Defenders: Doctrine of God: Attributes of God (Part 14): Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom

Summary

Podcast Summary: Defenders – Doctrine of God, Part 14

Episode Theme: Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom
Host: Dr. William Lane Craig
Date: February 16, 2022

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Overview

In this session of Dr. Craig’s Defenders class, the focus is on the interplay between God’s perfect foreknowledge and human freedom. Dr. Craig addresses the classic theological question: If God knows everything that will happen, including all human choices, does this mean humans lack genuine freedom and that all events are predetermined (fatalism)? Through lecture and Q&A, Dr. Craig explores distinctions between foreknowledge, foreordination, determinism, and the logical/chronological relationships between God’s knowledge and events.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

The Problem: Does Divine Foreknowledge Entail Fatalism?

• Articulation of the Problem

  • If God knows in advance every choice (e.g., Peter denying Christ three times), then is Peter fated to deny Christ and unable to do otherwise? (00:41–01:06)
  • The question: "Doesn't it follow from God's complete foreknowledge of the future that fatalism is true, that everything that happens happens necessarily?" (01:21–01:33)

• Historical Views

  • Martin Luther: Divine foreknowledge excludes human free will; freedom is illusory. (01:41)
  • Reformed Tradition: God's knowledge is based on His foreordination – everything occurs because God unilaterally wills it. No human freedom. (01:56–02:24)

• Craig’s Objection to Fatalism

  • If everything is foreordained due to God’s foreknowledge, then God becomes the author of sin and evil, which is theologically unacceptable. (02:51–03:18)

Distinguishing Foreknowledge from Foreordination

• Key Distinction
  • Foreknowing is not the same as foreordaining. God knows what people will do, but does not cause or determine those choices. (03:36–03:59)
• Logical vs. Chronological Priority
  • Chronological Priority: God's knowledge comes before events in time. (05:17–05:22)
  • Logical Priority: The event itself is explanatorily prior—God knows what will happen because it is what happens; the choice determines the foreknowledge, not vice versa. (05:30–06:12)
    • Memorable analogy: God's foreknowledge tracks your choices like an infallible barometer tracks the weather—it doesn’t cause the weather to be what it is. (06:55–07:20)
• Freedom and Divine Knowledge
  • If a person were to choose otherwise, God’s foreknowledge would reflect that different choice. God’s knowledge does not "lock in" the event. (06:12–07:45)

On Causality and Freedom

• No Causal Determinism from Foreknowledge
  • Knowing about an event does not cause it. God's foreknowledge is not a causal agent in events themselves. (08:11–08:24, 09:01–09:12)
  • Even if an event is free or contingent (like a random quantum event or a free choice), God's knowledge changes nothing about its nature. (09:57–10:37)
  • Quote: “Fatalism posits a constraint on human freedom which is simply unintelligible.” (10:12)

Classroom Q&A: Deepening the Discussion

On Spiritual Disposition and Determinism

• Taewon’s Question
  • Suggests spiritual alignment makes behavior necessary and God knows every decision. (11:06–11:40)
• Craig’s Response
  • Affirms that while background shapes us, there is still freedom—Peter could have denied Jesus a different number of times, for example. (11:41–12:36)
  • Even fallen humanity retains some genuine freedom of choice. (13:03–13:10)

On Randomness and Quantum Mechanics

• Brad’s Question
  • Challenges whether the denial of fatalism removes randomness; brings in quantum physics and observer effects (Schrodinger’s Cat). (13:26–14:57)
• Craig’s Response
  • Knowledge of a random or free event does not necessitate the event; the observer’s knowledge doesn’t cause determinism. (15:08–18:45)
  • Allows for hypothetical indeterminacy but maintains that foreknowledge alone doesn’t necessitate events. (17:17–18:45)

On Backward Causation and Logical Priority

• Eric’s Question
  • Asks if human choices cause God’s foreknowledge. (19:02–19:22)
• Craig’s Response
  • Stresses logical (not causal) priority: God foreknows what is true, but there’s no backward causation involved. Truth of the proposition (e.g., “Eric will choose A”) is the basis for foreknowledge, not the other way around. (19:31–21:09)

On Divine Providence vs. Mere Foreknowledge

• Cindy’s Question
  • Differentiates God’s knowing the future (foreknowledge) from having a plan (providence), referencing God’s plan of salvation. (21:14–22:49)
• Craig’s Response
  • Providence (God’s active governing and directing of the world) is a different topic, to be addressed later. Right now, focus is on whether foreknowledge alone makes events necessary. (22:51–23:50)

On Divine Free Will

• Unnamed Questioner:
  • Does God’s foreknowledge mean He lacks free will? (24:10–24:18)
• Craig’s Response
  • Denying freedom due to foreknowledge would also eliminate God’s freedom—an unacceptable implication. (24:18–24:48)

On Soft Determinism and Life Circumstances

• Katherine:
  • If God created us in certain circumstances, does He not determine our choices? (25:41–26:10)
• Craig’s Response
  • While circumstances influence us, they don’t completely determine choices; there is “plenty of room” for genuine (libertarian) freedom. (26:10–26:57)

On Open Theism

• George:
  • Asks about open theism, which says God does not/cannot foreknow future free acts, thus solving the problem of evil. (26:59–27:43)
• Craig’s Response
  • Open theists (unlike Lutherans/Reformed) deny foreknowledge. Craig argues open theism is unbiblical—Scripture repeatedly affirms God’s foreknowledge. (29:02–30:19)
  • Problem of evil remains for open theists since God does not intervene in history even as evil unfolds. (31:00–32:32)

On Fatalism vs. God’s Purpose

• Kurt:
  • Points to Ecclesiastes—does fatalism simply mean God has a plan? (33:07–33:39)
• Craig’s Response
  • Fatalism is not the same as providence/purpose. Fatalism says everything happens necessarily (no freedom or randomness), not just that everything has a purpose. (34:12–34:42)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the central misconception:
  “It’s not that what God foreknows determines the event. It’s the event that determines what God foreknows.” (04:13–04:44)

• Barometer Analogy:
  “God’s foreknowledge tracks your choices like an infallible barometer. The barometer doesn’t determine the weather … In the same way, God’s foreknowledge infallibly tracks your choices.” (06:55–07:20)

• On fatalism's incoherence:
  “Fatalism posits a constraint upon human freedom which is simply unintelligible and therefore really makes no sense at all.” (10:12)

• On Open Theism:
  “Open theism is just unbiblical—it isn’t even an option for a biblically orthodox Christian.” (29:02)

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Important Timestamps

• Foreknowledge vs. Fatalism Explained: 00:33–03:29
• Distinction Between Foreknowledge/Foreordination: 03:36–04:44
• Logical vs. Chronological Priority: 05:05–06:01
• Barometer Analogy: 06:55–07:20
• Clarifying Logical Priority and Causality: 08:24–10:12
• Q&A on Determinism, Randomness, Quantum Mechanics: 11:06–18:45
• Q&A on Causal Priority: 19:02–21:09
• Q&A on Providence: 21:14–23:53
• Open Theism Discussion: 26:59–32:41
• Purpose vs. Fatalism: 33:07–34:50

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Takeaways

• God’s foreknowledge does not necessitate fatalism; foreknowing is not the same as foreordaining.
• The crucial distinction is between chronological priority (what comes first in time) and logical priority (what explains what).
• Human freedom and even randomness remain possible in a world where God perfectly foreknows the future.
• Open theism, which denies God’s foreknowledge of particular future contingents, is viewed as biblically unorthodox and does not ultimately solve the problem of evil.
• Fatalism (everything happens necessarily) is not the same as providence (everything happens for a purpose); Craig vehemently rejects equating the two.

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This episode provides a thorough, logical, and scripturally grounded exploration of a core philosophical-theological issue, offering conceptual tools and clear distinctions that are vital in contemporary dialogue about God’s knowledge and human agency.

Transcript

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Welcome to Defenders, the teaching class of Dr. William Lane Craig today. The Doctrine of God, Part 14. For more information and resources from Dr. Craig, go to reasonablefaith.org now, the study

of divine omniscience, as I explained last time, involves two questions, two problems which

are very much discussed and which we

want to now address ourselves.

And. And the first of these is the

famous question of divine foreknowledge and human freedom.

And the objection arises here that if

God knows in advance everything that happens,

every choice that you will ever make, then isn't everything fated to occur? For example, if God knows in advance and predicts that Peter will deny Christ three times, then when the time arrives, isn't Peter fated to deny Christ three times?

Isn't it necessary that Peter deny Christ three times?

How could he do anything else, since God knows and has predicted that he

would do so and God cannot err? It would seem if Peter could do

anything else, that then God could be mistaken, which is impossible. So doesn't it follow from God's complete foreknowledge of the future that fatalism is

true, that everything that happens happens necessarily?

Well, some Christian theologians agree with this.

Martin Luther, for example, believed that in virtue of divine foreknowledge of the future, there is no human free will, that human freedom is illusory. Others in the Reformed theological tradition have

said that God's foreknowledge of the future

is based upon his foreordination of everything, because God foreordains unilaterally everything that will ever happen. Then, of course, by knowing his own

will and his omnipotent ability to bring

about whatever he ordains, God thereby knows that the future.

So on these views, there really is no human freedom to do otherwise.

Everything that happens necessarily,

even the fall

of man into sin, on this view,

since it was foreknown by God, happens necessarily and therefore is part of what

God has foreordained to happen. But.

But this, I think, is a serious theological mistake.

If we say that everything that happens necessarily in virtue of God's foreordination, then that makes God the author of sin. It means that man falls into sin

because this is what God ordains to

happen unilaterally, and man couldn't possibly have done otherwise. And that would make God the author of sin, which would seem to make God himself evil. And so this equation between divine foreknowledge of the future and divine foreordination of the future is one, I think, that we ought not to accept.

So how then could we defend the

Compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom.

Well, I think in the first place,

we want to break that equation between foreknowing something and foreordaining something.

Those are not the same things. God knows in advance all of the choices that people will freely make.

But that doesn't mean that he determines those choices.

In fact, quite the opposite.

If we want to speak of determination,

it's the choices that determine what God foreknows, not vice versa. It's not that because God foreknows you

will determine do something that you do it.

It's because you will do it that God foreknows it. So if there's any determination going on here, it's the event that determines what God foreknows, not that what God foreknows determines the event. And in understanding this, I think it's very helpful to distinguish between two types of priority. Chronological priority, which would be something being earlier in time.

If something is chronologically prior to something else, it is earlier than it in time.

And then logical priority, where something is explanatorily prior to something else. And these are not the same thing. Something can be logically prior to something

else without being chronologically prior to it.

And I think that's exactly what we

have in the case of divine foreknowledge and the events foreknown by God.

Chronologically, God's foreknowledge comes before the event.

First, God foreknows it, then the event occurs. So the foreknowledge is chronologically prior to the event foreknown.

But logically the event is prior to the foreknowledge. God's foreknowledge is what it is because the event is what it is. It is because you will choose pizza for lunch. That God foreknows is not that you eat pizza for lunch because God foreknows it. That's to confuse chronological with logical priority. So as long as we understand and that the object of God's foreknowledge is

logically prior to what he foreknows, it doesn't really matter that God's foreknowledge is chronologically prior to the event foreknown.

What that means is that if the event were to be different, then God's

foreknowledge would be different. And those of you who have been

with us the last few weeks will recognize there a subjunctive conditional, right? If the event were different, then God's

foreknowledge would have been different.

You will choose pizza for lunch. Let's suppose. But you don't have to.

You're free to choose something else. If you choose Panda Express instead, then God will foreknow that.

So if you were to choose Panda Express, God would have foreknown that instead

of knowing that you will eat pizza for lunch today.

So God's foreknowledge tracks your choices like an infallible barometer. The barometer doesn't determine the weather. Even though chronologically the reading of the

barometer may be first.

The barometer infallibly tracks what the weather will be. In the same way, God's foreknowledge infallibly tracks your choices. And if your choices were to be

different, then God's foreknowledge would have been different. Different.

And thus God's foreknowledge doesn't prejudice anything. When the time comes, you are completely

free to do something other than what you will do.

It's just that if you were to

do that other thing, then God's foreknowledge would have been different instead.

But God's knowledge of the future doesn't

fade anything to occur. I mean, let's think about it. Think about some events here on the timeline. Let's imagine this line is time. Let's imagine here some event, E, which

is foreknown by God.

And here is God in time, and he knows in advance that E will take place.

Now, God's knowing that E will take place is not a causal connection between

God and E. Merely knowing something about something doesn't cause E to occur.

The causes of E will be the prior events in the timeline that bring about E. And for all we know, E could be a completely contingent event. It might be the decay of a subatomic particle or a free will decision

of a human being.

And therefore, with respect to the events earlier than E, E may be causally indeterminate. It could happen, or it could not happen. So how does God merely knowing about

the occurrence of a causally indeterminate event

make that event fated to occur? How can that event occur necessarily?

Simply in virtue of God's knowing about it.

I mean, imagine God didn't know about it. Let's erase the dotted line and let's suppose God didn't know that E will occur. What's changed with respect to E? Nothing. There's no causal connection between God and

E that has now been removed.

Everything remains as before. And yet the theological fatalist who thinks foreknowledge implies fatalism would have to Say that now E is not fated to occur. Now E doesn't occur necessarily because it's

not foreknown by God.

But merely adding God's foreknowledge, as I

say, doesn't do anything to affect E.

So how could E be contingent and free in the one case and yet fated and necessary in the other? I think that fatalism posits a constraint upon human freedom which is simply unintelligible

and therefore really makes no sense at all.

If an event is not causally determined

to occur, then that event occurs freely or randomly, and God's merely knowing about it doesn't do anything to make it occur necessarily. Fatalism posits a constraint on human freedom which is simply unintelligible.

So long as our free choices are

logically prior to what God foreknows, then

there is nothing about the chronological priority

of divine foreknowledge that prejudices human freedom and implies that everything that happens happens necessarily. Any discussion of this question?

All right, let's start with Taewon and

get the microphone to her.

[Taewon]

Because there is such a definite correspondence between human behavior and their spiritual alignment, and so the human behavior happens necessarily according to their spiritual alignment, and God knows all about their spiritual alignment and knows the decision that follows, and also that the behavior will incur what kind of consequence. Therefore, he reads everything clearly.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Yeah.

To me, t', wan, it sounds to me like you're affirming determinism, that you're saying that in virtue of their spiritual character, everything you do is determined. And I don't think that's true. Even if you think that in virtue of total depravity and our fall into sin,

we sin necessarily. Still, I think people have the freedom to choose the array of sins that they might

commit.

So that, for example, to take Peter's denial of Jesus, he could have denied

him two times, or maybe he could have denied him four times, or he

could have done something different. But for Jesus to be able to predict that Peter would deny Christ three times before the cock crows twice, it just seems to me that cannot be

attributed to a person's spiritual disposition, such that God was able to infer from his spiritual disposition exactly what would happen.

Or think about the fall of man

into sin again, there it seems that Adam, not having a sin nature, is free to obey or disobey, and that there's nothing about God's foreknowing the fall and that would make Adam fall into sin.

There was nothing about his spiritual disposition

that would make him sin.

I think so I want to affirm

the view that even though we are fallen and sinful, nevertheless there is still genuine human freedom. All right, let's take Brad's question or comment. Well, I wanted to go to Brad first.

I saw his hand.

Yes.

[Brad]

So this seems to deny the existence of randomness. And if I know enough about how something occurs, I can postulate it, I can forecast it, I can use the formulas. If I had all of the inputs, I could figure out what would happen. But it seems to deny the possibility that there is randomness at that point.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Well, I'm surprised to hear you say that, Brad, because I would have thought just the opposite, that what I'm trying

to defend is the view of that there can be genuine freedom or randomness in the world.

[Brad]

Then how would it be foreknown?

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Well now that's a question we haven't addressed.

That's the second question. I said there were two questions we

want to talk about.

The first one is if God does

foreknow your choice or the motion of

the subatomic particle, does it happen necessarily?

Does God's foreknowledge obliterate randomness and freedom from the universe?

And what I'm saying is know that

this event E, remember E again could

be random or a free choice theoretically. And that whether God knows about it

or not doesn't do anything to affect

[Brad]

E. But doesn't that in quantum physics, the old Schrodinger dead cat thing, that it seems like observing things cause different things to happen, could that not be something that's happening?

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Ah, okay, now, all right, that's very interesting, Brad, because on certain. Oh boy, you're really opening up Pandora's box or a Schrodinger's box.

Maybe here on certain interpretations of quantum

mechanics, the so called measurement problem arises.

Namely the.

The quantum description of the physical system isn't completely determined until it's measured by

a classical measuring apparatus, which would be not have a quantum description.

The problem is you could give a quantum description of the classical measuring apparatus and then that would need then to

be measured by another further apparatus.

And this goes on to infinity. And some have suggested, well wait a minute, maybe you can break the chain,

the infinite regress, by saying when an

observer, a conscious observer, sees the result of the measurement, then that stops the

chain, the regress and makes it determinate.

Because you can't give a quantum physical description of a conscious state that's a non physical state. Right. When a conscious observer looks at the

classical measuring apparatus, you can't give a quantum Description of the state of consciousness. So that breaks the regress and makes reality determinate. Then all the way down.

Wouldn't that apply here? That's a very, very interesting question. Then, for theism. Because God is such an observer on a sort of cosmic scale. And maybe he collapses the wave function of the universe. So that he's the ultimate observer.

And makes everything determinant.

What I'm trying to do, Brad, for the sake of argument.

I, in fact, don't believe that quantum indeterminacy is ontic or real.

I think it's just epistemic. But let's.

In fact, having God would make it eliminate indeterminacy.

But what I'm saying is let's assume for the sake of argument.

That quantum indeterminacy is real.

What I'm trying to show here is

that merely knowing about it doesn't eliminate it.

If you don't like the example of E being a quantumly indeterminate event.

Then make it a free choice. Instead, make it be Peter's denying Christ three times. And that will be then unproblematic.

So you're quite right in raising this interesting question. But I'm asking you just for the sake of argument. Let's not go down that route.

Let's assume that these quantum events are random and indeterminate. And ask, would merely having knowledge that it would occur. Means that it's fated to occur and has to happen? And that's an independent question of whether or not, in virtue of being observed by an observer. The event is now determinant.

In fact, I mean, even on this

version of quantum mechanics.

It doesn't mean the event occurs necessarily.

It just means it's determinant. It means that there is a time

and place specifically at which it occurs.

But it doesn't mean that it happens necessarily. So even given that it wouldn't remove the contingency of the event. Simply by being known about it. It would remove its being indeterminate.

[Brad]

So now I have to have a Newtonian view of God and a quantum view of God.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Yeah, I'm trying to not draw those issues in here. To keep them keep us from, as

I say, opening the Pandora's box.

All right, Eric, let's.

[Eric]

Okay, so if our actions are the calls. That's then creating the effect of God's foreknowledge.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Now, wait. I didn't say that. Eric, let's be very careful.

Did you hear Eric's question?

Do our choices cause God to foreknow what he does? I didn't say that. That would require backward causation.

[Eric]

Yeah, that's what I was thinking.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

That you could have an event in the future which would have causal effects in the past. And.

And I think that that's a very, very difficult idea. Problematic. And I don't want to say that

that was why I used the word determine rather than cause.

And I also kind of even then waffled on that.

I said, if there is anything here

about determining, it would be the event that determines the foreknowledge, not the foreknowledge that determines the event.

But I don't think of this as causal, but priority.

We could distinguish another kind of priority

here, Eric, which would be causal priority.

And there.

I don't want to say that God's knowledge is causally prior to the event or that the event is causally prior to God's foreknowledge. We don't cause events, or I mean knowledge or ideas to pop into God's mind. Right.

We don't have any kind of causal connection with God to make those things happen.

Rather, the way it works is like this.

We have the ability to choose A or not A.

And whichever we do, the proposition Eric will choose A is true, or the proposition Eric will choose not A is true. You have the choice to determine which of those propositions is true by making that free choice. God is omniscient and knows only in all true propositions. And so in virtue of that proposition

being true, that's what God foreknows.

But notice, neither the relationship between you and a proposition nor the relationship between a proposition and God is a causal relation. So this is sort of logical priority

or explanatory priority, not causal priority.

[Cindy]

Okay, Cindy, Looking at this dilemma on a large scale, when God created the universe, foreknew that man would fall, he had a plan of salvation.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Yes.

[Cindy]

And in my way of thinking, Christ being God, took action that then, knowing in advance, would result in the salvation and a new Jerusalem, a new earth. In that, it seems to me, prior to the fall of man, prior to creation, there was a simple knowledge of the ultimate realization of a heaven and an earth, a new heaven and new earth and a salvation for the human race. So we're working that plan out.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Yes.

[Cindy]

In my mind, I see that as his salvation of us. Therefore, providing that.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Yes.

[Cindy]

And knowing that in advance, he had to have a plan. He had to have created a plan which to me caused the salvation to be possible. And in that regard, I'm not saying that we. That that action caused us to take certain Steps. But there seems to be to be more than just a foreknowledge. There was a plan.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Oh, absolutely, Cindy.

I mean, I am not here attempting to give an explanation of divine providence.

When we get to the subject of doctrine of creation, then we will talk about the doctrine of providence and. And God's sovereignty over the world, directing

it, governing it, directing it, acting in it to bring about his plan.

So don't confuse divine providence with this mere knowledge of what is going to

happen in the future.

You're quite right. But the Bible does indicate that Christ

and his death and the plan of salvation were part of the foreknowledge of

God that the Scripture describes Christ as foreknown from before the foundations of the world. So clearly God knew all of this,

and he worked out a plan in

accordance with his perfect knowledge.

But we're not talking about those other aspects here.

We're just asking this question of what's called theological fatalism.

And that is, does God's knowing the future imply that everything that happens, happens necessarily? That there is no free will, no randomness? Now, was there a question over here? I think.

[Unnamed Questioner 1]

I'm not sure if this is part of the second question or not, but does God's total foreknowledge remove the possibility of God having free will?

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Good question. If you say that foreknowledge is incompatible

with freedom, you not only remove human freedom, you remove divine freedom. Because God foreknows His own choices and decisions. And I don't think we want to say that that God is determined to do everything he does or that he is fated to do everything he does, so that when the time arrives, he has no ability to do otherwise.

So the theological implications of this go

beyond exterminating human freedom. It would eliminate divine freedom as well.

[Unnamed Questioner 1]

So you could modify your definition of God's foreknowledge. He has total foreknowledge of all the ramifications for everything he has so far. Preordained. He still has the ability to preordain other things or react to free will in man.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

No, I mean, I want to stick with the original definition of omniscience that I gave, which was that for any proposition P, if P is true, then God knows that P, and He does not believe any false proposition.

So he has complete knowledge of everything that's going to happen, every future tense, truth. Okay, let's go to another person.

I'm sorry, I forget your name.

Katharine.

Of course.

[Unnamed Questioner 2]

What I always get caught up on is if he created you and Put you in this specific time and place with these parents and these circumstances. Lucky me. Wouldn't he therefore have created me and put me in a place where I would make specific decisions and choices? And therefore, because he created me and put me here, he made me make those decisions.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Well, obviously there's a kind of soft

determinism in virtue of where you're born and of whom you are born. You're not free to suddenly start speaking Vietnamese right now.

Right.

Because you don't have that background on the other end. Probably Taiwan could start talking Chinese at

the drop of a hat because she

has a different background. But that doesn't mean that you're totally determined. That you're having your hand on your

chin is determined causally because of where

you were born or by whom. I mean, or the husband that you marry.

Certainly our lives are shaped by these

things, but there's still plenty of room for libertarian free choices within those parameters.

Okay, let's go over to George here.

[George]

George, Bill, for the sake of completeness, could you say a few words about open theism? I know, I think that's the view that God does not foreknow free choices. And that's not a deficiency because it's logically impossible. Like he can't make a square circle. It's not a deficiency. I know a number of people who consider themselves in the camp of orthodox Christianity hold that, including I think, one of your teachers, Clark Pennock, before he died. And one of the dividends of that would be, it would seem to solve at least a large part of the problem of evil. You can't blame God if he didn't know at the creation of the world that Hitler was going to kill, you know, commit the Holocaust.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Yeah.

George is right in drawing attention to a significant current within contemporary theology and in evangelical theology, frankly, on behalf of those who actually think that foreknowledge implies fatalism, they agree with Luther and certain

other thinkers that if God has complete

foreknowledge of the future, then everything that happens happens necessarily. But unlike Luther and these other theologians, they therefore choose to deny divine foreknowledge rather than freedom.

So it's sort of like two ends of the same teeter totter. Both of these theologians agree that foreknowledge

and freedom are incompatible. This leads the Lutheran or Reformed theologian to deny human freedom.

It leads the open theist to deny divine foreknowledge. Now, I think in virtue of the scriptural data that we've already reviewed, that

open theism is just unbiblical it isn't even an option for a biblically orthodox Christian.

The scripture not only gives multitudinous examples of God's foreknowledge of the future that couldn't be inferred from present causes, like Peter's denying Jesus three times before the cock crows twice, but the scripture actually says that God has foreknowledge. As I say, it uses words like

foreknowledge with respect to Christ being foreknown before the foundations of the world and God's entire salvific plan being foreknown.

And there's a whole family of words

in the New Testament that have this

prefix pra, which means for including pro gnosis, which is foreknowledge. It says God has foreknowledge pro gnosis, but also verbs like pra martirello, to

tell in advance, or pra cantangello and

pro matureo to bear witness to in advance, pro ganosco to know in advance. So it seems to me that it's just biblically unorthodox to deny that God

has complete foreknowledge of the future.

Therefore, I want to get off the teeter totter and say that neither of these folks is right, that there is

no incompatibility between foreknowledge and freedom as

long as we keep these crucial distinctions

of chronological and logical priority clear in our thinking.

Now, as for the problem of evil, George, it certainly is true that on open theism, since God doesn't know what's

going to happen in the future, that he didn't know in advance or very far in advance horrible things like the

Holocaust say and what Hitler would do

in World War II, that these things

catch God off guard, so to speak,

on open theism because he's just a sort of super intelligent but finite counselor

who doesn't really know what's going to happen. But I don't think this gets him

off the hook for the problem of evil.

Once the Holocaust starts to occur, once the Nazis begin to round up the Jews, why doesn't the God of open theism do anything to stop it? You don't need to be a genius

to see what's going on in Nazi Germany.

Why did he let the bomb plot against Hitler fail by having the bomb be placed behind a heavy table leg? Why didn't he just strike Hitler dead or have the bomb plot succeed? The fact is that the God of open theism sits idly by, twiddling his thumbs while allowing these evils to go

on and he doesn't intervene to stop

them, at least on the view that

we'll defend later on when we get to God's sovereignty and full foreknowledge and middle knowledge of everything that will occur.

You can say that though God knows about these evils and permits them to occur, he never does so without having

an overriding justification for doing so.

Unlike the God of open theism, he's not caught off guard. He's not surprised. He has morally justifying reasons for allowing

the Holocaust to occur. And I find that to be a better solution to the problem of evil

than to say that God is caught

off guard by these things and didn't see them coming and therefore isn't to blame for the evils in the world.

But certainly George has pointed out here

one of the key issues in the debate over divine foreknowledge and human freedom today. And that would be the problem of evil.

Well, I think we have time for just Kurt's question.

Go ahead.

[Kurt]

You seem to object to fatalism, and you're using it as a negative. But what then do you do with Ecclesiastes 3:1 where it says, to everything there is a season, and to everything under the heaven there is a purpose? That if God is saying that for the person who's writing that is saying that on behalf of God, why is fatalism as it's used negatively, not something where God, as the Lady Catherine over here said, he has a purpose and a plan, and he's working that plan.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Okay, that would be a good verse to quote against the open theist who says God doesn't have a purpose for

allowing everything to occur.

They catch him by surprise.

He didn't know that was going to happen.

On my view, God does have a

purpose for everything that happens. And with respect to human freedom, he

allows you to make choices. But if these are evil choices, which he doesn't positively will, he permits them to occur because he has overriding reasons

for allowing that to happen again.

This will fit into our discussion of

divine providence later on.

But don't equate fatalism with God's having

providence or sovereignty over the world. Those are two different questions.

Fatalism is the view that everything that

happens happens necessarily, not that things happen for a purpose. You see, it's not that things happen for a purpose, it's that they happen necessarily. There's no freedom, there's no randomness.

That's fatalism.

And I'm suggesting that divine foreknowledge doesn't imply that kind of fatalism.

All right, let's close with a benediction from the book of second Thessalonians. If we may bow our heads now. May our Lord Jesus Christ himself and God our Father, who loved us and gave us eternal comfort and good hope through grace. Comfort your hearts and establish them in

every good work and word. Amen.

The copyright for the content of this recording is held by Dr. William Lane Craig. For more go to reasonablefaith.org.