ChinaTalk Podcast – The Future of Economic Security with Dan Kim and Chris Miller
January 21, 2026
Host: Jordan Schneider
Guests: Dan Kim (former Chief Economist, CHIPS Program Office; now at Tech Insights), Chris Miller (author, Chip War)

Episode Overview

This episode digs into the CHIPS Act as a landmark case for American industrial strategy: its goals, challenges, and broader lessons for economic and national security policymaking. Dan Kim, who played a central role helping define and execute the CHIPS Act, shares firsthand insight into designing strategy from scratch amid global supply shocks and shifting geopolitical risks. Alongside historian Chris Miller, the conversation expands to frameworks for economic security, the efficacy of current models, lessons from US–China competitive dynamics, and the balance between efficiency and resilience.

Key Themes & Discussion Points

1. Defining the CHIPS Act’s Vision and Mandate

[00:00–07:30]

• Dan Kim’s Entry Point: Tasked by Commerce Secretary Raimondo to “draft up a strategy from a blank piece of paper and execute it” amid pandemic-induced supply shortages and shifting AI demand cycles.
  • “There weren’t too many prescriptions as to what a good looks like, what success looks like, and how will we have known that it worked.” (Dan Kim, [02:26])
  • Massive, real-world examples underscored the crisis: unfinished cars, cruise ships, and PPE shortages due to missing chips.
• Initial Strategy:
  • Focused on producing a “Vision for Success” paper outlining concrete, but broad, targets: e.g., at least two competitive clusters of leading-edge logic manufacturing, support for mature nodes, advanced packaging, and compound semiconductors.
  • Deliberate ambiguity in language to accommodate diverse stakeholders—“we couch the language very carefully to communicate with potential applicants, with Congress, and to the world about what we were aiming for.” (Dan Kim, [04:47])
  • Decision to focus on forward-looking goals rather than a historical diagnosis: “We scrubbed that version because we didn’t want it to be a historical lesson...somewhere in the archives…there is that version.” (Dan Kim, [06:11])

2. Trade-Offs and Omissions in CHIPS Act Implementation

[07:30–11:18]

• Some priorities (e.g., materials, conventional packaging) had to be left unaddressed or were only partially tackled due to resource constraints.
• Quote: “We couldn't address everything.” (Dan Kim, [10:56])
• Suppliers’ willingness to localize in the US depends on volume—“Come back to us when there’s a third fab,” said Taiwanese suppliers, highlighting the nuanced economics of each supply chain segment.

3. Frameworks for Evaluating Economic Security: The 4 Cs

[11:18–13:21]

• Dan Kim’s “4Cs Framework”:
  • Capacity: Are we building sufficient volumes of capacity?
  • Capability: Are we developing the technical know-how and tech base?
  • Competition: Are we supporting market competitiveness (not just concentration)?
  • Criticality: Are we targeting end-use markets essential to economic/national security?
• These guided project evaluation and helped set internal priorities.
  • “We looked at all four Cs in every application; that was built into how we measured things.” (Dan Kim, [12:38])

4. Friendshoring, Market Realities, and Global Interdependence

[13:21–24:24]

• Not all supply chain “friendshoring” is created equal—“It depends on how the market works for that product,” especially for standardized goods like memory (an oligopoly market) vs. advanced logic (highly specialized).
• Prediction: Memory will become a critical focus for resiliency as supply tightens.
• On global partnerships: “We did put out very clear statements that we value friendshoring and we established an international engagement team within the CHIPS team.” (Dan Kim, [18:57])
• On outsourcing and the fabless-foundry model: Despite the strategic risks, these have been “huge force[s] for good for the American industry” because they lowered risk and accelerated innovation. ([22:01])

5. Case Study—Apple vs. Xiaomi/BYD as National Champions

[24:23–34:51]

• Hypothetical “who wins the 21st century—Apple as hegemonic innovator vs. Xiaomi/BYD as ‘fast followers’”:
  • Apple invents and reaps enormous profits. Xiaomi/BYD excel at cost-effective, wide-scale manufacturing, but profit less.
  • Dan Kim: “Someone has to go first...I’d rather have them [the innovators] in the US than anywhere else.” ([28:13])
  • Chris Miller: “As a business, you’d much rather be Apple than Xiaomi.” ([29:00])
  • But: Does manufacturing volume (à la BYD) translate into geopolitical power more than aggregate stock market value? Open question.
  • On Chinese tech: Even China’s “fast followers” are still heavily reliant on foreign tech: “If you crack open China-made smartphones...there’s not that much Chinese technology in those smartphones.” ([30:48])
  • On self-sufficiency vs. competitiveness: China’s experience with its 3G standard—“They realized they needed to compete globally. That’s the path forward.” ([32:02])

6. Resilience vs. Efficiency & Wartime vs. Peacetime Economics

[34:52–43:01]

• Redundancy and surplus capacity are costly—true resilience would require far more than the CHIPS Act’s $39B.
• Complete “self-sufficiency” is both impractical and potentially undesirable; best is likely a middle ground aiming for “some level of resiliency rather than...wartime scenario planning.” ([39:50])
• Chris Miller: Even if war is not the base case, not preparing at all impairs escalation leverage—“You might have to fold earlier down the escalation ladder.” ([41:42])

7. Operationalizing Economic Security: Recovery, Capability, and Metrics

[43:01–49:47]

• Kim urges a focus on “time to recovery” after a supply disruption as a core metric—resilience is about minimizing that downtime.
• “If you have the capability, if you have some level of qualification...you have built in some level of resiliency in terms of shortening the time to recovery to your supply chain.” (Dan Kim, [46:22])
• Trade-off debates: Should the US prioritize mature node fabs (28nm) for broad resilience, or chase the bleeding edge (3nm)? Decision needs to be grounded in measurable goals, not just politics or optics.

8. Economic Warfare, Escalation, and the Value of Intermediates

[54:10–61:21]

• Chris Miller: Intermediate goods (e.g., microcontrollers, photoresists) are powerful levers—disrupting these has outsized economic effects.
  • “The earlier you are in a supply chain, the more disruptive potential you probably have.” ([55:12])
• Dan Kim: Supply chain and export controls aren’t black and white; the US and China are deeply mutually dependent and there’s debate over how much mutual reliance should be preserved for leverage (“escalation dominance”).
  • “Is the optimal amount of American-made AI chips in China zero or is it not zero?” ([57:44])
  • Questioning whether total decoupling or some maintained interdependence offers greater flexibility and leverage in a crisis.

9. Institutional Design: How Should the US Manage Economic Security?

[63:25–73:33]

• Current US approach to economic security is fragmented—Commerce handles some aspects, Treasury others, Defense still others. There is no “semiconductor czar” or central authority integrating all instruments (tax credits, grants, export controls, etc.).
  • Dan Kim: “The magic of CHIPS was that all of those kinds of professionals were all mixed into one pot to come up with a strategy.” ([64:55])
• Suggests considering models like an independent “industrial policy Fed,” or a Watchtower for oversight across critical sectors, to ensure stability and consistent coordination.
• The stability of East Asian industrial policy environments (not just subsidies) is a strength America currently lacks.

10. Soft Power and the Human Element of Industrial Policy

[73:38–79:51]

• If given a modest sum ($10M), Dan Kim would invest in retaining experienced CHIPS team staff to preserve “institutional muscle.” ([73:59])
• Broader point: National success is intertwined with how foreign partners and talent perceive and experience the US.
  • Powerful moment reflecting on anti-foreigner sentiment: “It seems the United States wants our money and our technology, but they don’t want us.” (Dan Kim, quoting Korean commentary, [77:30])
  • The draw of the US for expats and families has been a soft power cornerstone—must be protected alongside domestic production benefits.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Strategy Under Uncertainty:
  “Everyone has a strategy until they get punched in the face.” (Dan Kim, quoting Mike Schmidt quoting Mike Tyson, [06:52])
• On Market Realities:
  “With $39 billion, no. [We can’t fully de-risk from China and Taiwan.] And if you gave me $3 trillion, maybe, but even if I could, why would you?” (Dan Kim, [36:00])
• Four C’s of Economic Security:
  “Capacity, Capability, Competition, and Criticality…that was built into how we measured things.” (Dan Kim, [12:38])
• Efficiency vs. Resilience:
  “Planning around the peacetime scenario is inherently more prosperous…if you are aiming for resilience solely, then there’s going to be added costs, and that just means less overall prosperity.” (Dan Kim, [36:22])
• On Apple vs. Xiaomi/BYD:
  “Would you rather have Apple, or Xiaomi plus BYD?…I’d rather have the inventors in the US than anywhere else.” (Dan Kim, [28:13])
• On Global Tech Interdependence:
  “Neither [the US nor China are] anywhere close to being self-sufficient…and I suspect that’ll be the case for many years.” (Dan Kim, [77:43])
• Soft Power and National Image:
  “One commentator…said, it seems the United States wants our money and our technology, but they don’t want us.” (Dan Kim, [77:30])
• Final Reflection:
  “At the end of the day, we’re not just talking about technologies or countries, we’re talking about people… I hope we never forget that.” (Dan Kim, [79:26])

Timestamps for Important Segments

| Segment | Timestamp | |-----------------------------------------------------|------------| | CHIPS Act’s mandate & “Vision for Success” | 00:00–07:30| | What was left out; materials, packaging dilemmas | 07:31–11:18| | 4Cs framework explained | 11:18–13:21| | Friendshoring & market structure | 13:21–24:24| | Apple vs Xiaomi/BYD, innovation vs fast following | 24:23–34:51| | Efficiency, resilience, and peacetime vs wartime | 34:52–43:01| | Metrics for resilience, time-to-recovery | 43:01–49:47| | Economic warfare, dependencies, and intermediates | 54:10–61:21| | Institutional challenges and possible reforms | 63:25–73:33| | Soft power, human element of industrial policy | 73:38–79:51|

Essay Contest: Future Research Questions

[63:25–72:49]

• Escalation management: Which side is more willing/able to sustain costs?
• Learning from Cold War deterrence: How to build stable economic deterrence?
• Creating unified, rigorous frameworks for defining/measuring resilience.
• Institutional design: From centralized agencies to portfolio management—what works best?
• Coordination across protect–promote tools (export controls, incentives, etc.): How to optimize?

Conclusion

Dan Kim’s final insight: The strength of American (and allied) industrial policy must be measured not only in output and profit, but also in the system’s openness, attractiveness to talent, and ability to maintain mutually beneficial, trusted relationships with global partners. “At the end of the day, we’re not just talking about technologies or countries, we’re talking about people.”

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(Note: Ads, non-content intros/outros, and transition filler have been omitted.)