Dwarkesh Podcast – Episode Summary

Sarah Paine – How Russia Sabotaged China's Rise

Date: October 31, 2025
Host: Dwarkesh Patel
Guest: Professor Sarah Paine (Naval War College, expert on Russo-Chinese relations)

Overview

This episode explores the deep and complicated history of Russo-Chinese relations, focusing on how Russia has persistently worked to undermine China's emergence as a great power. Drawing on centuries of border disputes, wars, ideological schisms, and geopolitical rivalry, Sarah Paine provides a sweeping narrative of two empires locked in mutual suspicion—with each periodically destabilizing the other to prevent a strong neighbor. The conversation tracks critical moments of conflict, myth-building, and strategic manipulation from the Opium Wars to the present day, showing how these historical legacies shape the current "bromance" and its likely end.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Dynamics of Continental Empires (00:00–08:35)

• Enduring Rivalry: Paine frames both Russia and China as continental empires—paranoid about strong neighbors, focused on buffer zones, and governed by the rule of never allowing a great power next door.
• Cycle of Overextension: Both are prone to overexpansion and subsequent implosion, with their history marked by “blood and high mortality rates.”
• Quote: “There are no enduring alliances in this world because the neighbors figure that the hegemonic power offers nothing but trouble in the long term.” (A, 02:24)

2. Russia’s Pattern of Sabotaging China's Rise (08:35–30:30)

• Opium Wars & Treaty Losses: Russia manipulated China into ceding vast territories (Treaty of Aigun (1858), Treaty of Peking (1860)) while China was beleaguered by internal revolts and Western invasions.
  • “The Russians repeatedly derail the rise of China by scripting the Chinese to do things that are remarkably detrimental to Chinese interests, but pretty good for Russian interests.” (A, 09:46)
• Triple Intervention & Railway Politics: Following the First Sino-Japanese War, Russia orchestrated a coalition to deny Japan territorial gains—then grabbed those very territories for itself, accelerating the scramble for concessions in China.
• Karakhan Manifesto Myth: Russia (as the Soviets) promised to return seized lands to China, but once strong, reneged, cementing the myth of friendship despite record theft and manipulation.
• Sino-Japanese Dynamics: Stalin masterfully kept China fragmented by funding multiple sides in the Civil War—ensuring Chinese fought Japanese aggressors without direct Soviet bloodshed. He repeatedly pursued the "no two-front war" rule.
• Stalin’s Geopolitics: "What's not to love about fighting to the last Chinese in Korea? Stalin thinks this is great and it's going to retard Chinese development." (A, 29:12)

3. Turning Points: From Allies to Adversaries (30:30–48:00)

• End of the Illusion: By Mao's era, China realized the Soviets’ support came with ulterior motives. Disputes over status, military operations, and territorial demands shattered the alliance.
• Nuclear Stalemate: China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons (1964) allowed it to challenge the unequal border; the 1969 clashes brought the two to the brink of open war.
  • "The one that wants to nuke you is your primary adversary." (A, 46:33)
• U.S. and the Swing Role: The Sino-Soviet split allowed the United States to play a strategic “swing voter,” aligning with China to check Soviet power.

4. Structural Decline and Transformation (48:00–61:30)

• Soviet Decline: Paine details the economic sclerosis and leadership crisis in late Soviet Russia, exacerbated by reliance on oil, stagnation, and costly foreign adventurism.
• Collapse’s Consequences: Gorbachev's reforms spun out of control, unraveling both empire and the Communist system—offering China cautionary lessons.
• Russian and Chinese Nationalism: Both regimes now rely on nationalism to shore up legitimacy as communism’s ideological grip weakens or vanishes.
  • “When people cease believing in Communism, that's when China's nightmare scenario threatens—a descent into chaos.” (A, 56:51)

5. Contemporary Implications & the "Bromance" (61:30–79:08)

• Paranoia and Projection: Russia views itself as a perennially threatened great power and gaslights the West about NATO while pursuing imperial restoration.
• Putin’s Strategy: His popularity surges via foreign wars (Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine), but these same adventures weaken Russia and leave Siberia exposed to China’s reach.
• China’s Opportunity: As Russia focuses on Europe, China quietly expands into Central Asia and positions itself for greater access to Siberian resources—especially water.
  • “Why would it matter? Siberia has precisely the resources that China now needs and covets... and China is known for big water projects.” (A, 85:30)
• Prospects for Cooperation: Despite temporary alignment, serious, existential interests—and mutual distrust—ensure this relationship is fundamentally unstable.
  • “The question isn’t whether this bromance is going to last forever, but rather when it’s going to end. When is Xi Jinping going to decide he's got the right amount of leverage to get whatever it is he wants?” (A, 87:21)
• U.S. and the West: The optimal Western strategy is patience—don’t antagonize; instead, maximize prosperity and unity among allies, as internal contradictions will turn Russia and China against each other.
  • “If you play your cards appropriately and these two will take care of each other. The rest of us… can focus on maximizing our prosperity.” (A, 93:25)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Continental Empires:
  "You don't want any great powers on the borders. This is the fundamental problem with their relationship—today's friend can be tomorrow's foe." (A, 01:24)

• On Russia’s Approach to Alliances:
  "There are no enduring alliances in this world... Both Russia and China are known for overextending, overdoing it. And that may help explain some of their periodic implosions." (A, 02:37)

• On Stalin’s Cynicism:
  "Stalin's plan, his script... works beautifully. Because when the nationalists unite in the second united front... the Japanese are apoplectic. And this is when they escalate in 1937..." (A, 24:23)

• On Mao’s Realization:
  "By this time, Mao has figured out that the Russians don't want a strong China." (A, 35:55)

• On the Split:
  “The one that wants to nuke you is your primary adversary”—on the Damansky Island crisis and the shift in PRC hostility from the U.S. to USSR. (A, 46:33)

• On Modern Nationalism
  "The problem with nationalism is it's a very heady drink. If you imbibe too much, it clouds the judgment. Moreover, it repels minority people... and impedes the de-escalation of crises." (A, 59:12)

• On Putin’s Miscalculations:
  "Putin is trying to do empire in the age of nationalism. Well, it's a non starter. And he's dumping all of his ordinance on Ukraine, leaving Siberia wide open. And Xi Jinping has moved right in." (A, 92:58)

• On the Bromance’s Fate:
  "The question isn't whether this bromance is gonna last forever, but rather when it's gonna end." (A, 87:21)

• On U.S. Strategy:
  "Always gang up on them, right? I mean, really, why would you ever want to go alone with a bully? You'd want to go in with lots of friends. And this is what the World War II generation got right." (A, 89:32)

Q&A and Afterthoughts (65:24–89:33)

On Ideology in the Sino-Soviet Split

• Dwarkesh: “Why didn’t the fact that they were both these communist countries do more to cement the relationship?” (B, 65:12)
• Sarah Paine: “The problem with communism is that the economics of it don’t actually work, and...the principle that each one should be king of the roost, that hasn’t changed.” (A, 65:24)

Communism vs. Realpolitik

• Dwarkesh: Why would Stalin favor geopolitics over world revolution?
• Sarah: “Russians invented it—or actually they didn’t, Marx invented it—but they’re the guys who think, ‘Well, we operationalized it, so we should run it forever.’” (A, 68:44)

The Pattern of Dictators

• Dwarkesh: Was the Sino-Soviet split inevitable, or would Stalin have prevented it?
• Sarah: “Dictators' deaths profoundly weaken their systems, because they've got no good succession. So it means you're guaranteed a Cat Fight Royale.” (A, 70:34)

Lessons of Chinese Civil War and Present Relevance

• Dwarkesh: Should we take internal shifts in large states (like India, Nigeria, China) more seriously?
• Sarah: “On the China, the Chinese civil war, there was an understanding that it was a really big deal. …Americans...looking at it [realized] it's not feasible for us to alter this outcome.” (A, 72:15)

Stalin’s Calculations and Wrong Lessons

• Dwarkesh: Stalin misread Hitler’s intentions, but his logic made sense given his earlier success with Japan.
• Sarah: “Stalin thinks it's gonna work for him and he doesn't get it. He becomes the menu item for Hitler and it just about wrecks him. But it works beautifully against China.” (A, 83:31)

The Cooperative Adversary

• Sarah: “A cooperative adversary...doesn’t mean the adversary wants to cooperate with you, but they just don’t play their cards particularly well.” (A, 85:24)

Modern Parallels—Russia as Modern North Korea?

• Dwarkesh: Could Russia end up as China’s weak client, a new North Korea?
• Sarah: “Yeah, that could well be their future...the Chinese will try to get a very good terms of trade for resources and be...very few things back.” (A, 82:13)

Takeaways & Closing Thoughts

• The pattern of sabotage, betrayal, and cynical manipulation is not an aberration, but the rule, in Russo-Chinese relations.
• Cold War splits and contemporary “bromances” are fragile, strategic, and subject to historical interruptions—ideology is always subordinate to security interests.
• The Western world’s best strategy is clarity, patience, and internal resilience; instability and rivalry will continue to undermine any lasting Sino-Russian alliance.

Final Words:
“Be kind to each other.” (A, 89:33)

Suggested Listening

For next episodes:

• [War Termination: How to End a Conflict]
• [Why Russia Lost the Cold War]

For more: www.dwarkesh.com