voluntary safety regime, but ultimately, it's obviously kind of mandatory. I think this basically shows that it's mandatory. So it's logical that this is a real problem. And I think that the administration is realizing that this, meaning, like AI regulation and the very powerful capabilities that these models have requires regulation. And to the administration's credit, I think they've recognized that, and they have pivoted, at least in a broad philosophical sense. They haven't pivoted all elements of their policy. And they also are moving in ways that are very reactive and fairly chaotic. And I think what's clearly needed is you need a policy that is, first of all, not just reactive, that actually there is a kind of framework that's set out of like, here's the expectations, here's how we regulate things domestically, here's how we regulate them internationally. Here's what people can do, here's what people can't do, and has a degree of durability. I say a degree because, like, look, this is regulating at the frontier, and it's hard. And we did this in my administration, and, you know, there's degrees to which we would have to update the controls, and then business would yell at us and say, like, well, but this is not predictable and we're doing our best. Like we're trying to create as predictable of environment as we can while responding to national security risks. But like we did have some degree of a framework out there and you know, the Trump administration needs to do that. They need to, they need to be clear for like what is and isn't allowable domestically and like what the, what you know, there is, there's apparently some standards in the AIO for, for what would, how they would do model evaluation, but they're classified. Probably helpful if those were public. But regardless, you could work with it. There's not that many companies. You also need a corresponding strategy internationally of which I think we have none of. How are you going to ensure AI infrastructure globally is safe? And how are you going to make sure that other countries, when they start making this level of capability, which they do, which they will very soon, are not used against us in the ways that people, you know, the administration is correctly worried that people could inadvertently use, you know, current generation models against us too. So like there needs to be a comprehensive strategy here. We're just not seeing that. And I feel like that's like a trope in Washington of like, oh, we just need a strategy, right? So everyone says to anything. So I'm almost hesitate to say that. But like look, we export controls in particular are a powerful tool. They're a useful tool. They're a tool that can be used to actually ensure that technology is given to the people that you want, you want it to be and to, you know, I don't know, create like a international non proliferation regime to a degree, but we're not doing that at all. And instead we have this insane situation where right now Canadians are prevented from accessing these US models. But meanwhile the chips that make the models are free to be sent to, you know, many of them to China because of loopholes that the administration created and also to all other countries around the world. And there's no efforts to kind of get the global regime in order. So look, I hope that the administration recognizes that AI regulation holistically is important also. This is an indicator export controls are an important and powerful tool and it's something we should use. And I hope we actually start moving towards a smart export control strategy too, while also having a domestic regulatory strategy that is logical and predictable and that has good relationships between the companies and the government where it doesn't make people feel like the $700 billion in capex that hyperscalers are spending are pointless. You do need to make people feel like investment is going to pay off. But I'd be, I'm kind of concerned that this chaotic environment right now is like, even though it's a, this is a, these are real policy problems the administration is trying to address in terms of like fast evolving national security risks in AI, it's doing it in a pretty ad hoc way and the risks of that are just tremendous.
- [11:31]
Jordan
Yeah, let's talk about some of those risks. So one, I mean, you mentioned it like popping the AI bubble, right? Yeah. Like if the conclusion like stocks are up today because the Iran war ostensibly ended, but you know, if we end up in a situation where models can't get any better than they are as of, you know, I mean, not even June 2026, but say like March 2026, like a lot of that capex is kind of for naught because this is sort of like bake into everyone's projections is that like the models keep having increasing levels of economic utility. So clearly I don't think that's what they're necessarily aiming at here. And I for one have some sort of lodestar of like, even with this action, Trump not wanting to put on like a regulatory system which ends up like, you know, appreciably squeezing American GDP growth. But I think that is like the one that, you know, people, people like are talking about, oh, what's the economic impact of like AI export controls to China? Like, does Nvidia make $50 billion more or less? I mean, having models not get any better in America or having there be like significant uncertainty that sort of models can improve at whatever rate the technology would allow them over the next few years and is a, would be a real problem to this entire, this entire build out.
- [13:04]
Chris McGuire
We can.
- [13:04]
Jordan
All right, let's, let's go back and forth. What's your, yeah, what's your risk of this going wrong?
- [13:09]
Chris McGuire
No, that's exactly right. I mean, look, there's, you know, three companies right now that are relevant in the frontier space and you know, how much that's not. It's good that we have some competition. It's not a ton, like how much. There's a real question of how much can the market bear if, if you know, one of them, two of them, certainly all three of them are told like, sorry, you just can't release anything that's, you know, more capable or even not that. Right. Because presumably the government does want to work this out. But it's just if the perception from industry is that like even, you know, even if, like there's no way to release a model without being subject to some kind of insane draconian measure in response that, you know, very rapidly, without an effort to work it out, that the causes like cascading effects, at what point does that create actual business investment problems? I don't know. And some of this might just be. There obviously is deep personal. There's animosity here between the government and the company. So maybe this just isn't something that would ever happen with OpenAI or with Google. But there are real national security risks here. And I think there's going to be issues where, whether or not this one was or not, where, you know, the government has to work with a company to, to rapidly fix problems and they need to find ways to collaboratively do it together. And just saying like, nope, sorry, we're just going to impose like completely draconian controls that shut down the company, you know, very quickly. I mean, if, if the company was actually acting in a way that was like very actively hostile, then obviously, yes, that's warranted. But if it's not, then like, it's really in everyone's interest to work together to try to resolve this as quickly as possible because otherwise the spillover effects are going to be really big. And I'll bet you all the other companies are probably thinking like, oh, well, what if this does happen to us? I don't know if we create a model that's as powerful and as concerning, are we just inevitably going to get hit with a news informed letter once someone finds some issue somewhere, sometime? It's a hard dilemma. Here's another angle of this that I feel like has not really been explored. So there's the issue of export controls, obviously on kind of China and other countries and whether or not we should do that for their own purpose, obviously I think that we should and we should be trying to hold them back. But like, part of the reason that this really shows why you want to be holding them back, because the domestic regulation is hard. I will acknowledge that this is, this is a difficult problem. And that like you do have, you know, saying all the administration needs to do is just develop a comprehensive AI regulatory regime is kind of unfair and overly simplistic because this is a really, really difficult thing, right? Building this in a way that is smart and robust, but predictable. Look, the Biden administration, we spent a year talking about the AI diffusion rule. And that's just one element of the problem. That's just the international element of the problem. Just saying, just, just, just go figure this out. You know, it's hard. So the point here is like you actually want to have a really big lead over China because you're going to need time to figure this stuff out. And if you misfire on some of the regulatory measures, you know, it will, it will slow you down. And you want to have the time to make sure that like you can actually be deliberative. Think about it, you know, come up with the best kind of structured regime that is actually going to work and not blow the lead to China. And the more the you are ahead of China, the more you are actually able to do that. But if we're neck and neck with China because we're actually not doing anything on international controls, you're going to be forced into the environment that we're in now where you have this kind of ad hoc chaotic regulatory regime. It's going to produce worse regulations, it's going to have more incidents like this. It's going to have a spillover impact on business and investment and it's ultimately going to be worse for everyone. So having that time actually creates the more predictable environment, the better regulations at home. And that's better for everyone. That's actually one of the key underlying points of all the, and it's a sympathetic point, the government, because this is really difficult. But like you need to give yourself time to do this and if you don't do that, then you're also at fault for not, not giving yourself the time to do a hard problem. You just, you end up. Yeah, okay, you, you know, you did all your homework the night before and your paper is mediocre but like maybe you shouldn't have started the night before.
- [17:39]
Guest Rapper
Right.
- [17:39]
Chris McGuire
Give yourself actual time to, to, to do a good job.
- [17:43]
Jordan
Yeah, I mean there is an aspect of this where I'll, I'll give some grace to the administration and that like okay, what's our, is our analogy like itar for fighter jets or something? Like you know what a fighter jet can do years before you decide who you want to sell it to? Like it has this range, this speed, this, you know, EW system, these types of missiles. Right. Like there is an aspect of these to these models where, you know, whatever creative benchmarking and stress testing and red teaming like ten or a hundred or a thousand people can do, it's just an entirely different beast. Once you kind of like let it, you know, give it increase the, increase the circle of people who, who have asked, who have access to it. And I think like the, the idea that you wouldn't be like the idea that folks wouldn't be able to get around These sorts of controls particularly which are new. I mean I remember like, I guess the question to me is like is the, is the challenge that anthropic is facing currently of, of not letting actors, they don't want to, not not letting just like a random user be able to you know, improve their AI model or generate hacks from creative prompt testing something that like is ultimately like a stable and fixable one. Like Google had at the early days of itch image generation where people making, were making those black Nazis and they just like thought it was ridiculous. Or is there something sort of like, like deeply structural which sort of more time and research is not going to be able to necessarily figure out that these powerful models, like if you give, if you give a wide enough sort of like access surface to them, folks are going to be able to do, you know, basically whatever they want to. It feels like it's the former.
- [19:48]
Chris McGuire
I think it's the former. Yeah. I mean it's a fair question and one we need to you know, carefully think about. We've gotten better over time, right? Like it's harder to jailbreak models now than it was a year or two ago. So that seems to indicate that like, you know, this is something that we can continually improve on, especially with admins and AI. Now will it be ever like a completely zeroed out risk? Like that's a little hard to say, but you can certainly probably get this risk very, very low. And that's also an area where good collaboration between industry and government would be really helpful. Like if you have the NSA and Casey really doing robust stress tests in cooperation with industry on the models to make sure that they're as jailbreak proof as possible, that is good. And then if there's something else that comes up, then you work immediately to correct it. But like I don't know. I feel like that is as long as you can get it to a very, very low level. I don't know. I feel like we have reason to believe that that's possible. But there are you know, technical people who could have more robust thoughts on that than me. But like I, that, that it's not something. Because the alternative is like we basically just have to have to either live with like some crazy risk or just stop development which also isn't going to work because eventually you're going to, other people are going to get to that level too. So just want to invest in that, that R and D to, to you know, make this better. But you, you have to, you have to really incentivize It. Right. And it has to be collaborative.
- [21:28]
Jordan
I was just thinking like the, the Knicks and their coach, like they like this profession. Right. You are pulling from, I don't know, a hundred million people who've like dribbled a basketball in your life. And there's such a kind of effective professional winnowing process that like the top folks are compensated extraordinarily well for really, you know, really remarkable elite performance. And then we have Casey, which like, look, no, no disrespect, but like your budget is less than, you know, two weeks of Jalen Brunson's time and there's something not right with it. Like it's a big deal. I don't.
- [22:15]
Chris McGuire
Yeah, it's like the Landry Shammit. Right. The Casey's like on a non guaranteed contract right now. Right. Coming into training camp and like then they're just hitting three after three after three. Right. Like, man, maybe this guy should actually get some, some get. Get paid.
- [22:29]
Guest Rapper
Yeah.
- [22:30]
Jordan
Or just like not get like, like their. Their top hire fired because you know, their former employer is like, you know, on the. In the doghouse or something. Anyways, so I think in parallel to this, we started seeing all these blog posts about rsi, sort of like recursive self improvement and models that have like powerful cyber capabilities is something that like the world has been seeing on the horizon for, I don't know, a decade at least, like very acutely, two or three years. And the miss in the miso miss Mythos thing in particular, like we had, you know, four months to process. Right. So I guess I am. I don't know. I. I spent a while not believing in this stuff, but like the, the capacity for the American sort of like regulatory system to keep up with something which is moving even faster than what we've seen. Because basically like the regulation hasn't mattered really until. Until Mythos. And then now all of a sudden it does. And like if the sort of circle of things it starts mattering for continues to expand, you know, even doing the sort of one off stuff that we're gonna see now, it's just like I'm getting more pessimistic, Chris, that we're gonna be able to. We're gonna be able to handle this and, and get through.
- [24:02]
Chris McGuire
There's technical questions here that you and I don't have the robust answers to, which is like, how problematic was this particular incident? I don't know. And that's important. And regardless, even if it's not problematic, the government, the company should work to resolve even Minor things, but it does matter for, like, okay, is this something that needed an immediate, you know, fixed within half a day, or is it something where there could have been, you know, a little more time to discuss things? I don't know. And that also matters some for, like, what's the future of this? Like, you know, how prevalent are, you know, critical jailbreaks? Which is kind of the key question here. If you can get them to a point when they're not super prevalent, then regulation seems pretty possible. Right? But it has to be collaborative. But it's possible. It does require all the companies that are making models of that level of capability to be both within the jurisdiction of the US Government and having a good collaborative relationship with the US Government. Putting this issue aside, again, that is the case for largely the American companies. It's certainly not the case for anyone developing models outside the U.S. it's not the case for Chinese companies. I think this also begs really big questions for what open source policy will be. I think it's pretty clear if you're just taking this incident at face value, I don't see how you could possibly permit an open source Mythos under the way the administration has approached the problem. So what does that mean? Does that mean open source is just going to be told to stop in, you know, eight months or whatever, whenever it catches up to Mythos? Probably less at this point. But let's say they're a year behind, so around eight months maybe. Right? Like, that might be what happens. And this is, to a degree, been a problem that we've seen coming for a long time. So I don't know, like, I think if you actually have a big enough regime, right, where you actually can make sure that, like, the US Companies are pretty far ahead and, you know, you're,
- [26:19]
Jordan
you're,
- [26:21]
Chris McGuire
you know, not even though you, you're never going to be able to control, like, everyone outside, but if, like, they're delayed by a long time behind the US companies and then you actually do have, like, good, you know, predictable measures and good relationships with the companies and the government to be able to, like, iron out things quickly whenever they, they, you know, put out things that are good and then iron out things quickly whenever they happen, like that, that might actually be pretty good. And I think a lot of this is going to rely on AI actually getting better at fixing problems. But, like, we're seeing that with RSI too, right? AI is getting better at making AI like, it's also going to get better at preventing jailbreaks or things like that. So I feel like there is a path here to a world that is like relatively safe and extremely prosperous and very good for America. But it requires a lot of smart regulatory steps on the domestic and international side to work. And I think we're seeing the pitfalls of what happens right now. If you don't have that, it's, it's pretty scary.
- [27:28]
Jordan
Yeah, I mean I guess I'm, I'm almost thinking more broadly of like, okay, so what other sections of society are going to need their own project glasswing where like you get all the adult players to like really get on their shit six months, nine months, whatever before this stuff is released. And you know, for all of the hacks we see of corporate America, like I have a decent amount of faith and cisos of you know, Amazon and Google and Microsoft and you know, financial institutions to like use that time wisely. Now if we're sort of like going down the, you know, if we start looking at like different corners of society, right, which aren't necessarily as well capitalized, which don't have as much technical talent, where the sort of like earth shaking impacts of what a new model could bring over the next two years, that sort of, you know, that, that lead or that sort of breathing time where the quote unquote like good guys have access to the models but the, but sort of malicious actors, be them states or criminals or whatever just like can't, can't outrun whatever's on the open market. From a closed or open model perspective. It's just just, I don't know, it's just, it just freaks me out a little bit.
- [28:53]
Chris McGuire
Chris? Yeah, I, I, you're, I think you'll just have to have some normative changes, right? Like we're just going to have to be in a more security prioritized, you know, culture, right. Like you're, there's just going to have to be an expectation that basically any product that ships is going to have to have gone through that like consumers use is going to have to have gone through some degree of like AI enabled, like cyber defensive, you know, testing or upgrading, like it just, it just, because otherwise is you're just going to be smoked like ran out of the door. Right? So but if you do that and you have that kind of big lead, I actually think that in the cyber sense like we can actually get to a, a place where we, we. Yeah, I mean it's almost like dynamic in cyber you. Right, so outside of cyber actually I
- [29:41]
Jordan
just think like that if you're expanding the circle to the bio stuff and
- [29:45]
Chris McGuire
whatever, that's where I get much more concerned. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Because, because like the, the cyber problem, I think we can kind of, you know, if we do it well, we can address it and then you can actually have like, really, really good defensive systems and almost like get an advantage. But the problem is like, you can't deploy AI based bio defenses in the way that you can, like as rapidly as you can with AI based cyber defenses, because those are like physical things that you're going to have to get out there. So like that, that's where. Yeah, we're just going to have.
- [30:11]
Jordan
Or if they're just models that get just good. Get good enough to like put entire towns out of work. Because they've like completely. You know, I, I know these CEOs they keep talking about, oh, we want, we don't. We want to create more jobs, not eliminate them. But it just seems like there's, there's real prospect for like, radical economic disruption, even if it's not like the entire economy shuts down. Like, there are presumably corners of it where like 10 people can spin up companies which like, do the job of, you know, ten hundred, five hundred thousand accessories or.
- [30:46]
Chris McGuire
I mean, it's not just the AI labs that are saying this too. Like Jamie Dimon said, anyone who doesn't think the AI is going to cause job loss has got to get their head out of the sand. It's actually a lot of people who are following it obviously. I think that there's obviously segment people who maybe don't believe it or maybe want to push the narrative that won't cause job loss up until the music stops. So you can kind of keep going for as long as possible, but it clearly will. The question is the magnitude. I don't think we totally know and kind of when that will happen, but the idea that it won't at all is crazy. I mean, I think that's kind of why you're actually seeing this being a more bipartisan issue on Capitol Hill. I think actually representatives who are maybe not the most keenly aware on technology issues, but when there's a prospect of massive job loss in their districts, all of them get very keenly aware very quickly. And like, yeah, they're all paying attention to this. Right? And actually that's why I think you're starting to see AI regulation as something that both parties recognize as necessary. Because if this actually happens, like, no one wants to be the guy who's, who is, you know, supporting the, the. Let the private Sector RIP policy that then, you know, replace entire towns in their district.
- [32:00]
Jordan
Right, yeah.
- [32:01]
Chris McGuire
So Saline, which maybe is just like perverse political incentives. But regardless, like that is definitely how it's being viewed now.
- [32:08]
Jordan
And on the other side of getting the data center built in your town, Saline, Michigan, OpenAI very proudly announced was getting a $10 million refurbishment of their rec center.
- [32:21]
Chris McGuire
There you go.
- [32:23]
Jordan
So, you know, some peanuts for the masses. It'll help you. Those swimming classes will help you stay out of the underclass.
- [32:33]
Chris McGuire
I mean, mean, but this is where the federal government should step in, right? Like this is where like, yeah, we don't want to stop data centers in my opinion. Like we, we, you know, that would cause, you know, all sorts of, you know, we'd lose our lead, blah, blah, blah. But like we actually need a solution to help the people that are impacted by this. And the good news is, yeah, the silver lining here is like regardless on exactly what happens, this technology is going to create like very large amounts of wealth. The question is, who is it going to create it for? Is it going to be for like three to five people or is it going to. For the everyone in the country? It's actually a situation where it wasn't creating wealth. It would be, it would, we wouldn't even have an outcome, a path here, but it is, it's good.
- [33:13]
Jordan
Yeah. Yeah. And sort of relying on corporate largess and you know, Dario blog post saying, yeah, we're really concerned about future post economic America and we're going to be, you know, trying to keep our janitors employed even after we turn them into robots is like not necessarily like. No, this is like a job for legislators, not a job for CEOs to figure out. Yeah, one bit. You mentioned the, the, the Chinese models. Jerpu put out a press report saying cutting edge intelligence should belong to not only a few and it should not be withdrawn at any time. It should be open, available, extensible and built to serve every developer which like, you know, I don't doubt that the DRPU AI CEO believes this, but if I am a, like, I would would also be shocked if when sort of like Mythos level capabilities start coming out of these Chinese labs. If the Beijing feels similarly and not necessarily being cool with anyone and their mother having access to them.
- [34:21]
Chris McGuire
Yeah. And I also think that we, we're having all these conversations about like chips in China, which I find frustrating because this is a debate that was, was kind of largely settled in 2022 and we're relitigating it. But what that's also doing is it's like taking the oxygen out from some of the more interesting debates. I think people are talking kind of realizing more now and need to be addressed. And I think one of them is model access. I actually do think that restrictions on model access are necessary and probably are necessary right now. I think that the reason that the RSI loop is closing is because the models are getting really good at R and D. So you probably don't want the Chinese AI labs able to use the USAI models to be able to do their R and D, which is what they're doing. Right. Our labs use their own models to expedite their R and D. Chinese labs use US Models in order to expedite their R and D. So we probably should be talking about model access restrictions on China and on Chinese companies around the world. And we have to think about how to do that, but in a way that is smart and targeted and isn't just. Just draconian, resulting in the model going away. That doesn't achieve the intended effect. But I don't know. I think that the premise here is something that I think from a national security threat, we should be thinking about more. But we're only focused on American companies and not our adversarial companies. That's the problem.
- [35:49]
Jordan
Can we talk a little bit about the. I don't know. Yeah. If I'm a Canadian policymaker, European policymaker, Japanese policymaker, and I see this happening. I mean, they were already sweating about the sort of, like, drip trip access that they got to Mythos and then to sort of see this cut off. I mean, the. The irony is that, like, there isn't really another option for them. Right. Like, these companies are not going to, like, like, I'm sorry, like, no disrespect to, like, you know, Wemby Mistral over there, but I just don't think it's going to get it done. And so you're sort of either stuck just being a taker when it comes to American models or sort of just like, waiting for China to deliver you something which, you know, as Chris and I both believe may. May end up starting to close down once. Once they get powerful, more powerful enough. But how do you see this sort of playing out in other capitals? And, like, to what extent does it actually matter?
- [36:50]
Chris McGuire
They definitely should be nervous. I mean, just because, you know, the fact that the administration imposed controls on all of our allies would inherently make them nervous. I do think that we are moving even this particular situation aside, like, we are probably moving towards a tiered system of model release. Just in general whether. And I imagine that, yeah, us, you know, tier one US companies will probably the government and tier one US companies will probably be at the top of that list. And then you'll go down it from there to like, you know, tier two companies and then maybe close allies. Like, I kind of think that is how this is going to inevitably play out. I think that there's still a lot of that is basically how every other technology works. Right. That's how all the most advanced weapons technologies are too. Right. So that isn't necessarily unusual. I think we've been very slow to build a regime around this. I think you started to see the end of the Biden administration. There was some on efforts on global infrastructure and putting some restrictions on chips on most countries other than say the 18, you know, the fact that that got pulled down is it was very lucky for allies, but also like completely out of sorts with the Trump administration. Right. Which generally speaking has been looking to, you know, exact leverage over allies and squeeze them. And so it's very strange that the one area where they decided to kind of give allies everything that they want was in AI, which is nominally the most important area of future of technology and economy and military. But no, I think that we're inevitably, we're going to be moving towards a more restricted in models and in infrastructure. The next question you asked though is, is how much does it matter? I mean, it certainly matters for them and you know, where they take, you know, their technological development from a what
- [39:00]
Jordan
I guess from a US China perspective, like, how much does it matter if you know France?
- [39:06]
Chris McGuire
Well, for both of them, I mean, I think, look, allies don't have a real recourse to this. And actually it's still pretty good to be in the US ecosystem. Even if you don't have the tier 1A access, it's still going to be far beneficial to being in the Chinese ecosystem, and I think we should make sure of that. Obviously you want to make sure that everyone isn't incentivized to actually move to the Chinese ecosystem. But ultimately I don't see that happening. I don't see allies working with China to build an alternate semiconductor supply chain, an alternate AI model supply chain, all of which is going to be like, you know, full of Chinese propaganda and ultimately like, used to undermine them. It's tough. I mean, this is, you know, the US is like very dominant in this area and I think it's hard for allies to accept that. But it's true And I think there's ways that. That can manifest in collaborative ways, even if it doesn't mean that just we're absolutely sharing everything freely. You know, there's. For most things, we don't share absolutely everything freely and still, like, it's far beneficial to be in our orbit than to be in Russia's orb or China's orbit. And it's going to be the same way with AI, I think, over the longer term.
- [40:18]
Jordan
Yeah. I mean, like, the most things, right. Like, this is a giant commercial technology as well as, you know, the, the, the.
- [40:28]
Chris McGuire
The.
- [40:28]
Jordan
The frame. Dario likes of like, you know, nuclear power, you know, nuclear bomb adjacent. So the fact that, like, we're ending up in some, like, awkward new middle. Right. I mean, we weren't regular, like, you know, regulating electricity wasn't a thing. And. But it seems like there's. There's, you know, we're somewhere in between sort of like nuclear power and electricity and, And I don't know, like, insofar as this doesn't slow down, this doesn't get completely commoditized, then. Yeah, that, like, awkward. I don't even want to call it a middle ground. Yeah, that awkward. Sort of like itar. But, you know, way higher stakes and, you know, hopefully tuned in a way that like, you know, accounts for, you know, keeping. Keeping the rest of the world happy and playing with American models and hyperscalers while not, you know, being too frustrated that they end up looking for another answer from the prc. These are all coming back to the beginning. Like, look, I want Jalen Brunson on the case with this, you know, not necessarily some, some bench players. It's going to be. It's going to be really hard to sort of balance all of that as you have the sand shifting under you of this. Of these. Of these technologies developing in a way that, you know, you can't really predict even, you know, six or 12 months out.
- [41:53]
Chris McGuire
Yeah. I think the only thing you can really predict is that, like, you are going to. Having a big lead and a larger lead is going to be more important in a year than it is now now. So this is only going up in capability and importance and in complexity. So the value of generally taking actions to improve security and improve your lead really compound over time. And we're paying the price for that now, Right? We're paying the price for kind of inaction for the last year and a half, largely. And now we have very powerful capabilities. No regulations, chaotic environment. We're scrambling to catch up, up. And meanwhile, our adversaries are still kind of freely using our own technology. Even if we do cut that off, it's still going to be some time until you start to see the large effects because there's a lot that's already out the door. But there's also no better time to start fixing all those things than now because all these problems are going to be twice as hard four months from now.
- [42:51]
Jordan
The motivational Chris McGuire here. Keeping the positive energy in times of dark policy making. So we had the Friday afternoon anthropic sort of BIS letter I guess. Was it a week before? Oh my God. Only that we had a Sunday letter from. From Vis trying to close the loophole. Why don't you, why don't you give us the context on.
- [43:19]
Chris McGuire
I think it was two weeks. I think it was two weeks ago.
- [43:21]
Jordan
Okay, thank God.
- [43:22]
Chris McGuire
Two weeks before. Yeah, but no, this is just interesting. I mean first of all, this is like a massive story. The fact that this like, like there has been an export control story that has leapfrogged this one in a period of 12 days is remarkable. But such are the times that we're in. No. So effectively there. So there's a emergency guidance that was issued two weeks ago by BIS to state that Chinese subsidiaries of Chinese companies located outside of China were not allowed to buy controlled AI chips. The reason that they had to issue this guidance was a loophole had been created by commerce that was seemingly permitting these orders. So China has been banned from receiving AI chips since 2022. Since 2023 that's been extended to Chinese companies operating anywhere in the world. So the obvious if you're going to ban them to Tencent, then you don't want to allow Tencent them with their Malaysian subsidiary. Right. Pretty logical here. But basically what happened without going into too much of the regulatory gory details, which I'm happy to if you want to Jordan, but we'll try to spare people is because the Biden administration in the anti diffusion rule, it replaced the explicit part of the regulation that captured Chinese headquartered companies operating overseas. It replaced that with a global license requirement. So it put forward a global license requirement that applied to anyone, everywhere for AI chip orders. There were then some exceptions and exemptions for it, but as a matter of regulatory housekeeping it struck the provision that captured chip exports to China headquartered companies because just because it was redundant, the global control now captured that. So you didn't need two different parts of the regulation that would do that. The Trump administration said that they were not enforcing the global license requirement. They said they Were going to replace the rule that was over a year ago ago. They still haven't. As a result, talking with people in industry, I can attest to this. Eventually companies started to say, okay, well we're just going to take the law literally. Because if you look at the regulations, there is not an explicit prohibition against us sending to Chinese headquarters companies overseas. Which means that they could receive Blackwell chips or even forthcoming Rubin chips. They could have of without a license. So that's a huge problem. And that would, I mean it effectively neuters all of export controls. There was actually a second part of this too that meant not only that, but they could also make chips at TSMC or Samsung without a license as well. So we were in a very kind of bad situation. I don't know who exactly took advantage of this or in what magnitude. That information, you know, is still yet to be revealed. I know a lot of people are looking for it, but what I do know is that companies were telling people that this was a legally permissible route to take. And there's a lot of rumors that there were some things that were shipped pursuant to this loophole. So commerce closed this and two weeks ago and said, okay, no, you can't actually ship to Chinese headquarter companies. That also had the effect here.
- [46:53]
Jordan
What is this? The fact that it comes out on a Sunday tells you what?
- [46:57]
Chris McGuire
Well, is that this was a huge problem. Right. Like the BIS doesn't issue guidance a lot. They issue guidance on Sundays almost never. Obviously. Like it was never the administration's intention to allow these shipments. Right. The president's been very clear, like no black wells. You know, there's, you know, we, even the president has like this like tax system. Right. Where the, the, the say what you will about the policy to export ships to China, obviously I'm a big critic of it, but like, like there was
- [47:22]
Jordan
a system at least get our 25%.
- [47:25]
Guest Rapper
Yeah, right.
- [47:26]
Chris McGuire
Yeah. The system said built to set up revenue for it and like this is a way to circumvent that. Like this in no way is something that the administration intended, but the fact that it was happening shows that this is, this was a real problem that had to be. Once, you know, it was brought to administration's attention, I think they moved to close it right away. Generally speaking, I think this shows that the way that export controls have been administered has been incoherent and it is not something that's really been prioritized. The fact that you could create a loophole that would allow this kind of fundamental undermining of the entire regime because you said you were not enforcing a rule that then had this cascading effect is crazy. I mean, actually US Export controls, if you look at them still look at the regulations still for what type of chip is controlled, it will still say that there is a global license requirement for AI chips everywhere. And like, the AI diffusion rule is still on the books. Now the administration says they're not enforcing that. But then if you're like, okay, well, what is the policy? What is the export control policy for AI chips? You would actually have to go hire a law firm to tell you exactly what is and what isn't, because there's not. You can't even go back to like, like see a previous version of the regulations and like, the way the diffusion rule worked. It wasn't just, it didn't just modify. It wasn't just like, stick one rule into the regulations. It modified things through the regs. So when you say we're not enforcing, like, which provisions are you enforcing? Which one aren't you? Like, no layperson could possibly understand that. So you have this crazy situation where, like, it is impossible to tell what the export control regs are, and it's not surprising that then companies find ways to work around them. So this is like, this is regards to where you are on policy. It's patently unacceptable for the Department of Commerce regulations for over a year to not actually reflect the administration's policy. Like, just decide what your policy is and make the, make the regulations reflect that. They actually still reflect that. The Biden administration policies that the administration said that they wouldn't enforce. So this is what happens. So like, you need to, you need to actually take this seriously. I think also this current episode shows that, like, export controls are super relevant and also need to be taken seriously. And the administration just hasn't been doing that. You're like, I only have so much energy for it.
- [49:43]
Jordan
No, it's, I mean, mean, it's, it's just I, I remember when they first said it, like, we're not enforcing this rule. I assume that meant a week later we would get a new rule, right? Yeah, like that. And, and, and here we are, and we're kind of reaping what, what we sow from like, I guess just like not doing anything or not being able to agree on a thing or, you know, and the irony of all of this is, like, they're so worried about doing something that would lead to some, you know, new escalation with China and the, the directive. Clearly from the top is like don't do anything that would sort of like change the balance that we reached as of October of last year. Fair. But that means that you don't go backwards for like no reason or like not as like this wasn't like part of a grand bargain where like, okay, now they're going to, I mean, I don't know, like, and give us a trillion dollars of investment or something like it, it, it, it was just a sort of like like bureaucratic fuck up that clearly they like clued onto on a, on a Friday afternoon and then have to spend, had to spend the weekend dealing with. I mean the other question is like how many chips had to get sent before they realized that this was a problem? How much, you know, you know, how much, how much tape out happened at TSMC for, for Huawei or whoever. I mean it's just, yeah, it goes to show that there's some real issues over there.
- [51:12]
Chris McGuire
I think they wouldn't know because there's no licenses required, right? Actually no license required is even worse than, than approving licenses because obviously companies like might they, they didn't even have to tell the government how much they were shipping or what they were doing. It's, it's, it's, it's a, it's a, it's a bad situation. And also like these controls weren't even China controls, right? Like they were actually controls on other countries, on third countries. And this is why it's so, so perplexing to me that like there's not more efforts to, to crack down on these because actually the China regime is largely in place. But the problem is like Chinese smuggling is enabled through third countries. So the solution was mostly to like make sure that there's some, you know, license requirements on, on large numbers of third countries to limit that. You know, I think that's very clearly necessary now and that actually is not within the realm of the broader U.S. china, a, you know, detente, right? Like if we're saying okay, we're going to impose a license requirement on Malaysia or Singapore because obviously Preposterous numbers of GPUs are going there illegally to China. Like China can't really complain about that, right? Like they know that they're illegally smuggling the chips through these countries. Like we're just saying okay, we're just, you know, preventing this obviously illicit behavior that would actually diplomatically be achievable to do. I think the reason that these haven't been closed is because this has just been a whole issue set that's been deprioritized and ignored. But then as a result, actually the situation has degraded much farther than people think because we're actually allowing completely open spigot sales of the most advanced chips to Chinese companies. And I should also note that actually there's one element that hasn't been fixed. So in conjunction with the AI diffusion rule, separately, there was this rule released called the Foundry Due Diligence Rule, which basically said for anyone who's sending an AI chip design to TSMC or any 14 nanometer chip design design has to effectively confirm that it's not an AI chip through. There's a few ways that they could do that or get a license. And the reason is not that many companies are sending really advanced designs to tsmc. So that rule has a white list of companies that are all permitted and there's various other kind of routes you could go through. But it's necessary to prevent third country cutouts from making chips at tsmc, which we also know China did. So, so like Huawei got cut off, but then you can get a cutout in Singapore or Malaysia or someone else to send a chip design to TSMC and then have them route through there. This is actually still permissible. So the Chinese company itself cannot send, that's now restricted since Sunday, but the cutout can. So you get some random company in Malaysia, you know, not Tencent Inc. Can send a chip design to TSMC for a Blackwell level chip. And TSMC can, you know, unless they have, you know, very clear knowledge that's a Chinese company, which is generally like, like, I don't know. No company imposes really strong enforcement measures on this. That's generally the lesson we learned. I'm not singling out any company here, but in theory they could do that. So the whole point of this was to cut down on that. And that loophole was not closed by the guidance. So the administration is still not enforcing that rule. And we'll see if they do that. But I really hope that they do because I understand the diffusion rule was There's a bunch of. The administration wants to do their own thing, that's fine. But they never said that they were not enforcing the Foundry Due Diligence rule. They never said that they were not interested in enforcing that rule, which is only exists to prevent Huawei from making chips at TSMC and Samsung and others. But the net effect of their actions has been not enforcing it. And absent additional guidance, it will continue to not have any practical effect.
- [55:01]
Jordan
Let's close maybe on the congressional response to the Trump administration's Can we even say hot and cold relationship to kind of semiconductor export control policy? So what have you seen bubbling up from the House and Senate and what's interesting about it?
- [55:21]
Chris McGuire
Yeah, I mean, there's a ton of movement on a lot of bills on this that are really granular too and really in the weeds. I think that there's, you know, on both sides, these are bipartisan bills. But the Republican controlled House Foreign affairs committee is passed 18 export control bills out of markup in the last couple months. It was the kind of biggest swath of export control bills ever. There's a big push to get a bunch of them in the National Defense Authorization act at the end of this year. So you're seeing a very heavy interest from Congress in this space, I think, because there is a lot of concern on the China side. There's a lot of concern about AI, and the nexus of them is proving that this is actually still a pretty bipartisan issue. The biggest ones are probably the MATCH act and the AI Overwatch Act. The MATCH act would be focused on equipment controls and would basically force the administration to impose equivalent controls on allies or negotiate or impose equivalent controls on allies as they have on us, which I think would cut off most DUV shipments to China and a few other places where allies don't have the same level of control as we do, which is a big problem. Point is actually not to impose more controls on US companies, but to make sure that allied governments are doing the same as we are on control level. Also on servicing and maintenance. There's all sorts of areas where allies have worked with us on this, but they're not imposing the same level of control as us. Netherlands and Japan are still allowed to ship items to SMIC south, whereas US Companies are completely out. But they still have some things they can do. They can also ship relatively advanced things like some DUV machines to basically all fabs in China, except for a handful. So there's a lot of advanced allied equipment going to China and there's also some allied equipment that's going to the most concerning facilities. And this would basically stop all that. The other One is on AI Overwatch, which would look at GPUs exports and basically ban Blackwell exports to China. There's different versions in the House and Senate and with kind of different provisions. But it's building off of the GAIN AI act also that almost passed in the NDA last year was in the Senate version. It was one of the last items being negotiated. But that would have said basically a right of first Refusal for US customers over Chinese customers for AI chips, which in effect would have been a ban because the demand for them in the US is far more than the supply. And this would just be a straight up restriction, at least for the next few years on Blackwell or more advanced chips. So you're seeing a real push from Congress on this. I do think that some of one, at least there is going to be some export control bills in the ndaa. I think we're so this is getting so much attention and there's so many kind of like serious policymakers on both sides who are getting behind these things that you'll probably see something in the question is, is it some kind of token, you know, one of the smaller bills is kind of a token nod to it or is it one of the bigger bills? There's a few others that I haven't mentioned, the REM Security act, the Chip Security act, which would have real impacts but lesser so than those two. And then there's a slew of smaller, important but more minor ones as well. So that's the state of play.
- [58:51]
Jordan
The most interesting bit for me here is from a US China economic policy, tech policy side, we're at a bit of a stalemate where the Trump administration is scared anything that put on is going to sort of trigger rare earths and you know, have real impacts for the US ecosystem. But the dynamic is different when it comes from Congress. And of course this is like a great American tradition of like hawks in Congress. I mean you saw this during the Cold War with the Magnitsky act and you know, all this stuff for Jewish immigrants in the Carter era. You saw this, I don't know, more recently, recently in sort of Obama era sanctions escalation with respect to Iran and having it come today, it changes the dynamic for the executive when they're sort of doing their sort of bilateral negotiation with the, with whatever country it is because then they get to say, look, you know, our hands are being forced here. This isn't the naa is not something we're going to go veto on behalf of China to keep you guys having access to various controls. And it's also something, you know, the Biden administration was very anxious about, getting the Japanese and Dutch and, and, and South Koreans upset. But you know, that changes when it's like the, you know, when it's, when it's the House and Senate doing the squeezing. So interesting to see to what extent that, that that dynamic ends up playing out where, where we see more of the kind of like China hawk Stuff ultimately coming out of Congress for the remainder of the Trump administration as opposed to the White House. Yep.
- [60:39]
Chris McGuire
That is certainly how it's playing out. I think that's right. I think it's why you see the, you know, I've heard the Chinese government is lobbying really heavily against the MATCH act because they're concerned about it, which is all the more reason. Reason exactly why it should go through. But yeah, no, I think that's right. And the administration could kind of strategically use this. Right. And they don't have to go out and actively proudly declare their support for MATCH or Overwatch or other things, but they could just kind of quietly let it go forward and give a wink and a nod to people. And then when it signs and say to China, like, oh, sorry, our hands are tied, exactly like you said, I think that's a totally viable approach. Also something that many administrations have done done over the course of history that would allow them to create more negotiating space. But I don't know, it's not clear if and how they'll do it. I mean, look, the big concern I still have is the approach that the administration is taking on export controls. It seems like on AI, generally they are moving at least in a direction that is directionally correct. Right. They're moving more towards a. This is a serious thing that needs to be taken seriously. It's a big thing, it's moving fast. We have to have adults running it. We need to figure out how to get our hand around this. It's really scary and hard and obviously there's been a lot of missteps. But that is the general direction of travel. Also some good things. I'm not criticizing there, that is the general direction of travel, but the fact that the only export control related action they've taken on AI is this extremely draconian one against American companies. Says it seems to be there's some institutional issues on how export controls are being run and regulated at the same time. As you have two weeks earlier, this like unbelievable loophole that was created because of a kind of export enforcement screw up on export controls there, there just seems to be like a big disconnect between how it is thinking about in applying export controls and how it is thinking about in applying AI policy. And that's really problematic because export controls are so, so important to AI policy as I think the administration discovered over the weekend. So, like, we need to fix this because it's not working right now.
- [62:41]
Jordan
Yeah. So maybe you're too nice to say it. So I will. You know, Lutnick, we've currently got him the prediction markets at like 50% to leave over the, at the end of this year. I remember at the beginning of the administration Kessler was a pick that a lot of people were excited about because it's like look, it was, this was in the context of like Matt Gaetz, right where oh, here's this lawyer who's like worked adjacent to this stuff and has a totally normal functional resume that you would see being appointed in like a Romney administration or whatever. And now we've had a, I don't know, it's like a, the sort of, the ineffective policymaking is one thing and that's something that is probably, you know, from a cabinet level on down, but doing. But, but, but the loophole is just like some serious, serious bureaucratic malpractice which is not necessarily something that you can chalk up to sort of, to sort of xi Trump dynamics or managing the broader relationship. It's just like a giant fuck up that human beings are responsible for not being on their shit about.
- [63:58]
Chris McGuire
Yeah, and the question is how much was it exploited? Like, I, I don't know. But like all, you know, Congress should subpoena all the OEMs and ODMs and figure out like who actually shipped because to be clear, Nvidia and AMD probably actually didn't ship. Almost certainly didn't ship through the loophole because for various bureaucratic quirks they were separately restricted because of a separate letter that was sent. But like all the server makers who actually are the people who ship to the data centers, you know, Super Micro, you know, Dell Asus, Gigabyte, like I'm not, you know, all those companies theoretically were unrestricted. I don't know if anyone, any of them did or not. But yeah, Congress should subpoena all of them and see what their logs were and who they shipped to and if any of them shipped directly to Chinese subsidiaries. We gotta get to the bottom of this. But also just like we just need kind of competent enforcement and controls. I mean it's crazy. Like the Bureau of Industry and Security has not issued a single technology based control on China since the start of the administration. There's only one countrywide control on China that they've put in effect for the duration of this administration and that was the affiliates rule which obviously got taken down in conjunction with the rare earth controls. So there's been no countrywide measures on China. There hasn't been also anything on kind of the broader AI set at all. Keep in mind the Biden administration actually Controlled model weights in AI diffusion. Partly because we saw, oh, this was something that we're going to have to think about the spread of these overseas. The Trump administration is de facto controlling model weights very clearly. Mythos cannot be exported overseas. And even before this letter, there was a tacit agreement about who could be. Who could be exported to. Scott Bessant was like personally negotiating with Japanese banks which ones could get access. Like, okay, fine, it's basically de facto export control. Like, let's put an actual export control on the books so that people can see what it actually. What is, you know, regulated and what's not. Everything has been done via these private letters. But what that means is like, most companies don't know that. So, okay, those companies are restricted, but like most companies who don't receive those letters are not restricted and also have no reason to know what the regulations are. And this is how you get big screw ups. Like the, like the kind of subsidiaries loophole because it was actually completely valid for all these companies to ship to Chinese entities, especially after a year where they said they were going to replace the rule and then didn't. So, yeah, we just, like, I'll say this for the umpteenth time, but like, really need to take this very important issue set seriously. Seriously. You know, maybe this weekend is kind of the opening move on export controls now. We're doing AI export controls now. Okay, we're back. Like, wish it was on Chinese companies and not on American companies, but like, you know. Okay, well, let's miss. I don't know, there's one element of this that's good, like, but now let's like, vector it in the right direction. Actually use this very powerful tool to support, you know, US Companies and hurt our adversaries.
- [66:48]
Jordan
All right, um, yeah, I'll send it there. Chris, congratulations again. Thanks so much for being part of Chinatown.
- [66:57]
Chris McGuire
Congratulations to you too. We. We both owe. Deserve. Correct. Congratulations, I think, but yeah.
- [67:07]
Guest Rapper
Versus the whole Trump AI team tonight night New York watch the film DC never read a page most powerful model in the world Live Thursday dark by Friday Dario called it a new civilization on the line Begged him to regulate the night shook at the side high wolf for four years till the cuffs fit better Jassy dropped the dime in the admin grab the letter 5:21 they panic killed the best in the game I'm 29 and folded whole bitch ducking the blue they never read the plate just reacted on the fly Nick studied the tape and closed. That's the why close it Ships rule everything guard the GPU they never read the rule but the Knicks read you the Knick One side cut the nets down one side cut a deal New York knew the assignment DC can't find the wheel can't find it Runson read the set for the set even called Kessler signed the rule Then stood there by case off the dribble Squinting at his own paper weight what this do H200 gone see you later gone town Set the screen on time new just where he's needed down the hardy leaky chips and never even read it never ain't a no be in the lab when the sun ain't even up Bis wake up at noon Loophole the size of Taiwan rule everything guard the GPU they never read the rule but the Knicks read you One side cut the nets down one side cut a deal New York new the assignment DC can't find the will G read the brief called the rules for fools now he's drafting the regulation Scrambling for the tool strangled the future now it's his lord assigned Same rule he called a choco now it's brilliant now it's fine best and woke from the nap when the trophy start to gleam Wake up Nope Jensen slid it smooth leather jacket soft talk trunk near out the house house But Brunson don't bite Nope nope Chips rule everything guard the GPU they never read the rule but the Knicks wear you One side cut the nets down one side cut a deal New York new the assignment DC can't find the will can't find it the Knicks watch film new the assignment down the hall they still ask and what the assignment was was C R E A M M Diversify your export controls.