ChinaTalk Podcast Summary — "Party Time! Jon Zinn on US-China in 2025 and 2026"

Date: January 19, 2026
Host: Jordan Schneider
Guest: John Zinn (Brookings, former IC and Biden NSC)
Main Theme:
Quarterly check-in with John Zinn, analyzing the evolving US-China relationship across 2025–26: trade wars, rare earths, strategic miscalculations, shifting White House dynamics, and the international ripple effects of US foreign policy. The discussion diagnoses a surprisingly quiet period in bilateral relations and ponders risks for escalation, alongside lessons from recent crises.

Episode Overview

Jordan Schneider and John Zinn revisit the US-China relationship at the start of 2026, examining why the atmosphere has become unexpectedly quiet, the underlying strategic dynamics, and possible scenarios for renewed tension. The conversation ranges from policy psychology in both Washington and Beijing to the implications of recent trade wars, rare earth sanctions, and high-profile arms sales, as well as the role of US allies like Japan and the broader international environment.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Surreal Quiet in US-China Relations

• [00:16–01:40] Both host and guest remark on the almost "eerie" calm, given global tumult elsewhere.

  • John Zinn:

    "With everything going on in the world and what's going on domestically in the United States, it's like the beginning of one of those Western movies where they say it's quiet, too quiet... Why are we not hearing more?" [00:32]

• This lull is seen as a rare "fallow moment," ideal for reflection on how both sides arrived here and where things might head next.

2. Flashback: The Genesis of Trade War 2.0

• [02:19–03:30] Rewinding to early 2025, the US, under a renewed Trump administration, revisited hardline trade tactics, expecting a more explosive standoff than actually materialized.

• "Liberation Day" is flagged as a turning point—the day fresh tariffs dropped and tit-for-tat escalation with China kicked off.

  • John Zinn described visiting China during these events:

    "There was a sense of preparedness ... not just in policy but emotionally. I expected anger or anxiety. Instead, people were like 'We know this is coming and we'll deal with it.'" [03:30]

• The rare earths “card” played by China proved surprisingly effective, leading the Trump administration to gradually walk back its stance, shifting from confrontation to de-escalation.

3. Evolution of Chinese Responses: From “Flat-Footed” to Proactive

• [05:02–10:18]

  • Comparing the first Trump trade war (2018+) with this recent phase, Zinn observes:
    • Initially, China aimed for "no concessions, no escalation" but was unprepared for US moves.
    • In the latest round, Beijing was far better equipped—strategically and emotionally—to retaliate.
    • The US underestimated China's learning curve, still referencing outdated assumptions from "Trump 1.0".

• Zinn attributes some US miscalculations to misreadings of China’s post-COVID economic rebound (expecting a "V-shaped" recovery which never arrived), fueling overconfidence in Washington.

  • Notable Quote:

    "Whoever briefed Trump on China's economy ... would have led with the fact that China's real estate sector was the locus of so many of China's economic problems ... they're blowing up perfectly good buildings, what's going on here?" (Zinn, [09:32])

4. Shifting US Policy—from Aggression to Mollification

• [11:33–15:16]

  • After early aggression, the Trump admin swung quickly to mollify China, yearning for a deal to score "wins."

  • Personnel shifts matter immensely ("personnel is policy"), especially in a White House where "the president is clearly so influenced by the people who are the last ones to talk to him." (Schneider, [11:55])

  • Zinn and Schneider discuss how internal dynamics—fewer "China hawks," more pragmatists—pulled policy toward conciliation.

  • They compare US diplomatic strategy: Biden’s “balance” of pressure and dialogue vs. Trump’s “seesaw” of abrupt escalations and retreats.

  • Notable Quote:

    "There's more of a balance... part of the reason we didn't have as explosive a Chinese response was because our diplomacy was concerted in a certain way." (Zinn, [14:06])

5. The Limits of Leverage: Rare Earths, Economic Pain, and Realities

• [16:36–18:13]
  • Despite bold talk, both recognize Beijing’s deep leverage via rare earths and US dependency for key goods.
  • True resolution of strategic minerals dependency is a multi-year (or longer) challenge—“not a this-year problem or even a this administration problem.” (Zinn, [17:36])

6. Beijing’s Calculus: Stringing Things to Midterms

• [18:13–20:24]

  • Zinn argues China is content to let things jog along through the 2026 US midterm elections—expecting Trump will soon seek face-saving wins, as his political needs outweigh the salience of China in US domestic politics.

  • Negotiations have shifted from broad economic issues to “whack-a-mole” on individual sectors and firms (e.g., TikTok, soybeans).

  • Notable Quote:

    "China is happy to play this game of negotiating away some of the pawns... we're not talking about those big macroeconomic imbalances..." (Zinn, [19:44])

7. Notable Escalation: China's Proactive Use of Export Controls

• [20:33–23:38]
  • Xi Jinping showed a more offensive approach by imposing sweeping export controls, purposefully framed to maximize leverage before the midterms.
  • Zinn believes this marked a shift:

    "That felt really different... Xi Jinping switching from being reactive to US policy, to being proactive and taking the initiative..." (Zinn, [20:42])

  • China “left themselves leeway” for negotiation by delaying implementation, and their gamble paid off: the US continued talks rather than retaliating.

8. Risks of Renewed Escalation

• [24:06–28:44]

  • The dangers of “stringing Trump along”: If the administration feels stymied at home, Trump could lash out internationally—potentially in more aggressive ways than before, especially as frustration mounts into 2027–28.

  • Supreme Court rulings or new tariffs could easily provide a pretext for renewed Chinese escalation.

  • Notable Quote:

    "What they have to avoid... is give him just enough to keep him invested... that he doesn't just blow the whole thing up in frustration." (Zinn, [25:28])

9. Beyond US-China: Impact on Allies and the World

• [28:51–38:04]

  • China is “tightening the screws” on US allies (Japan, Europe) rather than mounting direct pressure on the US.

  • In the Taiwan Strait, China ramps up military pressure, expecting the US to limit itself to arms sales (not robust support) for Taipei or Tokyo.

  • A low-key US response to Japan’s increased support for Taiwan sends a discouraging signal to allies.

  • Memorable Exchange:
    Schneider:

    "You have a Japanese Prime Minister doing exactly what you want them to do, saying, 'yeah, this shit is our problem, too'... and then they get kind of... like China gets annoyed by it and... actually, we don't want you to be saying the thing..." [34:57]
    Zinn:
    "Instead of embracing them for it, they're getting hung out to dry." [36:38]

10. Are Peripheral Interventions (Venezuela, Iran) Part of China Strategy?

• [41:01–43:49]
  • There is skepticism that bold moves in Venezuela or Iran will meaningfully impact the bilateral balance with China.
  • Despite some Beltway theories, Zinn is doubtful that regime change cutting off China from oil is a significant new source of leverage—these are “problems they can manage.”

11. Lessons in Risk and Luck from Trump’s Chaos Presidency

• [47:34–50:55]

  • 2025–26 has seen repeated high-risk US moves (tariffs, Middle Eastern interventions, arms sales), yet serious escalation or catastrophe hasn’t occurred. This “Teflon” effect emboldens further risk-taking and shapes Washington perceptions.

  • Notable Quote:

    "He does these things that could end in disaster, but they don't. And... it ends up discrediting institutional Washington. ... It's better to be lucky than good.” (Zinn, [50:01])

• Schneider compares Trump’s style to a poker player on a hot streak:

  "You go all in enough times in life, like, I don't know—you may not hit anything on the river..." [51:57]

12. Strategic Culture: Presidents as Risk Takers

• [52:19–55:02]
  • After Iraq, US presidents (especially Obama, Biden) became cautious; Trump is a throwback to earlier, risk-heavy leadership. Zinn notes Clinton, Bush, and Trump—all “chaos muppets” born in 1946—shared a willingness to upend “the process.”

13. Recommendations & Reflections

• [44:38–47:34]
  • Zinn recommends Pantsov & Levine’s biography of Deng Xiaoping over Vogel’s, for its depth on Deng’s early life and formative experiences.
  • Both praise Joseph Torigian’s book on Xi’s father, emphasizing the improvisational, day-to-day nature of Chinese elite politics.

Key Quotes & Timestamps

• John Zinn: “I expected, you know, what I didn't detect when we were in Beijing last year. There was kind of neither anger nor anxiety... we know this is coming and we'll deal with it.” [03:30]
• John Zinn: “Their approach [in first trade war] was ‘no concessions, no escalation’... In the second trade war, the shoe's been on the other foot.” [05:49–06:35]
• Jordan Schneider: “You have a Japanese Prime Minister doing exactly what you want them to do, ... and then they get... kind of like... China gets annoyed by it and... actually, we don't want you to be saying the thing that we've been asking you to do...” [34:57]
• John Zinn: “Trump does these things that have a very high chance, 25–40%, just to pick random numbers, chance of total cataclysm. And then... the sky doesn't fall... it ends up discrediting institutional Washington.” [50:01]
• John Zinn: "It's better to be lucky than good." [49:00]

Notable Moments & Timestamps

• 00:16–01:40: Surreal quiet in US-China relations.
• 03:30–05:02: Business community and Beijing emotional preparation for escalation.
• 10:18–11:33: US miscalculation of Chinese readiness following COVID.
• 14:06: US foreign policy see-saw: aggression to mollification.
• 20:33–23:38: Xi Jinping’s shift from defense to offense with export controls.
• 28:44–32:27: China’s strategy with US allies (Japan and Europe), arms sales to Taiwan.
• 36:38: Analysis of US-Japan alliance handling.

Tone & Language

The tone throughout is analytic, slightly wry, and laden with historical and policy references. Both Jordan and John blend sober strategic analysis with witticisms about bureaucratic politics and the chaos of the Trump administration, sustaining an engaging and fast-paced dialogue.

Conclusion

This episode offers a panoramic view of US-China relations heading into the latter 2020s: why "quiet" can be deceiving, how both sides learn and adapt across trade confrontations, and the double-edged nature of risk-taking in US foreign policy. The quiet is fraught with potential, and the future, as both guests agree, may hinge as much on personalities and domestic bottlenecks as on long-range strategy.

Recommended Reading:

• Pantsov & Levine’s Deng Xiaoping
• Joseph Torigian’s biography of Xi’s father

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End of summary.