← Christiane Amanpour Presents: The Ex Files
Christiane Amanpour Presents: The Ex Files
Q&A: Iran’s leverage, Hormuz tolls & will Trump leave NATO?
00:25:27
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- [00:03]
A
This is a Global Player original podcast. We have to remember we created a new source of revenue and power for the Iranian regime.
- [00:11]
B
For a minute, I didn't know what universe I was in when you said for foreign policy reasons. Honestly, I literally have got to the point where I don't think there's any reason. Having almost no experts around him, he said to me that no matter how this war ends, he felt the entire Gulf State US Based US Relationship matrix is going to have to be rethought. Instead of bringing them protection from their mortal enemy, Iran, it's done the opposite. Hello, everybody, and welcome to the Q and A episode of the X Files. This is our bonus episode. I'm Christiana Manpour.
- [00:55]
A
And I'm Jamie Rubin in New York.
- [00:58]
B
It's where we answer your question. So let's get started. Here's the first one from Eileen on email. Given the deep distrust between Iran and the Trump administration, if the US Withdrew from the Middle east without securing the Strait of Hormuz, is there a viable diplomatic path that excludes U.S. involvement? Could a coalition of middle powers succeed in the absence of an effective UN So it's a pretty smart, bloody, intuitive and informed question. And I just say that also because Trump in his speech to the nation a week ago basically said, hey, we don't need it. It's not our Strait of Hormoz. We just want to help you all, but it's for you, so you come and do it. It'll just open naturally, is what he said, Jamie.
- [01:42]
A
Right. And that's obviously not true. So let's talk about the two relevant conclusions one can draw from this Strait of Hormuz Pandora's box that have been opened. One is the good news. The good news is that the whole world has realized how integrated the global energy, especially when it involves the transfer of oil and gas. And maybe, just maybe one silver lining of this whole war and all of the damage that it has done is driving people towards cleaner sources of energy. It's been moving in that direction anyway. It's economically sound. It's obviously the right move for climate change and I think it will encourage countries all over the world to be looking to find ways to handle their energy problems and energy needs without reliance on Persian Gulf oil, which is something.
- [02:37]
B
So that would put the US in the, you know, playing catch up. Thank you to Mr. Trump and all the others who've pulled your country out of any sensible renewal.
- [02:48]
A
Exactly. And the leader in this right now is true China. Exactly. But nevertheless, we can catch up. We would Catch up. I always like to say if 500 votes had gone the other way back in the year 2000, Al Gore would have been president and we would have been generating alternative sources of energy for the last 26 years and we would have been the leader. But.
- [03:10]
B
And would not have been over a barrel right now.
- [03:13]
A
Exactly. The second part of the, the really sophisticated part of this question is how do you negotiate with the Iranians if this war were to end, let's say today, where they now can show what damage they can do to the shipping industry and the insurance industry by causing the price of oil and shipping to, to skyrocket if they threaten to attack ships. My here, and this is what's going on behind the scenes is that a lot of the middle powers that the questioner asks about are trying to figure out a way to, in a post war situation to negotiate this, to escort ships, to try to create what you might call an informal arrangement with the Iranians who may end up making money out of all this as a result of this war, to allow ships to go in and out. And every country has an interest in it, China particularly, because they're been very reliant on Iranian in oil. And I think it is plausible that using China as an intermediary, think of how horrible that is. We're going to have to use China and countries like Canada, the European countries are going to have to work with the Chinese to negotiate arrangements for the Iranians to allow oil and shipping to go in and out of the Strait of Hormuz. That's kind of where we're heading. And ironically, if you remember when we talked about this on the podcast some time ago, the Canadian prime minister started talking about, about this is now the era of middle powers where they're going to have to take on responsibilities themselves. Trump would like that. But there's a downside to that, is that the United States no longer becomes the leader of the world, but rather a country that has to be worked around. Which is what leading from behind? Well, that's an Obama phrase, which I know but like very much. And so instead they're going to work around the United States because the Iranians are going to be more likely to work with middle powers through the Chinese. And this is again going to put the Chinese in the driver's seat as a negotiator with Iran.
- [05:18]
B
And just one addition, Iran, for its part in its stated goals. Anyway, IRGC has said that they want control of the straight. You know, they want to put up a toll like the Suez tall Or, you know, they bring up all these other things and then because it's this, this, this writer talks about the UN and this and that, they don't want an international body. They want to do bilateral deals with all these countries and say, okay, this much. You pay this much and, and all of that. And by the way, Jamie, it is obviously an international body of water. There's some international agreements. It's called iclos or something. Anyway, something to do with the law of the sea. But guess who's not signed up to it. Iran.
- [06:02]
A
Y so, by the way, just one other fun point on that. You remember the Javid Sarif article you talked about?
- [06:08]
B
Yes.
- [06:09]
A
Giving Iran compensation for the war. It may turn out. I'm just speculating Y that their compensation is going to come in the form of tolls in the Strait of Hormuz, and that's how they can square that incredibly complicated diplomatic circle.
- [06:27]
B
Yep. That's a good one. Right? You asked the next one.
- [06:29]
A
This is from Sam on email. Could the UK realistically reach an agreement with Iran to access the Strait of Hormuz on more favorable terms than global market rates, or would its alignment with the US Military operations undermine that possibility?
- [06:45]
B
Okay, so that's pretty complicated. All I know is that here in the UK there was a meeting over the last few days of all the interested parties, the, you know, the, the, the Europeans and others, to try to figure out how to do what Trump says, you guys do it. And of course, they have come to the conclusions we just said that they will, but only after the war ends. Nothing can be done to forcibly open the Strait of Hormoz, which formally is not closed. It's just Iran is choosing who can go in and out. So it's not closed. It's not like there's big wall that has to be battered down. So they've been discussing this, and as you say, it's something that they have to be pending our total independence from fossil fuels. The world has to figure out how to use this and get this straight up and running again, like the Suez Canal does. And by the way, the Iranians are also now threatening if, if there's a Trump, you know, escalation on power plants and all of that to make sure their allies close the choke point at the mouth of the Red Sea. That's close to Yemen, where the Houthis are, what's called Bob Al something. And I always forget it unless I read it, but that means gate of in any event. So this is, this is really important stuff that I guess you know, I keep thinking what Trump and his people said. You remember there was a few days when their messaging was short term pain for long term gain. They've stopped that now because all their big friends in, you know, in finance and the oil industry and etcetera, have told them this. There's no long term gain out of this right now. It could be long term pain.
- [08:29]
A
Look, you know better than anyone that the two countries are most associated with interfering in Iran's Internal Affairs. In 1953, the famous coup attempt were the United States and the United Kingdom. So the questioner was asking whether the UK could get some special arrangement despite its relationship with the United States. Militarily. That might be true in other countries, but I think for the Iranians and the Iranian regime, the UK and the United States are really as one. And despite the best efforts perhaps of the British diplomats, it will be very, very, very hard for Iran to see the UK in any different light than it does the United States. But in the end, some mechanism is going to have to be found to reopen the straits or at least have it open in such a way that traffic can resume. And how the Iranians behave now, something we've handed them. And I think whatever our, the war's cost and benefits are calculated. When we look at the benefits and the costs, we have to remember we created a new source of revenue and power for the Iranian regime by handing them something that was theoretical. In the past, it was theoretical Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz. Now they've done it. They've shown how easy it is to raise the cost of shipping, insurance and damage the world economy. Now it's something concrete and real that they're going to get benefit from unless some way is found to open it militarily. And the experts have looked at that, say that's extremely difficult, would require long term naval military operation. That would take a long, long time. That's one of the lessons of modern warfare. Drones reopened, you know, destroyed the navy of the, of the Russians in the Black Sea. And now the Iranians have shown easy it is with drones and mines and other capabilities to close down the Strait of Hormuz. This is the modern world where asymmetrical power can be demonstrated or just new power.
- [10:39]
B
The drone warfare is something completely different than what they had in the, you know, tanker war in that same area back in the 1980s. I would push back a little bit on the UK thing. Isn't the UK the part of the E3? I mean, the Iranians do talk to. No, but they do. And they've even, they've even mooted that if they can't talk to the United States, they'll talk to Europe and then there'll be some kind of, you know, bridge, bridge bridging or something like that. I think the UK has moved a little bit beyond 1953, but you never know. And I think Keir Starmer's position on this war was, was, was actually noticeable and for its own interests, was noticeable and in the UK Interest, it was a smart move given. Fair point where we are now. Mark, on email, he says following Trump's reported insult to MBS and a subsequent defense deal with Ukraine, does this signal a fundamental breakdown in the Saudi U. S. Relationship? Jamie, you aware of what Trump said about, about Mohammed bin Salman, the de facto leader of the. Of Saudi Arabia?
- [11:51]
A
Yes.
- [11:52]
B
Trump was yammering about how wonderful he's been for the Gulfs and this and that, and that's why they all love him. And then he said he had a good relationship with MBS Mohammed bin Salman and that's why he's kissing my ass is what he said.
- [12:06]
A
And, well, Right. And in normal times with a normal president, that would be called an insult. That could break up a relationship. But I think MBS and the president and the Gulf Arabs and the president have developed a close working relationship. Some people speculate because of the financial benefit that it brings to the Trump family. The fact that Qatar gave an airplane to the United States, I don't know what the reason for it is. I tend not to spend my time worrying about that. The congressional hearings that will follow will do all that for the rest of my life. It's my understanding that all of the Arab ambassadors have gone to the White House and made absolutely clear to the president that, that whatever the legal ramifications are, they do not want to see this escalate to a, a power war that would cause them extraordinary and perhaps irreversible damage to their economy, certainly to their idea of, of being an oasis in the region as, as the people used to talk about Dubai. So that's going to decide whether their relationship breaks down. I think the Saudis are willing to help Ukraine because Ukraine was willing to help them figure out how against drones. And that shows you the wisdom of Zelensky to go to the region and make arrangements with the Arab countries. But I think this, we're at a moment where we're going to find out how important the Gulf allies are to the United States. I find it hard to believe that President Trump, for foreign policy reasons, will break with those Arab countries. It would be a terrible mistake after all of the work we've been doing over the years to develop this as a plausible economic, political relationship that's beneficial to us and beneficial to the Israelis. Let's remember there are Israelis who want this war to go on forever and increase the, the pain to the regime because they still think the regime's going to fall. I don't know whether the Arabs think that or not. Some probably hope it. But what they don't want is to see this escalate to a war that will do untold damage to their economic well being.
- [14:14]
B
You know, for a minute I didn't know what universe I was in when you said for foreign policy reasons. Honestly, I literally have got to the point where I don't think there's any reason. And I just wonder whether you would agree that what is happening in the White House is a result of, well, the individual, but also having almost no experts around him.
- [14:40]
A
Exactly.
- [14:40]
B
There's no experts around him to tell him this, that or the other to war game to do that. Probably. I'm not saying the military didn't and General Dan Kane didn't, but I'm saying the Cabinet and the others who have been picked for loyalty and not for expertise. And it is showing up in my, in my view. I'll tell you one other thing. Admiral John Kirby, who you know as well, formerly with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen, then he was, you know, he had a platform as a spokesperson during the Biden administration for the White House and National Security and Pentagon, etc, so he said to me that no matter how this war ends, he felt the entire Gulf State, US Base, US Relationship matrix is going to have to be rethought because it really didn't do what they hoped it would do. Instead of bringing them protection from their mortal enemy, Iran, it's done the opposite.
- [15:38]
A
I think that's right. And I think you've captured, you know, the part of this that is very hard for people like me and you to talk about, which is when fundamental, simple, knowable facts are ignored, the Strait of Hormuz can be closed. The Iranian regime can't be easily overthrown. Those two simple facts that any expert in this region, any professional in this region would have told the President, don't think it's going to be easy to take down the regime. Don't promise to help them if you're not going to help them, because help is on the way. Was a call for them to rise up and we haven't followed through on it. Secondly, the Strait of Hormuz, we've talked about it over and over again. Those two knowable facts that any sort of 101 foreign policy expert would have known apparently were not provided to the president. And that's why some have called this, you know, a march of ignorance as opposed to the march of folly in World War I. This. These were knowable things, easily knowable things that were ignored. And expertise is obviously not important, rather than what they call gut instinct. And sometimes gut instinct without expertise can cause us to be where we are today.
- [16:57]
B
I mean, it is. It just beggars belief. We're five weeks in, Jamie, nearly, and there hasn't been. How long was the Kosovo bombing?
- [17:06]
A
78 days. I remember it well.
- [17:09]
B
Okay, that's a long time. That's longer than what. What's going on right now. That's a long time. And by the way, just to be totally honest, it did lead to the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic.
- [17:21]
A
Look, the difference, and we talked about this, I think in another episode is the Milosevic was a rational actor. And I think all of our discussions in this program need to remember that the Iranian regime is based on the concept of the Shiite resistance, the axis of resistance.
- [17:41]
B
But that for them is rational. We're just going to eye for an eye. I no, no, they think it's rational.
- [17:46]
A
And I But they're used to being in a resistance mode. That's the natural mode for them. Paula, on YouTube. Can a US president unilaterally withdraw from NATO? What would that process be and its global implications look like, particularly for US Troop deployments? Let me start with that because I know a little bit about it.
- [18:07]
B
And you know, Ruta is will have been in. In the U.S. secretary General.
- [18:11]
A
General, what is great irony here, think about this. Marco Rubio is one of the strongest supporters of NATO. I believe he passed a law during the recent years, before Trump's second term to make it extremely clear that the Senate has to be involved in any withdrawal from NATO because he believed in NATO. He believed in the threat from Russia, he believed in the threat from China. So the strongest supporter of NATO in the Senate in the Republican side was Marco Rubio. He's now Secretary of State. I cannot believe that he would be part of a plan to withdraw from NATO, but if we did it, it would be one of the biggest mistakes of modern foreign policy era. As bad as this war may turn out to be, pulling out of NATO, remember the United States still is a democracy. We still are a great power. We still have residual support from countries all over the world, and it's alliances that distinguish us from the Chinese. As bad as this war is and as dangerous as Trump has been to our allies, we still have allies. We have basing rights. We have support from Japan, from South Korea, from from countries in Asia, from Australia and all the European countries. That combined with the United States is what makes us a force of and power in the world. And, and if Donald Trump were to be making the mistake of pulling out of NATO, he would wipe that away in one fell swoop. And I just can't believe that he would do something that stupid. The Europeans don't seem to believe him anymore when he threatens it. I think it's no longer part of his, his, his, you know, his litany of threats.
- [20:00]
B
And so I don't believe any of his threats anymore. They're just not taking them anymore. I mean, their whole national and economic interests have been really damaged by this war. And as we've said before many times, Greenland was the last straw and Europe has developed a spine and they are not. You know, somebody said to me, once you've answered back to the bully, the bully has no more, you know, effect over you. So, but my question is not what it would do to the US what would it do to the concept. Just say, if European defense, what would happen? What would happen if NATO fell apart? Then what?
- [20:40]
A
Well, exactly. And the Russians, remember, then have the ability to threaten smaller European countries. I think the people scared most about this are the Baltic states, these small countries on the border of Russia who know that it's the American security guarantee that prevents Putin from widening the war. He's shown a willingness attack Ukraine because Ukraine was not part of NATO. He's shown a willingness to interfere in Georgia because Georgia was not part of NATO. He has not crossed that threshold because remember what it brings to bear. Everyone forgets this. There's a series of escalatory steps leading up to the potential use of nuclear weapons if you intervene in, if Russia were to attack the Baltic states. And so I think so far, remember, on the nuclear question, Putin has been willing to get keep the strategic arms control process in place. He all of his nuclear bluffs turned out to be just that bluffs. And I don't think even Vladimir Putin wants to play a grand nuclear role of the dice with all that goes with that.
- [21:49]
B
So listen, I think we've also answered the last question because it's very similar. Marta on Instagram asks What are the global implications if the US is no longer seen as the leader of the democratic, democratic world? Could this shift influence other democracies to change their systems or norms? You know, there's a big, big trial happening, you know, the Sunday after this bonus episode drops and that is the election in the illiberal democracy of Hungary. And it's going to be really interesting to see whether they go maga, whether they stay maga with Viktor Orban or not. And recent far right or recent elections rather in some of these countries with, with ascendant far right have shown them to be not as powerful as was feared. So I think that's actually interesting.
- [22:39]
A
Well, I think you're right and the polling is very encouraging for those of us who believe that Hungary should and ought to be a member in good standing of NATO, not a country that is effectively Russia's member in, in the NATO alliance. I think the Orban time maybe finally have come and what it will show you is that despite all of his efforts to control the media and control the, and legal processes that, that the voters can still make a difference. I'm going to make a risky prediction here. I'm going to predict that that Orban's time has finally come. I certainly hope I'm not wrong and I know that my involvement in this will have no impact. The Russians are intervening in the election very openly. Orban is running basically on a pro Russian platform. And think about it, Hungary, the country that was invaded by the SO Union, was one of the first members of NATO after the fall of communism. I hope and believe the people there understand that they've now reached the outer limit of being a member of NATO, but in Russia's camp. And let's just hope and pray that that election is fair enough so that the people's voice can be heard.
- [23:57]
B
The main opposition leader there is Peter Magyar. And just to finish and add a little bit of something to that question, we're also obviously talking about the EU. I mean, under Orban, he prevented the EU from sending, you know, really important funds, $90 billion to Ukraine, which desperately needs it right now. And I think some people have said because of this craziness with Trump and NATO and unreliable alliance, that now members want to be part of the EU not as they used to think it'd make us richer, but it'll make us safer. Safer. So I actually think that's an interesting move on the, towards the eu. So look, that's it. Thank you everybody for your questions. Thank you for listening to the Q a episode of the X Files. If you have questions for us, don't forget you can reach us on all social media platforms and by email. And those are amanpourpodlobal.com for email and social media is at Amanpour Pod. And don't forget you can also subscribe to our YouTube channel so you can see all our bonuses and all the main episodes you just for Christiana Manpour presents the X files on our YouTube channel. Don't forget you can always listen for free on Global Player. That's it. Signing out from London and we'll be back with another episode on Tuesday.
- [25:17]
A
And goodbye from New York. This has been a Global Player original production.