Defenders: Excursus on Natural Theology (Part 17): The Teleological Argument Part 4

Summary

Defenders Podcast: Excursus on Natural Theology, Part 17

"The Teleological Argument Part 4"

Host: Dr. William Lane Craig
Date: August 3, 2022

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Overview

In this session, Dr. William Lane Craig continues his exploration of the teleological (design) argument for God’s existence, focusing on the fine-tuning of the universe. He addresses whether design is a better explanation for fine-tuning than chance or physical necessity and critically examines Richard Dawkins’s main argument against inferring design. The session is interactive, featuring questions from class participants on objections, simplicity, and clarity in the design discussion.

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1. The Problem of Fine-Tuning and Competing Explanations

[00:15–04:00]

• Craig summarizes the conclusion of prior sessions: neither chance nor physical necessity plausibly explains the universe’s fine-tuning for conscious life.
• He introduces a principle: An improbable explanation can be accepted if no better exists.
  • Analogy: If a baseball batter accidentally hits a flying pigeon, chance seems justifiable because aiming would be even more improbable.
  • However, if someone with a rifle hits a pigeon intentionally, design becomes the better explanation.

Quote:

"You would be justified in believing in some improbable explanation just in case there were no better explanation available of the phenomenon in question."
— Dr. William Lane Craig [01:03]

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2. Is Design a Better Explanation?

[04:00–06:45]

• The primary question: Is design a better explanation of fine-tuning than chance or physical necessity?
• Noted objection: Critics argue the design hypothesis is undermined because the cosmic designer remains unexplained.

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3. Critique of Dawkins’s Central Argument from The God Delusion

[06:45–15:36]

• Dr. Craig summarizes Dawkins’s six-step argument (from The God Delusion), which centers on the problem of "who designed the designer" and the role of naturalistic explanations in biology and physics.
  • Concludes: “Therefore, God almost certainly does not exist.”

Craig's Rebuttal:

• The conclusion does not logically follow from Dawkins’s six premises.
• Even if true, Dawkins’s premises only suggest we shouldn't infer God's existence from design, not that God doesn't exist.

Quote:

"There are no rules of logic that would draw that atheistic conclusion from the truth of those six statements. So the Dawkins argument is just plainly invalid."
— Dr. William Lane Craig [09:05]

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4. Class Discussion: "God of the Gaps" and "Naturalism of the Gaps"

[10:28–12:15]

• Kevin: Points out the “atheism of the gaps” in Dawkins’s plea to “not give up hope” for a better physical explanation.
• Craig: Agrees, calling it “naturalism of the gaps.”
• Notes that both theists and secular scientists often reject chance or necessity as explanations, sometimes leaving only design.

Quote:

"What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander here. ... I do think you're right in seeing this as a kind of naturalism of the gaps."
— Dr. William Lane Craig [11:05]

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5. Clarifying Dawkins’s Position and the Role of Observation

[12:17–14:16]

• Bruce: Suggests Dawkins rejects the validity of observation if he dismisses the appearance of design.
• Craig: Clarifies that Dawkins does not deny the appearance—just claims there are naturalistic (especially Darwinian) explanations in biology but not yet for physics.

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6. Questioning Dawkins’s Logic and Presuppositions

[14:50–17:39]

• Cindy: Asks about the logical foundation of Dawkins’s conclusion; Craig responds that Dawkins never directly answered his critiques.
• Discussion highlights a possible circularity in Dawkins’s reasoning—presupposing atheism, then seeking arguments to support it.

Quote:

"He is arguing in a circle, then."
— Dr. William Lane Craig [16:57]

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7. Theology & Design: David Bentley Hart’s Objection

[18:27–18:56]

• Dennis: Asks about theologian David Bentley Hart’s critique of Intelligent Design as “bad theology.”
• Craig: Explains Hart’s Thomistic background, which sees God as pure being (very abstract), in contrast to "theistic personalism," which some apologists (including Craig) are accused of holding.

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8. Deeper Critique of Dawkins’s Argument

[19:35–24:44]

• Dawkins’s hope (step 6) for a future explanation is a naturalistic act of faith.
• Step 3—“Who designed the designer?”—is challenged on two grounds:
  1. Best Explanation Doesn’t Require Explaining the Explanation:
     • Archaeologists infer ancient peoples from artifacts, even if they know nothing about them.
     • Otherwise, “nothing would ever get explained and science would be destroyed.”
     • Quote:

     "In order to recognize an explanation as the best, you don't need to have an explanation of the explanation."
     — Dr. William Lane Craig [22:37]

  2. Complexity of the Designer:
     • Dawkins claims a designer is as complex as what is explained, making for no explanatory advance.
     • Craig argues God, as a pure mind without parts, is actually very simple—complexity of ideas does not imply complexity of the mind itself.

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9. The Role of Simplicity in Explanation

[29:38–38:22]

• Kevin: Questions how the doctrine of the Trinity affects simplicity.
  • Craig: The argument only supports a personal designer, not the Trinity; attributes like Trinity are separate and require further justification.
• Elizabeth: Argues that explanatory power, rather than simplicity alone, is the key scientific virtue.
  • Craig: Agrees and explores the nuances of theoretical virtues in science.
• Scott: Notes that demands for "explanation of the explanation" lead to infinite regress.
  • Craig: Agrees, and states that Dawkins provides no explanation for fine-tuning in physics—just hope.
• Bo: Asks if minds can still be "complex" in their faculties.
  • Craig: Emphasizes that Dawkins defines simplicity in terms of compositional parts, and a mind is substantially simple by that measure.

Quote:

"On the contrary, theologians and philosophers would typically say that God is very simple."
— Dr. William Lane Craig [38:22]

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10. Concluding the Argument

[38:22–End (~39:58)]

• Craig reiterates that the objection that God is too “complex” is unfounded, both conceptually and theologically.
• Summary position: Among the alternatives—necessity, chance, or design—design is the most plausible explanation for fine-tuning.
• Final benediction (content section ends).

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Notable Quotes & Moments

• Dr. William Lane Craig (on Dawkins's invalid conclusion):
  “The central argument of the God Delusion is a patently invalid argument.” [09:05]

• Dr. Craig (on explanatory basics):
  “In order to recognize an explanation as the best, you don't need to have an explanation of the explanation.” [22:37]

• Dr. Craig (on simplicity):
  “A mind or a soul is not a physical object composed of parts. In contrast to the contingent and variegated universe, with all of its inexplicable constants and quantities, a divine mind is startlingly simple.” [25:54]

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Key Takeaways

• Dawkins’s argument is found both logically invalid and philosophically shallow.
  It fails to exclude the possibility of God, even granting all its premises.

• The demand for an “explanation of the explanation” is misguided and not required in science or rational inference.

• God, as conceptualized in classical theism, is not a complex entity in the relevant explanatory sense.

• Fine-tuning remains best explained by design, according to Craig, with chance and necessity lacking plausibility or explanatory power.

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Useful Timestamps

• Fine-tuning & alternate explanations: [00:15–04:00]
• Dawkins’s summarized argument: [06:45–09:05]
• Discussion of "atheism/naturalism of the gaps": [10:28–12:15]
• Addressing the “who designed the designer?” challenge: [19:35–24:44]
• Discussion on simplicity and the Trinity: [29:38–30:37]
• Closing: affirming design as the best explanation: [38:22–end]

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For more resources, visit reasonablefaith.org.

Transcript

[Moderator]

Welcome to Defenders, the teaching class of

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Dr. William Lane Craig.

[Moderator]

Today an Excursus on Natural Theology, Part 17. For more resources from Dr. Craig, go

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

to reasonablefaith.org Today we are going to draw our discussion of the argument for a designer of the universe based on the fine tuning of the universe and to a close. And we'll probably finish early today, unless there's a considerable degree of discussion that you want to have on this material. Now, we saw last time that neither chance nor physical necessity provides a plausible explanation of the remarkable fine tuning of the universe for the existence of embodied conscious observers. These explanations are highly improbable, highly implausible. But we cannot infer immediately to design, because sometimes it can be justified to believe in an improbable explanation. You would be justified in believing in some improbable explanation just in case there were no better explanation available of the phenomenon in question. To borrow an example that David Manley used, imagine someone in a baseball game standing at home plate with his bat and he hits the ball over the fence and hits a pigeon flying. By now that would be amazingly improbable. And yet you would probably say that it was just by chance that he hit the pigeon. Why is this chance explanation of this highly improbable event acceptable? Well, because there's no better explanation available. In that case, the idea that the batter aimed at the pigeon and designed to hit it by swinging the bat so the ball would hit the pigeon is even more incredible and, and unbelievable. You can't hit a pigeon with a baseball by swinging a bat and trying to hit it. So in the case that there's no better explanation available, accepting the highly implausible explanation can be justified. But suppose a better explanation is available. So to illustrate, suppose that there is someone standing with a rifle on home plate and he shoots a pigeon in the distant outfield and kills it. In this case, it would be enormously improbable to say that he was standing there, just fired randomly into the air and struck the pigeon, and you wouldn't accept that explanation. Why? Well, because there's a better explanation available, namely that the man aimed to hit the pigeon and could do with a rifle what you couldn't do with a baseball bat, namely, put your bead on that pigeon and. And bring it down. So in this case, the improbable explanation, namely it's just by chance that he shot the pigeon, would not be the best explanation because there's a better explanation available. So the question we're facing now with regard to the Fine tuning of the universe is. Is design a better explanation than chance or physical necessity? If it is a better explanation, then we ought to adopt it. But if it is just as implausible, just as improbable as chance or necessity, then it would enjoy no advantage over them. So let's ask ourselves what objections might be raised against the inference that there is an intelligent designer of the cosmos who fine tuned the universe to be life permitting? Well, sometimes detractors of design will object to the design hypothesis because the cosmic designer himself remains unexplained. It gives an explanation of the design in the universe. But what about the cosmic designer? What explanation is there of his design? This is what Richard Dawkins calls, and I quote, the central argument of my book, the God Delusion. And he summarizes this argument, which is again the central argument of the whole book, the God Delusion. Here's how he summarizes it in six steps. Number one. One of the greatest challenges to the human intellect is, has been to explain how the complex improbable appearance of design in the universe arises. I'll read that again. One of the greatest challenges to the human intellect has been to explain how the complex improbable appearance of design in the universe arises. Step two, the natural temptation is, is to attribute the appearance of design to actual design itself. The natural temptation is to attribute the appearance of design to actual design itself. The reason the universe looks designed is because there is a designer. 3. Step three, the temptation is a false one because the designer hypothesis immediately raises the larger problem of who can designed the designer. So the temptation is a false one, one that we should resist because the designer hypothesis immediately raises the larger problem of who designed the designer. Number four, the most ingenious and powerful explanation is Darwinian evolution by natural selection. Now there he's talking about biological complexity, the appearance of design in animals and plants. And he says the most ingenious and powerful explanation is Darwinian evolution by natural selection. Number five, we don't have an equivalent explanation for physics. And here he's talking about fine tuning. He's no longer talking about those examples of the appearance of design in the animal and plant kingdoms. Here he's talking about physics and the fine tuning of those fundamental constants and quantities for the universe. And he says, number five, we don't have an equivalent explanation for physics. Six, we should not give up hope of a better explanation arising in physics. Something as powerful as, as Darwinism is for biology. So don't abandon hope. Number six is we should not give up the hope of a better explanation arising in physics, something that will be as powerful as Darwinism has been for biology. Conclusion, therefore God almost certainly does not exist. Now I think everyone in this class will find that conclusion jarring because the atheistic conclusion therefore God almost certainly does not exist, doesn't follow from the previous six statements. Even if we concede that every single one of them is true. There are no rules of logic that would permit you to to derive such an inference. There are no rules of logic that would draw that atheistic conclusion from the truth of those six statements. So the Dawkins argument is just plainly invalid. The central argument of the God delusion is a patently invalid argument. Now at most, what might follow from Dawkins argument? Well, at most I think what would follow is that we shouldn't infer God's existence on the basis of the appearance of design in the universe. We ought not to infer that there is a cosmic designer on the basis of the appearance of design in the universe. That would be the most I think that his argument would prove if its premises were all true. But notice that conclusion is entirely compatible with God's existence and it's even compatible with our justifiably believing in God's existence. The fact that you shouldn't infer to a designer on the basis of the appearance of design says nothing about whether God exists or not. It's entirely compatible with the existence of God. And maybe we should believe in God not on the basis of the design argument. Maybe we should believe in God on the basis of the cosmological argument or the argument from contingency or the moral argument. Or maybe our belief in God isn't based on arguments at all. Maybe it's properly basic, grounded in our religious experience or in divine revelation. The point is that rejecting design arguments for God's existence doesn't do anything to prove that God doesn't exist and or even that belief in God is unjustified. So Dawkins lack of philosophical depth is plainly on display here. Any discussion or question about the invalidity of Dawkins argument? Yes, let's get the microphone down here to Kevin and we'll take his comment.

[Kevin]

Dr. Craig, oftentimes many theists when they

[Bo]

give arguments for God's existence are accused of God of the gaps. Yeah, wouldn't when he says we should hope for a better explanation, isn't he, Isn't this like atheism of the gaps

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

is what I'm trying to say. I think you're right Kevin. Remember statement five or no statement six was we should not give up hope of a better explanation arising in physics. I think that is naturalism of the gaps. We don't have an explanation now, but let's not give up hope. There's no reason to think such an explanation will be forthcoming. So, yeah, I think what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander here. Notice that what we're using the evidence for is to argue that physical necessity and chance are not good explanations, and many scientists would agree with those conclusions. Dawkins himself would agree that physical necessity is not a good explanation, and he will present arguments against thinking the fine tuning is due to physical necessity. By contrast, many astrophysicists will say that chance is not a good explanation and they'll hold out hope for a physical explanation in physical necessity, but they'll reject the chance explanation or multiverse hypothes. Secular scientists themselves will often reject chance and physical necessity as explanations of the fine tuning. So I don't think that there's an objectionable God of the gaps reasoning going on here, but I do think you're right in seeing this as a kind of naturalism of the gaps. Bruce.

[Bruce]

Well, two things, I think. First of all, he jettisons the keystone element of the scientific method, which is observation. He said you can't trust your observations. So if the universe appears or the biosystem appears to be designed, that's you're rejecting observations. If you say, well, you know, you can't presume a design. And then secondly it's, well, let me

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

just say something on his behalf here. He doesn't deny the appearance of design. He agrees that it observations are that the world is apparently designed. But as we've seen, he thinks there's a good naturalistic explanation of this so that you don't need to punt to a supernatural explanation. Remember, he thinks that Darwinian evolution based on natural selection will explain biological complexity. And if it does that, then why punt to God? And moreover, as we've seen, he's got an argument, an objection against the divine design hypothesis, namely, it leaves unaddressed the question who designed the designer? So I think he's presenting an argument here. He's not just denying the scientific method, that we should go on the basis of observation. Go ahead. What's your second point?

[Bruce]

Well, you know, related to that, why would you have any more confidence in observations related to evolution? You know, if you couldn't draw any conclusions from the weight of your observations? But secondarily, why would evolution or any naturalism or materialism be any better explanation for what you observe? I don't see how that would follow from.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Well, obviously at this section of the class, we are not discussing evidence for a designer based on biology. We've done an end run around that to go back to these initial conditions in physics. When we get to the section of the course on doctrine of creation, we'll take up this question again. It's in the Defenders 2 series, if anybody is interested in looking at that. But we'll revisit it again as we come to it in Defenders 3. Yes, Stephanie?

[Cindy]

I'm befuddled by the conclusion drawn by Dawkins based on these six. What rule of logic is he purporting to be using in this? And what does he say when you

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

say that's not a reasonable conclusion? He's never responded to my critiques. I published them. And his response to me is that I am an odious man, but that's about it. That conclusion doesn't follow either. It really is remarkable to think that you could grant all six of these statements. And the conclusion doesn't follow by any rule of logic? No, nothing that would permit that. Let's go to Cindy here.

[Cindy]

Before I ask my question, can you repeat the challenge as he stated it?

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

The challenge, I think, if I understand what you mean, is that number three says we should resist the temptation to infer a designer because it leaves unaddressed the question, who designed the designer?

[Cindy]

Okay, I guess. Well, the point I was trying to make is I think when knowing Dawkins, if the real first foundational belief there is no God, it seems to me, therefore he's trying to find out an explanation to not to contradict his belief. So for him, Darwinism was the answer to explain development of life in its life forms. And therefore he thinks for physics there's got to be an explanation we haven't seen yet. So I think in his. I know he says the conclusion is God is not. Is not the probable cause, but it just seems to me he's. I don't know, maybe I'm assuming that's

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

not his conclusion, though. Cindy, the conclusion is, therefore God almost certainly does not exist.

[Cindy]

Right. I know it doesn't follow.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Right. About his presupposing it. He's arguing in a circle, then.

[Cindy]

He is. I just think that. I think the whole point of it was he has decided through whatever that God does not exist. Therefore, he is trying to explain circularly why there is no God. You know, we have two areas to be concerned about, the physical and Then the physical side, biological and physical. And so he's explained it to himself on the biological side. And he said, see, we found Darwinism to explain that side, and we just haven't come across the other one yet.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Yeah, I can understand someone arguing, given naturalism, given atheism, the best explanation of biological complexity is Darwinian evolution. In fact, Philip Johnson, who started the Intelligent Design movement, agrees with that. He says, if I were a naturalist, I would say the best explanation is Darwinism. But of course, that begs the question whether naturalism and atheism is true. And the way Dawkins presents this is as an objection to the argument for design. This is not a discussion of creation evolution. This is his chapter on arguments for the existence of God.

[Cindy]

And.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

And he wants to refute the design argument. And you can't do that by arguing in a circle. Right?

[Cindy]

Correct. That's the point.

[Dennis]

Okay, Dennis, I understand that the orthodox theologian David Bentley Hart says that Intelligent Design is not. He doesn't like it. He doesn't think that it's a solution to your interchange with Dawkins. And I've tried to find something in writing, but all we have is a YouTube video of David Bentley Hart saying that he doesn't like the, you know, design is intelligent Design is bad theology. And I just wonder if you knew more about what he had said.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Only a little bit. Kevin and I recorded a podcast this week on David Bentley Hart's allegation that people like Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinin Byrne, and myself hold us something called theistic personalism. That is to say, you think of God as a person who intervenes in the world to bring about, say, intelligent life or of that sort. And Hart is a Thomist who thinks of God in very abstract terms as the pure act of being. On Thomism, we don't really have any positive knowledge of the essence of God because God is the pure act of being and so cannot be grasped by the intellect. And so there's a kind of agnosticism about the nature of God that attends Thomism. And that, among other things, disinclines me to Thomism. I don't like this theology. So probably that's reflected in his claim that this is an inadequate theology because it's not Thomistic, I suspect. Yes, back here. What's the title of the podcast that addresses that? Well, I don't know what the title will be or how would I find it? Well, you will listen to our Reasonable Faith podcasts every Monday over the next several weeks, and eventually in the queue will appear this podcast recorded about David Bentley Hart and his critique of theistic personalism. But where Kevin puts it in the lineup, that's up to him. What is au courant in the culture will come to the head of the queue. So it'll come sometime. One near the head of the queue, I might say that is interesting to watch out for is on the controversy arising from Wheaton Colleges firing one of its faculty for saying that Muslims worship the same God that Christians do. And the Christian philosopher Frank Beckwith at Baylor University has come to her defense saying that Christians do worship the same God as Muslims. And so I'm responding to Frank's article in this podcast and showing why I think his argument fails. So that will be one too, that will be interesting to see. All right, well, we've talked about the invalidity of Dawkins argument. That is to say, even granted the truth of those six steps, the conclusion doesn't follow. But what about those six steps? Are they true? Does his argument succeed in undermining the argument for design? Well, I don't think it does at all, because I think that some of the steps in Dawkins argument are plainly false. Notice that step five, which says we don't have an equivalent explanation for physics, is a reference to the fine tuning that we've been talking about. And Dawkins admits that he has nothing by way of an explanation for it. And so the hope that is expressed in six that we shouldn't give up hope of a better explanation is just nothing more than the faith of a naturalist. It's the naturalist's faith that some explanation will be forthcoming. Moreover, consider step three of the argument that was that the temptation to infer design is a false one, because the designer hypothesis immediately raises the larger problem of who designed the designer. His claim here is that you're not justified in inferring design as an explanation of the complex order of the universe, and because then a new problem arises, namely who designed the designer. Now, I have a couple of problems with this step in the argument. First, this claim is flawed, I think, on at least two grounds. First, in order to recognize an explanation as the best, you don't need to have an explanation of the the explanation. This is an elementary point in the philosophy of science. For example, if archaeologists digging in the ground were to come across things looking like pottery shards and arrowheads and tomahawk heads, they would be justified in inferring that these were the artifacts left by a lost group of people and rather than the products of sedimentation and metamorphosis Even if they had absolutely no idea or explanation of who these people were, or similarly, if astronauts were to come upon a pile of machinery on the backside of the moon, they would be justified in inferring that that was left there by intelligent agents. Pardon me? Even if they had no idea whatsoever who those agents were or how they got there. In order to recognize an explanation as the best, you don't need to have an explanation of the explanation. Could you bring me a glass of water to wet my throat or something liquid stronger? What?

[Cindy]

I said stronger than, oh,

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

so you don't need to have an explanation of the explanation in order to recognize that an explanation is the best. In fact, if you think about it, that requirement would lead to an infinite regress of explanations so that nothing would ever get explained. For before any explanation could be accepted as the best, you'd need to have an explanation of the explanation. But before you could accept that, you'd need an explanation of the explanation of the explanation, and before you could accept that, you'd need an explanation of the explanation of the explanation of the explanation, and so on and so forth. Nothing could ever be explained and science would be destroyed. So in the case at hand, in order to recognize that intelligent design is the best explanation of the appearance of design in the universe, you don't need to be able to explain the designer. Whether the designer has an explanation can simply be left an open question for further inquiry. Second problem with step three. Dawkins thinks that in the case of a divine designer of the universe, the designer is just as complex as the thing to be explained, and so no explanatory advance is made. Now, this objection raises all sorts of questions about the role played by simplicity in assessing competing explanations. For example, there are many other factors that scientists consider besides simplicity when they weigh the question of which explanation is the best. For example, they'll consider explanatory scope or explanatory power or other theoretical virtues. An explanation which has broader explanatory scope might be preferred over a simpler explanation simply because it explains more things. So simplicity is not the only, and not even the most important criterion in assessing theories. But we can just leave those questions to the side. Dawkins fundamental mistake lies in his assumption that a divine designer is just as complex as the universe, and this is plainly false. As a pure mind without a body, God is a remarkable, simple entity. A mind or a soul is not a physical object composed of parts. In contrast to the contingent and variegated universe, with all of its inexplicable constants and quantities, a divine mind is startlingly simple. Now certainly it's true that such a mind may have complex ideas. It might be thinking, for example, of the infinitesimal calculus. But the mind itself is a remarkably simple entity, having no parts out of which it's composed. Dawkins has evidently confused a mind's ideas, which may indeed be complex, with a mind itself, which is a remarkably simple entity. And so in fact, postulating a divine mind behind the appearance of design in the cosmos actually does represent an advance in simplicity. It is a simpler explanation than just saying the universe is fine tuned the way it is by chance. So his argument fails on multiple accounts. It's not true that simplicity is the most important only factor in assessing explanations. And moreover, the explanation of a divine mind is more simple than the complex and variegated universe. And so it seems to me that of the three alternatives before us, physical necessity, chance or design, the most plausible of these three is design. Any comments or questions about those objections to Dawkins argument? Cody

[Kevin]

so one thing I was pondering, I know the argument doesn't argue to a specific Christian concept of God, but I was still thinking, considering we are Christians here and we believe that God, you know, you talk about a mind as a simple thing, but we also believe God is a trinity, right? You know, three persons, one being. I mean, what if somebody says, well, but you believe God is a trinity. But that's not, that doesn't sound like a simple explanation, this idea of three persons, one being.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

So I think you would be unjustified to infer to the Trinity as the best explanation of desire. I think that's right. That would be an ad hoc hypothesis for which there's no justification. So this gives you a personal intelligent designer of the universe, but whether he's a trinity or not, that's going to depend upon divine revelation or other factors. The argument doesn't draw the conclusion that therefore a trinity is the best explanation of the appearance of design.

[Elizabeth]

Elizabeth so to me, I'm writing a chapter on philosophy of neuroscience right now. Wow. And well, it's on my mind.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

And so yeah, I'm glad that you admit that you have a mind.

[Elizabeth]

I'm sorry, okay. I didn't mean to do that. Promised I'd Science puns. Okay. So anyways, to me it seems that simplicity is rarely even a consideration from both a philosophical point of view trying to explain physical phenomena, or just a scientific method sort of view and rather incremental validity or additional explanatory power offered by an account of some sort of phenomenon or entity is really what matters because that's what avoids just unnecessary, redundant or contrived detail.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Okay, you've said it well. And as I indicated, this appeal to simplicity on Dawkins part raises a whole host of questions about what are theoretical virtues of scientific theories that would make one preferable to another. And I think one of the points that you're spotting here is that Dawkins glosses or conflates the simplicity of the hypothesis with the simplicity of the entity that the hypothesis posits. And a hypothesis can be very simple in terms of its explanatory power. It doesn't add these ad hoc devices like that the explanation is a trinity or that it's purple or those would be a violation of Occam's razor or simplicity. You don't want to posit any more causes than are necessary to explain the effect. That's what Elizabeth is pointing out. But the causes that you do postulate the might themselves be quite complex entities. DNA molecules and all sorts of other things. So you're quite right in saying that there's a confusion I think going on here in Dawkins mind. Yes. I don't know the name of this fellow in front of Bo, but there we are.

[Scott]

Hi, I'm Scott.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Hi Scott.

[Scott]

So the explanation of the explanation argument kind of to me sounds like a three year old kid just asking his parents over and over and over, why? Why? But doesn't he run into the same problem of needing an explanation of the explanation? I mean, it doesn't just apply to the designer, it applies to the mechanisms of the naturalistic world too. You end up coming to a beginning somewhere.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Yeah, you're absolutely right. I mean this is.

[Scott]

So where does Dawkins though end up out of the three choices? I mean, it's not designed. So where does he end up on the other two? Is he going with chance there?

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Well, I don't think he has any explanation for fine tuning. All he has is a hope that something will emerge in physics that is comparable in power to Darwinian evolution in biology. And he would see Darwinian evolution as a combination of chance and necessity. The mutations, I think he would say, occur by chance. And then natural selection operates deterministically on the chance mutations to weed out those that are unfit and can't survive in the struggle for survival. So he would see that explanation as a kind of combination of chance and necessity. But he offers nothing with regard to the fine tuning. He admits he doesn't have an explanation.

[Bo]

Bo I wonder what you think about a potential rejoinder that you might get regarding the idea that the mind is simple. Of course, it's not composed of parts. I think I would agree. But it seems to me that there can be lesser and greater minds in the sense of they can vary in their faculties and how those faculties relate to one another. You know, I might have my beliefs, might inform my desires, and there can be various. I don't know, perhaps complex isn't the right word to use, but our minds are certainly more complex in their rational faculties than any animal mind that might exist. And conversely, and on the other end of the spectrum, God's mind is perhaps potentially infinitely more complex and his. Maybe complex isn't the right word to use, but in his faculties and how those faculties might work with one another. So even with a single mind, can you not have varying degrees of complex faculties or additional faculties?

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Well, I would say two things in response to that. First, that the way Dawkins himself defines simplicity is in terms of physical composition. If you look at the way in which he discusses his objection, he's saying that things that are composed of parts are more complex than simple things like electrons, for example. So it's his own concept of simplicity that's at work here in the objection. But then secondly, I would say that even though a soul or mind might have complexity with regard to its faculties like intellect, volition, maybe emotion, still this is not very complex, that they might be very powerful faculties. But I don't see that that is a sort of objectionable complexity that would be anywhere like the complexity of a fine tuned universe. Remember the odds we talked about one part out of 10 to the 120th power and so forth. There's nothing comparable to that in the faculties that God has. I would say Brad, or at least Bo. What we could say is that there's no reason to postulate that kind of complexity in such a design argument, that we're not asserting that. So we get to a relatively simple designer.

[Moderator]

Yes, I'm a little baffled by the simplicity argument. And I understand in the design argument we say we take simple parts and we put. We take all these simple parts and we put them together in a unique way that can't be evolved. And none of these parts will do this. None of them have any value whatsoever. But when I put them together in a unique way, it has function like the mousetrap. This is what I always like. So you know his argument that I've got to find something to break it all down into simple parts. To assemble in a unique way. And is the idea of design. But the idea of a designer is a designer can go immediately to the complex and not put it together with simple parts. So I think he's trying to find a naturalistic solution to saying, well, you've got to have all these simple parts that could be put together uniquely, and that's design. Well, God didn't do it that way.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Right. The objection here is that postulating a divine designer, God is somehow postulating a very complex entity, and that that's objectionable.

[Kevin]

Why?

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Well, because then you've postulated something just as complex to explain something complex, and he thinks that's illegitimate. Now, as I say, that raises all these questions about simplicity and explanatory power that are wrong. But in any case, it seems to me he's just fundamentally incorrect in thinking that a divine designer is a complex entity. His thoughts might be complex, his activities could be complex, but a mind, a pure mind without any body, has no composition. It's not made up of parts. At most, you could say maybe it has diverse faculties, but that's still very simple. So I'm suggesting, even on his misconceived argument, and I do think it's misconceived, he hasn't shown that a divine designer is a complex entity. On the contrary, theologians and philosophers would typically say that God is very simple. All right, well, with that, we're out of time. And so we draw our conclusion then, that the best explanation of the fine tuning of the universe is designed so that now we have a third argument in our cumulative case for the existence of God. Let's close with a benediction. And now, may the God of all power, who brought into existence the world from nothing, empower you to live a holy and fruitful life this week in his service through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

[Moderator]

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