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In 1890, an obscure professor at the US Naval War College published a book that at first seemed fairly innocuous. However, his book found an audience, an extremely powerful audience, and its success led to further research, which in turn ushered in a revolution in naval warfare which influenced the world's greatest powers for over a century. Learn more about the Mahan Doctrine and how it influenced 20th century warfare on this episode of Everything Everywhere Daily. This episode is sponsored by Dripdrop. When you're properly hydrated, everything functions better. Your energy, mood and focus all rise together. That's why Dripdrop was created. It's not only about quenching thirst, it's about keeping your body and brain operating at peak performance. Drip Drop is doctor developed and proven to hydrate fast, helping both your mind and body perform at their best. 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It's their best deal of the year and makes it really easy for you to give your expensive wireless bill the Scrooge treatment. All plans come with high speed data and unlimited talk and text delivered on the nation's largest 5G network. That's why I recommend Mint Mobile turn your expensive wireless present into a huge wireless savings future by switching to Mint Shop. Mint unlimited plans@mintmobile.com eed that's mintmobile.com eed Limited time offer upfront payment of $45 for three month, $90 for six month or $180 for 12 month Plan required $15 a month equivalent taxes and fees extra initial plan term Only greater than 35 GB may slow when network is busy. Capable device required availability Speed and coverage varies. See mintmobile.com. Alfred Thayer Mahan was an unlikely person to lead a revolution in warfare. Born in 1840 to a family steeped in military tradition, he graduated from the U.S. naval Academy in 1859 and served with modest distinction during the Civil War. His career was unremarkable until 1885, when he was appointed to lecture on naval history and tactics at the newly established Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. It was in preparing his lectures that Mahan experienced his intellectual breakthrough. Studying the Anglo French conflicts of the 17th and 18th centuries, he discerned patterns that previous historians had overlooked. In 1890 he published these insights in the Influence of sea Power Upon 1660-1783, a book that would become one of the most influential on military strategy ever written. Mahan's central thesis was deceptively nations that controlled the seas controlled their destinies. But his argument was more sophisticated than just naval cheerleading. He identified six fundamental conditions affecting sea 1 geographical position 2 coastal geography, including natural harbors and resources 3 extensive territory 4 population size 5 national character and 6 the character of government. A nation possessing favorable conditions in these areas, he argued, was positioned to achieve maritime dominance. The doctrine rested on four key principles. First, command of the sea was not about controlling every ocean but about defeating the enemy's battle fleet in decisive engagements, thereby achieving the freedom to use sea lanes while denying them to adversaries Second, commerce and naval power were inseparable. A thriving merchant marine provided both wealth and trained seamen for wartime service third, nations needed overseas bases and coaling stations to project power globally and fourth, a powerful battleship fleet concentrated for decisive action was superior to a dispersed fleet of cruisers formed on commerce raiding. Mahan developed these ideas further in subsequent works, including the Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812, which he published in 1892, and numerous other essays. For the United States, he advocated a large modern navy built around capital ships, a canal across Central America to facilitate fleet movement, overseas bases in the Caribbean and Pacific, and an assertive foreign policy to protect and expand American commercial interests. Mahan's theories found their most immediate and enthusiastic audience in his own country. The United states in the 1890s was emerging from post Civil War introspection and isolation and was looking outwards with growing ambition. Mahan's work provided intellectual justification for expansion at precisely the moment American leaders were contemplating it. His influence on Theodore Roosevelt can't be overstated. Roosevelt reviewed the influence of sea power enthusiastically, and the two men became friends and correspondents When Roosevelt served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1897 to 1898, he pushed for naval expansion based directly on Mahan's principles. As president from 1901 to 1909, Roosevelt oversaw the construction of the Great White Fleet, transforming the US Navy from a coastal defense force into a world class battle fleet. The Spanish American War of 1898 seemed to vindicate Mahan's theories perfectly. Admiral Dewey's decisive victory at Manila Bay and the destruction of the Spanish fleet at Santiago demonstrated the value of concentrated naval power in achieving swift strategic results. The war's outcome brought the United States overseas territories including Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines, creating the colonial infrastructure that Mahan had advocated. The construction of the Panama Canal, completed in 1914, was another Mahan project that was realized. Mahan had long argued that such a canal was essential for American naval strategy, allowing the fleet to move rapidly between the Atlantic and Pacific. Roosevelt made it a centerpiece of his presidency, engineering Panamanian independence from Colombia when negotiations stalled, then securing perpetual control of the Canal Zone. America's naval construction in the 20th century closely followed Mahan's prescription. The US built increasingly powerful battleships, established bases throughout the Caribbean and Pacific, and organized its fleet for decisive battle. By World War I, the United States possessed the world's third largest navy. Although the United States adopted the Mahan doctrine, it was initially more celebrated in Britain than in America. The Royal Navy had practiced many of Mahan's principles for centuries without articulating them so systematically. Mahan provided historical validation for Britain's maritime supremacy and intellectual ammunition against those who questioned naval expenditures. British naval officers and politicians embraced Mahan with fervor. The book became required reading at the Royal Naval College. Political leaders from both parties cited Mahan in parliamentary debates about naval estimates. The doctrine reinforced Britain's commitment to the two power standard, meaning a fleet larger than the next two navies combined. Admiral Sir John Fisher, the first sea lord from 1904 to 1910, revolutionized the Royal Navy along lines that both followed and departed from Mahan. The HMS Dreadnought, launched in 1906, embodied Mahan's preference for concentrated firepower in capital ships. But Fisher also advocated for submarines and developed the battlecruiser concept, showing more flexibility than strict Mahanian orthodoxy might suggest. A battlecruiser was a Type of early 20th century warship built with battleship sized guns and speed prioritized over armor. It was intended to outrun anything that could outgun it and outgun anything that could catch it. The British also faced a challenge. Mahan had not fully how to maintain sea control against new technologies. Mines, torpedoes, and eventually submarines threatened the decisive fleet engagement that Mahan envisioned. The Battle of Jutland in 1916, the largest surface engagement of World War I, demonstrated both the validity and limitations of Mahan's theories. Britain maintained strategic sea control, but but the anticipated decisive Trafalgar, like victory, never materialized. Germany's embrace of Mahan was enthusiastic, yet ultimately disastrous. Kaiser Wilhelm II read Mahan's work and reportedly kept a copy on his nightstand. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Secretary of State for the Navy from 1897 to 1916, used Mahanian arguments to justify the massive fleet expansion that would fundamentally alter European geopolitics. Tirpitz's risk theory was essentially Mahanian doctrine adapted to Germany's position. He argued that Germany needed a battle fleet large enough that Britain would not risk engaging it even if Britain would likely win because the damage sustained would leave Britain vulnerable to third powers. The fleet would give Germany diplomatic leverage and protect its growing overseas commerce, and the plan backfired catastrophically. Rather than intimidating Britain into accommodation, German naval expansion drove Britain into alliances with France and Russia. The naval race consumed resources that Germany might have used to strengthen its army while failing to achieve its strategic objective at sea. When war came in 1914, the German High Seas Fleet remained largely bottled up in port, unable to challenge British command of the seas effectively. The German experience revealed a limitation in Mahan's framework. He had analyzed how maritime powers achieved dominance, but provided less guidance for continental powers seeking to challenge established naval superiority. Germany discovered that building a Mahanian fleet without the geographical advantages, coastal infrastructure, or maritime commercial base of an established sea power was a recipe for strategic failure. Japan's adoption of Mahan's principles was perhaps the most thorough and consequential outside of the United States. The influence of sea power was translated into Japanese in 1896 and became immediately influential among Japanese naval officers and political leaders. Japan's situation seemed tailor made for Mahan's strategy. As an island nation dependent upon imports and seeking to expand its influence in Asia, Japan needed naval power to achieve its ambitions. The Japanese navy studied Mahan intensively and modeled itself on the Royal Navy, which Mahan had celebrated. The Russo Japanese War of 1904-1905 provided stunning validation of Mahanian principles in Asian waters. The Japanese annihilation of the Russian Baltic Fleet at the Battle of Tsushima in May of 1905, which I covered in a previous episode, was precisely the decisive fleet engagement that Mahan had theorized about Japan's victory achieved through superior training, tactical skill and concentration of force demonstrated that an Asian power applying Mahanian doctrine could defeat a European empire. Japan's naval strategy throughout the 20th century remained fundamentally Mahanian. Japan developed a powerful battleship fleet, established bases throughout the Pacific and planned for a defensive engagement with its likely adversary, the United States. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, which limited battleship construction, was viewed by Japanese naval officers through a Mahanian lens as an attempt to prevent Japan from achieving the 70% ratio to the United States Navy that they believed was necessary for competitive strength. Interestingly, Japan's ultimate challenge to American power in World War II began with a carrier based air attack on Pearl harbor, representing a technological evolution beyond Mahan's battleship centric vision. Yet the underlying strategic logic remain Mahanian achieve decisive superiority at the war's outset to secure control of all vital sea lanes and resource areas. The war's outcome, with American naval power progressively strangling Japan's island economy, vindicated Mahan's core insight about maritime vulnerabilities. Not all nations embraced Mahan's doctrine enthusiastically. France and Russia, both possessing significant navies, but fundamentally continental powers found Mahan's theories less applicable to their strategic circumstances. French naval theorists like Admiral Raoul Castex engaged critically with Mahan. While acknowledging his contributions, Castex argued that Mahan overemphasized decisive battle and undervalued commerce rating in what the French called guerre de course. For France, which could never match Britain's naval power and faced threats on land from Germany, a pure Mahanian strategy wasn't practical. French naval policy remained divided between battle fleet advocates and those who favored submarines and cruisers for commerce warfare. Russia's relationship with Mahanian doctrine was complex and ultimately tragic. Russia's naval officers studied Mahan and some advocated for a powerful fleet. However, Russia's vast land borders and limited ice free ports made naval power secondary to land forces. The destruction of Russia's Pacific and Baltic fleets in the Russo Japanese War demonstrated the risks of pursuing naval power without supporting conditions that Mahan had identified as necessary. After the Russian Revolution, Soviet naval strategy evolved into something quite distinct from hand. While Stalin briefly pursued a large surface fleet in the late 1930s, Soviet doctrine generally emphasized submarines, coastal defenses and naval aviation range rather than command of the seas through battlefleet supremacy. The Cold War saw Mahan's theories adapted to new circumstances. American naval strategy emphasized carrier battle groups and nuclear powered submarines, technologies that Mahan never imagined. Yet the underlying concept of controlling the seas to project power remained Mahanian. Soviet attempts to challenge American naval dominance were essentially efforts to overcome America's Mahanian advantages. China's naval expansion in the 21st century has been explicitly compared to Mahanian sea power theory. Chinese strategists study Mahan intensively and China's naval expansion. Artificial island bases in the South China Sea, development of blue water capabilities, and attention to controlling maritime trade routes all align with Mahan's principles. India studies Mahan as it builds a modern navy to influence the Indian Ocean as well. The String of Pearls strategy of ports across the Indian Ocean mirrors Mahan's emphasis on coaling stations and naval bases. Critics have argued that Mahan overemphasized naval power at the expense of other instruments of national power, that his focus on decisive battles was somewhat romanticized, and that technical changes had undermined many of his specific prescriptions. His work is also criticized for providing intellectual cover for imperialism and aggressive foreign policies. Nevertheless, Mahan's core insights retain remarkable power. Maritime commerce remains the lifeblood of the global economy, with over 80% of world trade by volume traveling by sea. Nations still compete for influence over strategic waterways. Naval power remains essential for projecting force and protecting interests far from home. The ability to control or deny the use of the seas continues to confer strategic advantages. The Mahan doctrine has shaped military thinking through two world wars, the Cold War, and many other minor conflicts. While most people have never heard of Alfred Thayer Mahan, his ideas have helped shape the world over the last 125 years. The executive producer of Everything Everywhere Daily is Charles Daniel. The associate producers are Austin Otkin and Cameron Kiefer. My big thanks go to everyone who supports the show over on Patreon. Your support helps make this podcast possible, and I also want to remind everyone about the community groups on Facebook and Discord. That's where everything happens that's outside the podcast, and links to those are available in the show Notes. 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