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A
Ishikawa Kazumi, principal director for Economic Security Policy at the legendary Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and industry, joins ChinaTalk. Thank you to the US Japan foundation for sponsoring this episode. Oh, man. Maybe my first question is, you know, perhaps the most famous economic policy bureaucracy in the world. Do you feel the weight of history every time you walk into work thinking, how can I kind of like bring the legacy of what Mehdi and Mitti have accomplished over the decades into the 21st century? Or is it kind of just another bureaucracy in a large, you know, span of bureaucracies? How do you guys relate to your history, maybe is the question.
B
Thank you, Jonathan. You are too kind for us. You appreciate us too much. Of course, as a Japanese, we should be very conservative and we should be very diligent to do the actual things. Therefore, I don't think the Metis is legendary at this stage. It used to be, however, these days that we are doing a little bit different things compared to the traditional industrial policy, which is very famous in US in 1970s, 1980s, it was then the Japanese industry policy to create strong Japanese companies to cover the world market, to earn the foreign currency. It was a typical industrial policy looking at. But what we are doing right now is totally different. That I will explain the economic security as national security. So therefore, please understand the traditional image of the Japanese ink is totally different from what we are doing right now. But thank you for that. Too much appreciation.
A
Well, you know, we all read these books in college and grad school and it's fun.
C
It was even in high school in my case. I grew up in France and every French student learns about the Mitti model in their geography class when they're about 15. So before this episode Nishikawasan, Jordan and I shared with each other. We were quite moved and emotional when we first visited your. You're building. Which is very embarrassing, but it's the truth.
A
It takes a special kind of nerd to cry at the gate of Medi. But, you know, you got two of them here. All right, so, you know, central banks can have a pretty straightforward definition of what they're optimizing for, you know, full employment at a certain level of inflation. Um, Japanese industrial policy in the 50s, 60s, 70s and 80s, as you just articulated, had some relatively straightforward things they were trying to do. Grow gdp, expand national markets, like, you know, advance the technological frontier, the sort of the KPIs, the, the date, the numbers that you're trying to optimize when you talk about economic security, I think is still very much an open question. Around the world as you think about what the government should do to pursue this. So how are you guys conceptualizing it?
B
Yep, thank you. My American friend kindly explained to me the meaning of the economic security in three terms. The first one was economic security. 100 years ago, the president, Franklin Lisbert used economic security word of the economic security to mean it's security for the daily life economy. So therefore, under the big depression times, Ella, your president started a stimulus plan as well as Social Security number things to defend the people's life. Thirty years ago, the Clinton administration used the economic security as free trade that every business or every person can do business activity all over the world safely. So the free trade, free investment, the free movement of the goods and the money was economic security 30 years ago. But since especially the, let's say the seven years or eight years ago, the world started economic security as national security. This is a traditional national security theory to strengthen national power to survive the destabilizing world. So therefore the source of the national power is composed of the military, diplomacy, intelligence, as well as the economy and the technologies. So therefore what Japan is trying to do is like us, like Korea or like European Union or like China. You know, we are trying to strengthen our economic power to survive and destabilizing the world. So that is our definition or our concept of economic security that kind of the same as the US or the global things.
A
So you know, you, you mentioned the 1930s. There's the FDR vision of okay, economic security is, you know, let's make sure that people can eat. There's another definition of economic security in the 1930s that you hear out of Italy, out of Japan, out of Germany, which almost seems like kind of more parallel to today in the 2000 and twenties than the FDR version of, you know, we need access to resources in order to fuel, you know, our economy and ultimately a war machine. Do you care to do some, you know, a little historical analysis there? Like what, what are, what are some reflections, if any you have on, on that era and how, you know, those powers define economic security?
B
Of course, this is my personal view. But you know, the cyclical things, critical things, we to consider that if I exaggerate last 20 or 30 years, the world, you know, the order was relatively very rule based. Not so much, you know, the conflict in the sense of the economic war or the economic coercion, weaponization of the supply chain was less seen in last, you know, let's say the 22,000 or 2010. However, the last eight or 10 years there's some kind of, you know, economic coercion or the economic conflict, unfortunately is happening. Of course, someone is saying, you know, that before the, let's say the hundreds years ago that a lot of the world trade and economy situation was, how can I say, destabilized. So therefore every country is trying to block their economy by changing the structures. Of course, we don't want to deflect the. They do the same things as 100 years ago. But what we have to do is then to, unfortunately we have to think about how to sustain our supply chain or how to maintain our, you know, the market economy and free trade by somewhat intervening the government with governmental intervention to some areas. This is what we are thinking right now. Yeah.
A
So coming back to that, you know, the purpose of economic security is to, you know, preserve national security and ultimately national power. You know, by definition, we're doing things that are like uneconomical. Right. Because if it was just free trade in open markets, we wouldn't have to be taking any of these decisions that are driven out of a concern for a nation's economic security. So again, you know, coming back to that sort of like central bank analogy, is there a target you guys are working towards? Like what is the. What is the ultimate goal? Is there a way to quantify just how economically, you know, how economically secure a country is?
B
We have two concepts when we say the economic power in the sense of the economic security. The one is then indispensability. We say the strategic indispensability or the technological speciality for Japan's sake. And another thing is autonomy, especially the supply chain autonomy. The indispensability is necessary to maintain the Japanese technological power leverage as well as Japanese spirality. In the sense of the economic power. The autonomy is very important for. Let's think about energy or the food, every daily life or the business ingredients. Supply chain is necessary to maintain our business activities. So therefore the two concepts, indispensability and autonomy, is our, you know, the goal as economic security.
C
So, Nishikawa san, when I was visiting Tokyo in March, you explained to me that you have three categories that you use to assess where Japan is on various sectors. Some you still have the strategic indispensability that you can cultivate. You can try to maintain it in others, there's some catching up to do, or you need to make sure that you're not dependent on one source for some critical components. So maybe you could tell us more about the three categories and how you assess every sector.
B
Yeah. Thank you. As I said we have to take in a targeted approach how what kind of area Japanese government should intervene to the market economy or the free trade. And we categorize into the three areas. The one area is the green areas. Areas where the Japanese supply chain autonomy was or is being lost, unfortunately. Like let's say some kind of critical minerals, some kind of the ingredient for the pharmaceutical goods, as well as some kind of the legacy semiconductor things. These areas we have to. We are currently relying on the one source, one company or one country too much. So therefore we have to diversify the sources. For example, as for the critical minerals right now layers, we have to not only relying on the certain one countries, but also trying to create another mining project as well as then the finales and the process things. The supply chain diversification is very important for the one areas. This is a green areas, the blue areas, the areas where the Japan still has fortunately the technological speciality, which means the indispensability like let's say the semiconductor equipment and also test kit material processing thing. A lot of very sometimes tiny or behind the scene technologies, but very important technologies that we still have. So therefore we would like to control technologies. Control does not mean that Japan dominate. Of course, we are sharing such technologies within a very safer manner, not avoiding the misuse of such technologies to let's say that some kind of military use. Therefore for government's sake, the export control or the investment screening seems important also. Therefore business side, the IP control or the trade secret, the control seems very important. This is a blue alias. And red area is then final area is the areas where the disruptive innovation is going on. Which means then the future indispensability or the future autonomy matters. For example, the quantum technologies, cutting edge semiconductors or the AI things, bio technologies, these things nuclear fusion. If we do nothing, if we have no actions, the future indispensability or the autonomy will be lost. Therefore, we should invest proactively invest the public private partnership investment, strategic investment is very key to this red area. So therefore the diversification control and investment this is necessary areas which Japan is trying to intervene somewhat to the market economy and the free trade.
A
So let's start with a bit of a case study then pulling from our first bucket rare earth. Of course this is something that America has woken up to in the past few months, but something that the Japanese policymakers and public at large have been focused on since the early 2000 and tens. So you know what has and hasn't been accomplished and what are the lessons that you've learned and that you think the rest of the world should learn when it comes to diversifying away from Chinese supply.
B
You know, 15 years ago we have some kind of the shortage of the rare earth. Rare earth is a tiny critical mineral. Very, very tiny. However, the result we cannot create the. Let's say the high end magnet for example. This kind of the high end magnet is very necessary for the every electrical, electronic, the components or the products from the smartphone to the ev. Therefore the layer earth itself is very tiny. However, the supply chain wise it affect a lot not only the Shibiri use but also the military use as well. So therefore the first one is then the Japan land how rare earth is important 15 years ago. But second thing is then you know, the layer earth is not. How can I say the weapon. Let's say the F35 or the, you know, the military equipment that we have to control such kind of equipment. However, the lay earth is almost civil use. The non military use is Then almost all of the royal house is used for the non military use. So therefore the it is not logical or practical to control every tiny layers all over the world. So therefore we have to ask the business side to diversify sources. The layers itself is okay, no problem. However, please don't rely on one source too much. Please diversify your sources so that in any case you can maintain the supply chain. So this kind of the importance of the public private partnership is our second takeaway of the layer of things. And the third thing is then we need continuous painstaking efforts to diversify the sources. Of course it takes time to create a new type of mining project and also the refinery and the process supply chain is very long and it takes times to train the people to change the locations. And also the biggest thing is that we have to continuously ask the businesses to maintain their mindset to diversify the supply chains. Sometimes some event happened, then the business react but the event finished the business forget. This is of course a tendency of the ordinary business. However, we have to maintain the continuous efforts by providing lots of information and the necessity of the diversification. So these kind of three takeaways how the one tiny critical minerals impact huge supply chain. Second is public private partnership. Third is a continuity. Maybe these three important takeaway.
A
There's so much to ask on the getting businesses to do things when you don't necessarily have all the money to pay to make it economical for them. Because this is really the rub of all this economic security stuff is that it, whatever it is, is more expensive than the thing that would leave you vulnerable to. To economic coercion. So you know, are you just calling up the CEOs every week and saying, hey guys, don't forget about what happened, you know, after those boats collided. Like what is the, you know, what are the balance of carrots and sticks and what worked well and maybe what didn't work as well. Kind of looking back to this, to this story.
B
Bottom up and the top down, the boss approach is very important. The bottom up means then once event happened, we will create some kind of case study and to provide such case study to the businesses from practical level to the top level, time to time continuously. So it's a kind of business school case study like that, these kind of case study. Why is then critical minerals? Why is then, you know, some kind of the pharmaceutical goods. Why isn't some kind of, you know, the electrical components, whichever. But the many cases may provide the learning process to the, you know, practical side and top side. But from the top top down to the top down approach is then to ask the business CEOs or the board of directors to take care of the geopolitical issues or the geo economical issues. Not as just learning, but to try to reflect their learning into the actual business decision. That for example, let's think about the CO2 issues or the ESG issues or some kind of other norms for the governance, the business governance, corporate governance, not only learning how CO2 or ESG or the humanitarian things or some kind of the norms is important, but that the business is trying to reflect such norms into the daily decision. So therefore, let's think about, you know, the RE100 or the renewable energy things is going on. Therefore such kind of a top down approach that we are trying to ask the CEOs again, you know, please let's say take care of the geopolitical geo economical event and please think about how Such event can affect 2D your daily business life.
C
Thank you. I thought I may ask about the other two categories. So to remind listeners, blue is maintaining indispensability and red is acquiring future indispensability. It strikes me that in those sectors you'd have to work quite closely, hand in hand with academia as well as the firms and also work hand in hand with other ministries. So export controls are important, but then I believe the Ministry of Finance does the investment screening, so that's pretty important too. But maybe you could tell us a bit more about how those work, those two buckets and whether you use subsidies as well.
B
Okay, thank you. You pointed out the good things. The why is the export control and why is the subsidy? But you know, ordinary. My personal view is ordinary business peoples or ordinary academias, the economic security or the national security is a kind of the cost or the kind of the, you know, regulation to take free action from debt. So it's kind of the governmental regulation that they dislike it. Of course. However, what Japanese government is trying to do is, as I said, is to strengthen economic power backed by the technological base. Therefore, what we are trying to do is to encourage innovation or business expansion in strategic areas. As I said, green areas, blue areas or red areas, the more innovation or the more business create safer, secure Japanese national security situation. So therefore what Japanese government is trying to do and what business is trying to do is a profit or the sales expansion is going to the same direction. So therefore we are always saying not only the cost of the regulation but also it's a kind of the opportunity and we are trying to encourage the innovation and business in the strategic areas. So therefore the combination of protective measures like the export control or the IT control or research security, as well as promotional things like the R and D support or the innovation support, these kind of the promotion side and protection side combination is a very key to ignite the heart of the business person as well as researchers to invest more to the economic security things.
C
When you said businesses don't like it, businesses tend not to like being regulated and being told what to do. But I do remember reading a poll just after I visited you in Tokyo that suggested that business businesses liked then lesser known politician who's now your Prime Minister, Takeichi san, precisely because they enjoyed her tenure when she was economic security minister. So my perception is not to disagree with you, but my perception is that Japanese firms appreciate that there is geopolitical risk and want to engage with the government on those terms. I understand that any individual regulation can be annoying for businesses, but maybe just a quick question on that. Do you not get the impression that your firms are slightly more interested in talking to you about geopolitical risk than in other countries?
B
Oh, I cannot evaluate it because I am very much biased because I am trying to encourage the business in Japan to think more about the geopolitical geo economical things. However, unfortunately a lot of event is going on in the world. So therefore especially the global business peoples in Japan, they became very familiar with the concept of the economic security. But on the other hand, of course in Japan we have lots of businesses all over Japan, especially the local areas, such CEOs or the board of directors have less opportunity to be affected by some event or to talk about such kind of event. So therefore the still under developed. Therefore we are trying to expand our learning or the information to all over the Japan, especially for the strategic areas, so that still we are ongoing. I'm not sure how much, let's say the US business or the European business, Singapore business, Corian business is taking care of that. But my feeling is that let's think about semiconductor industries from the Nvidia or the TSMC or the Samsung SK or Kyokushare 2D, you know, AMAT, ASML, Tokyo Electron, JSR, these supply chain, long supply chain, they are very wake up because they are very much carefree in looking at economic security because then it is affected a lot by the global event. And actually the semiconductor issue is kind of the symbolic topic which provides the information and the necessity to the even non semiconductor companies or non semiconductor researchers. Because then the result semiconductor. For example, during the COVID 19, without semiconductor, lots of automotive companies stop the factory operation. And unfortunately some ventilators cannot be expanded because of the lack of the enough semiconductor. And without semiconductor some kind of gadget cannot be created. So therefore the people feel very uncomfortable, unconvenient because of the lack of the semiconductor. So therefore the semiconductor company itself has already ignited by the global event. And the nature of the semiconductor is a good case for wider business, wider people think about the economic security things.
C
Can I ask therefore. So the semiconductor sector is more sensitive to this. I think we could all agree on that. And there's a sensitivity about being dependent on other parts of the world or other countries in Asia for exports of semiconductors to Japan. But then there's also the other side of the story, which is at the most advanced and the most advanced semiconductors, those also fall under export controls. The US has export controls on the really advanced semiconductors precisely with this goal of maintaining their advancement and their technological preeminence. Japan also has some export controls. So maybe you could run us through quickly how your export control framework works. I believe it's country agnostic and this is a philosophy that Japan defends quite vociferously, the same as the eu. So how do Japanese export controls work? And then maybe you can tell us about the specific case on lithography technologies as well. So there was a very prominent newsworthy case where the Japanese, the Dutch and the US agreed not to export certain lithography technologies. So maybe you can tell us about that cluster of issues.
B
As for the export control of the semiconductor, our policies are very simple. We have done the traditional Export control in these areas from the Wassena arrangement, the Wasana alignment means then that avoid too much concentration of the military equipment into the one region or the one country. So therefore we have to control the technology which is used for the military things as well. And the semiconductor, especially the cutting edge semiconductor is unfortunately is used for the, you know, high end military or intelligence things. So therefore it is global norms to control the cutting edge semiconductor. So therefore the Japan is doing such things. But what Japan is trying to do is again that we are trying to grasp the misuse of the technologies. So the civilian use is okay. Therefore the with Japanese license policies, if the end user and the end user is shipping use and no problem, we will issue licensing. It's not export bank. It's a kind of the scrutinizing whether each export is okay or not. Therefore, please check the Japanese economic export control of the semiconductor. We issued a lot of licenses, of course, just controlling that. And also we should be very careful control the list or the. You know, the conditions of the where that we request licenses. Because you know, the semiconductor is of course, as you may know, is a global very much global supply chain issues. So without global cooperation we cannot achieve. No one country can achieve the semiconductor things. Therefore we have some kind of responsibility to be very self restrained to such kind of control things. This is what we are doing. As for the export control, however, export control only cannot suffice to tackle against the disruptive innovation things. Of course, then you know, AI, quantum and semiconductor things, digital things is going on. A lot, a lot of innovation is happening. So what our goal is technological spirality, as I said, in the sense of the economic security. So therefore not only the control the existing technologies, but also to generate the new technologies. Innovation is very important for these areas. So therefore we are very keen, very proactive to support innovation for the cutting edge semiconductor and AI and quantum things. So the combination of the export control and the more subsidies or the support is that we call run faster strategies to take our technological spaniarity.
C
We wanted to ask you about the U.S. japan deal. Maybe a general assessment from you on the United States Japan agreement and what it does for economic security. Japan is already a big investor in the US and there are clauses within this agreement on Japanese investment into the U.S. but maybe you can tell us what this deal does for coordination on economic security. And then later on we can ask about how you coordinate with other like minded countries.
B
Thank you. Maybe the before I visit you. The October President Trump and the Prime Minister Takaichi summit We had a good meeting between the President Trump and Prime Minister Ishiba Former Prime Minister Ishiba this February and visiting to D.C. the Prime Minister already agreed to strengthen the economic security, strategic sectors cooperation like AI, you know, the semiconductor or the quantum, these kind of things. And last month October the President Trump and the Prime Minister Takaichi agreed the golden age the you know, arrangement agreement and to encourage the AI semiconductor quantum as well as ship building or the critical minerals. So these collaboration is very important for Japan to strengthen our indispensability and autonomy. And also that we believe that it may contribute to the US Technological spirit, indispensability and the autonomy as well. So therefore followed by the President Trump and the Prime Minister Takaichi meetings. Prime Minister Takaichi issued her comment her strategy in Japan in November to ignite 17 sectors strategic sectors as her growth strategies. So therefore we are very much you know, the focusing on to realize such kind of the strategies. You pointed out, you know, the global cooperation in addition to the US this is a heart of our economic security policy because then the regardless of the semiconductor or the regardless of the critical minerals that Japan alone cannot achieve indispensability and autonomy for strategic sectors. We need collaboration allies and like minded countries. So therefore, for example as for the semiconductor issues, we invite TSMC to Kyushu and we have collaboration with then this is open Samsung, some around issues in Japan and rapidas the new foundry. This is truly global. US Japan, European cooperation technology foundry. So therefore in order to secure the indispensability that we need naturally the global collaboration. Also let's think about real things. The real mining process and refinery and process and final goods. This is someone done in Australia and Canada, someone done in Malaysia, someone down in Japan and some products is used in US or Europe. So therefore the global supply chain is very natural things to maintain our and their autonomy. So therefore we are doing the global collaboration as a natural step of our economic security policy.
A
There's a kind of broader question involved in this discussion of economic security. And so in that you know, as much as you can make yourself, you know, you can work towards these goals and you know, try to diversify. If China's going to be the second largest or the largest economy in the world and you're next to them, you're by definition going to be a large trading partner. And the kind of not every like there is still going to be ways that both countries will be able to harm each other economically as long as there is that trading relationship. So we've had A lot of discussion in the US over the past year or so going back all the way to, you know, Cold war words talking about escalation, dominance and you know, who can absorb the most economic pain to make the other side fold. I'm curious, sort of given that economic security in a globalized world is by definition almost imperfect. How you guys think about navigating the ambiguity and the sort of latent ability for adversaries to still cause economic pain no matter how well you do your job.
B
Maybe I had better say the two things. The one is, you know, the. Between the Japan and China. The China is our important trading partners. So therefore, you know, we have to maintain our, you know, free trade and market economy base, including the China, of course and it affect to the some kind of good for the other countries, including Asia and the US and the India Pacific as well. But of course we have to be very mindful to secure the indispensability and autonomy. These two things in my mind is not contradicting each other. If we can maintain, if Japan can maintain the technological scalability, supply chain, autonomy more and more we can respect more freer trade and free market economy and vice versa. So therefore Japan is trying to strengthen ourselves rather than attacking someone. Sorry, this is my personal view, very naive things. However, what I am thinking is we don't want to be doing some kind of economic statecraft to reduce the others power. We don't want to do such kind of things. We would like to strengthen our side power so that to maintain the good relationships. Therefore the some countries, you know, that is trying to weaponize their indispensability. But Japan should not do that. That's what we are thinking especially you know, that this is not official the Japanese policy, but as a practitioner we think such kind of. The concept is very important.
A
Gotcha. Peace, Peace through economic. Economic peace through economic strength.
B
Yeah, sorry, the naive things, but my personal view.
C
I wanted to ask about the conference you're organizing. We'll see if I manage to make it. But when we met in March, you used a very interesting term to convince me that Japan, while it has the right networks on security, people who know each other, who talk to each other. So this is on the hard security, military side. You felt that this network of Japanese experts and international experts who wish Japan well, this network did not yet exist for economic security. So this is your goal for the Economic Security Global Forum which you're organizing in mid December. So perhaps you can tell me a little bit more about what you're trying to Achieve and hopefully you'll use the interesting term you used again with me in March. Maybe you'll use that term again.
B
Thank you. I use the word of the mafia this much. However I have to use the community rather than the mafia. It is politically correct. So that to create economic security communities between the public, private and globally. The reason is in order to analyze what is non strategic sector, what kind of actions we should take urgently. We need information, we need intelligence. Such kind of intelligence not coming from inside the government, it's coming from the businesses or the researchers or academias. Because this is not military thing, this is economic things. Therefore the good public private relationship provide good information and good analysis. It assured good outcome of the policies and these things again that only Japan alone cannot achieve such kind of things. So therefore we have to create global community. The government, academia or the business combined. So this is what I am calling called economic security communities. This December Japanese government will have economic security Global Forum, the government hosted forum December 15th. And also the idea is not only the government hosted one but also the other events like Japanese institutions like Jetro or John Mac, they will have separate meetings or the forums closed or open. And also there are some, you know, the institutions in US or the EU or in Germany, they are coming kindly coming to Japan to have their own hosting event. And also the this mid middle of December as I said the symbolic semiconductor things we have the semiconductor Japan, semiconductor Japan that held by the semi semi. So this is good timing for us to do some kind of gathering or to create communities. So of course everyone is welcome. This is our just a trial we would like to continue throughout the next years. Please consider to take care of that. Thank you.
A
So in. In the US you you've seen some scandals and it's clear that I think the American government now runs on signal. You know when. When Mehdi wants to chat casually with businesses. What. What apps do you guys use for the group chats?
B
Oh, oh, oh, oh. That's interesting question. You know the. Of course when we use the Japanese government use it. I can say that we are using a teams, Microsoft Teams.
C
Okay.
B
For our. You know the inside government and with business in the secured manner. The things.
A
But, but the, but the mafia doesn't use teams.
B
Oh, okay. Yeah, yeah. So therefore not only the online things but also the face to face meeting is of course very important, Very important, very very important. Especially the practitioner level as well as top level C suite level. The boss level is very important. Of course we have to avoid some kind of the. Let's say the legal issues like non competition law, you know, compliance of the competition law is very important. So therefore we of course are taking care of such kind of things.
A
But no one, there's no. There's no app people use to text.
B
Text?
A
Yeah, like on. Like on signal. Everyone's texting all the time in Japan. Do you. Does anyone text?
B
I don't think so. Especially the. For these kind of talks. Of course we have the signals, we have the line L I N E. The Japanese version, the sns. However, more online bubble or the face to face meeting is important because actually how can I say the economic security issues is a very dynamic and no textbook we have and the situation changes day by day, week by week. Therefore we need to the deep collaboration, deep communication with each other. So that text not so much.
A
Well, I thought war was really complicated, but apparently American Vice President and Cabinet ministers can figure that out via text as well. Anyways, sorry. Okay. All right. I think we'll end it with that. This was such a pleasure. Thank you so much for being a part of ChinaTalk.
B
Thanks a lot. So please keep in touch. Thanks a lot.
Date: January 2, 2026
Host: Jordan Schneider
Guest: Ishikawa Kazumi, Principal Director for Economic Security Policy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan
This episode features a detailed conversation between Jordan Schneider and Ishikawa Kazumi of Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), exploring how Japan conceptualizes and enacts economic security policy in the 21st century. The discussion covers METI’s historical role, the shift towards economic security as national security, strategies for supply chain resilience, coordination with global partners (especially the U.S.), and METI's approach to public-private cooperation.
Historical Reflection:
Quote:
Changing Meanings Over Time:
Modern Japanese Approach:
Key Concepts:
Sector Categorization (Three Buckets):
Lessons Learned:
Methods:
Balancing ‘Carrots and Sticks’:
Business Engagement:
Sensitive Sector:
Global Cooperation Required:
Bridging Hard and Economic Security Networks:
Global Forum:
This conversation provides a nuanced look into how Japan is reframing economic policy for a turbulent world—grounded in historical strengths but reoriented toward resilience and global cooperation. METI’s approach is pragmatic: sectors are carefully prioritized, public-private ties are emphasized, and there’s recognition of both the limits and necessity of economic security measures in an interdependent world. Kazumi’s candid, sometimes self-deprecating insights provide a rare look at Japanese policymaking, blending caution, optimism, and a dose of diplomatic humor.