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Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
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Hadran.org.il is the portal for Daf Yomi studies for women.
Hadran.org.il is the first and only site where one can hear a daily Talmud class taught by a woman. The classes are taught in Israel by Rabbanit Michelle Cohen Farber, a graduate of Midreshet Lindenbaum's scholars program with a BA in Talmud and Tanach from Bar-Ilan University. Michelle has taught Talmud and Halacha at Midreshet Lindenbaum, Pelech high school and MATAN. She lives in Ra'anana with her husband and their five children. Each morning the daf yomi class is delivered via ZOOM and then immediately uploaded and available for podcast and download.
Hadran.org.il reaches women who can now have access to a woman's perspective on the most essential Jewish traditional text. This podcast represents a revolutionary step in advancing women's Torah study around the globe.
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Chullin 12 - May 12, 25 Iyar
2d ago00:46:16Tap to summarizeRav Nachman states in the name of Rav that meat is permitted if someone supervised the slaughter throughout the process. The Gemara questions why supervision is necessary, given the principle that most who engage in slaughtering are experts. It concludes that the case involves someone known to be ignorant of the laws of shechita who successfully severed the first siman (sign); however, this is insufficient to assume the second will be handled correctly, thus requiring supervision to ensure no disqualifying error occurs during the remainder of the slaughter. Rav Dimi bar Yosef asked Rav Nachman: If an agent is appointed to slaughter an animal or separate teruma (tithes), and the owner subsequently finds the meat slaughtered or the produce tithed, can we assume the agent performed the task and the food is permitted? Rav Nachman distinguished between the two: the meat is permitted, but the produce is not. He explained that we cannot automatically assume the agent performed the task, and must consider that a third party might have intervened. Regarding shechita, this is acceptable because of the presumption that most slaughterers are experts. However, regarding teruma, if a third party separates tithes without the owner's permission, the act is legally ineffective. The Gemara suggests that the question of whether we presume most slaughterers are experts is a Tannaitic dispute, but this suggestion is ultimately rejected. Although a deaf-mute, a minor, or a mentally incompetent person may slaughter under supervision, the Gemara infers from the Mishna's phrasing that one should not grant them an animal to slaughter ab initio. Furthermore, the fact that their slaughter is valid and the meat is permitted indicates that slaughtering does not require intent (kavana), a position attributed to Rabbi Natan.
Transcribe →Chullin 11 - May 11, 24 Iyar
4d ago00:42:51Tap to summarizeStudy Guide The Gemara asks for the source of the principle that we follow the statistical majority (rubba), such as in cases of yibum involving minors where we assume the male is not a saris (sterile) and the female is not an aylonit (barren). The Gemara proposes ten different Torah laws as potential sources for this rule. While difficulties are raised against each possibility and some are resolved, the Gemara ultimately rejects them all. It suggests that these sources might only prove that we follow the majority when it is impossible to clarify the actual status; however, in a case where it is possible to determine the reality, one may be required to investigate rather than rely on the majority.
Transcribe →Chullin 10 - May 10, 23 Iyar
5d ago00:49:13Tap to summarizeIf it is discovered after shechita that the knife has nicks, can we assume the slaughter was valid because the nicks occurred after the two simanim were cut, or is there a concern that they occurred while cutting the hide before the simanim? Rav Huna and Rav Chisda disagree on this matter. Two difficulties are raised against Rav Chisda's ruling to permit, but they are resolved. From where do we derive the principle that an item retains its status until proven otherwise (chazaka)? Rabbi Yonatan derives it from the case of a leprous house, but Rav Acha disagrees with his derivation.
Transcribe →Chullin 9 - May 9, 22 Iyar
6d ago00:28:33Tap to summarizeThere is a dispute between Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav and Rav Chanania bar Shlemia in the name of Rav regarding which practical skills a Torah scholar must master through repetition. The first opinion lists writing, slaughtering, and circumcision, while the second adds the knot of the tefillin, the sheva berakhot, and the tying of tzitzit. Rav Yehuda quotes two further statements in the name of Shmuel. The first is that a slaughterer must be expert in the laws of shechita; otherwise, the meat may not be eaten. Since meat can be disqualified for five specific reasons, an unlearned slaughterer might perform an invalid slaughter without realizing it. The second statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel is that a slaughterer must inspect the two simanim (the windpipe and gullet) to ensure they were properly severed. While Rav Yosef attempts to provide a proof for this requirement, Abaye rejects it. The Gemara discusses the status of meat that was not inspected, debating whether it is classified as a treifa or a neveila. Both positions are rooted in their interpretation of Rav Huna's principle: a living animal is presumed forbidden until it is proven that a valid shechita was performed, but once slaughtered properly, it is presumed kosher until proven to be a treifa. The Gemara then analyzes the second half of Rav Huna's statement, inferring that an animal remains kosher even if there is an unproven concern that it might be a treifa. This is illustrated by a case where a wolf takes an internal organ and returns it with a hole; we do not assume the hole existed prior to the wolf's intervention. Rabbi Abba challenges this from a ruling regarding food nibbled by creatures, where we fear teh hole where they are nibbling was a pre-existing hole from a snake who may have injected venom into it. To resolve this, Rav Huna distinguishes between matters of danger and matters of ritual prohibition (issur). While Rava rejects this distinction, arguing that stringency regarding danger should imply stringency regarding prohibitions, Abaye accepts the differentiation, citing proofs from the laws of impurity. After Rava rejects Abaye's proof and Rav Shimi raises a difficulty with Rava's position that the Gemara resolves, Rav Ashi concludes by bringing support for Rav Huna's position.
Transcribe →Chullin 8 - May 8, 21 Iyar
1w ago00:45:37Tap to summarizeRabbi Zeira says in the name of Shmuel that if one heats a knife and uses it for slaughtering, the animal is not considered a treifa. Although the heat could potentially damage the animal, the sharp edge of the blade severs the windpipe and gullet before the heat from the sides of the blade can cause a burn. A question is raised regarding a person who strikes another with a hot knife, resulting in a leprous mark: is this classified as a boil (shechin) or a burn (michve)? The Gemara explores the practical halakhic implications of this distinction. Two sources are brought to resolve the matter - the first being the aforementioned statement of Rabbi Zeira - but the Gemara distinguishes between the cases and reaches no definitive conclusion. The Gemara then transitions to a discussion regarding benefit from knives used for idol worship, detailing when they are forbidden or permitted. It further addresses the status of meat slaughtered with a knife previously used for non-kosher slaughter, as well as the process for kashering a knife used on a treifa. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav notes that a slaughterer should maintain three distinct knives: one dedicated solely to slaughtering, one for cutting meat, and one for removing cheilev (forbidden fats).
Transcribe →Chullin 7 - May 7, 20 Iyar
1w ago00:46:07Tap to summarizeRabbi Yehuda Hanasi decreed that produce in Beit Shean did not require tithing, as he ruled the area was not considered part of Israel for those specific purposes. This decision was based on the testimony of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Zeiruz, who observed Rabbi Meir eating a vegetable leaf without tithing it. Rabbi Yirmia challenged this testimony, suggesting various reasons why Rabbi Meir might have eaten the leaf without realizing it was untithed or why it might have actually been tithed. In response, Rabbi Zeira argued that if God protects the animals of the righteous from inadvertent sin, then God certainly protects the righteous themselves. The Gemara recounts the story of Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair's donkey, which refused to eat untithed produce, to support Rabbi Zeira's assertion. This episode is part of a larger narrative regarding Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair's journey to redeem captives: the first part describes him splitting a river to cross; the middle section concerns the donkey's refusal to eat; and the final part involves Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi inviting him to dine, an invitation he ultimately declined. Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair was exceptionally careful never to benefit from the food of others.
Transcribe →Chullin 6 - May 6, 19 Iyar
1w ago00:46:55Tap to summarizeWhen Rabbi Zeira heard that Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Asi were eating meat slaughtered by a Cuti, he assumed they must have been aware of a prior decree permitting it. He reasoned that had it been forbidden, they would have inadvertently consumed non-kosher meat - a mistake God would not allow to befall the righteous. This principle is derived from the story where God protected the animal of a righteous person from sin; how much more so would He protect the righteous individuals themselves! From this incident, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Zeira eventually conceded to Rabbi Yaakov that the shechita of a Cuti had been forbidden by the decree of Rabban Gamliel, even if a Jew was present to supervise the process. The Gemara explains that although Rabban Gamliel and his court originally decreed that the shechita of Cutim was unacceptable, the restriction expanded over time. A story is told of Rabbi Meir, who forbade their wine after discovering that a minority of the Cutim worshipped idols. Later, a subsequent generation of Amoraim in Israel - Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi - were informed that the Cutim had ceased to be "Torah worshippers" entirely. Consequently, they accorded them the status of gentiles regarding all halakhic matters. The Gemara clarifies that while their shechita and wine had been forbidden by Rabbi Meir and Rabban Gamliel previously, the ruling was only universally accepted and finalized in the time of Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi. The Gemara presents two other instances where the concept of God protecting the righteous from accidental transgression is applied. The first involves Rabbi Zeira regarding the laws of demai (produce from an am haaretz which tithes may not have been separated). When produce purchased from an am haaretz is mixed with other ingredients, its status is debated. Seeing Rav Asi eating such a mixture without tithing it, Rabbi Zeira inferred that it must be permitted, as God would not allow a righteous person to eat untithed food. The Gemara challenges this conclusion based on a braita that appears to forbid such mixtures. However, the Gemara resolves this in two possible ways by explaining that the case in the braita involved a unique type of "mixture." While the initial difficulty was raised from the second half of the braita, the Gemara also questions the first part, which permits returning food to a neighbor who is an am haaretz without re-tithing it (as we do not suspect the neighbor of swapping the food). Although three other Tannaitic sources suggest we should fear a swap, the Gemara distinguishes each case as unique. A third situation is mentioned where Rabbi Zeira applied the principle of divine protection. It concerns Rabbi Yehuda haNasi in the footsteps of Rabbi Meir permitting produce in Beit Shean to be eaten without tithing, on the basis that Beit Shean was not considered to be within the halakhic borders of the Land of Israel.
Transcribe →Chullin 5 - May 5, 18 Iyar
1w ago00:43:39Tap to summarizeAfter explaining that the source for Rav Anan's statement in the name of Shmuel, that one can trust the slaughter of a person who worships idols was derived from Yehoshafat, the Gemara seeks evidence that Yehoshafat actually consumed Achav's meat. Two additional sources are examined to support Rav Anan. The first involves Eliyahu, who was fed meat by ravens (orvim), which supposedly originated from Achav's kitchen. However, this is dismissed as a unique divine decree that cannot serve as a legal precedent. The second source is a braita previously cited about accepting the slaughter of a Jew who does not observe the commandment. While it was initially thought to support Rav Anan, and referring to one who worships idols, the proof is deemed inconclusive as it can also be reconciled with Rava's position, and be referring to one who eats non-kosher mean to satisfy one's appetite. A challenge is raised against Rav Anan from a braita that equates an idol-worshipping Jew to one who rejects the entire Torah. This difficulty remains unresolved. The braita cites the biblical source for the rule that an apostate cannot bring sacrifices from a verse regarding a burnt offering. However, another braita derives this from verses regarding a sin offering. The Gemara explains why both derivations are necessary. Rabbi Yaakov notes that Rabban Gamliel and his court prohibited slaughter performed by a Cuti. Rabbi Zeira suggests this only applies when no Jew is supervising. Rabbi Yaakov disagrees, arguing that such a case was already prohibited; Rabban Gamliel's decree applied even when a Jew is present. The Gemara questions whether Rabbi Zeira ultimately accepted this view.
Transcribe →Chullin 4 - May 4, 17 Iyar
2w ago00:46:55Tap to summarizeAbaye and Rava each found support for their respective positions in a braita - Abaye from the first sentence and Rava from the second. How does each Sage address the proof cited by the other? The second case in the braita permits a Jew to rely on a Cuti and consume birds strung together, provided the Cuti eats the head of one of the birds on the string. The Gemara raises difficulties with this case: perhaps the Cuti is merely tricking the Jew, or perhaps Cutim do not hold that one must slaughter birds at all, as the requirement is not explicitly written in the Torah. The Sages resolve the latter difficulty by explaining that Cutim accepted the laws of shechita upon themselves; therefore, they can be trusted even regarding details not explicitly stated in the Torah, including all the ways in which a slaughter can be disqualified. This, however, is a Tannaitic debate: whether or not Cutim can be relied upon regarding laws not mentioned in the Torah that they are known to have accepted. A separate braita is brought to demonstrate this dispute. Rava holds that one may rely on the slaughter of a person who does not observe the laws of kashrut, specifically one who eats nevelot, provided the knife was checked beforehand. Rava's ruling is based on the principle that a person would rather perform an act in a permissible way than a forbidden way, so long as it does not require significantly more effort. This is proven from a braita regarding the chametz of those who are generally untrusted; one can eat their food after Pesach, relying on the fact that they must have traded their food with gentiles to avoid the prohibition of chametz that remained over the holiday. A Tosefta is brought to further support Rava's position, but it is subsequently rejected. The Gemara explains that the Tosefta refers to a person who worships idols, rather than one who merely consumed non-slaughtered meat. This reading is supported by a statement of Rav Anan in the name of Shmuel that one can trust the meat of a person who worships idols. The source for this is the biblical figure Yehoshafat, who ate from Achav's meat in an incident that appears in Chronicles II, Chapter 18. The Gemara raises several difficulties about deriving this law from that incident, but all difficulties are eventually resolved.
Transcribe →Chullin 3 - May 3, 16 Iyar
2w ago00:46:33Tap to summarizeStudy Guide Following the presentation of Raba bar Ulla's interpretation, the Gemara introduces five alternative explanations of the Mishna. After surveying these options, it clarifies why each sage rejected the competing positions, highlighting the specific logical or textual difficulties inherent in each.
Transcribe →