Who's In Charge? Israel's Angst

Summary

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For Heaven’s Sake: "Who’s In Charge? Israel’s Angst"

Podcast by the Shalom Hartman Institute & Ark Media
Hosts: Donniel Hartman & Yossi Klein Halevi
Release Date: May 27, 2026

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Episode Overview

This episode delves deeply into the current Israeli sense of uncertainty, fear, and loss of control after months of war and upheaval, post-October 7th. Donniel and Yossi explore the political, strategic, and emotional turmoil gripping Israeli society, particularly as the nation approaches new elections. They discuss military and diplomatic challenges, societal trauma, and the political narratives expected to shape the upcoming electoral campaign—probing whether anyone is truly "in charge" as Israel confronts profound internal and external threats.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Israel’s “Twilight Time” – Ben Hashmashot

• The hosts open by likening Israel’s current state to "Ben Hashmashot," a Jewish term for twilight, denoting a period of profound uncertainty—not knowing whether it’s day or night, not knowing one’s place.
  • Quote: “We in Israel have been in twilight time now for months... one of the most disconcerting experiences that Israelis have experienced in decades.” (Donniel, 01:32)

2. Loss of Control and Sovereignty

• Despite initial feelings post-October 7th that Israel might regain a sense of mastery, that hope has evaporated:
  • No military front—Gaza, Hezbollah in the north, or Iran—feels secure or resolved.
  • Even significant military successes have not restored a real sense of safety or strategic control.
  • Quote: “It’s not uncertainty, it’s just that we know we’re not controlling anything.” (Donniel, 05:23)

3. Debating Achievements vs. Setbacks

• Yossi pushes back against total pessimism, arguing for perspective:
  • Israel has made significant progress since October 8th, particularly in pushing back enemies from the border and impeding Iran’s nuclear and leadership capacity.
  • Quote: “Iran was on the verge of nuclear power… [now] the nuclear program has been set back. That alone is a dayanu moment.” (Yossi, 10:11)
• Donniel counters, saying the regional balance has shifted to Israel’s disadvantage:
  • Iran is “emerging wealthier than ever before,” its influence undiminished; Hezbollah and Hamas have adapted; Israelis’ subjective sense of security remains shattered.
  • Quote: “One of the greatest losses is that Iran… is going to now emerge flush with cash—a superpower…” (Donniel, 13:10)

4. Trauma and The Enduring Psychological Crisis

• The hosts return repeatedly to the psychic wound of October 7:
  • The feeling of helplessness, especially as the hostage crisis was resolved through international rather than Israeli initiative, persists.
  • Quote: “The trauma of October 7th, ultimately, was this return of a sense of helplessness… And the angst that you feel in Israeli society today is that the haunting of October 7th is still with us.” (Yossi, 17:25)

5. Military and Governmental Paralysis

• Despite “impressive military achievements,” Israelis are left with recurring security crises (e.g., reserve soldiers’ emergency call-ups), no negotiation alternatives, and the sense that military force alone cannot restore control.
• The government is accused of lacking strategic flexibility, underlining the feeling of drift.
  • Quote: “We only had one solution, and we boxed ourselves in with one tool to deal with every problem.” (Donniel, 21:12)

6. Election Dynamics: Who Can Restore Control?

• The core theme for the upcoming election is “control”—who can restore it, and how?
• Ben Gvir’s prior slogan “Who’s in Charge?” remains potent, but his actual performance on internal security is critiqued.
• Political blocs will vie to claim they can restore national mastery, but the opposition is likely to stress Netanyahu’s failures and focus on exhausted reservists and the contentious ultra-Orthodox draft issue.
  • Quote: “Now, of course, the opposition is going to say, well, are you going to give the country back into the hands of… the prime minister who brought us to this situation?” (Yossi, 24:37)

7. Netanyahu’s Campaign Narrative: Control and Blame

• The conversation dissects the likely Netanyahu strategies:
  • Asserting that he “oversaw the comeback,” even as public trust diminishes.
  • Relying on tried narratives: blaming the left, courts, army, and invoking “deep state” conspiracies.
  • Running not on achievement, but on owning the “right-wing” security narrative.
  • Quote: “If you let the left back into power…our security is going to be in the hands of the Islamists. Now, he’s already using that argument.” (Yossi, 28:32)
• Notable moment: Netanyahu’s boast that he “warned six years ago” about drones, despite being the prime minister throughout.
  • Quote: “When you’re the Prime Minister, who are you warning? You’re warning yourself?” (Yossi, 30:29)

8. The Right’s Mindset and “Permanent Opposition”

• The right wing’s historical psychology—never taking responsibility, always blaming institutional enemies ("deep state," courts, army)—remains central.
• Quote: “The right has a permanent mindset of opposition…still its strongest emotional card.” (Yossi, 31:06)

9. The Battle Over Right-Wing Authenticity

• The campaign is expected to descend into a contest of “who’s the true right,” sidelining real policy debates.
  • This dynamic risks further polarizing society and reducing the election to identity warfare.
  • Quote: “One of the greatest successes of the right wing in Israel is that they own the language of security…if you care about Israel’s security, you have to be on the right.” (Donniel, 33:17)

10. Outlook: Ben Gvir’s Ascent, Ultra-Orthodox Issues, and Deepening Divides

• Ben Gvir may emerge as the only “genuine” right-wing leader of substance as larger parties fracture.
• The role of the ultra-Orthodox draft is likely to be a flashpoint, with little real impact but much symbolic weight.
• Both hosts warn that the coming months will be “tribal, ugly, and accusatory,” with little room for pragmatic solutions.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “We in Israel have been in twilight time now for months… one of the most disconcerting experiences that Israelis have experienced in decades.”
   — Donniel (01:32)

• “Iran was on the verge of nuclear power… [now] the nuclear program has been set back. That alone is a dayanu moment.”
   — Yossi (10:11)

• “One of the greatest losses is that Iran… is going to now emerge flush with cash—a superpower...”
   — Donniel (13:10)

• “The haunting of October 7th is still with us.”
   — Yossi (17:25)

• “We only had one solution, and we boxed ourselves in with one tool to deal with every problem.”
   — Donniel (21:12)

• “When you’re the Prime Minister, who are you warning? You’re warning yourself?”
   — Yossi (30:29)

• “The right has a permanent mindset of opposition…still its strongest emotional card.”
   — Yossi (31:06)

• “One of the greatest successes of the right wing in Israel is that they own the language of security…if you care about Israel’s security, you have to be on the right.”
   — Donniel (33:17)

• “Israel’s angst, Yossi, I can’t wait not to have angst. I gotta tell you, I’m really yearning for a non-angst moment in my life.”
   — Donniel (40:08)

• “But you live in the wrong country and you’re part of the wrong people.”
   — Yossi (40:11)

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Key Timestamps

• 00:59 – 02:10: Introduction to “Ben Hashmashot” and the theme of loss of sovereignty and control
• 07:06 – 15:41: Assessment of Israel’s security situation post-October 7th—achievements vs. vulnerabilities
• 15:41 – 19:16: Psychological aftermath; trauma and helplessness, especially with regards to hostages
• 19:36 – 22:38: Government strategies and failures; repeated troop call-ups and limited policy options
• 22:38 – 25:17: Election strategies, Ben Gvir’s “control” messaging, rise of internal insecurity
• 25:39 – 32:06: Dissection of Netanyahu’s tactics and the right wing’s enduring opposition mindset
• 32:45 – 39:12: The coming culture war: right-wing authenticity, deep state narratives, impact on political discourse
• 39:12 – 40:19: Final reflections—ultra-Orthodox draft, future policy paralysis, and unending Israeli angst

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Summary Takeaway

This episode is an unvarnished, passionate exploration of Israeli society’s current existential anxiety, exploring the collapse of old certainties about security, leadership, and sovereignty. The hosts reflect both the public’s exhaustion and persistent hope for restoration of agency. As elections loom, the political contest appears likely to prioritize narratives of control and right-wing authenticity over substantive policy change, exposing Israel’s fractured national psyche and the deep wounds left by recent traumas.

For listeners seeking a sharply reasoned and emotionally resonant analysis of Israeli public life at a historical crossroads, this episode is essential.

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Transcript

[A]

I'm Deborah Pardes, the host of Ark News Daily. What's happening in Israel and the Jewish world right now matters, but it can be hard to keep up, let alone make sense of it all. And that's why we started ArkNews Daily. Every weekday morning I walk you through the most important news, give you the context you need, and let you know what to look out for next. I don't try to convince you of anything and I don't want to waste your time. So on most days I'll be in your ears for about 10 minutes or less. Then you can move on with your day, hopefully feeling a little smarter than before. Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts or follow the link in the show notes. I hope to see you tomorrow.

[B]

You are listening to an art media podcast.

[C]

The Jewish tradition has a category called Ben Hashmashot, which literally means twilight time. It's a time when it's neither day nor night and you don't really know where you are now. We in Israel have been in twilight time now for months. For months. And it is one of the most disconcerting experiences that Israelis have experienced in decades. But there's this fog in which, in essence, we just don't know.

[D]

We thought we had overcome October 7th. We thought we had defeated that sense of helplessness. We fought a seven front war. We have fought Israel's longest war. And after all of this, and after all of the extraordinary victories, the beepers with Hezbollah control over Iranian skies for weeks at a time without losing a single plane, I don't know if we've ever had such impressive military achievements. And yet in the end we're still left with October 7th. Are we in control anymore?

[C]

Hi friends, this is Daniil Hartman and Yossi Klein Halevi from the Sholem Hartman Institute. And this is our podcast for heaven's sake, in collaboration with ARC Media. Today is Tuesday, May 26th and our theme for today we entitled who's in Israel's Angst? The Jewish tradition has a category called Ben Hashmashot, which literally means twilight time. It's a time when it's neither day nor night and you don't really know where you are now. We in Israel have been in twilight time now for months. For months. And it is one of the most disconcerting experiences that Israelis have experienced in decades. You know sometimes when something is bad, you know how to adjust. When something's good, it's not hard to adjust. You could deal with hardships, you could deal with success. Vis a vis the rational dimensions of the decision process. Our lack of sovereignty, which in the past led to the releasing of the hostages, is now creating even greater angst. But while we could talk about that and Yossi, you'll talk, you know, I could tell you what to talk about, but you'll talk about whatever you want to talk about. As should be today, the primary focus is not on whose sovereign, but it's on an experience in which nothing is under our control. Who decides is not our control. But I think now it's going to another level. We aren't successful on any of the fronts. And for the first time in Israeli journalism, they're beginning to actually not just in Haaretz, in other news outlets, talk about what do we think is going to happen in Iran, what do we think is going to happen with Hezbollah, what do we think is going to happen in Gaza? And on every front, we are confronting realities or the adjustments of our enemies, whether Hamas disarming, Hezbollah moving to drones, for which we didn't have an answer and for which, as much as we bomb, we're not going to be able to help Iran being able to withstand a huge amount of military and economic pressure. All the solutions that we had have dissipated. And so there's a sense. It's not uncertainty, it's just that we know we're not controlling anything. And what we will do, it's not sure whether that will effectuate a return of control. And so you have blustery statements and we are now going to bomb and we're going to do and we're going to show Hezbollah, but at the end of the day, or even somebody saying, yes, it's okay, we're going to have to fight with Iran every year or two, as if that's an option. Declarations that are trying to assert control when the experience of Israel is an experience now of every front being out of control. And I want us to talk about it. How do you understand this, Yossi? How do you understand this challenge? How do I understand it? And then shift to where is this going to lead us? Because the one thing that we actually do have control over is the fact that elections are coming at the latest. They'll be October 27th or 28th, I believe. But in all probability, it seems that they're going to be on September 15th or September 8th. The two ultra orthodox parties have some calculation about which day is better for them. I don't know what it's when people come back from Oman before they went to Oman, whatever it might be. There's some when the yeshiva Boys are more pious studying somebody. Everybody has a calculation. So whatever it is, in our insane universe, literally the election date will be decided on who feels that, which part of the high holiday season will be more conducive to turning out an ideological vote in their favor. Leaving that aside, in our insane universe now, but we have control over that. But how is this experience now, in your and my estimation, going to impact on the campaign? And how do we respond to this angst? So, Yossi, who's in control? How do you understand this?

[D]

So, you know, listening to you, I feel very divided because part of me is exactly where you are and where I think most Israelis are, which is this feeling of acute drift, of loss of control. The other part of me says, well, where were we on October 8th and where are we today? And part of this feeling of drift and profound disappointment and disillusionment with our ability to adequately defend ourselves militarily is based on the exaggerated expectations that the prime minister laid out by repeating over and over again that the goal was absolute victory. He guaranteed, given the circumstances of the Middle East, Israel situation in the world, that there was going to be deep disappointment and frustration. So that's one way of looking at it. And if you think about where we were on October 8th militarily and where we are today, again, do you want to look at our situation in that context? And I think that if we do look at it in that context, we still really have come a tremendous distance, or you can say, compared to the expectations that were laid out by our bombastic prime minister, then obviously we've fallen short. So that's one piece of it.

[C]

Could I ask you a question on the first one before you get to the second? Because I actually feel we are worse off than we were on October 6th. Not October 8th. October 8th, we're better off.

[D]

Awesome. Now we have a new subject to debate. This is really an interesting question. And I think that if you feel that way, and if many Israelis feel

[C]

that way, they don't. I feel that way.

[D]

Okay.

[C]

I think Israelis don't dare go there after all the sacrifice of our kids. And I've seen this when I'm sitting in front of soldiers. There's things that I can't say because, you see, they were there. I. I did 400 days. I fought. I sacrificed. Spouses, being alone. There's certain things you can't say. But I just think with a cold analysis, Iran is stronger. Hezbollah has found a new weak zone into Israel. Hamas has withstood everything that we've thrown at it. And unless we come up with something else, I don't know if we're better off than we were. Put it this way, at least it's debatable. But now I want to give it to you.

[D]

Let's debate it. You know, is IR stronger than it was before the war? Absolutely not. Iran was.

[C]

Yes.

[D]

Okay, here we go. If we're talking, if we're just going

[C]

to make statements, I can make a statement. You want to make a statement? I can make a statement.

[D]

To quote both of us. Absolutely correct. So look, Iran was on the verge of nuclear power. It was on the threshold before this war. It has been set back. We don't know by how much, but certainly here I think we can agree that the nuclear program has been set back. That alone is a dayanu moment when you factor in the elimination of Iran's top tier leadership and second tier leadership. You're now dealing with third level leadership that's running the country. And you know, Daniel, one of the things that drives me crazy, you see this over and over again in the foreign media, that the war has empowered Iranian hardliners. Really? Really. The Iranian hardliners have now taken over as a result of this war. You mean to tell me that in January when they massacred 40,000 of their own people, those were the moderates who were in charge of, you know, this ludicrous game. And obviously you're not making that claim, but it's there in the media. And I think that that's part of the equation. We have substantially weakened their leadership, their nuclear capabilities. And in the end, what happens in Gaza and Lebanon, as important as that is, is secondary to what will happen in Iran. On October 8, they were sitting on, literally on the border a few hundred meters from the last Israeli houses in the south and in the north. And today they've been pushed back. Now, we haven't neutralized the aerial threats. You would need a buffer zone of hundreds of kilometers, if that. But they're not literally sitting next door.

[C]

Fair enough.

[D]

To our neighborhoods. So that's my argument for why we are substantially better off today than we were.

[C]

That's your.

[D]

Absolutely, yes.

[C]

Let me try to justify my. Absolutely. I think to claim that there wasn't progress, and I think you outlined legitimate points. I don't know if I agree with every one of them, especially when it came to Hezbollah.

[D]

Fair point, fair point.

[C]

There was progress. But the reason why I say absolutely is, is not because we didn't achieve certain things, but achievements are counterbalanced or outweighed by Losses. And I think one of the greatest losses is that Iran, at least on the surface, is going to now emerge flush with cash, a superpower that everybody in the area, and in fact, the world, has to take into account right now, when they were far more marginalized than they were right now. You know, I would recommend to everybody, I'm sure everybody listens to Dan Sinore's podcast, Call Me Back. The last one was, I wouldn't say I enjoyed it because it was so heavy, but the analysis of Nadava Yal and Mark Dubowitz was just outstanding. Just outstanding. Of course, they're also not certain, and they themselves say, everything I'm telling you is with the caveat that everything's going to change. So I'm not claiming that what they're claiming is certainty, but at least they're outlining a potential deal of Hormuz for Hormuz. And Mark speaks about, okay, everybody's concentrating on the 900 pounds of enriched uranium. He says, that's not the point. There's three and a half percent and 26%. Now, I don't know anything about this. Like, you know, but that's why I listen to people like Mark. They know stuff. They've actually studied this and they know, like, what do I know about enriched uranium? I have placed this, but it turns out that the three and a half percent is 80% of the way and the other one is 95%. So, like, we're fooling ourselves.

[D]

It takes far longer to get to three and a half percent than it does to get from three and a half percent to the threshold.

[C]

So the chances of this deal putting everything on the table, Iran is emerging wealthier than ever before. All the Gulf states who were on the verge of even talking about an Abraham Accord to protect themselves from Iran are now saying, I don't need an Abraham Accord. You know, Qatar, what is Qatar? Qatar does what Qatar always does. What is it doing? I'll give you billions, and that way I'll get my safety. Hamas. Is Hamas weaker? I think this notion of Hamas sitting on our border, I think Hezbollah sat on our border, but maybe if we made any minor progress, it's in the north. But if you ask the people who live in the north, so I don't want to say we didn't achieve anything, but now, when I'm sitting Now, today, Tuesday, May 26th, do I feel safer today? I don't feel safer on any front. Maybe I feel a little less endangered by Hamas in Gaza, but I wasn't living on October 6th with the feeling of endangerment, you know, but maybe that was a delusion. But I look at Israel's security, Israel's position in the world. I'm not in a celebratory mode right now.

[D]

No, nobody is. Nobody is the deal. And the truth is, you know, really, there is this growing feeling among Israelis of losing control. And it begins with the question of whether our prime minister is still in control. And we know that he's actually not. He's not in control of the defining issue of his political career, which is Iran. He's lost control of the narrative. And are we still independent in any meaningful way when the United States is really dictating the extent of our defense? And so that's one piece of this. I think there's a deeper issue here, which is since October 7, Israeli society has been in the grips of a struggle between this profound sense of. Of loss of control, the most minimal control, and the trauma. And we've said this repeatedly here, the trauma of October 7th, ultimately, was this return of a sense of helplessness and the hostage situation prolonged October 7th. Long after we were already taking the initiative on the battlefield, we were still feeling helpless. And how did the hostage situation get resolved? It wasn't through some dramatic Israeli Entebbe like rescue. It wasn't even through our negotiating skills. In the end, it was Trump. And so that sense of loss of control, that sense of profound helplessness, was not alleviated by the return of the hostages. There were other open wounds that were alleviated by their return, but not that fundamental issue. That was that rupture that opened up in Israeli consciousness on October 7th. Ever since October 7th, we have been in a struggle with ourselves between this sense of loss of control, fundamental control, and the ability to regain some sense of mastery over our own destiny. This is what I hear you saying, that's what speaks to me, is a sense that we thought we had overcome October 7th. We thought we had defeated that sense of helplessness. We struck out on every front. We fought a seven front war. We haven't fought a seven front war since 1948. We have fought Israel's longest war. And after all of this, and after all of the extraordinary victories, the beepers with Hezbollah control over Iranian skies for weeks at a time without losing a single plane. I don't know if we've ever had such impressive military achievements. And yet, in the end, we're still left with October 7th. We're still stuck in this profound sense of, are we in control anymore? Did Zionism fail? Are we still the safe refuge of the Jewish people. These are the profound questions that opened up on October 7th. And the angst that you feel in Israeli society today is that the haunting of October 7th is still with us.

[C]

I really appreciate that, Yossi, because you know what makes it even more upsetting is that we've had huge achievements since then.

[D]

That's right.

[C]

It's one thing when October 7th happens and you were caught unprepared, and now, now we're going to fix it. Right? But now you fixed it, and how different are we? It hit me today when a few hours ago, it was announced there's something called tsavshmone. How would I say that in English?

[D]

It's an emergency call up of reserves.

[C]

Order number eight. Call it. And the reserves that were just let out because so called, there was a ceasefire. And everybody in Israel was like, there's a ceasefire in the north, but what ceasefire is there in the north? All that. And then last night, Prime Minister Netanyahu says, we are now going to hit them the way we know how to hit them, and we're going to go beyond the 8, 10 km beyond the litany, et cetera. And he calls people up again who were just back, and they're going to now fight north of the litany, and they're going to capture, what, another little buffer zone. But which buffer zone is going to stop you from drones? You don't even have to be present where the drone is. You could activate the drone from a telephone. I'm also now a military knucker because everybody knows you don't even have to be there. You could just plant them. Hezbollah could be sitting on the beach 50 kilometers north of Beirut. They could be sitting in Europe and activate squadrons of drones hidden. What do you mean? So you're going to send your troops, you're going to go huff and puff again? So what happens is that we're searching for the answer of control and we're calling our kids up again. It's just I felt it very, very deeply again. And by the way, I'm not even blaming the government for trying. I think one of the key failures that I spoke about all along is that we never had a moment where we were going to move to negotiations. We only had one solution, and we balked ourselves in with one tool to deal with every problem. And I think that's the government's fault. But that's part of life. Life. But now we're in this, Yossi. We're in this very, very precarious position. Militarily strategically, internationally, we're not controlling anything. And we sense that. What is that going to do? If I was Netanyahu, this is the worst framework or context within which I would want to go on a campaign in which in another three months people are going to have to vote and ask, do we want you again? Are you the one? And Bennett is now campaigning not on Netanyahu's failures, but on Netanyahu's absence. His new slogan is Israel needs a prime minister. Would it be nice if you had a prime minister, like someone who actually was like, so he's marketing that he's going to bring back some control. Whether he can or not is a separate question. But how do you see this working out in the electorate and in the discourse, which will be obviously very, very violent, unpleasant, verbally violent, how do you see it playing out with the different parties and the different sides of the political map?

[D]

In the last election, Ben GVIR ran on the slogan who's in Charge? And the subtitle of that slogan was It's Time to Return Control to Israel. And it was a very appealing slogan. And Ben GVIR directed that slogan to internal issues, and he was referring to Palestinian terrorism, but even more so and more insidiously referring to Arab Israeli citizens. And that slogan took him to where he is today. Leaving aside the disastrous performance in this very area of control that he ran on, crime in this country has gone through the roof. Ben GVIR has lost control over the south, the North. We're speaking of this feeling of losing control. Ben GVIR has given many Israelis a feeling that we don't even have a police force anymore we can depend on. But I think that that's a winning slogan that defines this coming election. Not necessarily domestically, although also domestically, but primarily in terms of the region, in terms of our relations with the world. How do we regain control? And Bennett is actually saying that by saying it's time to have a prime minister. There's a feeling that no one is in control. There's a feeling of, as you described it earlier, of profound drift. And so I think that what's going to play out as we get deeper into election season is the struggle over the question of which block is better able to deliver the sense of restoring control. Now, of course, the opposition is going to say, well, are you going to give the country back into the hands of. Of the prime minister who brought us to this situation? And here I think there will be a convergence of the sense of external and internal unraveling, focusing heavily on the question of the Haredim, the ultra Orthodox. And you mentioned earlier about how exhausted the reservists are. They're being called up for another round. And that, of course, is an opening for the opposition to push what I think is going to be its most successful issue, which is the.

[C]

So what does Netanyahu do, Yossi, in your mind, what could he claim? How does, how does he. Hold on. See, he has an advantage. The ultra Orthodox parties, they have their fixed people, fixed voters. Like it's not even. No, there's no slogan, there's no issue. They're just vote for us because we're. We're your ideological home.

[D]

We're going to take care of you.

[C]

And that's. They're done. Ben gvir, he's gone up. He has eight, nine seats. He's gonna get his votes. It's gonna come down to whether Netanyahu gets 27 or 22, whether the religious Zionist Party even exists or not. We'll leave that aside. But how does the Tanyahu. Like, for the life of me, why would you vote for now, could you make a case. And I know because you love him so much, I'm going to ask you that. How does he campaign?

[D]

There's a benign scenario and a pathological scenario. The pathological scenario was hinted at by unnamed Likud sources who told an Israeli journalist the other day that if we don't strike hard in Iran, we're going to lose the elections.

[C]

Oh, what.

[D]

And I don't believe that we went to war on October 8th and continued the war because of Netanyahu's political needs. There was a convergence, a happy convergence from Netanyahu's perspective of his political needs and the country's security needs. This time, as we get closer to elections, many Israelis are going to be very carefully watching what Netanyahu does, because there are many people in this country who don't trust his most basic relationship to security if it impacts on his political fortunes. Now, that brings us to a situation that I don't know if we've ever been in before in Israel's history. Of course, political considerations have always played a factor. You remember EOD Olmert, when he was prime minister during the Second Lebanon War, was accused of prolonging the war by a few days because he wanted to get an extra measure of victory, and it blew up in his face. Political considerations, whether on the part of the political echelon or of the generals, is always a factor in our wars and in wars generally. But not to this extent, not to the extent where you have such fundamental mistrust by a large part of the Israeli public of is he doing this for Israel's security or to win the election that takes us into very dangerous territory. That's one piece of this, the more benign way in which he could try to convince Israelis that he deserves yet another go after 18 years as prime minister. Just give the kid a shot. Give the kid a chance. I think that his argument will be that despite everything, he's the one who oversaw the comeback, the military resurrection, right, that's the word that he uses, Kuma, the renewal, the rebirth of Israeli power. And he will try to make the case, which is increasingly difficult, but still, that Israel is in a much stronger place than we were on October 6, that we were living in this fantasy that we could control Hezbollah and Hamas on our borders. Now, of course, he was the Prime Minister then. He was the prime Minister not only on October 7, but on October 6. He was responsible for that self delusion that Israeli society was really being held by. So I don't know how he makes an effective pitch beyond telling his base the same tired narrative. If you let the left back into power, they're going to bring in the Arab parties and then our security is going to be in the hands of the Islamists. Now he's already using that argument. He's using that, yeah, he's just.

[C]

That leads. You know, though, just as you were talking, one of his recent press releases stated that six years ago he warned about the threat and danger of drones. So like someone said, but you were the prime minister for the last six years, so. But you warned. So he warned. So there is the extent to which he will just, you know, deny. And any failure wasn't his. It was always the army's failure or the Supreme Court's failure. And so a, in order to remove any sense of accountability, there's going to be a vicious attack against the Zionism and loyalty of everyone is to blame,

[D]

everyone else is to play. But Danielle, before you get there, I just want to respond to that extraordinary statement of I warned six years ago, when you're the Prime Minister, who are you warning? You're warning yourself, what do you do about. But there's something psychologically revealing about Netanyahu specifically, but more generally about the right in that statement, which is they have never internalized that they are now in power and always looking to blame the opposition or treason in the army because you can take responsibility. The right has a permanent mindset of opposition. And now this goes back historically, this goes back 70 years. This goes back to the right wing revisionist split with Labor Zionism, when Labor Zionism controlled the Yishuv, the pre state community here, and then controlled the state for the first 30 years of its most formative years. The right settled into this mindset of permanent opposition and it has never freed itself from that. And that is still its strongest emotional card. And we're going to see it play out in this election as well. They're going to appeal to the Mizrahim, you were persecuted, you were discriminated against by the left, which was true. It was true 30 years ago. But they're still carrying this historic burden.

[C]

That is one of the reasons, Yossi, the discourse around Deep State is so profound in the right wing conversation. And in a recent poll in this confab of leading Likud supporters, when they were asked what's the primary issue that Israel faces right now here, Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, breakdown of government, crime, gangs and cities, what do you think they said is the number one issue for the next government?

[D]

Oh, it's the control of the courts.

[C]

Sure, of the courts. Because if you read in the newspapers, it was the courts who were responsible for October 7th. So all of the above. We're going to have that, the most

[D]

conservative court in Israel's history, of course,

[C]

so we're going to have all of that. So that I see. But there's another dimension I see emerging in the political discourse in Israel, especially after October 7th. Huge swaths of Israeli society now feel they have to call themselves right wing. Like the. The failure of October 7th is a failure of a centrist or left wing aspiration or perspective on Israel's security, that to care for Israel's security. One of the greatest successes of the right wing in Israel is that they own the language of security, which is on the surface it's absurd given the military credentials of people on the left and the center. But it doesn't matter. If you care about Israel's security, you have to be on the right. And Netanyahu is going to campaign. He can't campaign on his policies. I don't think he could campaign on the victories. He's going to campaign on the fact that with all the troubles that we're still in, only the right will keep us safe. And that resonates. And let me just share with our audience a very, very successful video that he just released. It's a story of a family sitting around the Shabbos table and everybody there is center, center, left. And the sun comes out, comes out, comes out of the closet. What was he comes out of the closet, that he is a Bibi supporter, that somehow the failure of October 7th is a failure of the left. So I think what he's going to run, we're going to see a campaign on the category of the right. Now, if you look at his opposition, Bennett Lieberman, members within the Likud who are thinking now of breaking with him are saying, what does being right mean? Does the right mean that you allow ultra orthodox not to serve? Does the right mean that you don't take care of the settlements in the north? The debate is going to be who is the true right wing? Who is the true right wing? And Netanyahu's strength is that he is more right wing than Bennett Lapid and Eisenhut Lieberman is going to try to say I'm the one who's really, really right. But part of this concerns me because as we move forward, if the debate is on who's the real right, which party is going to actually put forth policies that the country needs which have nothing to do with right wing or left wing? And so part of this process, an election, I'll put it this way, and then I'll give you last comments. Yossi. An election that emerges out of a lack of control for the opposition to Netanyahu. They have to actually put forth policies, but they're not going to. And what they're going to be doing is they're going to try to prove because they feel that policies don't work when campaigns identities win. And they're going to try to fight for who's the better or more authentic right. And I think that's not going to bode well for the next number of months. And then we'll see whether that handcuffs the government. That's going to come. Any thoughts to conclude, Yossi?

[D]

So two thoughts. One is that listening to you lay out the different positions of our leaders, it occurred to me that none of them are genuinely right wing.

[C]

That's right.

[D]

Netanyahu is not right wing. Everyone knows it. He used to be a pragmatist, now he's the dark side of pragmatist. He's an opportunist. Bennett has already compromised himself fatally to the right by forming his alliance with Yair Lapid Lieberman. Sometimes he's right, sometimes. There is no real right wing leader today except for one person, and that's Ben Greer. And that's what worries me. My fear is this government is not coming back to power. I don't believe that. I Don't believe they have the numbers. They can't form a coalition, according to almost any poll. But what I see is that as the Likud loses ground, Ben GVIR is going to step forward and this is his plan to present himself as the last.

[C]

As the truly.

[D]

As the truly could. Exactly. The last point, Daniil, is that this election, just to bring our conversation full circle, is going to be the meeting point, at least for Netanyahu, between the loss of control that Israelis feel and the historic grievances of the right. And he's going to try to connect those two and convince Israelis that the reason they feel a loss of control is because the right still has not been fully empowered. There are, as you say, the deep state and the courts and the traitors in the army and one IDF commander after another, commander in chief who has failed because they're really leftists at heart. And this is the narrative that he's going to try to play out. And historically it has worked. The question is whether after October 7th and after we've seen the collapse of Netanyahu's special relationship with Trump and the actual failures of Netanyahu and handing over control of the People's army to the ultra Orthodox, after we see the disasters, the reality of the loss of control, the question is whether Netanyahu can still spin a perception of the loss of control. That can play into liquids narrative, you

[C]

know, and maybe in a future podcast. We need to talk about the role of the ultra Orthodox in this story, because the way it's being presented is that the drafting of the ultra Orthodox is one of the necessary tools to reclaim control. But factually that's going to take years and it's not doing that either. And what happens when you need the ultra Orthodox to build a coalition? Eisenkot is already speaking to them. See, if it was about policy, it would be one thing, but it's going to be tribal, it's going to be ugly, it's going to be accusatory. But all campaigns are, and the question will be how much this campaign is going to shape policy afterwards. All of that we're going to see. But that too on this, we also don't have control. So Israel's angst, Yossi, I can't wait not to have angst. I gotta tell you, I'm really yearning for a non angst moment in my life.

[D]

But you live in the wrong country and you're part of the wrong people.

[C]

Okay.

[D]

Other than that, keep hoping.

[C]

Okay. Okay, yes. Let's see. You know, every 10 minutes, there's a different proclamation of certainty about what's going to happen next time we see each other. We'll either be in the midst of even deeper uncertainty, or maybe we'll have moved in another direction. Whether for the good or the bad, none of us know right now, but that'll be for a lifetime from now One week Yossi, it was a pleasure being with you. Thank you.

[D]

Great to be with you.

[E]

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[B]

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[D]

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[D]

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[B]

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[E]

For Heaven's Sake is a product of the Shalom Hartman Institute and ARC Media. It is produced by me, Daniel Goodman, with help from Miriam Jacobs, Hadar Taylor Schechter, and Aviva Katmanaur and studio support from Go Live Media. Our episode was edited by Josh Allen. Maital Friedman is our Executive producer and our music was composed by Yuval Samov. Past episodes can be [e-mail] where you can explore more of Arc Media's podcasts. You can watch the video versions of our episodes on our YouTube channel. Follow the YouTube link in the show Notes. Also, to receive updates on new episodes, please follow the link to arcmedia.org and subscribe to Arc Media's weekly newsletter. For more ideas from the Sholem Hartman Institute, visit our [e-mail] for heaven's sake is a product of the Shalom Hartman Institute and ARC Media. It is produced by me, Daniel Goodman, with help from Miriam Jacobs, Hadar Taylor Schechter and Aviva Katmanaur and studio support from Go Live Media. Our episode was edited by Josh Allen. Our episode was edited by Josh Allen. Natal Friedman is our Executive producer and our music was composed by Yuval Samo. Past episodes can be [e-mail] where you can explore more of Arc Media's podcasts. You can watch the video versions of our episodes on our YouTube channel. Follow the YouTube link in the show Notes. Also, to receive updates on new episodes, please follow the link to arcmedia.org and subscribe to Arc Media's weekly newsletter. For more ideas from the Shalom Hartman Institute, visit our [e-mail].