Lawrence Freedman on Strategy and Nuclear War

Summary

ChinaTalk Podcast Summary
Episode: Lawrence Freedman on Strategy and Nuclear War
Date: February 25, 2026
Host: Jordan Schneider
Guest: Lawrence Freedman

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Main Theme and Purpose

This episode of ChinaTalk features a wide-ranging conversation with Professor Lawrence Freedman, leading historian and scholar of strategy and war, covering lessons from the Falklands War, parallels with Taiwan, the complexities of nuclear strategy, decision-making under stress, and reflections on war, peace, and historical writing. Freedman’s insights, drawn from a career analyzing conflict and command, are placed in the context of contemporary US-China relations and global security dilemmas.

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Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Parallels Between the Falklands War and Potential Taiwan Scenarios

• Island Defense and Amphibious Operations: Freedman describes the Falklands as an instructive case for understanding the challenges of defending and occupying islands. The lack of a large population and issues of popular resistance distinguished the Falklands from a Taiwan scenario, but the maritime and logistical challenges resonate.

  • "It does tell you about the challenges of maritime operations to take islands." (01:00, Freedman)

• British Political Dynamics: The UK initially viewed the Falklands as expendable, engaging in prolonged, unsatisfying diplomacy with Argentina mostly out of inertia and alliance commitments to the islanders—only to be suddenly forced into military response by an unexpected Argentine invasion.

  • "The British got themselves caught in a game whereby they wished to be seen to be negotiating but couldn't negotiate the transfer of sovereignty..." (02:23, Freedman)

• Timing and Military Readiness: An accidental window of British preparedness allowed the UK to respond effectively; delays or planned carrier sales could have otherwise crippled a response.

  • "If the Argentinians had been a bit more patient, they would have been better off." (04:22, Freedman)

• US-Taiwan Parallels: Freedman argues that while there are surface similarities with Taiwan, the status quo there remains tenable as long as all sides maintain the fiction of a 'One China' policy. Political signals suggesting abandonment can be risky, but he notes that conflict is not inexorable.

  • "There's no necessary dynamic there. It's not hurtling inexorably to a conflict..." (05:44, Freedman)

2. Intelligence Failures and the Psychology of Decision-making

• Assumptions and Misread Signals: The UK misjudged Argentina’s intentions, projecting British reasoning (public opinion, risk aversion) onto an autocratic regime—a common error in strategic analysis.

  • "They assumed that factors which weighed heavily in the formation of British policies...would be equally compelling constraints on countries ruled by one party or heavily under the influence of a single leader." (08:08, Freedman)

• Stubborn Interpretations: Even as evidence mounted, British officials persisted with outdated assessments—a phenomenon echoed in the initial Western reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

  • "It was just for internal consumption, this report, but it sort of warned against all the things that then took place..." (08:08, Freedman)

3. Domestic Political Pressures in Crises

• Popular Reaction: The public reaction to war or invasion can override prior isolationism or cynicism. Even leaders not initially inclined to act can be forced by domestic political imperatives.

  • "The prospect of humiliation was a powerful motivating force, and if they hadn't been able to send a task force, Thatcher would have been in great difficulty." (10:00, Freedman)

• Motivation of the Aggressor: Often, aggressor regimes expect quick, negotiated settlements. Commitment shocks—unexpected resistance or popularity at home—can drive them deeper into conflict than planned.

4. Writing History and the Limits of Knowing

• Incomplete Records and Reinterpretation: Even with access to archival materials, the fog of war and human memory limit the historian’s ability to reconstruct ‘why’ critical decisions are made.

  • "History is always being interpreted and reinterpreted because there's lots of evidence around and you can decide what to pick on and what not to pick on..." (13:23, Freedman)

• The Importance of Context and Individuals under Stress: Freedman underscores that high-stakes decisions get made under stress and time pressure, and even participants retrospectively misremember details.

5. Human Nature, War, and National Psychology

• Popularity of Nationalistic Responses: Military response to national humiliation can be a pivotal and redeeming moment for a leader, as in Thatcher’s case.

  • "The fact that she could send a task force made a difference." (15:51, Freedman)

• “War Fever” and Historical Blindness: Societies lacking recent painful war experience—such as contemporary China—may exhibit dangerous confidence echoing pre-1914 Europe.

  • "There is like a little echo of like, you know, 1914 European powers being like, oh, man, this would be so fun and awesome and amazing when, like, you know, it wouldn't..." (17:32, Schneider)

6. Xi, Putin, Autocracy, and the Risks of Succession

• Comparing Xi and Putin: Freedman draws parallels between personalist leadership—the drive for a “legacy victory”—and catastrophic miscalculation, as in Putin’s Ukraine war.
• Successor Risks: A “post-Xi” China, with less stable succession mechanisms or unclear party-military boundaries, could become more dangerous than the status quo.
  • "The longer Xi is there, the harder it becomes." (22:49, Freedman)

7. Nuclear War: Deterrence and the “Crystal Ball Effect”

• Why No Nuclear War?: Nuclear weapons made the destructive potential of war so stark that they heightened leaders’ incentives not to use them, creating a “crystal ball effect.”

  • "Nobody could think of a way to win a nuclear war. Still can't think of a way to win a nuclear war. But it wasn't hard to think about how destructive it could be." (24:42, Freedman)

• Futile Quest for Victory: Both US and Soviet strategists attempted to make nuclear war “winnable,” but eventually the futility and moral gravity won out.

8. The Realities and (Limited) Achievements of Arms Control

• Origins and Outcomes of SALT: Early arms control talks were less about actual limitations and more about managing offense-defense balances and encouraging dialogue.

  • "The real breakthrough was the strength, both sides being aware...there just was...a barmy idea [to pursue missile defense]." (32:23, Freedman)

• The Limits of Formal Symmetry: Negotiations often devolved into arcane debates about counting warheads and systems, without fundamentally changing the reality of mutual destruction.

• Arms Control and AI: Freedman disputes analogies between nuclear arms control and contemporary debates over AI, arguing that nuclear weapons’ clear effects and the Hiroshima precedent made cooperation unique.

9. Decision-making Under Uncertainty and the Role of Advisors

• Moments of Decision: Freedman recounts being present at moments of policy debate (e.g., Thatcher with Gorbachev), noting that effective leaders are open to advice and capable of challenging their own prejudices.

  • "It demonstrates that it's only at certain times when you can often penetrate the decision making process because you have a leader that suddenly doesn't quite know where they are..." (38:04, Freedman)

• Institutional Friction and Leadership Confidence: Johnson and Vietnam vs. Kennedy’s confidence and skepticism—a recurring lesson in how personal psychology shapes major events.

10. Historical Memory, Military Experience, and Modern Leadership

• Military Experience at the Top: Leaders with direct combat experience—Kennedy, Sharon—often approach the use of force with more skepticism than those without.

  • "Kennedy having experienced a pretty traumatic moment in the Pacific War, was much more...had the junior officer skepticism about senior officers." (47:20, Freedman)

• Changing Institutional Knowledge: The fading of WWII-era generals and direct military experience changes the character and caution of leadership.

11. The Ukraine War as a Test of Modern Military Theory

• Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in Practice: The Ukraine war defied predictions of swift victory and exposed the enduring difficulties of offensive action against prepared defenses. The proliferation of drones and battlefield networking is significant, but the dynamics recall older patterns of attrition and motivation.

  • "A lot of what's going on wouldn't surprise anybody who'd been through the Second World War once they were updated on the technology." (50:42, Freedman)

• The Cost of Strategic Stupidity: Putin’s miscalculation has devastated both Ukraine and Russia—a case study in failing to understand context and overestimating military ability.

12. The Historian’s Craft and Engaging Writing

• On Writing About War and Strategy: Freedman laments the tendency for endless reinterpretation and the undervaluing of high-quality secondary literature. He praises writers who pair insight with style—Michael Howard, Tom Schelling, John Keegan—and shares his own process: scavenging from wide sources, engaging the audience, and writing before “knowing everything.”
• Negotiating History’s Fragmentation: The process of assembling a narrative from scattered sources mirrors the chaotic reality of real-time decision makers.

13. Enduring Lessons and Reflections

• Reminder of Contingency: Freedman stresses that understanding the historical record prevents determinism and encourages humility in prediction.
• Call for Accessible Histories: He advocates for readable, engaging histories of more recent conflicts, especially given the policy relevance for future crises (e.g., the forgotten Sino-Soviet split).
  • "There's always a lot to be done to remind people of sort of the stream of history of which we're a part and that...unless you understand this history, you're going to get the future wrong." (65:00, Freedman)

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Notable Quotes and Memorable Moments

• On Human Failings in Policy:

  • "History is made by people who don't know what's going to happen next." (89:55, Freedman)

• On the Crystal Ball of War:

  • "If everybody had known in 1914 what the world would look like in 1918...they wouldn't have bothered [to go to war]." (24:42, Freedman)

• On Decision-Making and Fatigue:

  • "Fatigue is an incredibly important factor in decision making...they keep going, the adrenaline keeps them going...but they're tired." (62:57, Freedman)

• On Writing and Influence:

  • “If you've got something to say, you should be able to say it in a way that's accessible to other people. And, you know, language should be more than functional...convince [readers] of your arguments, or at least give them what they need to argue back at you.” (74:09, Freedman)

• On Leaders and Advisors:

  • “You need a leader that is confident enough in their own analytical capabilities and their own judgment to make a call against those advice, but also against their own instincts. And that's, you know, that's quite rare.” (43:40, Freedman)

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Key Timestamps for Important Segments

• 00:43 – Start of discussion: Falklands parallels and Taiwan
• 05:22 – Military readiness and accidental windows of opportunity
• 08:08 – British intelligence failure and the perils of mirror-imaging
• 10:00 – Domestic political pressures and the psychology of national humiliation
• 13:23 – The limits of writing history
• 15:51 – Thatcher’s transformation and the power of nationalist response
• 17:32 – War psychology and China’s lack of recent experience
• 22:49 – Xi, autocracy, and post-succession risks
• 24:42 – Nuclear war, deterrence, and the “crystal ball”
• 29:44 – SALT, arms negotiations, and their real effects
• 38:04 – Policy decision moments and the value of open-minded leaders
• 50:42 – Ukraine and the “revolution in military affairs”
• 55:50 – Human error, mishigas, and the end of strategic rationality
• 65:00 – The state of war writing, historical memory, and relevance
• 79:32 – Writing process, sustaining curiosity, and engaging the audience

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Style, Tone, and Closing

Freedman’s tone is measured, insightful, and often self-deprecating, eschewing false certainty and emphasizing the complexity, contingency, and human dimension of strategic issues. Host Jordan Schneider steers the conversation with intellectual curiosity and humor, grounding the discussion in both contemporary policy debates and broader historical themes.

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For listeners interested in strategy, policymaking, war, and history—particularly regarding China and great power competition—this episode is a masterclass in how to think rigorously, skeptically, and humanely about conflict and the perilous temptations of power.

Transcript

[Interviewer]

Lawrence Friedman, the Dean of Strategic Studies, graces us with his presence today on Chinatalk. He's written books about the Falklands War, nuclear strategy, political military relations, Kennedy's foreign policy, the revolution of military affairs, and my personal favorite on the history of strategy, you know, not to mention countless other academic and popular articles. He's now part of a father son substack duo, samf substack.com I've read so much of his work that I'm kind of overwhelmed by the directions I could take this conversation. So, so apologies to Lawrence and the audience for me scattering around centuries and geographies over the next hour or so. Lawrence, thank you so much for joining Chanson today.

[Lawrence Friedman]

My pleasure.

[Interviewer]

All right, so we're going to start with the Falklands War. I was rereading the official history that you wrote about 15 years ago, and there were some Taiwan parallels. Am I crazy for seeing some, you know, some, some connections there?

[Lawrence Friedman]

Well, it's about the defense of islands and the occupation of islands. The Japanese, interestingly, have been. Have looked at the Falklands for, for similar sorts of reasons. So it tells you something about the problems of amphibious operations. It's obviously very different in one respect in that there was not a lot of population on the Falklands, but there were not sort of the issues of popular resistance or the risk to civilians as a result of fighting. But it, it does tell you about the challenges of maritime operations to Take Island.

[Interviewer]

I mean, what actually really struck me was the first book about the buildup to, to the war where you had this, like, really weird dynamic of the UK telling the islanders, like, you guys, something's got to give here. Like, the current path is unsustainable. This is too expensive. We're not really going to be up for this. It's halfway across the world. It doesn't really matter all that much to us. And then, you know, you had this very confusing, you know, multi year back and forth, you know, with an autocracy who is having, you know, coups and all this other sort of like internal tumult. And all of a sudden it sort of, you know, creeped up on the, on the uk the fact that this invasion happened.

[Lawrence Friedman]

Yeah, I mean, it's an interesting story because there's no doubt that in, in the Foreign Office at least, the preference was to find a way to sort this out, because the wider interests in South America were far greater than, than those in the Falklands itself. But a commitment had been made in, in the late 60s to re, to sort of follow the wishes not the interest but the wishes of the islanders and the islanders wished to stay British and everything the Argentinians did sort of reinforced that wish including having coups and economic collapse and so on. It reinforced that wish. So the British got themselves caught in a game whereby they wished to be seen to be negotiating but couldn't negotiate the transfer of sovereignty unless by some mechanism the islanders decided that would be a good idea all by themselves and there was sort of a prohibition on forcing them into it. So you hoped that. They hoped that the logic of the situation would dawn upon the islanders but it never did because they felt more comfortable with the status quo than with any devices that the. The Foreign Office came up with, such as leaseback. So eventually the procrastination couldn't hold anymore. Argentine impatience run out. And in a way the British were fortunate that the Argentinians in the end acted impetuously in, in April 1982 because if they'd waited a bit then there would probably be very little the British could have done about it.

[Interviewer]

Why was that?

[Lawrence Friedman]

Well, it was because the. The full effects of the 1981 defence review hadn't quite taken hold and as it happened in, in the. In April 82 there's quite a bit of fleet at sea. There'd be an exercises off Gibraltar, quite a lot of troops were back for, for the Easter holidays and so it could be mobilized and if there were carriers available, the idea was to sell HMS Invincible to Australia for example and Hermes was due to be scrapped. So if that was the case then we would not have been able to take air power with the task force. So in which case it would have been hopeless. So if the Argentinians have been a bit more patient, they would have been better off.

[Interviewer]

Yeah, I mean, you know, this obviously isn't a direct parallel between US policy towards Taiwan today but you know, you can see a world in which, you know, an isolationist American president starts talking to Taiwanese leadership and saying look like we might not be there for you and you may have to make some sort of arrangement.

[Lawrence Friedman]

I mean in both cases the aggressor country, assuming China would be the aggressor, was convinced that there was a territorial unity that had to be respected. The difference obviously with the Taiwanese case is in principle, the Taiwanese government also agrees that there is some sort of unity. It just doesn't want it to be overdone. So the status quo is tenable with Taiwan as long as both sides can live with the fiction that one way or the other they're staying still part of the same country. As we know, should the Taiwanese government decide to end that fiction which the Biden administration, as all previous American administrations has cling to, then there would be trouble. I don't think there's a new conversation to be had with the Taiwanese government by a future American administration. It's really an issue of whether they just stick with the current, say, fiction, artificial situation. It's possible, I suppose, that a Trump like president would, would make. Would be so sort of disinterested in the US international commitments that Beijing would see an opportunity to, to push the matter further, that that's a possibility. But the thing about the Taiwan is there's no necessary dynamic there. It's not hurtling inexorably to a conflict so long as both sides decide they can stick with this status quo.

[Interviewer]

So one of the sort of big things the UK government had to hand wring about was of this being sort of an intelligence failure and them not really understanding just how serious was. You write about a report that the government put out which quote, pointed to a tendency to assume that factors which weighed heavily in the formation of British policies, such as public opinion, a reluctance to use force and, and military balances of power, would be equally compelling constraints on countries ruled by one party or heavily under the influence of a single leader.

[Lawrence Friedman]

Yeah, which of course was true. I mean, it was somewhat ironic. I mean it was just for internal consumption, this report, but it sort of warned against all the things that then took place, including, I think, which is quite important, just persevering with a particular assessment, even when evidence is coming in that suggests at least you should question it a bit. I think that was part of the problem with the Falklands is the intelligence community had a view that this would be such a foolish thing to do, that the Argentinians wouldn't do it, despite the evidence that maybe they might. And even when they were doing it, they were reluctant to, to get off that position. Now, you know, we saw this with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, you know, because it seems such a stupid thing to do. You assume therefore that Putin wouldn't do it, but of course he did, because he didn't see the world as we do now. We maybe probably were more accurate than he was about the foolishness of the thing, but that didn't help in terms of preventing the war.

[Interviewer]

Last thing on the Falklands, when the invasion happened, there was enormous domestic political pressure to do something about it, and it almost cost Thatcher her time in the top job. Even if we're in a timeline, Trump Isolationist. He convinces himself he doesn't care about Taiwan. I. I think it's definitely possible that if something does happen, and maybe the president isn't inclined to do it in the first place, the sort of dynamic once an invasion happens could shift so rapidly that a leader could feel compelled to do it. I'm sure. Besides this, there are other cases in history where you see those sorts of events playing out.

[Lawrence Friedman]

It's an important point because, I mean, even in this case Argentina, the Argentinian junta probably anticipated that this would be the prelude to a negotiation. No special intention to hold on by force to the island. But A, the British then sent a task force so they couldn't just back away. And secondly, it was the most popular thing they'd ever done, so they felt they had to stick with it equally, I think. I mean, this was territory that was British. The islanders look and sound acted British, wanted to be British. So it's a bit different from obligations to a client state or ally or whatever. But probably it is important to note the prospect of humiliation was a powerful motivating force and that Thatcher. If they hadn't been able to send a task force, Thatcher would have been in great difficulty. Whether or not she would have fallen is speculative, but she would have been in great difficulty. The fact that she could send a task force made a difference.

[Interviewer]

I love the, you know, you talk about the islanders being British. There was like this one passage in there where basically like the, like the Foreign Office, they keep sending people to talk to the islanders and be like, come on, guys, like, please, you know, consider this, that and the other thing. And, and all the islanders, like, they're always polite to them. So the Foreign Office people, like, convince themselves that there's maybe a little more going on there than there otherwise was.

[Lawrence Friedman]

I mean, they're an interest. I mean, I. I've been to the Falklands and rather liked, like the islanders, like the island, actually, despite how bleak it's. It's often described. And they were dependent upon the UK and they knew that, so being outright rude was not such a good idea. But I think they were pretty clear in their heads what they wouldn't accept. I think one of the more successful of the ministers who went out there came from sort of Welsh mining area. I was very familiar with the phenomenon of places that sort of seemed to be on decline, but people. This was their way of life and, and they wanted to stick with it as long as they could, rather than uproot themselves because it was politically convenient to somebody else,

[Interviewer]

you know, you mentioned somewhere that, you know, you were. You. You were. You were covering the Falklands in real time. And then all of a sudden, 25 years later, you have this opportunity to, you know, peek under the hood and, you know, see all the. See all the secret diplomatic cables and interview anyone and everyone who is still alive to talk to you about this. I'm curious, you know, even in the. It was interesting that even in the. In the introduction to these books, you were saying, like, look, I was not able to answer every single question. You know, was that your expectation going in? What's like the broader lesson about writing history, having sort of seen that, seeing

[Lawrence Friedman]

that arc through history is always being interpreted and reinterpreted because there's lots of evidence around and you can decide what to pick on and what not to pick on, what questions to ask. And, of course, the archival evidence, it's substantial and good to be able to go through, but it's by no means complete. In the 80s, a lot of business was done on the phone. Now it's done on emails or WhatsApp. It's quite hard to get hold of it. So the information is always incomplete and there's always puzzles as to why somebody did something. And in the end, histories of this sort are about individuals under high stress, with big responsibilities, often under the pressure of time trying to make decisions. And often when you talk to them afterwards, they can't quite remember why they took the decisions they did, or they, you know, they get the chronology wrong. It all seems a bit of a blur to them later. What you can normally get is. Is the basic arguments and the basic concerns and the key decisions you're going to miss. You're always not going to quite get the nuance right or, you know, not be quite accurate as to who was in the room. And, you know, there are some issues, like, you know, still, the origins of the First World War probably will go back to the origins of the Russian invasion of the Ukraine, where you can see there are so many big issues at play and questions of alliances and their futures and so on, that it's going to be hard to be absolutely sure about what was the key variable, what was the key factor. But by and large, I think a good historian ought to be able to. To make sense of these events in their broad terms, even if some of the detail will be subject to later reinterpretation.

[Interviewer]

I want to come back to one more thing. You know, Thatcher sending the task force to the Falklands being the most popular thing she ever did. Does that tell you something about human nature. You know, you mentioned humiliation otherwise. But, like, why do people get so excited about this stuff?

[Lawrence Friedman]

Well, I mean, you've got to remember Thatcher in 1982 was not in a strong position politically. Her government had put the economy through the wringer. It was only just coming out and starting to recover from a recession. She was not particularly popular in her own government and the cabinet, and there was a risk, if she wasn't careful, that everything would just turn against because she was doing what a patriotic nationalist leader should not do, which is lose territory. So in that sense, it was quite a special moment. And it was more than just sort of the excitement of war. I mean, she could have lost. And it's not hard to work out a scenario where, having set the task force, Britain was still obliged to concede in the end, the islands to Argentina wasn't inconceivable because it was a war. So, I mean, I think she was shocked by the events, fearful of the consequences, and not very knowledgeable about military affairs. And it was a very quick learning process for her. But, you know, having read through all her files, you know, she showed nerve when she might have wobbled a bit. She didn't. She stuck it through that, transformed her reputation and kept her going for at least another five years before decision making got a bit awry again.

[Interviewer]

Yeah, I mean, I guess I was kind of getting at a broader question, like. And. And this is one of the thing that. One of the things that really worries me about China is it feels like, like once you have. Once a country has a really big awful war, they're not super excited to have another big, awful war anytime soon. And, you know, China hasn't fought anything in, you know, since 1979. And it's just like, when I read Chinese know, online discourse about it, it does. There is like a little echo of like, you know, 1914, you know, European powers being like, oh, man, this would be so fun and awesome and amazing when, like, you know, it wouldn't by any stretch of the imagination.

[Lawrence Friedman]

Yeah, I mean, I think there is that. I mean, the ch. The Chinese, you know, are worried themselves that they haven't fought a war since 1979. They haven't got commanders who are hardened and experienced to know what war is like. And, you know, you've got to hope that one of the consequences of watching the current war is that they become aware of the pitfalls at least of these sort of operations. I think starting a war, you know, Thatcher didn't start the war. I mean, she was faced with a war that somebody else started and she had to respond. Now, Zelensky didn't start a war. He's grown in stature because how he's responded to a war that Putin started. For Z to start this war, he's not only got to be prepared to take the risk that it may not work out as expected, but he's got to have this as such a priority that is prepared to sacrifice the Chinese economy, at least for a while, to potentially serious upheaval. So I think all you can do is note the competing factors. I think the worry, the worry about Z is sort of a legacy idea that, that he would like to be the leader that sorted out forever the status of Taiwan, just like Putin wanted to be the leader that sorted out forever. Ukraine was very much Russia's sphere of influence. And it's always very hard to get at quite how much this matters to an individual leader in charge of a large country, whether this is something which dominates every waking hour or is something they come back to now and again when they feel maybe it's time to look at it. I'm still of the view that Xi would rather not go to war over Taiwan, but can imagine circumstances when he might and certainly doesn't want either the Taiwanese or Washington or anybody else to think he definitely won't. I think it's important to the whole credibility of his position that that possibility is always there.

[Interviewer]

Yeah, I think you're right. And you know, she, like Putin has a track record and she has basically spent his entire life as a local and provincial official. And in those roles he spent time for working on anti poverty and you know, party building exercises. But Putin has spent the past 15 years like invading countries. Like this is his M.O. and she also, you know, he's, he's, he's been in, he's been in power for 10 years now. He's like completely centralized control of the PLA. And I mean the, the having a, having a, having like a fisticuffs border fight where a couple people die on, on the, with India is very different than like invading Georgia or like having a proxy war in Syria. And sort of my, my hope and sense is that when, you know, when she looks at all the different factors at play, he just decides it isn't worth it. But what's really scary to me and I think, you know, coming back to the Falklands thing is the post she world where potentially you have this like weird PLA hunter thing that's trying to sort of like assert itself and assured its legitimacy. And that I think more than like, unless she, like, really goes senile and is kind of like becomes off the rocker. The, the sort of post she moment is the one that's really scary to me because, you know, particularly like 79 happened partially because Deng wanted to assert his control over the party and tell the pla, look, even though you guys all think this is a bad idea, like, we should go to Vietnam, because I'm just going to show who's boss and that that is the dynamic which is a little more worrisome than, than Xi all of a sudden waking up one day and saying, you know, we're, we're. We're launching the votes.

[Lawrence Friedman]

Yeah. I mean, I think it's interesting. I think when you look at Russia, one of the problems is that there are no institutions left, essentially, and there's no successor to Putin. None has been. I mean, there will obviously be at some point a successor to Putin, but we don't know who it is or how he probably more likely than a she will be chosen. I think in China, the institutions are there still. I mean, the part as he went, the party is still there, and the party has its processes and its structures that are still in place. The relationship with the, with the military is quite interesting because, as you know, a lot of the reforms of the PLA in recent years have been to cut the army down to size and reduce its political influence. So I think he's quite conscious of that. You know, that's an indication that within the Chinese system, there are sort of forces at work which we may not always understand that well, which can produce all their tension. And certainly when you have a leader as dominant to see, and if they go, then the succession is always going to be a problem. And someone like Z is unlikely to want to nominate a successor because as soon as you do it in these systems, they become a threat. So it's. I think that in principle, post Z should be easier than post Putin because you do have the structures there, but the longer Z is there, the harder it becomes. I think.

[Interviewer]

Speaking of communist systems, why wasn't there a nuclear war?

[Lawrence Friedman]

Why wasn't there as yet? I think because it's scary. You know, there's a famous idea of the crystal ball effect that, you know, if, if everybody had known in 1914 what the world would look like in 1918, you know, the, the Kaiser and the Tsar and the, the Emperor of Austria, Hungary, and, and all those who sort of suffered by the end of the war wouldn't have bothered because they didn't know, but they had optimistic views about what could happen. I think one of the things nuclear weapons did was to give us a very stark and pessimistic view of the likely outcome of war, which had the effect from quite early on of increasing the incentives not to, not to go nuclear. So, you know, if you look back, even when the Americans had a superiority at the time of Korea, there was always unease about using such a terrible weapon. And I think that unease carries on to this day again, as I think hopefully we can still see in Ukraine. Nobody could think of a way to win a nuclear war. Still can't think of a way to win a nuclear war. But it wasn't hard to think about how destructive it could be. So. And leaderships on both sides really didn't want to test the theories. They were prepared to make an effort to avoid that sort of calamity. So. And the longer it has gone on, in a sense, the more unthinkable nuclear use seems to be. Now that could change. It could change because potentially because of developments in Ukraine or because of something between India and Pakistan or because the, the, the North Korean leadership is crazier than we think it is or, or whatever. So you can't rely on this indefinitely, which, which is part of the dilemma of living in the nuclear age. But so far, the way we've discussed the issues, which nobody has ever really tried to play it down successfully, that we have a very clear idea about what nuclear war could entail and therefore that creates enormous incentives to avoid it.

[Interviewer]

What's, what's fascinating reading nuclear history is just how hard people tried to make it winnable, right? I mean, you had so much engineering, sort of like strategic energy, trying to figure out how to, you know, put your bases in the right place and like, just have, like, if we only could have this delivery system and we could only, you know, harden our shelters this and that way, then, like, maybe we could get an edge. And, you know, you have these moments in time where, like Colonel Slim tells jfk, like, screw it, like, let's just bomb them. We've had enough of this. But both on the Soviet as well as the American side, it was really like the presidents and sort of the most, the people at the top who were the ones who had to say, you know what? I'm not going to be the one that's going to kill 500 million people.

[Lawrence Friedman]

I think that was, I mean, Certainly during the 50s and into the 60s, there was enormous effort put into trying to find a way to win a Nuclear war and somebody like LeMay. You win a nuclear war by getting in first with the maximum carnage and assume that the enemy will just be left unable to respond. It's not inconceivable. In the early 60s they could have got away with it. Paul in cost and an awful lot of fallout. The. I think by the mid-60s that had changed and why you, you know, you, you, you have since then periods when there's big debates about different sorts of nuclear options in practice. It's a long time since anybody has come up with a serious scheme for starting and winning a nuclear war. Now these things can change. But I think we've been in that position for a long time. But you know, a lot of effort had to be gone through to prove the proposition wrong before the proposition was eventually accepted.

[Interviewer]

Let's talk a little bit about SALT and nuclear sort of negotiations. You recently wrote a sort of like salt 50 years on essay. So salt and nuclear arms reduction treaties, like why do they even begin in the first place?

[Lawrence Friedman]

So there are a number of things going on. First, it was useful to have the two sides talking about something and this was an obvious agenda point because there was a view, particularly late 50s, early 60s of how a situation might develop in which even though both sides didn't want a nuclear war, the sort of logic might push them into, into preemption or misapprehension, miscalculation. Kennedy was very fixated on that sort of problem. And this became clarified around the issues of first strike and second strike and so on. As long as both sides had a second strike capability, the situation stable. If both sides had a first strike capability, then we'd be on a head trigger all the time. But I think there's a particular reason for the origins of salt, which was a desperate effort to by McNamara, Secretary of Defense and the scientists in the arms control community not to go ahead with a large scale anti ballistic missile system. While the Russians didn't seem so bothered by the idea. So they got up the idea in their head that if only you could persuade the Russians not to go ahead as well, then that move enshrined in a treaty would stop an arms race. That was the basic idea. Now I think when you look at it, which is what I've tried to do with that article, actually there were good reasons for not going ahead with an ABM system because it would be overwhelmed, because it was much easier to defeat it with.

[Interviewer]

I love this. Yeah. Ash Carter, who was, who was working at the legendary Office of Technology Assessment, which no longer exists in Congress. He said he, this was his first thing he did in, in, in national security. He was a physicist and they were like, oh, look at these rocket things. And he writes a report being like, this is the dumbest thing I've ever heard. It's never going to work. Talk to me, you know, when Moore's law, like develops 40 years down the line and then maybe we can come up with something.

[Lawrence Friedman]

Yeah. You know, and the Russians, I think, having just instinctively thought, well, you know, how can anybody object to a defensive weapon? Realized too that it was all pretty pointless because it could be overwhelmed. So it wasn't actually the arms race stability arguments that were crucial. What was crucial was the supremacy of the offense over the defence at this time. And for that reason, even without salt, I mean, SALT happened because both sides had come to that conclusion and SALT confirmed it. And that was seen as an important breakthrough. But actually the real breakthrough was the strength. Both sides being aware because of moving and decoys and so on. There just was barmy idea. And then when you moved on to arms control for offensive systems, no solution was ever really found. And part of the argument in that article you mentioned was actually a whole new strategic theory was created about the benefits of a perceivable symmetry in which neither side could claim it was stronger than the other. But it was a wholly contrived thing. And because it was contrived, contrived, it sort of elevated the importance of the sort of measures of capability and led to more arguments than it sought against the committee on the present danger in the 1970s on into the Reagan administration. So actually, I think one will be hard put soberly to say the strategic arms control actually calmed the situation. It was a good thing, I think, for the two sides to talk to each other. They did learn quite a lot about each other in the process, but I suspect the situation would have stabilized anyway.

[Interviewer]

The way you sort of describe what salt ended up turning into, it's almost like a game of Settlers of Catan, because, you know, the US and the Soviet Union, they, they all had sort of like different, like it wasn't exactly parallel. And you know, some people's, you know, ICBMs were a little better than there were some bombers. But, you know, we're talking in like orders of, of like thousands. Right. So everyone's still going to be able to kill each other and like everyone else on the planet, but, you know, salt kind of turned into this game of like, okay, is like one of my BOMBER Worth like 75% of 1 of yours. And you know, at the end of the day you're still, you're still able to kill everyone else in the other country in that more than this, this effort to denuclearize, which like didn't really end up going anywhere for the duration of the Cold War, seems to me to be the real key here.

[Lawrence Friedman]

Yeah, and you know, serious people expended in intellectual effort trying to explain why it mattered if one side had a superiority in one measure, even if not in all measures, when both could blow each other up. And it was just, it was bad theory, if you like. It elevated things. Now, you know, as a matter of practical politics. How much would Congress ever have accepted? Sure, the US just holding back on numbers while the Russians scooted ahead. Probably there would have been enormous pressure to catch up anyway. But at least you could have talked about it as sort of rather basic instincts at work rather than try to develop a quasi sophisticated theory to explain it.

[Interviewer]

Yeah, I mean, folks are talking today about sort of artificial intelligence and arms reduction and so like this, the us, Soviet Union, nuclear discussions as a parallel, which like I really don't see because you know, these folks are worried about like the AIs getting out and taking over the planet. But like two, two big differences. One, like you had Hiroshima and Nagasaki already, so everyone on the planet was convinced that this stuff was, was going to kill you and going to kill you and everyone you love. And then you also had the fact of the matter that like America and the Soviet Union built thousands and thousands of nuclear bombs. And so, you know, you're not going to, it seems to me like completely implausible to get into a world where the US and China like decide not to make what, you know, some people think is like the most powerful things in sliced bread. If all it is is anthrax, then like it's not that big a deal. If it's a nuclear weapon, then like there's no way that nation states are not going to be pursuing it to the sort of like maximum extent of its capabilities.

[Lawrence Friedman]

I mean, the difficulty of conversations about AI is. AI is so many different things. I think a lot of the hype either way is overblown. It's important, but I mean, the point is that it's layered. That is that AI comes on the top of all the other things that are already there. And it's the interaction of AI with the legacy, so called legacy systems that makes a difference.

[Interviewer]

Is there a particular decision in history? You would have loved to be a fly on the wall in the Room for.

[Lawrence Friedman]

I think it'd be very frustrating with some of them to be a fly on the wall and not being able to say, don't do it. No, I mean, you know, there's not a moment of the Cuban Missile Crisis that people haven't been through. And of course, in the end, yeah, I think the crisis indicates how there are moments of decision, but a lot of it is, you know, developing assumptions that you can never quite pin down when the decision was made. Even, you know, with the Iraq war, it's actually quite hard to say. This is when the decision was made to go to war against Iraq in 2003. It was sort of incremental and there were lots of moments. I mean, the only time I got close to a significant decision in the sense of talking to participants was when Thatcher met Gorbachev for the first time in December 84. And that was interesting. I mean, I was in a briefing for her in which somebody in the Cabinet Office had got mainly genuine Soviet experts, particularly on the Soviet economy, and then me along as an arms controller, to talk to her before the visit. And that was interesting because the academics, who were very capable people, were able to impress on her the weakness of the Soviet economy. And she sort of, you could see her lapping this up and getting quite enthusiastic as the conversation went on about the implications of this and, and how it could be, you know, and what could be done with it. And I think that was, you know, one of that. And a general policy towards Eastern Europe was one of the better aspects of Thatcher's foreign policy. And it was informed, took advice, it was interesting. And then, you know, all when the moment came and the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc started to fall apart, she. Her prejudices came back to the foreign because she. Not about the Soviet Union, but about Germany, because she couldn't bear the idea of a united Germany. So I think what's interesting to me there was to be at a moment when you could see a prejudice being challenged successfully. Now, as often as not, that just doesn't happen because the people surrounding especially well established leaders are. Tend to be, if not out and out, sycophants, at least wary about challenging the leader's thoughts directly. So it would always be interesting to be a point where it would be a really good thing to challenge ideas. I mean, I did try to do this in November 2002 with Tony Blair, by taking a group of people, experts on Iraq and the Middle east, not to challenge the view that something needed to be done about weapons inspectors and so on, but about what could happen with the war. But the timing was all wrong because it was towards the end of the big UN negotiation about a new resolution for Iraq. So people weren't on the edge of their seats at the time expecting a war at any moment. And as I recall, they were largely worried about or interested in the possibility of a coup against Saddam. So the conversation just went off in an odd direction. So in comparison with the one with Thatcher, which was very productive, it, but was probably pushing it an open door, this one didn't even begin to push properly because the situation wasn't right. So I mean, I think these are moments that are quite get a glimpse of the way that policymaking is being made. But it demonstrates that it's only at certain times when you can often penetrate the decision making process because you have a leader that suddenly doesn't quite know where they are and what the situation is and is open to ideas, but if they're not open, if their ideas are fixed. It'd been great to be part of the conversation with Putin early in 2022, if you got a chance to say, do you really understand Ukraine? Do you really think this is on? Et cetera, et cetera. Because as far as what can tell, nobody did that.

[Interviewer]

Yeah, I mean, it's interesting if that's your frame of terrible decisions, LBJ and Vietnam. Right. And it's interesting because you had ball there. And that's sort of like when the counterfactual falls apart where you literally have that person embodied who's like saying all the things and is in the position and then the President goes a different direction.

[Lawrence Friedman]

I mean, I mean, Johnson first didn't have a lot of confidence in his own judgments against all these bright people he'd inherited from Kennedy. Secondly, he, he, what he did understand was US domestic politics. And he could see only trouble in quote, unquote losing Vietnam. And then as far as one can tell, he was never particularly convinced by the arguments for the bombing or land force, but he couldn't see a way to avoid them, especially once that was the advice he was being given, whereas Kennedy was. You know, if you look at Kennedy's decision making in late 1961 on Vietnam, he was the most dovish member of his own administration because he had enough confidence in his own judgment to challenge the assumptions people were making. So first, anybody who seeks to offer advice, especially an academic or outsider, has to be sensitive to the overall political context in which an individual is operating and the domestic political factors and so on and so forth. The many different Foreign policy issues that may be in play at any given time. But they also need a leader that is confident enough in their own analytical capabilities and their own judgment to make a call against those advice, but also against their own instincts. And that's, you know, that's quite rare.

[Interviewer]

You know, there was this line in, in command where you're talking about Thatcher's decision to, to fight in the Falklands where someone said, you know, if she had been, you know, if she had been like a private in, in World War II, she would have known how bad this could have gone and would have been less confident. And you know, Kennedy, Kennedy's World War II service was like very real. LBJ's wasn't. He was like a sitting congressperson. He like flew on a, you know, he like flew to Guam or something and then flew back. And, you know, it's interesting thinking about history when you know, you have folks like, like a Sharon or what have you who really have deep military experience in their 20s and 30s when they become to, you know, when they, when they ascend to power, those often tend to be the ones that are, that are, you know, more hesitant to, to escalate when there's a, when there's the potential to do so.

[Lawrence Friedman]

Yeah, well, I mean, Sharon was not against escalation.

[Interviewer]

You're right. Bad example. That's a terrible example.

[Lawrence Friedman]

Was an escalator. I think so. Look, I mean, I think Thatcher was very conscious of the fact that she was surrounded by people, people who'd known war. I mean, two of her small war cabinet had got military crosses in the Second World War fighting. The chief of defense staff, Admiral Lewin, had been on the Malta convoys and so on. I mean, these were serious. They knew about warfare and she didn't. And that made her probably too prepared at times to, to accept their advice. I think Kennedy's view, Kennedy having experienced a pretty traumatic moment in the Pacific War, was much more. Had the junior officer skepticism about senior officers.

[Interviewer]

Sure.

[Lawrence Friedman]

But on the other hand, he was following a supreme commander as president and he was very conscious of that. He was very deferential towards Eisenhower, in fact. So I think, you know, as time went on, the military advice was being given by people who might have seen combat, but not that sort of combat, not, not World War type combat, not big clashes of big army type combat. And so, no, everybody was a little bit in the dark about what it could mean. And I think when you're talking about the United States, you're talking about a country that could never quite believe that Anybody could really beat it and nobody ever really did. I mean, it lost wars rather than got beaten in wars, you could say, because the political conditions worked against it. So you've got an interesting dynamic at work there with somebody like. So a case like Israel, where they've been fighting from day one of their existence. Everybody of any seniority has got some sort of military experience. Obviously, one of Netanyahu's problems is it was his brother who was the war hero rather than him. But someone like Sharon had been in there from the start and had forged very sharp views. And then it's a small country, they all know each other. I mean, they've all rubbed up against each other at some point and they formed their friendships and their enmities and so on and got the measure of each other. It's very different in a big, large country where people don't know each other quite so well and haven't and are not sure of who was going to respond well to the particular pressures of a crisis or whose military judgments are going to be affected by which service they were in and, you know, the particular little bit of action they may have seen and so on. So I think after the Second World War, well into the 60s, you had people around who really didn't, and indeed into the 80s, you had people around who really did have a good feel for what war, big war could involve. But over time that has been lost and maybe, sadly, we're regaining it again as we watch what happens in Ukraine.

[Interviewer]

Let's stay on Ukraine for a second. So Andrew Koprenovich, you know, one of the originators of the concept of the revolution in military affairs, recently said that people expected Russia's invasion to be a second Desert Storm, but what we're getting is a second Iran, Iraq War. What is the sort of takeaway, you know, one year in, what is the, like, initial takeaway about how. How you think the sort of information technology precision revolution has played out in the Ukraine context?

[Lawrence Friedman]

I mean, many ways. I mean, it obviously was never. Maybe the Russians thought it would be a bit like Desert Store, but pretty clear quite early on it wasn't. It's not really Iran, Iraq either. I can see more similarities, but by and large, I mean, the lessons are not that surprising from Ukraine, which is one reason why it's been possible to follow it. I think defence tends to be stronger than the offense. To have success in an offensive requires that either you're facing a thin defence or you've thinned it out yourselves. And that's quite hard to do without air power. I mean, both sides have found that quite hard. So it tends to attrition, and that's what's happened. You know, if Ukraine is able, as I would hope, to make breakthroughs in its offensive, it will because of superior equipment and tactics and because of motivation. Its soldiers know what they're fighting for. I don't think the Russian soldiers do. But these are all things you could have drawn from earlier conflict. There are aspects of the war which, including the Russian attacks on critical infrastructure now, most randomly, on towns and cities, that reflect, well, that don't reflect any particular understanding of what, what these sort of tactics have achieved in the past. I mean, you can't wholly write off the. The attacks on critical infrastructure because last December they came quite close to succeeding. Ukraine was in a difficult position, but it got through. And, you know, then you get into issues of the quality of air defenses versus striking air power and missiles. These are all issues that anybody who follows modern conflict knows pretty well. Now, the drones are a new aspect, at least not, not as such, but in the way that they're being used, particularly lots of cheap drones. And know you can see the role of information communications networks being important in linking intell, you know, battlefield intelligence with the ability to strike targets as and when they appear. So, I mean, I think there's all sorts of interesting stuff there. But. But I said I've been trying to write on this, and I keep on coming back to the thought that a lot of what's going on wouldn't surprise anybody who'd been through the Second World War once they were updated on the technology. A lot of that is just a variation on technologies they would have known quite well. They would have worked it out quite quickly.

[Interviewer]

I don't know, is there a bigger takeaway was stupid?

[Lawrence Friedman]

I mean, you know, starting a war on the basis of a political prejudice, which is what Putin did, I mean, it's cost the Ukrainians dear. I mean, it's appalling what's happened to Ukraine. Every Ukrainian I know has lost somebody or lost friends or whatever, but done terrible damage to Russia too. Everything that he thought he might have achieved in the first couple of decades of being in charge has been lost. The economy's been set back. Nobody wants to invest in Russia anymore. A lot of its brightest people have left the country. Their military machine will take years to revive again. They still got an air force and, and the navy, but their army has had a torrid time. So starting a war without a clear plan to conclude it a realistic plan to conclude it and checking that real, that plan against all the best advice would lead you not to do this sort of thing. So I, you know, I think the political lessons are always the most important. Too much discussion of strategy, whether military or otherwise, ignores context. Assume there's some sort of rules you can apply which will bring you victory or whatever. You need to understand the context in which you're operating. And Putin didn't.

[Interviewer]

Maybe this gets back to a question I asked earlier, is like, what is it about humans that can't appreciate how stupid wars are or have to keep relearning this lesson.

[Lawrence Friedman]

Well, we all make mistakes. I think. Jesus, I think Putin, you know, there's a word, mishigas, which Yiddish word for getting an idea in your head that is bonkers. And Putin is fixated with Ukraine. Now, he's not alone in that. When the first time I heard a Russian express complete dismay at the idea of Ukraine as a separate country and a belief that one day would have to be brought back under Russia's wing was in 1992. And I remember the conversations quite vividly. This is some guys we brought to the UK for sort of courses and so on in London. This guy's views were sufficiently shocking that I eventually took him along to parliament. So, you know, they could hear it as well. So it's not, you know, it's not new. And Russian disdain for Ukraine is not new. It goes, you know, well back in history, certainly into Soviet times. And so. But Putin didn't have to make a big deal of this. And there are a variety of reasons for it. One, just the idea of Ukraine as a separate state. Secondly, the particular fear of contagion from popular movements and anti corruption campaigners, democracy campaigners. He didn't like the color revolutions. He got into his head that this sort of a noxious form of Western decadence would come this way. There are the issues of NATO enlargement, though I think they're overdone. But there was certainly something there as well. And all this formed a mix, probably coming together during COVID when he's in isolation, as we can see, he's a complete hypochondriac. So he sits there reading books and deciding that Ukraine isn't viable, doesn't deserve to exist, while it causes Russia so much trouble and Russian speakers so much trouble and decides to act. And before, Putin had used military force, but always in a pretty cautious way. Mean. He gambled, but gambled cautiously, but the caution went to the wind, maybe didn't. Maybe he thought it was a. An easy win. So it's going to take a long time, I think, before we're absolutely confident of that. I mean, you know, we've got a certain amount of evidence. How much is in Moscow archives, Who knows? And, you know, one suspect that eventually be very hard to find a Russian who was in favor of this war. But this is what happens when you let somebody dominate the political scene for so long and exclude people who take a different view.

[Interviewer]

Is there a, like, a strategist at some point in history where, like, you'd enjoy having an office across from them?

[Lawrence Friedman]

The most realistic would have been to be involved in British decision making during the Second World War. Churchill, for all his faults, was actually open to advice, did have civilians, some rather odd, others very bright around, and was prepared to support them. So you could have probably got a hearing. And the strategic debates were really so important and difficult. In the end, I think the, you know, the right decision to take, but, you know, to be part of the conversations between the US and British chiefs of Staff about second fronts and Italy were these landings of good ideas, I think would have been absolutely fascinating. I say, because I understand, you know, I know I know quite a bit about these debates and can understand what they would have been about. Now, if you go further back in time, it would have been interesting to debate these matters with Clausewitz if we could have understood each other, because the fact that the poor chap died before he finished his books means that, you know, there's questions that are left lingering. And because so much time is spent now interpreting what he really meant, it would have been nice to ask him directly what he really meant. So I think, you know, when one studies these things, sometimes you do try and imagine what you would have said and how you would have been involved. As I've indicated a couple of times, when very much on the periphery, I at least have some access to people making decisions. And I think when you do that, you realize the strategy is not the sort of very deliberative process in which it often appears how much it's about shifting assumptions that people may not even recognize how much they're shifting how, how much it may turn on bits of information or a single conversation that one person had with another that put a thought in their head how, you know, staff work may not be as important as we think it should be, and so on and so forth. So I think when you actually, and you get this a bit from, you know, historical research, looking back at what one can find out, but there's always A risk, I think, for historians that we make the process appear more methodical than systematic than it actually is. Because, you know, there are five factors which were important here. We can list them all and maybe they all were very important. You can find evidence for. But how they were coming together in somebody's mind is very different. And what priority had, what salience they had, very different. So you can identify them, you can judge which you seem to think were the most important, but it never. It won't quite capture the human dimension of the decision making.

[Interviewer]

It's interesting because, like the text of a book, it ends up being put in an order. Right. But when you're in an archive, right, and you have like 20 pieces of paper all spread spread out around you and you're trying to like put it all together, like that is actually the headspace that these guys were in where they have all this different data coming into their heads and they're trying to do their best and they're tired and they're fighting with their kids and, you know.

[Lawrence Friedman]

Yeah. I mean, whatever it is, they've got home lives and they're tired. I mean, fatigue is an incredibly important factor in decision making. You know, talk to people who've been to Keith recently. I mean, they all remark on the people that talk to are very tired. I mean, they've been doing this for a long time now and it's the same group of people, by and large, and they're tired. I mean, they keep going, the adrenaline keeps them going. And no doubt, and it's a mental tiredness as much as it's physical tiredness. But sometimes you read reports say, you know, people join the Cuban missile crisis and they just don't tired because there was almost as if they dance, sleep in case they miss something. So, you know, these sorts of things are very hard and as you say, sort of the jumble of stuff that's coming in at you and what captures your attention at a particular moment, what doesn't. And I, you know, it's part of the excitement of the archival research, especially when you see the words directly in front of you that can slowly put together how the sequence of event even. Why it's always hard to quite capture what's going on in somebody's head. And of course, this is why things like telephone transcripts are so much more revealing, which you have very few really. So much more revealing than the sort of official minutes of meetings and so on.

[Interviewer]

Yeah, I mean, it is a real shame that Watergate happened because then maybe we'd Have a few more, you know, decades of presidents deciding it'd be a good idea to record everything they say. But anyways, that's a bummer. Are there books you wished existed or just like topics or things you think need better coverage, whether it's fatigue in decision making or a particular campaign or what have you that you just, you know, you can't find like the right book to really scratch your itch on.

[Lawrence Friedman]

I'm more struck by how many books have been written. And I think, you know, one of the things that happens when you do, I mean, the research difference for the command book is every time is there anything on that I'd find it, you know, and, you know, I think that the tragedy of our profession is how much stuff is written that people forget about. You know, certainly found a brilliant article that nobody's. So I can work out. Nobody's ever actually looked at apart from the author or maybe the editor. You know, I have quite a strong view that, you know, there's something exhilarating by primary research in the archives, but we pay far too little attention to secondary material. Somebody's already been through it. You should respect that. I mean, it amazes me how much people do find topics filter out, even on the Second World War, which you'd have thought done to death, but absolutely not interesting books on individuals, particular engagements come out all the time. What I was trying to do in command was to say, look, we spent a lot of time on the world wars, but actually there's been an awful lot of activity since 1945. And no, it's not the case that on these topics there wasn't anything to read. They're just not as developed as many as the big themes of the two world wars. So, you know, I think as time passes and more archives become available, looking at the last 80 years will, will continue to be fruitful. I think that there's a lot that's not understood and what you don't have. I mean, for example, I mean, there's not, I mean there are very good, very well researched books say on Dien Bien Phu, on the French imperial campaigns. But what you don't seem to me to have are the sort of easy to read, accessible big histories that you get on D day or something like that. So I think leaving aside where scholarly research might be useful, I think that there's more to be done to bring recent history to light and to life so that people can, can follow periods which they're often quite murky. You know, in the UK you'll see occasional references to Suez in 1956, which at one point would have meant quite a lot most people because they remember this rather foolish British French expedition to topple NASA after he nationalized the Suez Canal and so on. But it means nothing now, I think to people in the UK and equally, you know, in, in in the US this is going back, coming back to, you know, your China theme. I'm hoping to write something on this for the substack. You know, how many people in current policy making positions are aware of the Sino Soviet split and the fact that from the sort of 63 to about till the 80s, Russia and China, Soviet Union and China were as wary of each other as they were of the United States because, you know, they think the world started with the end of the Cold War. So I think that there's always a job to do in. And this, as you know, it's a relevant policy question because if you understand that history, you don't get so certain about the solidity of any sort of Russian Chinese alliance now because there was one before and it fell apart with acrimony. So I think there's always a lot to be done to remind people of sort of the stream of history of which we're a part and that, you know, the future is always more interesting maybe. But unless you understand this history, you're going to get the future wrong.

[Interviewer]

Any books that you think do that really well?

[Lawrence Friedman]

Well, you know, there's, there's a lot being written now on Ukraine, Sahib Plokey's book on, on the Ukraine War. It's not particularly great on what's happened since the war broke out, but it tells you an awful lot about where it came from and the history of Russian Ukraine relations. I mean, I think lots of the stuff on Vietnam that traced it to the past. Even Ken Burns, his documentary series did that. So I think when, when you, when you get a big event, people do in the end look back. I think the problem is looking when the issue was live. Just keep on reminding yourself of the history and going back because it tells you what's contingent, you know, tells you a lot about contingency. Again, going back to this questioning of assumptions, things you thought were important was because of particular circumstances rather than sort of laws of nature that these things don't have to be, they happen, they are because of past decisions, past events that have all left their mark and shaped things. And I think that that's an important, always an important corrective to very sort of firm beliefs about what will and will not happen and how people will and will not respond to certain situations in the future.

[Interviewer]

Well, what was the most enjoyable read for your book about the future of war?

[Lawrence Friedman]

Oh, Oh, I certainly enjoyed reading H.G. wells. Not because he's a great writer, because he isn't, actually. It's quite a plodding style at times and sort of caricature, but it's just fascinating with somebody, you know, writing before the First World War, into the Second World War, but particularly before the First World War, just to see the assumptions he was making about how wars would unfold. So there's always just sort of fascinating moments when you suddenly understand when you get an insight into how he saw the world, because he was just unusual about using fiction as a means of developing his sort of futuristic fantasies which went towards that fantastical. You know, the atomic bomb is called the atomic bomb because of H.G. wells. So I. I found that that was sort of getting me going. I. I love looking at the earlier stuff, actually. I mean, what you. When you. You know, I. I'm obviously very familiar with more recent writing, but it's more of a revelation to look back at stuff that was written a long time ago, especially often because you see very similar themes to the ones that you now recognize being explored in a different time in a different way. So there's this famous book called the Battle of Dorking, which was written in 1871, which was one of the first of the sort of scarce scenarios about how we could be invaded by the Germans, or you can call them the Germans, but obviously that's who he was talking about. And again, you know, you go through. And you can pick out what was assumed at the time to be particularly important and make a difference. And then you get authors like Joseph Conrad say, you know, whose book the Secret Agent is still, I think, one of the most fascinating books about terrorism. But he was quite an essayist as well. Great polemicist, very polish in his attitudes to both the Russians and the Germans. And it's. Again, I just found the reminders of how well people could write and. And the points that they were trying to make, which we'd often just forgotten about. So, I mean, that's why I like the History of ideas.

[Interviewer]

Yeah. I mean, because that's the. That's the thing with, you know, Joseph Conrad and all your strategists is like, the. Like, half the reason people still read them is because they were good writers. And, you know, so much of the other stuff, stuff just, like, isn't. Which is just a bummer the person

[Lawrence Friedman]

who was the biggest influence on me was, was Michael Howard, Sir Michael Howard, who was my supervisor, mentor, friend, etc. And the first book, I would say not the first book I ever read about the issues that came to bother me, but the first book that really influenced me was a collection of his essays called Studies in War and Peace, which I'd recommend to anybody. Came out in 1970 or something. It's just full of elegant writing, but a range of topics. He's a brilliant synthesizer. He can capture in a few sentences sort of almost historical epochs. And that had an enormous influence on me. You almost remember I read it when I found he was going to be my supervisor, never having dealt with him before. And I read it overnight, literally overnight, sort of gripped by it, because it showed how, how you could express yourself on this. I mean, I've been reading, you know, articles on nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy before then, but nothing like this before. And then Tom Schelling, who I became still is a favorite whose style is different. And some of it can get quite formal, but at his best it can be a bit playful, but you can feel him always trying to think of a way of making the argument, always trying to find a way to get through to his audience, to communicate more effectively. And I think there's an important lesson there for academics and think tankers alike that, you know, if you've got something to say, you should be able to say it in a way that's accessible to other people. And, you know, language should be more than functional. It should draw people in and know, convince them of, of your arguments or at least give them what they need to argue back at you. And, you know, I worry that'll be handed over to chat GBT or something in the future rather than people making the efforts themselves.

[Interviewer]

Well, I mean, you know, if we live in a world where, like, great researchers who aren't good stylists can convey themselves more Effectively, thanks to ChatGPT, I don't think that's like the worst of all possible worlds. I mean, you know, if I could say, if I could take an essay I wrote and be like, make this in the style of Joseph Conrad. Like, I mean, I'd pay a lot of money for that.

[Lawrence Friedman]

Yeah, I'm interested to know what happens with that. People do these things in the style of Shakespeare now, so you never know

[Interviewer]

any other, any other, you know, writers or stylists aside aside from those too, thinking back over the years, or you're just like, man, this person really, really knocked the ball out of the park.

[Lawrence Friedman]

John Keegan was. Was also a great. A great stylist. I think over time, his books didn't sustain the same quality. But if you read the Face of Battle, when that was another book, that was an absolute revelation to read because it was both an imaginative piece of historical research, looking back at battles in the same place over far different timescales. And he asked a really interesting question, came up with some interesting points. What is it that gets men to fight? And he was a very elegant stylist. He worked at it when. The danger with being too elegant a stylist, I guess, is the style can take precedence over substance. I mean, you know, it's always my advice when editing was to start with your favorite sentence and take it out because you probably got so enamored with the words you'd managed to use and the language that you forgot got to check whether it was actually making a valid point. So you can get. I mean, style can be overdone at times. And I can think of people which I won't name who fell in to that trap. The aim is to communicate. I mean, I think that that's. A Man is about sustaining a reader's interest. And, you know, dense prose, which may be full of important information, develop a significant argument, but which, you know, has got your reader nodding off after two pages is not going to do the job.

[Interviewer]

Can we talk a little bit about the Lawrence Friedman production function? I mean, like, how do you pick the next book, the next article, you know, other thing, other. Other other tips and tricks, like cutting your favorite sentence, like what what is. You know, what has kept. Kept you going and motivated and curious over the years?

[Lawrence Friedman]

Well, I think when you're younger, when I was younger, you would be tending to write more, to demand. If somebody asked you to write something, I mean, somebody's interested in what you have to say, so you would do it. But as you get older, I found I really only want to work on stuff that really interests me, getting the right question. I mean, my approach to writing has always been to get into it. I've never believed in sort of doing all the research before I start writing, because I never know till you start writing what. What actually you need to know. So it's a sort of odd process of. Asking a question and then realizing it might be the wrong question. Different question suddenly becomes more interesting. You hit upon a bit of work, a bit of writing that you hadn't thought about before, some the way somebody else or a little bit of archive that you hadn't come across before. You know, that's what makes it enthralling and exciting and keeps you going. I think if, if you don't start writing until you think you know everything, then you'll never want to write because you're bored of the topic already. So another thing which I do, which don't particularly recommend is what I call scavenging, which reflects the fact that when I started in this business, though my instincts are as historian, often the archives just weren't available because I was writing about contemporary stuff. So you had to scavenge newspaper reports, congressional hearings, interviews, memoirs, some good journalistic accounts of stuff, anything, anything that could help a bit. So being prepared to look at diverse range of sources, I say not being sniffy about only being archived. Sometimes the archives aren't very good or aren't. Aren't available, you know, great when they are. So I've always been a bit of a scavenger. I enjoy writing and I think if you don't enjoy writing, it's quite hard. But I do. And I think it's, it's a. It is a creative process. It isn't about sort of functional thing, about putting down. Things I've learned, conclusions I've reached, but it's about engaging with an audience. And that really is about engaging with yourself. You know, if I'm bored with something, how could I expect somebody else to be interested? And how do I choose topics now? Well, in a sense I haven't had. I mean, I chose the book on command because I'd wanted to write something about command and I wanted to write something about post 1945 military history. So it came together. Now I just find I'm sort of immersed in Ukraine. So that. And the demands of my substack, which are. Is a beast which keeps on. Which needs feeding. So that keeps me going, sadly. I mean, I'd rather I. I didn't feel an urge to write about Ukraine because it wasn't, wasn't happening. But as it is, that sort of draws me in and sort of, you know, having spent a career looking at wars, when you have such a big one happening here and now inevitably that that's what I feel I should spend my time on.

[Interviewer]

So I read all the Makers of Modern Strategy again because I was interviewing Hal Brands and you know, I got to Delbruck, he got cut from the latest one, but he was in the older, older versions and you know, he has this crazy life arc of like he's spending most of his life, you know, thinking about can I. And what have you. Then all of a sudden World War I starts and he's like, you know, he's the. He's the, you know, 1915 equivalent of a substacker and just like writing columns, being like, we're doing this, we're doing that. And it's. It's a very surreal thing in.

[Lawrence Friedman]

In a way, I hadn't realized that that Howard that dropped him. I mean, Delbr. See, Delbro, only people only knew about Delbr because of the first makers of modern strategy. He was. He was sort of an accidental inclusion into that. I mean, in Germany he was well known and he was important because, I mean, Pre World War I, because he was the most prominent challenger to the assumption that, you know, of the quick, decisive war by defeating the enemy army and was the one who warned about wars of attrition. So actually in some ways is very modern theorist Delbruck based on a very, you know, on a firm understanding of military history. And yes, he did. He did do commentary. Other people, I mean, little art and so on, although less successfully during the Second World War he was in government for a bit. And then, as he seemed to get it all wrong, was not such an effective commentator in the war as he had been in the peace. But I mean, in past wars you could also see people with military historians putting their all in. You have to be quite careful. I think just because you're good on the history doesn't mean to say you're necessarily going to be a good commentator. But Deborah was, I mean, was a very shrewd guy.

[Interviewer]

If the US had intervened more aggressively in Bosnia earlier on, do you think the example of having the first Gulf War in a successful intervention and in Bosnia could have like changed something about the 90s and 2000s?

[Lawrence Friedman]

Because there was Kosovo in the end, which I think in the circumstance, probably the right call. But it had unfortunate knock on effect, I think probably, I think Kosovo was more important in. In Russian attitudes than enlargement, to be honest. I mean, I remember. So we go back to. To this. I had have a colleague, James Gough, who before we employed him at King's, come to me and explained to me why there was going to be a war in the former Yugoslavia. That's what he was doing this research on. And in March, April 1991, we had a big seminar at King's which all the Yugoslav, as it then was experts came along. And I was absolutely convinced after that that there would be a war because they were all arguing with each other. I remember getting very frustrated at a number of conversations on European security seems to me as a complacency on this matter. And so when it started, I wasn't surprised, except for the viciousness with which it then developed and the feebleness of the international response which lasted into. Into the war, spreading to Bosnia. And so I think this is the origins of more. I mean, so extent it was the Kurds in Iraq also in 1991. I mean, the two. One almost created a precedent for the other. But I sort of feeling that you couldn't just let this stuff pass. And then you had the Clinton administration coming in, demanding that more be done for the Bosnians, but not particularly prepared to do it itself, and that enormous difficulties in transatlantic relations with the British and French on one side and the Americans the other, until eventually, by the mid-60s, mid-90s, everybody got their positions more or less aligned, and a more firmer intervention did take place, just as the war was turning against the Serbs more because of Croatia than Bosnia anyway. So would it have been better to have acted earlier? Sure. Would it have sent a good message? Probably. But it's a good example of the problem of. Of how long it can take before a position forms that a government will act upon long in a way after it would have been especially useful. I mean, you can see it in the current war. I mean, I think the US Administration has not been bad at all on this, but, you know, there's been this incremental process of, you know, saying, well, we'll give you this, but not that, and the Ukraine say, well, we need that as well, and say, well, we don't think you do. And eventually they say, yeah, well, yeah, you do. But it would have been far better if they'd said that right at the start. Oh, really? Right. So I think again, it comes back to what we've been talking about a lot, which is the nature of. Of policymaking and the very human factors which influence it. And, you know, what seems clear to us now is not always clear to those when the decisions are being made. One of my lines is that history is made by people who don't know what's going to happen next. And, you know, we do have the benefit of hindsight.

[Interviewer]

So last, last question, which maybe isn't a comment but more of a request, is you've earned the right to write a book without footnotes. And I think, you know, doing Will Durant, he wrote Fallen leaves in his 90s, so you've got a little bit of time. But I do think, you know, some sort of like, just like 100 page. Like, here are all of my lessons about decision making and strategy and. And warfare. I think would be a real treat to.

[Lawrence Friedman]

Oddly enough. Oddly enough, that's probably what I'm going to do next, because I've been trying to. I. I can't. I'm not sure I can quite face. For the moment anyway, a major piece of hard research. But I have been thinking about a little book on strategy at least, rather than another great big thick tome.

[Interviewer]

All right, well, can't wait to have you back on Chinatalk to talk about that volume. Lawrence Friedman, thank you so much for being a part of Chinatalk.

[Lawrence Friedman]

My pleasure. Good to talk to you. Bye.

[Chorus/Singer]

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[Interviewer]

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[Lawrence Friedman]

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[Interviewer]

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[Lawrence Friedman]

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[Lawrence Friedman]

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[Lawrence Friedman]

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