Loading summary
Transcript105 lines
- [00:01]
William Doroupel
If you want access to bonus episodes, reading lists for every series of Empire, a chat community, discounts for all the books mentioned in the week's podcast ad, free listening, and a weekly newsletter. Sign up to empire club@www.empirepoduk.com.
- [00:19]
Stitch Fix Advertiser
stitch Fix shopping is hard. Let's talk about it.
- [00:22]
William Doroupel
I don't have time to shop, so I buy all my clothes, where I buy my seafood.
- [00:26]
Anita Anand
I just want someone to tell me what shirt goes with what pants.
- [00:30]
Stitch Fix Advertiser
I just want jeans that fit. Stitch Fix makes shopping easy. Just show your size, style and budget, and your stylist sends personalized looks right to your door. No subscription required, plus free shipping and returns.
- [00:41]
William Doroupel
Man, that was easy. That looked good.
- [00:43]
Stitch Fix Advertiser
Stitch Fix Online personal styling for everyone. Take your style quiz today@stitch fix.com.
- [00:59]
Anita Anand
Hello and welcome to Empire with me, Anita Anand.
- [01:03]
William Doroupel
And me, William Doroupel. And today we've got something a little bit different.
- [01:07]
Anita Anand
October 1973, the Yom Kippur War. The day Arabs crossed the Suez Canal into the Sinai. The intelligence failure that made this possible, the extraordinary military engineering that made this happen, and the oil embargo that made the whole world feel the consequences. This is by absolutely any measure one of the great thrillers, if you like, of the 20th century.
- [01:34]
William Doroupel
I think we should start with one of Avi Shlime's great insights from his book the Iron Wall. And he very much blames the intelligence failures in 1973, the fact that the Egyptians were able to surprise the Israelis as much as they did to what he calls ha conceptzia in Hebrew. It's a set of assumptions that he says are deeply embedded in the Israeli military. Think the period, and it allows the Israelis completely to underestimate all the Arab armies, but particularly the Egyptians.
- [02:05]
Anita Anand
Can you talk us through the assumptions and just make those clear to us?
- [02:10]
William Doroupel
So if you remember back in the 1967 episode that we did with Eugene, the key Israeli coup was to destroy the Egyptian air force, the enormous Egyptian air force at that point on the ground in the first 10 minutes of the war. And an idea embedded itself in Israeli military thinking that Egypt will not go to war. First achieving air superiority over Israel. And as they'd lost most of their efforts in 1967 and had yet to rebuild it, that basically Israel was completely safe. The other idea is that Syria, which was a smaller power than Egypt, Egypt, we don't really think of today as a kind of major military power in the Middle east, but it was in the 1960s, and the idea that Israel had at this point was that Syria would not attack without Egypt and that a coordinated Egyptian Syrian assault was therefore impossible if there hadn't been a proper Egyptian rebuilding of its air wing. It's a very reasonable assumption. Air power is the key in desert warfare. And Egypt genuinely had not restored its air force to anything like 1967 levels. But according to Avi's assessment, this had led to such contempt for the Arab armies following this Lightning victory, 1967 that we talked about, that they simply thought there was really no possibility of Arab assault on Israel in the early 70s. And therefore there was no countermeasures in place.
- [03:35]
Anita Anand
Israel thought, nobody will act without Egypt say so. And Nasser is not there to say so anymore. That's also not a ridiculous assumption. And the man who comes to replace him, Anwar Sadat, they underestimate him. So let me tell you a little bit about Anwar Sadat. He's born in 1918 in a small village in the Nile Delta. He's dark skinned. And this is important because it is still a society where, you know, the lighter skinned people are the ones with the power and being dark skinned, a social stigma. So he's regarded really in Cairo politics as a provincial outsider, sort of a yokel.
- [04:13]
William Doroupel
He's called the donkey, in fact, initially by the kind of the grandees in Cairo. Yeah.
- [04:19]
Anita Anand
But when he inherits the presidency From Nasser in 1970, he's had years in prison, he's had years in opposition to think about, you know, what he would do if he was in charge of Egypt, what Egypt needs to maintain that position that it did have under Nasser, being the colossus of the Middle East. And what he decides is the most daring strategic analysis of any Arab leader of his generation, that Egypt cannot afford to remain at war with Israel. It's a striking thing. People haven't dared to say it or even think it. The economy is wrecked, his army humiliated twice in a decade, the air force destroyed, Sinai gone. And now you've got the Soviets who are there thick on the ground dragging their feet about sending their most sophisticated weapons to Egypt. So he realizes that if he's going to get any of this back, to restore the honor, you know, do something about this humiliation, he needs to get Sinai back and he can't get Sinai back without America. So getting America requires sort of demonstrating to Washington that there is a status quo in the Middle East.
- [05:28]
William Doroupel
So no one really wants to sort of break the deadlock. Israel has got hold of the west bank and Gaza. Jordan has lost the West Bank, Egypt has lost Gaza. The Soviets, who were very enthusiastic Backers of Egypt have now got a bit cold on him and they're just not sending the new weapons particularly they want anti aircraft missiles, the SAM missile systems, and they're not getting them. And they can tell that the Soviets are sort of going a bit cold on them. So the whole thing is stuck. And he also has this long term idea of basically dumping the Soviets and going over to under the American umbrella. You can see that America is the growing economy of the moment and he thinks it's a better. So he's got that he has to somehow reengage everybody in the Middle east. And he has this idea that if he can make at least a decent stab at getting the Sinai back, he can put the whole business of occupied territory back on the agenda. So he comes up with this idea with great patience and precision. And it's a bit of a genius plan. He first of all mobilizes the Egyptian army in May 1973 and Israel mobilizes its reserves, thinking that war is coming. And then he stands them down and August the same thing happens again. So he sort of trains the Israelis not to take these Egyptian mobilizations seriously. In other words, he's sort of calling
- [06:53]
Anita Anand
Wolf, hits them in the Exchequer because every time they mobilize, it's not cheap, you know, tens of millions of dollars.
- [06:59]
William Doroupel
And the idea is that he's sort of training them to ignore him. And Mossad buys this. They come to the conclusion that they don't need to take what they regard as Egyptian theater seriously.
- [07:10]
Anita Anand
But it's a brilliant deception. If a deception is going to work. You do the same thing again and again. People expect the same result again and again. But then in the week before October 6, the Egyptian army stages what looks like to the Israelis, oh, they're off again. Another exercise. Massive troop concentrations visible from Israeli observation posts on the Eastern Bank. Israeli intelligence assessing. Well, this is the same as we saw last Tuesday. The exercise is scheduled to conclude on October 7th. The Israelis note the dates, they file the reports, but they don't mobilize this time. Remember, you know, tens of millions every time you mobilize. Because the idea is, you know, this is just mere theater. If not mobilizing, how is Israel fortified? I mean, do they have defensive positions if they're not moving into attacking positions?
- [07:58]
William Doroupel
So at the end of 1967, the border resolves itself at the Suez Canal. And at the far side of the Suez Canal the Israelis have built something called the Balev Line, which has cost millions to put in. It's regarded as absolutely State of the art. It's on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and consists of 33 heavily fortified strongpoints built into and atop of a sand rampart which is a massive 20 to 25 metres high. That's roughly eight storeys running 150 kilometres along the entire length of the Canal Bank. So the Israelis think that they're completely secure. They've got bunkers, observation posts, tank ramps, connecting roads allowing reinforcements within hours. It's like a sort of modern version of Hadrian's Wall, if you like. And the idea is that this is impregnable. And Israeli military engineers have estimated it would take any Egyptian crossing force at least 24 to 48 hours to breach that rampart, to establish bridges. And during that time, again, thanks to the conception, the idea is that the Israeli air force, which has showed itself to be so incredibly brilliant in 1967, will simply destroy any Arab air force or any Arab ground forces that get across the canal. They'd be shredded in Israeli ideas. You know, the Bilev Line isn't just a fortification, it's a guarantee of time. And it gives the Israelis the times to mobilize the reserve and get these aircraft shot down.
- [09:18]
Anita Anand
Securing the knowledge that the Soviets have not given surface to air missiles.
- [09:21]
William Doroupel
They have given a few, but haven't given as many as these Egyptians want.
- [09:24]
Anita Anand
Yeah, so, okay, so, I mean, that does sound like it's a good plan on the Israeli side. What's going on in Sadat's mind?
- [09:33]
William Doroupel
So Sadat has had the advantage of a young Egyptian military engineering genius called Baki Zaki Yousef. And Baki Zaki Yousef is sitting at his desk looking at plans of the Bartlev sand rampart. And he has an idea so simple it's almost absurd. It's made of packed sand, this line. You don't blow up sand, you wash it away. And he proposes to use high pressure water cannons. And they've already got these high pressure equipment at the canal because it's used for dredging operations in the canal. So they have everything they need already to have. And he has this genius idea that he will attach these pumps to floats. He'll float the pumps in the canal and he'll wash away the sandbank with powerful jets of water and do it instantly. So they test this and to everyone's thrill, on the Egyptian side when they try it out, it works perfectly. So they quietly import 300 more British made petrol driven pumps. 150 more German pumps are added to it with gas turbines. And each combination of two German pumps or three British pumps, can they estimate blast through a 15 meter section of wall in under two hours?
- [10:47]
Anita Anand
Wow.
- [10:48]
William Doroupel
And so this fortification that's built to withstand an artillery onslaught could be washed away with jets of water very quickly.
- [10:56]
Anita Anand
The timing is important because in The Israeli reckoning, 48 hours, it buys them to get the air force up in the air to strafe and deal with whatever's coming behind. But actually, in two hours, that's just completely game changing.
- [11:09]
William Doroupel
Exactly that. So they have one other very clever idea, which is to do this on the holiest day of the Jewish year,
- [11:18]
Anita Anand
the day where observant Israelis, they fast, they go to synagogue, roads are empty. This is a huge practical obstacle because you choose a date like that, you're choosing a date when the army simply has not got its boots on.
- [11:34]
William Doroupel
Yep. Literally. Yep.
- [11:36]
Anita Anand
So take us to five past two in the afternoon, because that time is very notable.
- [11:41]
William Doroupel
So they pick on this time, 2:05pm and at this point, 2000 guns, rocket launchers and mortars open up simultaneously. And the noise is so massive, it's heard in Cairo, 200 miles away. 2,000 artillery pieces firing 10,500 shells in the first minute, 175 shells second. And the Israeli strongpoints on the eastern bank, each manned by a small platoon of reservists, are immediately overwhelmed. Simultaneously, 250 Egyptian military aircraft take off and strike the Israeli air bases, radar installations, command centers and artillery positions in the Sinai. Exactly what the Israelis had done to them in 67. The Egyptians succeed in doing only into the Sinai, but still. And then, in an operation which somehow Mossad, the legendary Israeli intelligence services, somehow not got their eyes on, they have rehearsed this operation hundreds of times. 8,000 Egyptian infantry in a thousand rubber assault boats cross the Suez Canal in the first wave. They paddle across, under fire, land on the eastern bank and immediately begin clearing paths through the minefields beyond the sand rampart behind them. Within minutes, the water cannons tear into the packed sand.
- [12:57]
Anita Anand
Enormous pressure aimed at them. Within four and a half hours, just four and a half, the Egyptians managed to blast 80 separate breaches in the Balev sand rampart. 80 gaps, 80 spaces wide enough to carry vehicles and bridges and armor. 3 million cubic meters of packed sand. And think of it as the beach analogy of, you know, sort of these, these enormous structures which just crumble with a blast of water.
- [13:29]
William Doroupel
Through these gaps, 10 heavy pontoon bridges and five light bridges, pre packed, pre rehearsed, snapped into place by Egyptian engineering units under fire. And by midnight on October 6, just 10 hours after the attack began, 10 bridges are in place across the canal. 50 ferries are operating. 80,000 Egyptian troops are on the eastern bank. By the morning of October 7, the crossing is more or less complete. 100,000 troops, 900 tanks and 12,000 support vehicles have crossed the Suez Canal. All but one of the Bahalev fortifications has been captured or destroyed. And most importantly, these Soviet SAM missiles which the Egyptians were so keen to get their hands on, the ones they have got, have brought down 27 Israeli planes in the opening hours of the war.
- [14:15]
Anita Anand
Join us after the break where we take you through the next few hours of what everybody thought was impossible.
- [14:26]
William Doroupel
This episode is sponsored by BetterHelp. One of the lessons of history is that uncertain times are nothing new. Kingdoms falter, governments lose their nerves, and older people find themselves living through times and events that they didn't choose. What's new is the closeness of it, the way that the anxieties of an age now arrive without a pause. Staying informed matters, but so does the ability to keep one's footing in these uncertain times. BetterHelp connects you with qualified therapists here in the UK, matching your needs and preferences with the option to change if the fit is not right. It's a way of creating a little distance from the noise and thinking more clearly about how you are responding to it. Therapy can offer perspective, space to talk things through, to understand emotions, and to keep each new development in proportion rather than let it crowd everything out. BetterHelp makes starting therapy easy. Sign up and get 10% off at betterhelp.com empire that's betterhelp.com empire.
- [15:41]
Alistair Campbell
Hi there. Alistair Campbell here from the Rest Is Politics. And I'm here to tell you about a really important interview that's out now on our podcast channel. The rest is politics. Leading this week, I spoke to one of the defining political figures of our time, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine. It is a fascinating interview. Reflects on his upbringing, reflects on his political rise, reflects on how he stayed in Kyiv during Russia's invasion, redefining leadership in wartime. And he warns us very much against anyone, not least Donald Trump, falling for Vladimir Putin's lies, warns that ceasefires may serve as a strategic pause rather than a sign of genuine peace. He offers a very blunt assessment of Putin, looks at his enemy's strengths, strategy and crucially, his weaknesses in a war he is convinced Russia cannot win. And he doesn't hold back on the international response at times, particularly from the US if you'd like to hear more, and I Hope you do search. The rest is politics leading wherever you get your podcasts. And now back to your show.
- [16:47]
Anita Anand
Welcome back. This must have been like a catastrophic, unimaginable bolt from the blue.
- [16:54]
William Doroupel
It really was. And just as the Egyptians were gobsmacked by the Israeli preemptive strike in 1967 which wipes out all their aircraft, so the Israelis now have it's their turn to feel both terrified and amazed as they hear this crossing has been made, that this brilliant military operation has taken place, that all these bridges are in place and the tanks have crossed. And this isn't just in the north, because at exactly the moment that the mortars open fire at the Suez Canal, the Syrians have gone into action to attack the Golan Heights.
- [17:29]
Anita Anand
When you say it's coordinated, you're saying Egypt and Syria knew exactly minute by minute what was going to happen. This is all pre agreed, Is that what you're saying?
- [17:37]
William Doroupel
Yes. Those of you who have not heard our bonus with Avi Shaim, we should say that the great revelation he has is that King Hussein had given dropped heavy hints to Golda Meir that Egypt and Syria were up to something and that Israel should be on guard. But she went off to a conference the next day and somehow nothing happened. And this was, I think, just four days before this all. So nothing happens because it's the day
- [18:02]
Anita Anand
before the big holiday also because, you know, they've gone through the Six Day War, really, they know what it is and they're not bothered. What's the worst they can do? And then suddenly you've got this pincer movement. What is the Israeli response to that?
- [18:16]
William Doroupel
So the initial Egyptian assault is a complete success. They move right into Sinai, they down the aircraft that are meant to be attacking them and it's 100% success. The Syrian assault onto the Golan Heights, the Golan Heights being this mountainous eminence which was grabbed by Israel in 1967. And now the Syrians are trying to get back. They have to attack uphill. And it's much more hard work. It's not just crossing over a bridge into a desert. It is a massive tank assault uphill at the Golan Heights. And the Israelis are completely outnumbered. There's only 177 Israeli tanks in place that morning. As 1,400 Syrian tanks come at them them, it's a ratio of 8 to 1. But the geography is on Israel's side and there is an extraordinary resistance by the tank regiments at the Golan Heights. And Israel loses more than 150 tanks. On the Golan Heights in the first two days alone. But it does not lose the heights. Much of the heights remain in Israeli hands.
- [19:27]
Anita Anand
I'm really intrigued though, but what people like Moshe Dayan, who we've spoken about before, he of the iconic eyepatch, the Defence Minister Hero of 1967, you know, a man who was held up as, look, we can withstand a six day war and be victorious. He gets in touch with Golda Meir. She was the Iron lady of Israel, one of its founding leaders. Born in Kyiv in 1898, grew up in a family of poverty and persecution, the pogroms of the Russian Empire. She migrated then to Wisconsin, joined the Labor Zionist Party in the United States, and soon after marrying her husband when she was just 19. They moved back to Mandate Palestine in 1921. And straight away she's involved in politics. She's very active in trade unions, in the Jewish Agency, becoming one of the signatories of Israel's declaration of independence in 1948. And then she rises to the position of foreign minister from 1956 to 1966. And it's after the death of Prime Minister Levi Eshko in 1969 where, you know, you have a short period where you've got Yigal Allon, famously of the Allon Plan, who served as interim Prime Minister. There's a snap election, and then in March 1969, the Labour Party invites Golda Mayer out of retirement because bear in mind, she's 70 now to run as Prime Minister. So she becomes Israel's first and so far only female prime minister. Anyway, so that's who we're talking about. What do we know about their response to this and the conversations that they're having? I mean, there must have been frantic phone calls going on here.
- [21:05]
William Doroupel
So again, it's Avi Schleim who's found the smoking gun. And he has evidence in the Iron Wall that nuclear options are discussed because Israel has the bomb. At this point, they think they're going to lose Jerusalem. Some of the tanks are heading down towards the Lake of Tiberias, and this could be the end. Israel is saved by the fact that the 7th Armored Brigade, led by somebody called Colonel Avigdor Kahalani, he holds his position in the northern Golland in what will be known as the Valley of Tears. And he fights for four days almost without sleep or resupply, drawing on incredible reserves of strength to destroy literally hundreds of Soviet battle tanks coming down from the Syrian side of the border in one of the most remarkable feats. And this Basically saves Israel because again, if the Syrians had broken through over the Golan and completely destroyed the Israeli positions, it would have been game over. And this allows time for the United States to step in and resupply.
- [22:04]
Anita Anand
So the United States, yes, our involvement in this is interesting because seeing this unimpeded attack from two different sides, the US decides to airlift an entire new tank regiment into Israel, so resupplies the army. This is, remember the Nixon administration. And they are in a difficult position because they want to make inroads into the Arab world.
- [22:26]
William Doroupel
Arab oil is already important at this point.
- [22:29]
Anita Anand
Sound familiar to anybody?
- [22:30]
William Doroupel
So they do not want to fall out with Arab.
- [22:32]
Anita Anand
And yet, and yet they can't let Israel go because Israel is an absolute ally, a predictable ally in this region.
- [22:40]
William Doroupel
And there's also, I think, the sense that the Syrians and Egyptians are Russian
- [22:45]
Anita Anand
supplied, not without merit because remember, both of these places have been thick with Soviets in very high positions. You know, Sadat will eventually take a broom and clean them out of Egypt. But you know, they're right. You know, there are Soviets in departments of labor, armaments working, you know, at every single level. And by the way, Soviets who are working with utter disdain for the Egyptians.
- [23:09]
William Doroupel
They're working with which Sadat picks up and resents.
- [23:11]
Anita Anand
Yeah, and he hates it. You know, it's humiliating to have these Russian speakers who are treating the people of their own country like second class citizens. So just in this equation, you know, what they're seeing is okay, the Arabs have got Soviet weapons, so we'll give the Israelis American weapons. And there's an emergency request to restore the depleted arsenal from Israel. And President Nixon approves legislation on October 18 for a $2.2 billion arms package for the Jewish state.
- [23:44]
William Doroupel
And just to put this in context, if you remember Back to our 1967 Six Day War episode, the main arms supplier for the Israelis at that point had been not America, but the French. The aircraft were Mirages. Dassault was the main aircraft supplier. This is the point at which the US for the first time puts everything behind Israel. It's no surprise today because we're used to Israel getting massive arm infusions from America. It's been happening over the last two years with Gaza week after week. But this is something new in 1973. Not completely new because there are American weapons already, but the scale of the American package, well, 2.2 billion.
- [24:29]
Anita Anand
I mean, there's never been anything like that. I mean, that's a crazy Willi. I mean it's where America most visibly enters the fray. It's also a time when Ariel Sharon enters the fray as a truly dominant figure. Can you talk us through, first of all, who is he?
- [24:46]
William Doroupel
So we met him once before on Empire during the Suez episodes with Alex von Tilzelman and anyone that hasn't heard those. Alex is fantastic. Go back and listen to those. Sharon made his name doing operations over enemy lines. He'd go into Jordan and in response to Fedayeen attacks over the border, one way he would go and destroy Arab villages. And he was very ruthless. He was renowned from the beginning as being someone that would just take out civilians without any compunction. By 1973 he is a veteran. He's 55 years old and he's beginning to be a bit heavier than he was as this young commando who made his name tacking into Gaza and tacking into Jordan in the 60s and 50s. He's broad shouldered, heavy, and he's been fighting Arabs and sometimes his own military superiors for his entire adult life.
- [25:39]
Anita Anand
They sort of find him, what, insubordinate? That, you know, they'll issue orders and he'll go off and do what he wants. Is that why he has a problem at top grass?
- [25:45]
William Doroupel
But he wins battles and he is greatly loved by his men. And he is the kind of superstar of the Israeli special forces and he's renowned for his reprisal operations that even senior Israeli figures regard as disproportionate. So he's already fought in 48, 56, Suez 67. He's brilliant, fearless, insubordinate, utterly ruthless, and the Israeli military establishment both kind of loves and fears him in equal measures. But he is the hero of the hour because having now stopped the Syrian advance over the Golan Heights, it's time for the counterattack against the Egyptians into Sinai. It is sharon who on October 14, realizes that the Egyptians have made a mistake. October 14, Sadat, under pressure to relieve the battered Syrians who are now the focus of Israeli defence operations, orders his armored divisions to advance out beyond their bridgehead into the open Sinai. And this means that they have to move beyond this famous SAM missile umbrella,
- [26:54]
Anita Anand
the surface to air missiles. I keep reminding people, because you boys love your acronyms.
- [26:58]
William Doroupel
I grew up with SAM missiles. Anyway, in the open desert, the Egyptian tanks, which are, you know, in their great numbers, have crossed over but have not advanced very far. They now advance well, they're sort of
- [27:12]
Anita Anand
open completely in an open desert. The Sinai is just an open desert.
- [27:17]
William Doroupel
It is. I mean, in a sense it's good TAG territory in that for most of it it's fairly flat. There are mountains, but you can drive around them. But they are open to Israeli air attack. And on a Single afternoon on October 14th, the Egyptians lose. We don't know the exact numbers, but between 150 and 250 tanks are destroyed by the Israeli air force. It's the largest tank battle since Kursk in 1943. You have to go right back to the Second World War to find something like this. And this is Sharon's moment. He is commanding the 143rd Reserve Armored Division and he finds a gap between the Egyptian second and third Armies near the great Bittern Lake. And he wants to cross the canal into Egypt itself. The idea is that if you can cut through, you can isolate the Egyptians in the Sinai, cut them off and, and this plan, it is audacious to the point of recklessness. He reaches the crossing point. The Israeli forces have to fight through a place called Chinese Farm, which is a kind of Japanese built agricultural station in the Sinai held by Egyptian commandos. And the battle for the Chinese Farm is one of the bloodiest of the entire war. The Israeli paratroopers fight through the night in narrow irrigation channels, close quarters combats and the casualties are terrible. But there is a breakthrough in the early hours of October 16th. Israeli forces are now west of the Suez Canal behind the entire Egyptian army.
- [28:48]
Anita Anand
So I mean what it does mean is that Sharon's men are able to cross into Egypt west of the Suez behind the Egyptian Army. The bridgehead expands, forces are able to drive north towards Ismail, heading towards Suez. I mean always the hot point of every conflict in this region. And they cut the supply lines of the Egyptians third Army. I mean that's devastating.
- [29:11]
William Doroupel
You're in a desert, you need your
- [29:13]
Anita Anand
supplies, you don't have supply line, you die. There is literally nothing to be found.
- [29:18]
William Doroupel
And they've advanced by October 22nd to within 100 kilometers of Cairo. So this is an extraordinary military achievement by the Israeli tank regiments. Extraordinary.
- [29:27]
Anita Anand
Israel has turned what seemed like a near catastrophe into something that certainly looks like a military victory.
- [29:34]
William Doroupel
So this is where in a sense Sadat's genius is located. Because he has realized, and his aim is not complete victory. He never thought that he could invade Israel, destroy the state of Israel. That was never part of the plan.
- [29:48]
Anita Anand
This is the shaking the cage thing you were talking about, which is notice us, take us seriously, take us seriously. That's what you're saying.
- [29:54]
William Doroupel
That's exactly what I'm saying. And what it does is it opens him up to be in Negotiations now. It makes the Soviets take them seriously, it makes the Americans take them seriously.
- [30:07]
Anita Anand
Get him a seat at the table, WILLIAM Exactly.
- [30:10]
William Doroupel
And so in February 1973, Sadat makes a direct peace proposal. And what we'll hear in the next episode is the whole story of Camp David and this extraordinary voyage of Sadat to Israel. That is going to be our next episode with the wonderful Eugene Rogan.
- [30:31]
Anita Anand
It is an amazing story. People in khakis and slacks deciding the face of the world. If you don't want to wait for that episode, why would you join our club? Empowerpod uk.com empirepod uk.com and you'll get it straight after you've heard this. Willi, I wanted to ask you a question. So that has won a seat at the table, but at what cost? Can you talk us through numbers? I mean, how many, how many have killed?
- [30:53]
William Doroupel
So 2,688 Israeli soldiers die in October 1973 as a direct result of this assault. And the Arab numbers are less clear, much higher. About 8,000 Arab dead. AVI Shaim has written wonderfully on this. He makes the point that had the Israelis not been lured into complacency, all this could have been avoided. There were warnings from King Hussein, there were clear signs that the Egyptians were planning something and the Israelis didn't take it seriously. Despite military defeat for Egypt, this succeeds in shaking the cage, getting the Egyptians back on the table, putting the momentum into the search for a Middle Eastern peace.
- [31:40]
Anita Anand
This is a tale of two stories, both sides, Egypt and Israel, claiming victory. Is that where we are?
- [31:46]
William Doroupel
And when you go to Egypt today, this is regarded as the great Egyptian victory by the fact that Ariel Sharon surrounded the army and cut them off and all that. It is remembered as a victory despite the reality of ultimate military defeat. But the peace is much more complicated, as Sadat had calculated. And Guleme is forced to resign. In April 1974, Moshe Dayan's career is over because he hadn't prepared for it. Labor Zionism, the movement that founded Israel, Labor Labour Party, in charge for the whole of the period up to now, never recovers. And the October earthquake, as it's sometimes called, has shattered the political status quo.
- [32:26]
Anita Anand
So sort of these founding fathers and mothers, if you like, are sort of not trusted because, you know, how did you not see this coming? There'll be a commission that looks into the failure of intelligence in the run up to this. And the nation, again facing what it thinks is an existential threat to state, then turns to Likud, the right Wing Conservative party under Menachem Begin are in power. They're the ones who are trusted, and there are consequences. I just want to go back to the question of America's involvement and oil, because 1973 doesn't just transform what Israel thinks of its own security, getting Egypt back in the spotlight, it transforms the global economy to continue. Can you speak a little bit to that?
- [33:10]
Alistair Campbell
Yep.
- [33:11]
William Doroupel
So this again is something that Sadat had anticipated and planned for before all this. At the same sort of time as he is buying in pumps from Germany and planning all this, he pays a visit to King Faisal in Saudi Arabia and he tells him about his secret war plans, and he sets up the oil weapon. And on October the 16th, 11 days into the war, the Arab oil ministers gather together in Kuwait. There's a new sense of confidence. The leaders of the Arab oil states are also buoyed by the knowledge that the industrial world was dependent on them, which previously there'd been much less of a hold on the oil industry. But by 1973, they have OPEC and they have the ability to use this as a weapon against the West.
- [34:02]
Anita Anand
This is the time where the Shah of Iran realizes, you know what? You've not been taking me that seriously either. We've got opec, I got oil. And there is a lot of muscle flexing that causes absolute panic in the State Department, in the United States, particularly when formerly tame powers or tame leaders are suddenly turning around saying, you know what? Actually, no, we have our hand on the taps because we got all the oil. Oil, and we can turn it off.
- [34:32]
William Doroupel
Two things that happen immediately. Four days later, after this meeting in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia declares a total embargo on oil exports to the United States, a direct result of this airlift of tanks to Israel. And the Netherlands, who at that point is Israel's most vocal European supporter, is also added to the embargo list. And it's the first time in history that oil has been used as a deliberate political weapon against the Western powers. The effect is immediate.
- [35:02]
Anita Anand
So all of this, like I said, you know, sort of leading to diplomatic quaking, and where there's a diplomatic quake, you often find Henry Kissinger because it becomes his sort of sole duty to do this sort of shuttle diplomacy flying between Jerusalem, Cairo, Damascus dozens of times. I mean, the air miles on this man during this period trying to get some kind of disengagement agreement separating the armies, but also ensuring the taps are turned back on, that this does not impair American reach into oil. The embargo ends in March 1974. But the oil price never goes back. Pre embargo, the price for a barrel of oil is $3. After embargo and after Kissinger diplomacy, it stays at 12.
- [35:49]
William Doroupel
Correct.
- [35:49]
Anita Anand
It just doesn't. Never. Well, that world of a $3 barrel of oil is gone. That's never going to happen again.
- [35:55]
William Doroupel
In Britain, America and the Netherlands, there's queues around the blocks, people trying to get petrol and petrol stations unable to get it. Speed limits are reduced. Sunday driving is banned in several European countries. The British government introduces a three day working week to conserve energy. American motorists queue for hours at filling stations. The Western economies, which had grown without a break since Second World War, go into the deepest recession since the 1930s.
- [36:20]
Anita Anand
Yeah.
- [36:20]
William Doroupel
And a conflict in the Middle east has made ordinary people in towns like Birmingham and Pittsburgh feel the consequences in their daily lives in the way that nothing in the Middle east had previously done. And this completely, of course, changes the political calculus.
- [36:35]
Anita Anand
Yeah, absolutely. So, I mean, but also, do we not then see in this period of time that you get the Gulf super wealthy states, because they've also realized, hello, hello.
- [36:48]
William Doroupel
We've been undercharging for this.
- [36:50]
Anita Anand
Yeah, we can get more for this. And so you have this ballooning of income for Saudi Arabia, for example, from $4.3 billion in 1973 to $36 billion in just three years in 1976.
- [37:05]
William Doroupel
Extraordinary.
- [37:05]
Anita Anand
Abu Dhabi, Qatar, they all go through these transformations, you know, these huge skyscraper edifices that we see. This could only have happened after they realized the value of what they've got and that they can charge more and, you know, wealth funds reshape culture and the political landscape and indeed the mindset, one might say, of the Arab world. You've got this huge money flow that's coming in, but it also coincides, and I need to understand more about why it also coincides with the spread of Wahhabi Islam as well, because we talked about this before as the 1970s where you see a much more hardline, much more conservative Islam spreading, even as, you know, the petrodollars are flooding in.
- [37:48]
William Doroupel
So can you remember we talked to Kim Gattas about this in her brilliant episodes on the rivalry between Saudi Arab. And we'll be coming back to Kim actually talking more about this, but she, brought up in Beirut, begins to see the spread of Wahhabi missionaries, these very puritanical, hardline Salafist and Wahhabi preachers. And for example, in Pakistan, you suddenly find a King Faisal mosque, an enormous mosque being built in Islamabad. Mosques Madrasas, Islamic media organizations right across Africa and Asia, spreading this very hard line, divine form of Islam. And this is going to change the entire spirit of the Islamic world into the 80s and the 90s.
- [38:37]
Anita Anand
It feels so current. It does, doesn't it?
- [38:41]
William Doroupel
This is obviously why we're doing this series. Now. Not only do we have the consequences of imperial Israel, if you like, Israel no longer the frightened newbie in the region, surrounded by hostile states, but having moved out beyond Gaza and the west bank, and as we'll see, moving into
- [39:01]
Anita Anand
Lebanon in 1980s, in 2026, right where we are now, the supply of oil is being used as a military instrument by Iran.
- [39:11]
William Doroupel
And again, you kind of feel that if only this American administration were listening to Empire Pod a bit more closely
- [39:16]
Anita Anand
than they thought we would. Yeah. We wouldn't be able to think that we need to replace that question of how often do you think about the Roman Empire? How often do you think about the Empire podcast? Because if people did a bit more, they might learn a thing or two. Yeah.
- [39:30]
William Doroupel
I know that when you've been watching Trump's interviews over the last fortnight, but he's been saying no one could have expected that the oil would have stopped, and that is obviously bollocks. Anyone with any knowledge of the region knows that the oil is the. Is the key.
- [39:44]
Anita Anand
What an academic Turner phrase you have, my friend. I mean, it's almost professorial in your gravitas.
- [39:50]
William Doroupel
I like to keep this gravitas for special moments.
- [39:53]
Anita Anand
I hope you're enjoying this series. I hope you're learning something from it. Next week, Abi Klam is going to be with us for this special bonus episode. And then we've got episode six, Eugene Rogan, taking us through Sadat's flight to Jerusalem and 13 extraordinary days at Camp David. So please don't miss it. And thank you very much for listening to us. We have now over 90 million downloads and we don't take any of them for granted. Anyway, till the next time we meet is goodbye from me, Anita Anand, and
- [40:21]
William Doroupel
goodbye from me, me, William Durimpo.