Defenders: Excursus on Natural Theology (Part 21): The Moral Argument Part 4

Summary

Defenders Podcast — Excursus on Natural Theology (Part 21): The Moral Argument Part 4

Host: Dr. William Lane Craig
Date: August 31, 2022

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Episode Overview

In this episode, Dr. William Lane Craig continues his Sunday school class on Christian doctrine and apologetics, focusing on Natural Theology and, specifically, the Moral Argument for God's existence. Having defended the first premise (if God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist), Dr. Craig shifts to defending the second premise: objective moral values and duties do exist. The class considers philosophical support for this claim, addresses contemporary objections (especially from evolutionary psychology and sociobiology), and discusses the epistemological basis for believing in objective morality. Several participants raise questions and objections, leading to a lively and instructive exchange.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Acceptance of the Second Premise: Objective Moral Values Exist

• Craig’s Surprising Discovery:
  Dr. Craig observes that, contrary to expectations, most academic philosophers (and especially philosophy professors) accept the existence of objective moral values—even more so than students ([00:15-01:35]).

  • “It is not the case that students get their relativism from university professors... the professors are more objectivist than the students.” — Dr. Craig ([00:34])

• Reasoning by Analogy:
  Our trust in moral experience is compared to trusting our sense experience about the external world, unless we have a strong reason to doubt them ([01:37-03:15]).

  • “Just as I believe my five senses... unless and until I have some overriding reason to distrust my senses. Similarly... I should also accept what my moral experience tells me...” — Dr. Craig ([00:44])

• Moral Experience and Fallibility:
  Moral experience, like sensory experience, can be fallible but remains trustworthy without a defeater ([03:15-04:15]).

2. Concrete Examples that Underscore Objective Morality

• Illustrations to Convince Skeptics:
  Dr. Craig suggests that most people, when presented with examples of atrocities (e.g., rape, child abuse, Sati, foot-binding, Crusades, Inquisition, clerical sexual abuse), will acknowledge some acts are truly wrong, indicating belief in objective morality ([04:20-08:09]).
  • “Actions like rape or child abuse aren't just socially unacceptable behavior. They're moral abominations. Some things, at least, are really wrong.” — Dr. Craig ([05:13])
  • “People who fail to see this are just morally handicapped. They're like... vision impaired and can't tell the difference between red and green.” — Dr. Craig ([05:33])
• Strategy for Discussion:
  Practical advice is given for dialoguing with moral relativists: use tailored examples, including religious atrocities, to surface intuitions about objective morality ([06:23-08:29]).

3. The Bankruptcy of Socio-cultural Relativism

• Panel Discussion Example:
  Dr. Craig recounts a panel discussion about biblical authority and homosexuality where one panelist's moral relativism failed to condemn abuse universally ([08:30-10:25]).
  • “Who's to say that that society's values are wrong?... This sort of hardness of heart ultimately backfires, I think, on the moral relativist.” — Dr. Craig ([09:45])
• Implication for Theism:
  He emphasizes that relativism not only fails as a moral position but also undermines claims about God’s goodness ([10:06-10:35]).

4. Properly Basic Belief and Moral Intuition

• Student Question (Cody):
  Cody notes that internet atheists often default to denying both God and objective moral values for “lack of evidence.” He asks whether belief in moral values is properly basic, like belief in God ([11:29-12:08]).
• Craig’s Affirmation:
  Dr. Craig affirms that both beliefs are properly basic; we are justified in our moral beliefs unless there is an overriding defeater ([12:08-13:38]).
  • “This is a properly basic belief grounded in our experience of moral values and duties. And unless and until some overriding reason is given to me... I'm justified in thinking that there are objective moral values and duties.” — Dr. Craig ([12:45])

5. Objections: Sociobiology, Evolution, and the Genetic Fallacy

• The Evolutionary Debunking Challenge:
  Dr. Craig explores the idea that our moral beliefs, if evolved or shaped by social conditioning, are untrustworthy ([14:33-17:20]).
  • He calls this a classic genetic fallacy: the origins of a belief do not determine its truth.
  • “You might have acquired your moral beliefs through a fortune cookie... but they could still happen to be true.” — Dr. Craig ([16:10])
• Key distinction:
  The evolutionary account may explain the origins of some moral behaviors (e.g., reciprocity), but not the content of moral beliefs ([22:27-24:09]).
  • Citation: Biologist Jeffrey Schloss critiques the adequacy and coherence of evolutionary accounts of morality, noting their inconsistency and lack of explanatory power ([25:30-26:40]).

6. Is Evolution a Defeater for Our Justification?

• Clarification by Cody:
  Cody tries to connect this issue to Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism: if evolution only aims at survival, can we trust any of our beliefs, let alone moral ones? ([17:39-18:14])
• Craig’s Multi-Pronged Response:
  1. No Compelling Evolutionary Account:
     The best scientific literature doesn’t explain moral beliefs, only certain behaviors ([25:30-26:40]).
  2. The Argument Presupposes Atheism:
     Only if naturalism is assumed does the evolutionary challenge succeed; if God exists, he could ensure reliable moral beliefs ([27:03-28:28]).
     • “So you have to presuppose atheism in order for this argument to get off the ground. And that's question begging.” — Dr. Craig ([28:05])
  3. Self-Defeating Skepticism:
     If the evolutionary objection works for morality, it undermines all beliefs—including science and naturalism, leading to broad skepticism ([28:29-29:25]).

7. Clarifying “Objective” vs. “Subjective” in Moral Experience

• Philosophical Clarification:
  Michelle challenges whether moral experience can count as evidence for objective morality, since experience is subjective ([30:35-34:37]).
• Craig’s Reply:
  All experience is subjective (it happens to us), but its object—what we experience—can still be objective ([34:45-36:10]).
  • “If I have an experience of the external world, that doesn't make the external world subjective. So, in exactly the same way... the object of the experience can be objective.” — Dr. Craig ([35:02])
• Analogy Discussion:
  Using the example of flat-earth belief, it's noted that being objectively wrong or right is independent of subjective experience ([36:10-37:36]).
  • “The subjectivity of your experience doesn't mean that the fact you believe in is subjective. Why isn't it just as objectively true to say that torturing a little girl and raping her is wrong as to say that the Earth is round?” — Dr. Craig ([37:41])

8. Q&A and Wrap-Up

• On Truth and Evolution:
  A participant asks about the relationship between evolutionary benefit and moral truth, querying whether acting in the interest of survival (e.g., harming "the weak") could ever be “true” in a moral sense ([37:57-39:32]).
  • Dr. Craig clarifies that no credible theorist claims evolutionary benefit equates to moral rightness ([39:37-39:57]).
• Summary of Rebuttals:
  Dr. Craig succinctly reviews his three main rebuttals to evolutionary skepticism of moral knowledge ([39:57-41:52]).

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Notable Quotes & Moments

• On Faculty vs. Student Morality:
  “Faculty professors are more likely to believe in the objectivity of moral values than students... philosophers are the ones who affirm moral values and duties are objective in the clearest way.” — Dr. Craig ([00:18-00:40])

• On the Power of Examples:
  “All you have to do is produce a few illustrations... and let them decide for themselves.” — Dr. Craig ([06:54])

• On Properly Basic Belief:
  "There’s no way to prove that you’re not a brain... in the Matrix... Rather, we are justified in believing in the world of physical objects... exactly the same thing about our moral experience." — Dr. Craig ([12:10-12:45])

• On Sociobiology Objection:
  "This objection seems to be a textbook example of what is called the genetic fallacy..." — Dr. Craig ([15:05])

• On Question Begging:
  “The claim that because they've evolved, they're aimed at survival, not at truth, presupposes atheism... Only assuming that atheism and naturalism is true, is it the case that our moral beliefs are aimed at survival rather than at truth.” — Dr. Craig ([27:35-28:05])

• On Subjectivity vs. Objectivity:
  “Of course our experience of everything is subjective because it’s experiential. But the object of the experience can be objective. And I’d say that’s what moral values and duties are.” — Dr. Craig ([35:02])

• On Self-Defeat:
  “If everything we believe is unjustified, then belief in the evolutionary account itself is unjustified, so it is inherently a self-defeating objection.” — Dr. Craig ([29:20])

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Important Timestamps

• 00:15: Introduction of the second premise of the moral argument
• 03:25: Analogy between sensory and moral experience
• 05:13: On recognizing moral abominations (e.g., rape, child abuse)
• 08:30: Story from the Society of Biblical Literature on moral relativism
• 12:08: Cody’s question on properly basic beliefs
• 14:33: Introduction of the sociobiological objection
• 18:14: Cody draws connection to Plantinga’s work
• 22:27: Discussion on whether evolutionary accounts explain moral beliefs
• 27:03-29:25: Three main responses to evolutionary skepticism of moral knowledge
• 34:45: Exchange with Michelle on objective/subjective experience
• 37:57-39:57: Discussion on truth, evolutionary benefit, and morality
• 39:57-41:52: Summary of key rebuttals to evolutionary debunking

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Conclusion

This session deepens the defense of the moral argument's second premise, arguing that our everyday moral experience puts us on firm ground for believing in the existence of objective moral values and duties. Through analogies, real-world examples, and engagement with evolutionary critiques, Dr. Craig seeks to show that both moral realism and the theistic foundation for morality are more plausible than their critics suggest. The dialogue with class members (notably Cody and Michelle) further clarifies philosophical points and showcases how to navigate common objections.

Listen further or explore resources at reasonablefaith.org.

Transcript

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Welcome to Defenders, the teaching class of

Dr. William Lane Craig.

Today An Excursus on Natural Theology, Part 21. For more resources from Dr. Craig, go

to reasonablefaith.org We've been talking about the moral argument for God's existence, and I've completed my defense of the first premise of that argument, that if God does not exist, that is to say, if atheism is true, then objective moral values and duties do not exist. And we looked at some objections to that premise, and I answered those as best I could. And so today we want to move to the second premise of that argument, that objective moral values and duties do exist. Now, I initially thought that this would be the weak and more controversial premise in the argument. In my debates with atheistic philosophers, however, I find that virtually nobody denies this premise. Virtually everyone affirms that some objective moral values and duties do in fact exist. In fact, it might surprise you to learn that actual surveys taken on university campuses indicate that faculty professors are more likely to believe in the objectivity and moral values than students. And that of the faculty philosophy professors are more likely to believe in objective moral values and duties than professors in other disciplines. So it is not the case that students get their relativism from university professors. As is often thought, the professors are more objectivist than the students. And of the professors, the philosophers are are the ones who affirm moral values and duties are objective in the clearest way. Now, why is that? Well, philosophers who reflect upon our moral experience would say that just as I believe my five senses, that there is a world of physical objects around me that I'm sensing unless and until I have some overriding reason to distrust my senses. Similarly, in the absence of some overriding reason to distrust my moral experience, I should also accept what my moral experience tells me, namely, that some things at least are objectively good or evil, right or wrong. Now, notice that this doesn't require that our moral experience is infallible in telling us which moral values and duties exist or that we have neither. Are our five senses infallible? The stick that is in the jar of water looks bent. The highway appears to have water on it in the distance on a hot day, our senses can mislead us. And nevertheless, unless we have some sort of overriding, defeater or reason to distrust our five senses, we generally believe what they tell us, that there is a world of physical objects around me which I perceive. And in exactly the same way, we may grow in moral sophistication and apprehension as we discern certain things to be right or wrong that we didn't see before. I think in the history of mankind there's been moral progress. But what that presupposes is that objective moral values and duties do exist, which we fallibly and defeasibly apprehend. And in the absence of some sort of overriding defeater or reason to doubt our moral experience, we should also believe that there are objectively existing moral values and duties. And I think that most of us recognize this. Most of us would agree that in moral experience we apprehend a realm of moral values and duties that impose themselves on us as objectively binding and true. For example, several years ago I was speaking on a Canadian university campus and I noticed a poster on the wall put up by the Sexual Assault and Information center, and it read as sexual assault, no one has the right to abuse a child, a woman or man. Now, I think most of us would recognize that that statement is true. Sexual abuse of another person. Actions like rape or child abuse aren't just socially unacceptable behavior. They're moral abominations. Some things, at least, are really wrong. And by the same token, love, generosity and self sacrifice are really good. And people who fail to see this are just morally handicapped. They're like the person who is vision impaired and can't tell the difference between red and green. And there's no reason to let their impairment cause us to call into doubt what what we clearly perceived. So I found that although many students give lip service to relativism, 95% of them can be very quickly convinced that some moral values and duties do objectively exist. All you have to do is produce a few illustrations, especially those that are tailored to the person you're talking to, and let them decide for themselves. For example, you could ask them what they think of the Hindu practice called sati, which was the practice of taking a widow and burning her alive on the funeral pyre of her deceased husband. Or what do they think of the ancient Chinese custom of tightly binding the feet of female babies, thereby crippling them for life because they wanted to make them resemble lotus blossoms. You can especially make this point effectively by appealing to examples of atrocities perpetrated in the name of religion. Ask them what they think of the Crusades or the Inquisition. Ask them if they think that it's alright for Catholic priests to sexually abuse little boys, and then for the church to try to cover it up by moving the priest to another diocese. If you're dealing with someone who is honest and not just trying to have an argument, I can guarantee you that Almost every time that person will agree that there are certain some objective moral values and duties. Now of course, sometimes you may encounter hardliners who will just dig in their heels, but usually their position is seen to be so extreme that other people are just repulsed by it. For example, many years ago I attended a meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature which featured a panel discussion on biblical authority and homosexuality. And all of the panelists endorsed the legitimacy of the homosexual lifestyle. One panelist dismissed the biblical prohibitions against this activity on the grounds that they reflect the cultural context in which they were written. Now, since this is a case for everything that Scripture says, it wasn't written in a vacuum after all, he concluded that there are no timeless normative moral truths in Scripture. In the discussion from the floor, I pointed out that such a view leads to socio cultural relativism, which makes it impossible to condemn a society which has moral values that include the abuse and, and the persecution of homosexuals. Who's to say that that society's values are wrong? Well, he responded with a fog of theological double talk and then claimed that there's no place outside of Scripture either where we can find timeless moral values. And I responded, but that just is what we mean by moral relativism. In fact, on your view, I said, there's really no content to the notion of the goodness of God. He might as well be dead. And Friedrich Nietzsche recognized that if God is dead, that leads immediately to nihilism. Well, at that point one of the other panelists jumped in with the knockdown refutation. Well, if you're going to get pejorative, we might as well not talk about it. So I sat down. But the point wasn't lost on the audience. The next man who stood to his feet said, wait a minute, I'm rather confused. I'm a pastor and people are always coming to me asking if they've done something wrong and whether they need forgiveness. For example, he said, isn't it always wrong to abuse a child? Well, I couldn't believe the panelists response to this pastor's question. She said, what counts as abuse differs from society to society. So we can't really use the word abuse without tying it to a historical context. Well, the pastor was insistent. He said, call it whatever you like, but child abuse is damaging to children. Isn't it always wrong to damage children? And she still wouldn't admit it. This sort of hardness of heart ultimately backfires, I think, on the moral relativist and exposes in the minds of most people the bankruptcy of such A worldview. So I think that on the basis of our moral experience, we are justified in affirming a realm of objective moral values in the same way that on the basis of our sense experience, we are justified in affirming a world of physical objects around us. Any question or response to that point, Dr. Craig?

[Cody]

My experience on the Internet, when talking about this argument, is most people will deny the second premise of the argument. And my experience has been they usually do it in the same way that they deny the existence of God, by saying, like, there's no evidence for the existence of God, that's why we don't believe. It's almost like the default position.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Yeah.

[Cody]

And I guess what I'm trying to say is, would you compare, when you say experience, would you compare our belief in God, properly being properly basic, on our moral. On our experience of him would be in the same category as our moral experience of objective moral values and duties. That would be a properly basic thing.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Exactly. I'm glad you discerned that. That shows you understand what we were talking about when we talked about the proper basicality of belief in God. There's no way to prove that you're not a brain. Innovative chemicals wired up with electrodes by some mad scientist being stimulated to think that you're here in this room listening to this lecture. There's no way to prove that you're not a brain or a body lying in the Matrix inhabiting some virtual reality. Rather, as I say, we are justified in believing in the world of physical objects around us on the basis of our experience of the world, unless and until we have some overriding reason to doubt that experience, to think that I am a brain in a vat or a body lying in the Matrix. And in the absence of such an overriding defeater, I am perfectly justified in accepting what my sense experience tells me, that there is a world of physical objects around me. And I would say exactly the same thing about our moral experience. This is a properly basic belief grounded in our experience of moral values and duties. And unless and until some overriding reason is given to me to think that that experience is utterly delusory, I'm justified in thinking that there are objective moral values and duties.

[Stephanie]

Stephanie, this could not be more timely because this week I'm writing a. I'm writing a rebuttal to post structuralism. And I'm the only one in the entire group who actually thinks that there is a foundation to belief. So I have a sneaking suspicion I'm going to be pummeled for the Next few days. But one of the things I wrote in my stance against post structuralism is that the only truth post structuralists recognize is oppression and marginalization and corruption of power. Yet, by their own floating definition of truth, they must leave open the possibility that people are only marginalized because they perceive the words and actions of others to be oppressive. This, of course, is ridiculous. If, however, oppression and marginalization are real and tangible wrong truths, then there must be actual right truth truths. So pray for me this week, okay?

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Yes. Good. All right. Well, now the question arises. Do we have some overriding reason to distrust our moral experience, to think that we are victims of some sort of gigantic illusion? Well, some people have claimed that the sociobiological account of the origins of morality undermines our moral experience. Now, remember, according to that account, our moral beliefs have been ingrained into us by biological evolution and social conditioning. Does that give us reason, then to distrust our moral experience, that there are objective moral values and duties? Well, the sociobiological account clearly does nothing to undermine the truth of our moral beliefs, for the truth of a belief is independent of how you came to hold that belief. In fact, this objection seems to be a textbook example of what is called the genetic fallacy, which is trying to invalidate a person's point of view by showing how that person came to hold that point of view. For example, someone might try to indict your belief that representative democracy is the best form of government by saying, well, the reason you believe that is because you were born in the United States, but if you'd been born in another country, you would have held a different belief. That's the genetic fallacy, trying to invalidate the truth of a belief by showing how the person came to hold it. You might have acquired your moral beliefs through a fortune cookie or through reading tea leaves, but they could still happen to be true. In particular, if God exists, then objective moral values and duties do exist, and regardless of how we come to learn about them. So the sociobiological account, or as it's sometimes called, the evolutionary psychological account, at best proves that our perception of moral values and duties has evolved. But if moral values and duties are gradually discovered rather than invented, then our gradual fallible apprehension of the moral realm no more undermines the objectivity of that realm than our gradual fallible apprehension of the physical realm undermines the objectivity of the physical world. So, taken as an objection to the truth of premise 2, this simply commits the genetic fallacy. Any comment or question about that response?

[Cody]

Yes, Cody, I'm thinking perhaps one way Maybe they could get around the genetic fallacy part is to. Okay, so, you know, like there's Alvin planting his evolutionary argument against naturalism where he tries, I mean, because that's not a genetic fallacy, but there, you know, he tries to show that, well, if you believe evolution, you believe this is how your cognitive faculties have evolved, then you have a good reason to doubt, you know, all your other beliefs. And what if they tried to do that for this? And then I just want to make a comment. I find it funny, by the way, the same people who bring this objection up, by the way, will say, ah, see, this undermines our, you know, moral intuitions, but somehow it doesn't undermine the rest of our cognitive faculties.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Oh yeah, and that's just hypocritical, isn't it? Okay, Cody's point is an excellent one and will form the segue to the very next point I'm going to make. But let's ask if there's any other comment on this point from first, that insofar as this objection is intended to undermine the truth of premise two, it commits the genetic fallacy and doesn't really do anything to undermine the truth that objective moral values and duties exist. Yes. Question over here.

[Bruce]

It's interesting when we talk about the existence of objective moral truths and is there a God? Because it seems to expose, I think, a certain part of human nature that we want to have the privilege of having our lives be objectively meaningful, but at the same time we don't want to be responsible to a higher power when we really can't have it both ways. Because only a higher power, only the existence of a higher power can ensure that our lives are objectively worth something. So we can't have the privilege of having a meaningful life without the responsibility of the moral obligations that are involved in attaining that.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

I agree with you 100%. And what these people would have to say is that not only are the lives of other people morally worthless, but that their own life is morally worthless, and that other people are at liberty to treat them any way they want, treat them as dirt, persecute them, abuse them, and no moral protest could be raised. And I think you're quite right in saying that that's not how people want to live. They do recognize their own self worth at least, and that such activity would be wrong.

[Bruce]

Yes, Bruce, just to add on to that good point, Ravi Zacharias says if you're truly an atheist, that's a life that's truly devoid of meaning, purpose and hope ultimately. So all These the first question to ask college students, if they say they're or anybody else, if they say they're atheists, why are you here? You know, sure, I'm going to be a doctor.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

That was the first premise of the argument. And you remember I shared that initially when I was speaking on university campuses, I just talked about that first premise that if there is no God, then ultimately our lives are absurd. They have no ultimate meaning, value, or purpose. But then the students began to respond by saying, but there are things that are valuable and good and so forth. And it hit me that they had supplied this missing premise in a moral argument for God. And as I say, I think that most people will grant the truth of premise 2 if you just probe a little bit and use telling examples with them. Well, let's go on by saying that perhaps the sociobiological objection or the objection from evolutionary psychology is not intended to undermine the truth of our moral beliefs, but rather our justification for holding such beliefs. If your moral beliefs were based on reading tea leaves, well, they might accidentally turn out to be true, but you wouldn't have any justification for thinking that they were true. And so you wouldn't know that they were true. And so similarly, the objection here could be that if our moral beliefs have been produced by evolution, then we can't have any confidence in the truth of those beliefs. Why? Because evolution aims merely at survival, not at truth. Our moral beliefs are selected for their survival value. The fittest are the ones that survive. And if having moral beliefs will be conducive to the perpetuation of your species, and then these moral beliefs will be selected for in the process of evolution. And since evolution is aiming merely at survivability, not truth, we can't trust our moral experience. And so we can't know that premise two of the argument is true. And this is the objection that Cody was suggesting just a moment ago. The objection is aimed not at the truth of premise 2, but but at your justification for believing premise 2. Now, my claim is that we're justified in believing premise 2 on the ground of our moral experience unless and until we have some overriding defeater of that experience, just as we're justified in believing that there is a world of physical objects around us on the ground of our sense experience, unless and until we have an overriding defeater of that experience. Now, such a defeater would have to show not merely that our moral experience is fallible or defeasible, but that it is utterly unreliable, that we may apprehend no objective moral values and duties whatsoever. Our moral experience is so powerful, however, that such a defeater would have to be incredibly powerful in order to overcome our moral experience, just as our sense experience is so powerful that a defeater of my belief in the world of physical objects, I perceive would have to be incredibly powerful in order for me to believe that I might be a brain in a vat of chemicals or a body lying in the matrix. But, as Louise Antony, an atheist philosopher, put it, in our debate on the foundations of moral values, any argument for moral skepticism will be based on premises which are less obvious than the existence of objective moral values and duties themselves. That is to say, any argument for moral skepticism will rely upon premises which are less obvious than premise two of the moral argument and therefore could never be justified. So what is, then, this allegedly powerful defeater of premise two that shows that my moral experience is utterly untrustworthy? Is it just that our moral beliefs are the result of evolutionary development and therefore they're aimed at survival, not at truth? Is that the whole objection? Well, if that's it, we need to ask ourselves, what is the evidence for that? And in fact, there is no compelling evidence that our moral beliefs are the products of biological evolution. In a complex survey of literature on this topic by the biologist Jeffrey Schloss, Schloss examines contemporary work on evolutionary theories of morality. And he reports, and I quote, not only do we lack currently a fully adequate evolutionary account of morality, but the manifold accounts we do have are also disparate and are often represented by prominent exegetes and as having resolved issues that are still in dispute. In other words, Schloss is saying that these accounts offered by evolutionary psychology are mutually contradictory and that the proponents of these theories are making claims that in fact they cannot support. In personal correspondence, Schloss elaborated, and I quote, the evolutionary debunking argument assumes that moral beliefs are in fact adequately explained by natural selection. There is little question that they are not. Dispositions towards certain behaviors, like reciprocity, parental care, et cetera, do have fairly compelling evolutionary explanations, but we don't actually have a plausible evolutionary proposal for the moral beliefs associated with these behaviors. I've done a fairly recent review of the literature, and I can't find any coherent account for moral beliefs or even normative intuitions. And yet, how easily we allow the evolutionary debunker to get away with mere hand waving and generalizations in trying to undermine the veridicality of our moral experience. The powerful defeater of our moral experience of premise 2 simply does not exist. Secondly, moreover, the Assertion that because our moral beliefs have evolved, they are aimed at survival, not at truth presupposes atheism. The claim that because they've evolved, they're aimed at survival, not at truth, presupposes atheism. For if God exists, then plausibly our moral beliefs, though evolved, will be generally reliable. God would want us to hold generally reliable moral beliefs. So the defeater presupposes that naturalism is true. And that begs the question, that begs the question in favor of atheism. Only assuming that atheism and naturalism is true, is it the case that our moral beliefs are aimed at survival rather than at truth. It is actually the debunker of our moral experience who has the burden of proof here to give a sufficiently powerful defeater of our moral experience. So he needs to prove that our beliefs are not aimed at truth if they're evolved. And that is obviously not the the case. If God exists, you have to presuppose atheism in order for this argument to get off the ground. And that's question begging. Finally, number three, the objection turns out to be self defeating. On atheism and naturalism, all of our beliefs, not just our moral beliefs, are the product of evolution and, and social conditioning. And thus the evolutionary account would lead to skepticism about knowledge in general. But this is self defeating because then we should be skeptical of the evolutionary account itself, since it too is the product of evolution and social conditioning, and therefore the argument or objection undermines itself. And this, as Cody reminds us, is Alvin planning as evolutionary argument and against naturalism, that naturalism has a built in defeater. If our beliefs are aimed at survival rather than truth, then the naturalist can have no confidence in the truth of naturalism. And therefore this objection would undermine not only our moral beliefs, but all of our beliefs, including the belief in naturalism and atheism. So it seems to me that given the warrant for premise two provided by our moral experience, we're justified in thinking that objective moral values and duties exist. Any comment or discussion of this objection from evolutionary psychology to our justification for our moral beliefs? Yes. Back here in the corner. Michelle.

[Michelle]

Hi. Okay, I'm gonna have to dumb this down a little bit, so if the room could forgive me. Premise one, if God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist. Premise two, objective moral values do exist. Premise three, therefore God exists.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Right. Three is the conclusion.

[Michelle]

Okay, and right now we're talking about two.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Yes.

[Michelle]

Right. Okay. So personally, I'm not convinced that objective moral values do exist. And the argument then to me, it doesn't. If objective moral values do not exist, I don't go to God does not exist. It's just not a meaningful argument for me. I can see that objective moral values do not exist and yet God exists.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Oh, really?

[Michelle]

Yes.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

How could you affirm that God exists and objective moral values do not exist when one of the essential attributes of God is goodness?

[Michelle]

I think that morality is by definition subjective, not objective. Even though I know we talked about in prior weeks, you know, the Nazi argument and all that stuff. But the thing is, for us in this room to look back on that and say even if they had won, we still think it's wrong. That's still my subjective experience. That is not evidence for me that there is objective morality. And I don't make a conclusion that because there is no objective morality, there is no God. But I.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

You just want to undermine our justification. Or it sounds to me like you're saying even the truth of Premise two.

[Michelle]

Yes, the truth of Premise two is my problem.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Excuse me?

[Michelle]

Yes, the truth of premise 2 is my problem again.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Here let me step back from the argument and just say that if you believe in God, you're committed to the truth of Premise two, because God has as an essential attribute goodness. God by definition is a being that is worthy of worship, and nothing would be worthy of worship if it isn't good. So every theist is committed to the objectivity of moral value because he believes in the goodness of God. Now, that's not going to rescue the argument, but I just want to speak to you as a sister in Christ, that if you believe God exists, you have to believe in the objectivity of moral values. Don't you believe God is good? Yes. If you worship him, you must believe that. Otherwise how could you worship something you don't think is good? So. So I mean, just as a Christian, you're committed to the truth of Premise two, but you can perhaps role play here the role of the atheist and say, all right, I believe in Premise two, but as an argument for theism, this isn't very good because I playing the role now, playing the devil's advocate as the atheist, I don't think Premise two is true. But then I've already responded to that, Michel, As I say, if you believe in the world of physical objects around you, on the basis of your sense experience, you have exactly the same sort of reason for believing in a realm of objective moral values and duties because you have an experience of that realm. And unless and until you have some overriding defeater of that Experience. And you're justified in believing in it, just as you're justified in believing in the external world.

[Michelle]

You know, you're using the word objective and the word experience. And to me, the word experience takes me out of objective and into subjective. Okay, that's my suggestion.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Yes. I've heard other people say something like this, and I think this is based on a confusion. Obviously my experience is subjective. Right? That's what experience is. I have an. But the object of the experience isn't therefore subjective. If I have an experience of the external world, that doesn't make the external world subjective. If I experience Ben Jones, that doesn't make Ben Jones a product of my consciousness, even though my experience of Ben Jones is my experience and his subjective. Now, hang on. So in the same. Exactly the same way, yeah. I have an experience. Say I have an experience of pain. That's obviously subjective, right? That a pain experience is my inner experience. I have a pain experience. But that isn't to deny the objective truth. He is in pain. You know, somebody stuck a knife in his leg and is twisting it around. And look at him, he's writhing and screaming. It's obviously true that he is objectively in pain in. Even though his experience is subjective. So of course our experience of everything is subjective because it's experiential. But the object of the experience can be objective. And I'd say that's what moral values and duties are.

[Michelle]

Let's use an analogy that's a little less physical, medical and a little more abstract. Right. Because we're talking not about injury or that of pain, more about beliefs. So the one that comes to my mind is the flat earth. Right. For many, many centuries, the commonly held belief was that the earth was flat. And many people, we could take you to the mountaintop and you could see the edge. So there was evidentiary support for that belief. Now, objectively, the world was round whether we believed it was flat or not.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Good, I'm glad you. That's what you think.

[Michelle]

The thing is, though, that it doesn't lead to any conclusion for me that like, you know, I believe.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

Michelle, don't you believe that the Earth is round?

[Michelle]

I do.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

It's spherical, isn't it? So you believe on the. And I assume you believe this on the basis of evidence. Right?

[Michelle]

Right.

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

So on the basis of the evidence, you think that these people in the past were wrong in what they said. They were objectively wrong. The Earth is objectively spherical. Even though your experience of that is subjective, you have a subjective experience of the Evidence, you see it and so forth. But you believe that the Earth is round. So the subjectivity of your experience doesn't mean that the fact you believe in is subjective. Why? Why isn't it just as objectively true to say that torturing a little girl and raping her is wrong as to say that the Earth is round?

Brad, your last point. You made a point. I just wanted to explore it a bit. Is that the belief, the evolution that evolutionary forces led us to, to these things, that if our beliefs are based on survival rather than truth. So I'm going to ask you a question. What is truth? I probably shouldn't phrase it that way.

It's the property of a proposition that corresponds to the world as it actually is.

So if the evolutionary forces say, I'm going to continue the human, you know, animal structure, and by doing that we kill children that are weak and eat them or, you know, whatever things that are repugnant to us. But it does result in more survival, you know, and protects the Earth. We should kill one third of the population because the Earth is important and we need to have a sustainable environment. I hear this all the time. Is that truth? And how do we argue that truth if it is against our objective moral value? Yeah, that may protect the Earth, but it hurts. That's against my objective moral right.

It would be objectively morally wrong to do that.

So I know that's not a very good question, but I.

[Michelle]

Well,

[Dr. William Lane Craig]

nobody is claiming, not even atheists, that you can just read moral values off of the evolutionary process. Nature is red in tooth and claw, and so no one claims that whatever helps you to survive is good because lots of things are violent and wrong. So there isn't any claim that evolution teaches us what is good and evil. The claim that we're exploring is whether or not my moral experience of right and wrong and good and evil is undermined by the fact that moral values have evolved or my perception of moral values has evolved over time. And I gave three responses to that. Let me just review these three responses before we conclude today. The first response is that, in fact, there is no such account in the literature. There is no coherent, compelling account recognized by biologists that it would explain how moral beliefs or normative beliefs arise from biological evolution. The second point is that that would undermine the objectivity of these beliefs. Only if atheism is true, because only if naturalism is true would our beliefs be shaped by survival value and not by truth. So the argument begs the question. It assumes that atheism is true, and then the third response was that if this objection is true, if this would undermine our moral beliefs, and then it undermines everything we believe, because all of our beliefs then are selected by evolution for survivability, not for truth. But if everything we believe is unjustified, then belief in the evolutionary account itself is unjustified, so that it is inherently a self defeating objection. All right, well, we can resume this discussion next time, but we're out of time now, so let's close with benediction. And now may the God of love, who sent the Lord Jesus Christ for our sake as sinners and enemies of God, fill your hearts with love, even for those who oppose you, ridicule you, and persecute you, and so fulfill the image of Christ in you. In Jesus name, Amen. The copyright for the content of this recording is held by Dr. William Lane Craig.

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