← History As It Happens
History As It Happens
Georgia Between the Kremlin and the West
01:02:14
Since emerging as an independent state in 1991, Georgia has struggled to establish its nationhood. "Joining 'the West' has driven Georgian elites’ strategic thinking for decades," writes the historian Bryan Gigantino. Yet, at the same time, Tbilisi...
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- [00:00]
Martin DeCar
History as it happens. December 17, 2024, Georgia between the Kremlin and the West. More than 100 demonstrators were arrested overnight.
- [00:10]
Brian Gigantino
In Georgia as protesters.
- [00:12]
Martin DeCar
Georgia says 21 police officers have been injured in pro EU demonstrations on Sunday. The unrest was triggered by. So the police right now are firing streams of from inside the parliament. Today. We have decided not to put the issue of opening negotiations with the European Union on the agenda until the end 2028. The demonstrators are saying the ruling Georgian Dream Party has betrayed Georgia. Protesters have taken to the streets of Tbilisi, clashing with police for three weeks. They've condemned their government's decision to suspend talks to join the eu. Are Georgia's leaders really leaning toward Moscow or simply being pragmatic in light of their country's historical relationship with a powerful neighbor? Both history and memory matter. That's next as we report History as it happens. I'm Martin decar.
- [01:04]
Unnamed Speaker (possibly a Western official or commentator)
Russia has tended to view the expansion of freedom and democracy as a threat to its interests.
- [01:10]
Martin DeCar
NATO is calling for a halt of fighting in Georgia's South Osetro region. Battling that could draw Russia into a full scale conflict. Witness the terrifying aftermath of a Russian airstrike on one Georgian town.
- [01:22]
Brian Gigantino
Yeah, I think it's incredibly difficult to see the recent course of events simply in terms of this reaction to one law or one decision by the current ruling party. I guess I'll start with saying in 2012, Georgian Dream came to power as this party that was going to undo or right the wrongs, you could say, of the previous government, which was led by a man named Mikhail Saakashvili and the United National Movement. And so the Georgian Dream's power and claim to legitimacy was totally rooted in this idea that we are going to move away from the mistakes that were made under the saakashvili era.
- [02:09]
Martin DeCar
In August 2008, war broke out between Georgia and Russia over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Who is more to blame remains the subject of controversy.
- [02:20]
Brian Gigantino
The flare ups the worst fighting in years between the former Soviet Republic of Georgia and a breakaway region called South Ossetia.
- [02:27]
Irakli Kobakhidze
Today, which Russia has launched a full scale military invasion of Georgia.
- [02:35]
Unnamed Speaker (possibly a Western official or commentator)
I have directed a series of steps to demonstrate our solidarity with the Georgian people and bring about a peaceful resolution to this conflict.
- [02:42]
Martin DeCar
Breakaway Georgian region where violence has fled. Russian troops backed by tanks and armored vehicles are patrolling the streets. The following September, a report commissioned by the European Union blamed Georgia for starting it, but said Moscow's military response went beyond reasonable limits and violated international law. The findings were also very critical of Georgia's conduct under President Mikhail Saakashvili, whose attempt to retake the two regions, which were after all legally part of Georgia, failed. Mikhail Saakashvili, who had been viewed as an important partner by the Bush White.
- [03:17]
Unnamed Speaker (possibly a Western official or commentator)
House I'm impressed by this leader. I'm impressed by his vision. I'm impressed by his courage.
- [03:24]
Irakli Kobakhidze
We are proud to be friends of the United States. I'm picking on behalf of every Georgian. I have to say that this cooperation, friendship, the US Helped us when we needed it most and like other peoples in Europe, will never forget that. But our cooperation held. Friendship is not only about security. It's not only about economy primarily. It's about our shared values.
- [03:49]
Martin DeCar
Now, maybe you don't remember much of this. You probably don't think of this five day war very often anymore or care much about who controls South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Russian troops occupy both provinces to this day. But this short war looms large in the minds of Georgia's government under the Georgian Dream Party and the opposition as they fight over the country's future. Georgian Dream has suspended until 2028 long planned talks to join the European Union leading to weeks of street demonstration. As our guest in this episode writes in Jacobin, Georgian Dream came to power in 2012, 2013. Aligned with a party of European socialists, always committed neoliberals. Georgian Dream was social democratic in name only. It presented itself as a radical change from the 2004-2012 government of Saakashvili and the United National Movement, yet has pushed forward its core tenets market economics, EU and NATO integration. In building a European Georgia, this technocratic party pursued a policy of strategic patience with Moscow after the 2008 Russo Georgian War and of structural reform to align with EU accession requirements. Georgian Dream embraced strategic partnership with Washington, yet mildly de emphasized Saakashvili's usphilia by emphatically pursuing EU membership. Now we'll share a link to historian Brian Gigantino's essay in my weekly newsletter. You can sign up@historyasithappens.com and he'll be joining us in a moment. He is in Tbilisi following the protests and some surreal scenes there. Demonstrators have been firing fireworks launchers at police or as seen in this BBC news segment. A reporter asked Georgia's prime minister why he had suspended the EU talks and the prime minister denied it. Huh. People feel betrayed. Can you understand that?
- [05:51]
Irakli Kobakhidze
The response is very clear. So we have not suspended anything related to the European integration. It's just a lie. And there are the opposition leaders. There are the media outlets linked with the opposition who are just lying to these people.
- [06:05]
Martin DeCar
But you suspended this until 2028.
- [06:09]
Irakli Kobakhidze
No, it's not true. It's not true.
- [06:11]
Martin DeCar
Really? Here's what he said. Three days today we have decided not to put the issue of opening negotiations with the European Union on the agenda until the end of 2028. Behind the Headlines lies a complicated situation in a country still trying to establish its post Soviet nationhood on the post Soviet periphery, where memories of the USSR are shunned by the same government seeking to keep Russia and the west happy at the same time. Historian Brian Gigantino is a lecturer at Georgian American University in Tbilisi. He is the co host of the Reimagining Soviet Georgia podcast. Welcome to this podcast.
- [06:51]
Brian Gigantino
Thank you for having me. It's great to be here.
- [06:53]
Martin DeCar
Tell us a little bit about your background, your field. What attracted you to studying post Soviet Georgia, the region of the world where you now live?
- [07:02]
Brian Gigantino
My path actually to Soviet history and the post Soviet region, or Eurasia, and specifically in the caucus, is kind of long. But it starts in California. When I was growing up, I had a bunch of friends who were from the Soviet Union and I used to hang out at their houses and really was interested in understanding more about their families and their family's culture and where they came from. And so then when I went to University, University of California, Santa Cruz, I studied history and I studied the Russian language and I focused on the ussr, the history of international communism, and I studied the Russian language. And then I went to Russia and started learning Russian language there. Finished my undergraduate in 2011. And then I actually went to Russia for the first time in 2013.
- [07:52]
Martin DeCar
Oh wow. So well into the Putin era then.
- [07:55]
Brian Gigantino
Yeah, yeah, well into the Putin era. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And then went to Ukraine. And then in 2016 I went to visit Georgia and Armenia. And then in 2017 I got a master's degree and I studied the Soviet Union. But after my trip to the caucus, the South Caucus, I realized that if you study the Soviet Union from the non Russian regions, it actually gives you a whole different perspective and understanding on the USSR as a whole. Meaning that very often in the west and in other places, sometimes even in Russia, we're kind of told the Soviet Union was simply this continuation of the Russian Empire or simply Russia, when in fact, when you examine the Soviet experience of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan or Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, even in Central Asia, you actually get a different perspective of the entire history. Right. Not only how this multi ethnic state existed, but also how People themselves in this region understand the Soviet past, which sometimes is a lot more nuanced than, say, sometimes we. We. We see or take for granted. So that's really what it was. And so when I went and I got my master's, I studied nationality policy, national consolidation, national development of the South, Caucus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. And then I finished in 2019. And in 2019, I decided that if I really wanted to understand the region, I should actually move there and start researching, writing, going to archives, meeting people. And so I did, and I've been here ever since. And now I'm co hosting a podcast called Reimagining Soviet Georgia and writing articles both academic and popular.
- [09:34]
Martin DeCar
Well, I would venture to say that you know more about Georgia than almost all American citizens, myself included. You know, when I grew up in the 1980s, early 1990s, the Soviet Union was this dark and scary place. I remember Ronald Reagan and the evil empire. It always seemed to take up the entire atlas, the world maps. They'd hang from the classroom walls in school. This huge USSR looked like communism was controlling almost the entire world. And then after 1991, suddenly it's gone. And, I mean, I didn't think about Georgia at all. I knew that Stalin was from Georgia. And Edward Shevardnazi, who is Gorbachev's foreign minister, that's about it, until the last couple of weeks to prepare to speak to you because of these protests in Tbilisi and other parts of the country. So let's talk now about some recent developments that listeners may be familiar with. They've been in the news and put them in a larger context to explain why there is popular discontent in Georgia right now. There was a passage of the law on transparency and foreign influence that rubbed the United States and the EU the wrong way. There was a law banning gay marriage. Then there were elections, parliamentary elections on October 26. Opposition parties and the EU parliament say that these were not fair elections. They were even rigged, maybe. And then the big one, the decision by the Georgian Dream Party, the ruling party, to suspend talks to join the European Union. These talks will now be suspended until at least 2028. I know that's a lot. We don't have to micro analyze each of those developments right now, but let's put them in a larger context. The struggle for Georgia to establish nationhood since 1991.
- [11:19]
Brian Gigantino
Well, yeah, I think it's incredibly difficult to see the recent course of events simply in terms of this reaction to one law or one decision by the current ruling party. I guess I'll start with saying in 2012, Georgian Dream came to power as this party that was going to undo or right the wrongs, you could say, of the previous government, which was led by a man named Mikhail Saakashvili and the United National Movement. And so the Georgian Dream's power and claim to legitimacy was totally rooted in this idea that we are going to move away from, from the mistakes that were made under the Saakashvili era. One of those mistakes was, of course, the war with Russia in 2008 over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These are two contested territories which Georgia claims that are rightfully under Georgian jurisdiction, but are recognized as independent by the Russian Federation.
- [12:20]
Martin DeCar
And international law recognizes them as part of Georgia. Right?
- [12:23]
Brian Gigantino
International law recognized them as part of Georgia. And actually the majority of the world recognize them as part of Georgia. China recognizes them as part of Georgia. The entire post Soviet space recognizes them as part of Georgia, the European Union and the West. In fact, this is an issue that basically the entire international community recognizes as part of Georgia. Bashar Al Assad, who just was overthrown and deposed in Syria, was one of the few states that actually recognized the independence of Abkhazia, besides the Russian Federation, ironically enough. But the point is, is that when Georgian Dream came to power, they had this idea of trying to stick to two or three major goals of being a state, right? One of them was peace. They wanted to have this policy of strategic patience with Russia. Second one was to have good relations and deepen integration with the European Union. And this is something that they accomplished, actually. Both of those they accomplished, right? The Georgian Dream has deepened relations with the European Union far more than the previous administration, which had been closer to the United States. So Georgian Dream coming to power actually was this kind of recognition that the United States is slowly but surely withdrawing politically from Eurasia and that instead we're going to try to deepen ties and become a member of the European Union. And the third one, I think, was this at least rhetorical move away from some of the crude neoliberalism and the aggressive authoritarian and draconian statecraft of the Saakashvili regime. Most of those things they had actually been able to accomplish. But starting in 2019 and ramping up in 2022 with the Russian full scale invasion of Ukraine, things started to change. And maybe we can talk about what those changes were. But around that time, you started to see a split between Western supported NGOs, the opposition mobilizing more against the ever embattled Georgian Dream government.
- [14:21]
Martin DeCar
Well, the context you put in this excellent article you wrote in Jacobin that I'll share in my weekly newsletter. The context that you place these developments in is Georgia's attempt to escape what you call post Soviet peripheralization. So trying to get out of the post Soviet periphery or shadow to join the EU and the prosperity and benefits that come with that, without antagonizing Russia. I want everyone to open up a map on a tab or however they're listening to this show on their phone or whatever, and look at where Georgia is, and they may understand immediately, geopolitically, why the country doesn't want to antagonize Russia. So you said change is starting to happen. Is it because for a long time the EU didn't really want Georgia as much as Georgia wanted the eu. But then that changed.
- [15:12]
Brian Gigantino
First thing is this concept of post Soviet peripheralization. Many people make the argument that when the Soviet Union collapsed, that there was this parade of revolutions and that there was this reclamation of political sovereignty. But very often what people don't talk about are the longstanding and deep political, economic and social crises and geopolitical crises that were unleashed that actually undermined not only the stability of states to govern, for society to function and for a healthy economy to emerge. So Georgia is a unique case in this regard because in the Soviet Union, the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic was a very privileged republic. It had very high levels of white collar workers. It exported luxury goods to the rest of the Soviet Union. Things like wine, mineral waters, tangerines. They had high rates of ruble millionaires. Right. People who were very wealthy. In the Soviet system, you had a disproportionate number of Georgians who were working at high levels of the all Soviet governments. Not to mention the fact that Stalin himself, the most powerful global statesman in Soviet history, was from Georgia. Right. And this of course led Georgia to have a very special and specific status, not only in the south caucus, but in the entire Soviet system. Right. There was a room to nation build. There was decades of economic development and what I would call national consolidation. Meaning that over the course of the Soviet Union, Georgia became more Georgian. This was not a Russification process, but a Georgianization process whereby Georgian national institutions were developed. Historians writing about the history of Georgia in a specific way. So you got the creation of a stable, economically developed Georgian nation in the Soviet period. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Georgia became like the rest of the post Soviet space, a peripheral country in the world system, economically and politically. But not only that. If you compare the Georgian SSR to the rest of the Soviet Union, Georgia saw The steepest decline in living standards, meaning that unlike Tajikistan, which had lower living standards in the Soviet Union and descended into civil war, Georgia saw state collapse that was the most extreme. Ethnic conflict, territorial dismemberment and huge crisis in living standards, inequality rose. So the actual process of decline was much more extreme than even in Russia or Ukraine. On top of that, Georgia was industrialized in the Soviet period, but had the highest rate of deindustrialization of anywhere. So of course, in Eastern Ukraine, for example, in the Donbass region, some of these industries maintained. Certain capitalists were able to take over some of this industry and repurpose it for something else. But in Georgia, you saw the total gutting and destruction of industry that it had in the Soviet period. So that actually led Georgia to become this peripheral state in both the post Soviet space and, and in relation to Europe and in relation to the Middle east even. And after the 2003 Rose Revolution, after Shevard Nadze came back to power and kind of stabilized the state, more or less, the Rose Revolution was not only pro west, pro United States transfer of power, led by Saakashvili and some others who used to be aligned with Shevardnadze, and also led by nonprofit organizations, NGOs that had received funding in US and EU led democracy promotion projects, but they also had this idea of modernization of Georgia, which was to create a state that would oversee a radical neoliberal form of economics, gut the state of any kind of socioeconomic capacity, while doing so with a very heavy hand, you could say, of repression, incarceration, and also trying to make Georgia a destination for foreign direct investment. So if you can imagine this last thing, I'll say if you can imagine in this period Georgia's competing with other post communist countries for Western investment, how can you get a capitalist or somebody with money from the west to invest in Georgia? If there's a civil war, there's tensions with Russia, there's all these problems. Well, they basically have no laws, right? So they were trying to entice people to come because there was no productions for workers, there was no taxes on capital being removed from the country. So they were trying to entice money to come. And then they built this kind of economy focused on foreign direct investment. This had economic consequences, undermining the strength of the economy in the long term and also undermining the capacity of the state to actually make economic reforms in service of the population.
- [20:16]
Martin DeCar
It's not an economy for Georgia, it's a globalized economy. And you point out in your piece that there's been grinding poverty and it persists and there are rural areas that are very poor and feel alienated by what some call neoliberalization or globalization. In Russia, it was called shock therapy. So we have to remember that while the fall of the Soviet Union was celebrated by people like me and my ignorance, I was 16 years old in 1991, so you can forgive me. The fall of the Soviet Union led to a disastrous decade for Russia's economy and the collapse of a state function. Ukraine's economy was a shambles. And now, as you're saying, Georgia's economy was also in a lot of trouble as well. And this was the fix. Was it called shock therapy there? I mean, what was the difference between what the United States was prescribing for Russia versus what happened in, in Georgia with this invasion, if you will, of non governmental organizations and Western embassies?
- [21:14]
Brian Gigantino
Yeah, this is actually interesting. There was of course discussions about shock therapy saying, you know, we should replicate what happened in Poland or we should replicate what happened in some of these post communist countries. Whether you had economic scholars and advisors coming and giving lectures in Georgia or others. But maybe the unique case of Georgia is that after the 2003 Rose Revolution, especially the people who were in control of the state and affiliated NGOs like the Liberty Institute made something like shock therapy, neoliberalism, radical globalization, the ideology of the state. So it wasn't simply that you had external forces imposing it on Georgia, but you had a wing of the elites who had now come into power who were trying to not only nation build meaning like a new flag, a new national identity, what makes Georgia part of the west in this particular historical moment, 2003, 2004, 2005 of us led unipolarity and globalization, right, the march of the west into the post communist world. But also trying to say that this is naturally part of what it means to be Georgian. And in my view, this was actually something that was naturalized to such a degree where, you know, the national mythologies of Georgian history were re articulated through this political and geo economic and geopolitical view. Right. We're historically in opposition to Russia. We're historically part of the West. You know, for example, Saakashvili opened up a statue to Ronald Reagan in the center of Tbilisi. And at the unveiling in 2000, I think 10 or 11, he says, you know, Ronald Reagan, we're indebted to him because he's the one who actually freed Georgia from the tutelage of Soviet communism by opposing the Soviet Union. Right. Or one of our national heroes, Ilya Chavchevadze, was the original economic liberal. So the other thing I'll say really quickly, this was so extreme and radical in the Georgian state at the time that you even had moments where the Georgian elites were going to the right economically speaking of what even the World bank and the WTO and international financial institutions asked them to. More Catholic than the Pope, as we say.
- [23:39]
Martin DeCar
And this is where anti Soviet memory politics comes in the instrumentalization of history, the ruling party, Georgian Dream. How do they use in this moment where they're now pulling away from EU talks and from the vantage of the west, moving closer to Russia? I mean, are anti Soviet memory politics still in play here? I mean, it's a very complicated situation because it's not like these protesters want to go back to communism in a command economy. The protesters want to join the eu.
- [24:09]
Brian Gigantino
Yeah, I'll start with saying that. I guess I'd first argue that I don't think that Georgian Dream is trying to go towards Russia. This is actually a misnomer because the Georgian Dream government is simply trying to make mitigate what is a real and ever looming threat of a more aggressive and assertive Russia in a time and in a moment and in a neighborhood where they have to. Right. There's no way that a state like Georgia with a very weak military can rely on NATO, they can't rely on Turkey, they can't rely on the eu, and they definitely can't rely on the United States to protect them if there was to be a conflict with Russia. So one of their goals, and again, I have many critiques of Georgian Dream, but one of the goals that I think is a rational one, is to get the Russian Federation and Putin to perceive Georgia as a sovereign state that is not a proxy of the West. And part of that has to do with making certain political concessions, but doing them in a way that doesn't compromise or sacrifice the limited sovereignty that the.
- [25:13]
Martin DeCar
State already has, fair or unfair. That's just the reality of it, where Georgia is on the map. Right, right.
- [25:19]
Brian Gigantino
And a lot of this has to do with the fact that the EU and NATO, of course, have been long dragging their feet in relation to Georgia, because of course, there's all the reason in the world to believe that neither the EU or NATO are actually interested in integrating Georgia, but they have this kind of worst case policy where they're kind of dragging the country along.
- [25:38]
Martin DeCar
Not to digress, let me just interject here, but this was the critique of what George W. Bush did at the Bucharest conference in 2008. He floats the idea of having a Membership Action Plan for NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia when everyone knew that countries like France and Germany would object, and it went nowhere. But it antagonized Russia and it leaves the country itself in a no man's land.
- [26:00]
Unnamed Speaker (possibly a Western official or commentator)
This week our alliance must also decide how to respond to the request by Georgia and Ukraine to participate in NATO's Membership Action Plan. These two nations inspired the world with their Rose and Orange Revolutions. And now they're working to consolidate their democratic gains and cement their independence, welcoming them into the Membership Action Plan, which send a signal to their citizens that if they continue on the path to democracy and reform, they will be welcomed into the institutions of Europe. It would send a signal throughout the region that these two nations are and will remain sovereign and independent states.
- [26:47]
Brian Gigantino
That's exactly what happened. And this is much more informative of a moment to understand some of the actions that the current government has taken over the past few years. In response to your question about anti Soviet memory politics, it's also quite complicated. The first thing that I would say is that anti Soviet memory politics came back to Georgia when the Soviet Union collapsed. And in a sense they had been kept incubated by the Georgian emigres during the Cold War. And when they come back, this anti Soviet idea of Georgia divorced from the national consolidation and development during the Soviet period. When they come back, they play a role in animating how people are imagining this new nation that's going to emerge. Shevardnadze, when he was in power from 1995 really until 2003, was overseeing such a crisis that there wasn't a clear nation building project. It was more about, okay, eventually we want to be part of Europe, but we really need to get the state just organized. In 2003, after the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili's government actually tried to rebrand Georgia to being a historically European state, eternally struggling for freedom against Russo Soviet occupation. Because the Sovietization of Georgia was done by Georgian Bolsheviks with the help of the red army in 1921, after the small period of pseudo independence between 1918 and 1921 where a different faction of social democrats were in control of Tiflis or Tbilisi. The point is that the narratives about Soviet occupation had actually been renaturalized in the post Soviet period, but became part of the national narrative under state led national narrative under Saakashvili. So you saw things like the banning of communist symbols, the creation of the museum of Soviet occupation, an attempt to Reorganize the Stalin Museum in gory. Right. The. The destruction of Soviet monuments. And part of this has to do with the fact that the Russian Federation would instrumentalize Soviet history. Cherry pick Soviet history for its own geopolitical ends. And in 2008, when Georgia and Russia fought a war for five days in August of 2008 over Abkhazi and Zado Setia. Right. That the European Union says the Georgian side began, that this reanimated and reinvigorated the anti Soviet memory politics as a metaphor for Georgia's national opposition to the Russian Federation. Saying that the Russian Federation is occupying us, just like the Soviets the bolsheviks did in 1921. But the problem was it wasn't simply a metaphor for the Russian Federation. You also had this ideological commitment to undermining socialism, Marxism in service of this period of like the end of history. Right.
- [29:51]
Martin DeCar
Francis Fukuyama.
- [29:52]
Brian Gigantino
Yeah, Fukuyama. Yeah. The victory, the historical victory of liberal democracy and capitalism over the socialist bloc. And this was kind of naturalized into a state ideology by the Sankashvili era. Now, interestingly enough, when Georgian Dream comes to power, they don't question that state ideology. Right. The only difference is that they don't wanna have as aggressive a posture towards the Russian Federation without sacrificing sovereign. So they sort of reduce the amount of anti Soviet memory politics as a core feature of the statecraft, but they did not reject it. I'll give you an example. The recent protests. There had been a preliminary wave of protests in 2019 and 2020 where people who were opposing Georgian Dream said, georgian Dream is a Russian party taking us back to the Soviet Union. We will never go back to the ussr. This was a protest slogan and some organizations openly using this. Right. There are some NGOs in Georgia. Some are focused on history, some focused on memory politics. And they constantly say, you know, Russia is the Soviet Union. We will never go back to the Soviet Union. But then at the same time, Georgian Dream also weaponizes anti Soviet memory politics. They recently called President Salome Zorobashvili, Sergo Urzonikidze, who was the leading Georgian Bolshevik during Sovietization in 1921, who had been asking Lenin for help to Sovietize Georgia. Right. And so when Salome Zorobashvili wrote letters to the European Union asking for them to intervene into Georgian affairs, to sanction the country, to undermine the government, the current Georgian government used that and said, she's the same as Sergova Janakidze, this Georgian Bolshevik who's trying to undermine the sovereignty of the state and get foreign actors to. To invade politically invade, excuse me, not militarily. So you see the way that both sides use this, because in my view, Georgian dream is incredibly anti communist, very hostile to the Soviet past, and in fact, they are also not very fond of Russia. They simply are trying to forge a pragmatic course. But this pragmatic course has led them into tension with certain segments of the collective West. Not all the collective west is fractured and has led to this current crisis.
- [32:12]
Martin DeCar
So in 08, there were separatists in those two regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And the Georgian government sent its military there to quell the separatists. Right, and that's what provoked the Russian military intervention. Is that the short history of it?
- [32:28]
Brian Gigantino
Kind of. I mean, the issue is, is that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a. Remember that in the 90s, there was a war between Abkhazia and Georgia in the 90s, which is a very complex story that I don't want to. I don't have time to get into all the details about. But the important point is that between the 1990s and 2008, both South Ossetia and Abkhazia were considered territorially part of Georgia under Georgian jurisdiction. It's just the Georgian government never had full control over the two regions. South Ossetia was an autonomous oblast. Al Qasi was an autonomous republican during the Soviet period. And so the national intelligentsia and elites of these two regions wanted to maintain some semblance of sovereignty in the post Soviet arrangement. And this led to conflict over what that would mean in the post Soviet period. So the 2008 war was initiated by Saakashvili when he began to shell the capital of South Ossetia, Sinvali. But there was a long lead up to that moment. There were some shootings that happened. The Georgian government tried to take control of South Ossetia by closing this economic lifeline to the region, this large market. And then it exploded in 2008 when he decided to unilaterally begin the conflict. There are different explanations for what led to it, but it's clear that even if you were to say that the Russians were mobilizing and that there was this conflict that was unfolding, that it was the Georgian side, led by Saakashvili and the United National Movement, that actually started the conflict.
- [34:07]
Martin DeCar
Something I've learned from doing this podcast over the past four years, which has necessitated a number of episodes about the collapse of the Soviet Union in this period of time. We're living through right now is at the end of the ussr. While championed and celebrated in the west, it was an end, but it was also a beginning. And the best way to understand the collapse of what was an empire, if you will, is as a process that is still unfolding and often unfolds in very bloody ways.
- [34:39]
Brian Gigantino
The end of the Soviet Union was much, much more bloody and violent than sometimes people want to give credit to.
- [34:48]
Martin DeCar
And it's often called the wars of Soviet succession. Some people use that term, you know, what's gone on.
- [34:53]
Brian Gigantino
But I think I would approach the question slightly differently. It's actually the fact that the Soviet Union was organized in a non imperial way internally that has led to the reason that it has actually fractured in the way it has. The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, like others, built their nationhood, their national institutions, and was deeply economically integrated with an all Soviet economy. Right. In a sense, the Soviet Union was so good at building nations, it created these blueprints that when the Soviet Union collapsed that the nomenclature and the elites of those different regions could just immediately turn into nations. In the Georgian context, it was overly dependent on the all Soviet economic structure, which was completely integrated in such a way that when the Soviet economy collapsed, this integrated economy and I personally view as like a non imperial structure, it was something else. The word empire, it suggests that there was this center that was dominating the periphery. But in the Georgian case, not only Georgians themselves, but the development, the forms of national collective rights suggest that it was some other kind of structure that still needs to be adequately interrogated and thought about. And there are debates that are among historians about what exactly the Soviet Union was, it's actually precisely because of this shared modernity, shared economic integration and shared kind of like universalist vision that collapsed that has made the post Soviet period so difficult. And one of the reasons that you have, whether we're talking about Russia, Ukraine, we're talking about Armenia, Azerbaijan, we're talking about Russia, Georgia, what I call this post Soviet sovereignty crisis. Why is it that none of the states can actually assert some semblance of protected sovereignty in this post Soviet period? That's so dangerous. And I think it's got to do with the way that this unique polity was dismembered.
- [36:53]
Unnamed Speaker (possibly a Western official or commentator)
Russia has tended to view the expansion of freedom and democracy as a threat to its interests. The opposite is true. Free and prosperous societies on Russia's borders will advance Russia's interests by serving as sources of stability and economic opportunity.
- [37:14]
Martin DeCar
And some historians have said the Soviet Union was an empire within a nation state, a Minor digression. Because you talked about anti Soviet memory politics and how that has changed, its use has changed over, over time. Putin today sees Stalin as a state builder. He's kind of rehab Stalin of all people, rehab Stalin's reputation because of victory in World War II. That means a lot to Putin as he wages war in Ukraine. Stalin is from Georgia. What's his reputation like today and how does the Georgian Dream Party view him?
- [37:45]
Brian Gigantino
Well, the Georgian Dream Party does not comment on Stalin. They don't make commentary on Stalin. But the thing is in Georgia, I think the vast majority of Georgians have a respect for Stalin. And the reason that they have a respect from Stalin is very clear that this was probably the most famous and globally important Georgian to ever live. Right. The most recognized Georgian to ever live. But not only that, I think Stalin is a representation of the unique position that Georgia had within the Soviet Union, which is that a Georgian was running the entire ussr. Beria was also from Georgia, or Jonakidze was also from Georgia. A number of different, well known, all Soviet political figures were from Georgia. And this was, I think, a point of pride. There's two ways to think about it. The first is that because state led and NGO supported and academia supported erasure of the nuanced texture and complexity of the Soviet past, Stalin is one of the remnants in terms of like him as a person, where people can actually have reconciliation in some way with the Soviet past. Right. Because the Soviet past in Georgia, Georgia's Soviet experience is not simply about Stalin. Right. There was national development, there was linguistic development, there was, you know, scientific development, all kinds of cultural production, economic stability, industrialization, Georgian engineers going around the world and helping build things or all of these different aspects of the Soviet past which have been basically erased from the public sphere in terms of being something to be proud of, embrace and discuss. Whereas like Stalin is simply an image that people can use as the basis from which to try to connect with that in a sphere in which nothing else is allowed to exist is politically kind of banished. Also, of course, Georgia benefited quite greatly under the Stalin period. There's not really a basis in the historical memory for having an antipathy towards Stalin like some others have. For example, even in high Stalinism, the Georgian party was able to use that, that moment to consolidate Georgian nation building in different ways. Right. So that makes it also a much more nuanced and complex thing.
- [40:16]
Martin DeCar
These complexities are fascinating. We could spend all day discussing the history of, of Stalin. Matter of fact, I'm sitting here in front of my microphone. I have a bookshelf and I have Stephen Kotkin, Volume one and volume two, waiting for him to finish the third volume of his.
- [40:32]
Brian Gigantino
I would recommend a great book by one of my favorite historians, professor emeritus at the University of Michigan, Ronald Suny. He recently wrote a book about Stalin's younger years in Georgia. It's called A Passage to Revolution. And it's kind of in conversation with and a little bit critical of Kotkin. He was one of the first American, he's of Armenian origin, but American historians to study the caucus and Sovietology in the United States and really wrote some of the initial works in English about Georgia, about Armenia. And he wrote this amazing book recently. It was like kind of one of his final books because he's retiring, about Stalin's younger years in Georgia. And I think it really opens up some of these complexities about Stalin being a revolutionary in Georgia and his role here.
- [41:13]
Martin DeCar
How do you spell his last name?
- [41:15]
Brian Gigantino
Late author S U N Y Back.
- [41:17]
Martin DeCar
To what's happening now. We can wrap up with this. And this is a, this is a heavy topic as well because as you say, Georgian dream, really, the Georgian political establishment has made joining the EU a major priority for decades, but it is now suspending accession talks until 2028. So I guess my question is why it is trying to straddle the fence a bit. I'm talking about Georgian Dream not antagonizing Russia while also trying to benefit from a better relationship with the west or the eu. But these recent laws that have been passed, the law against gay marriage, the other one about Transparency for any NGOs, non government organizations that receive a lot of foreign funding. You know, whatever the details of these pieces of legislation, they've rankled Western capitals. You have said that Georgia has an imported civil society that agitates her government accountability, but with a caveat. I'm reading from your article here. Georgia's Euro Atlantic orientation was anchored through these non state institutions insulating key policy debates from the ebbs and flows of changing governments. Georgian Dream initially saw no problem with this, but apparently they do now because they're putting off the talks to join the eu.
- [42:36]
Brian Gigantino
First, we'll start by saying there's a big difference between an ideal of the eu, what the Georgian population, who's mobilizing in defense of the European Union, and what I call the really existing eu. Not the same thing. So in Georgia, the European Union is this kind of messianic form of nationalism that claims that if Georgia is part of the European Union, that its security, economic and problems of governance are all going to be resolved.
- [43:09]
Martin DeCar
Right. It's even in the Georgian constitution. Right. Joining the eu.
- [43:13]
Brian Gigantino
Right. And that is not the same as a really existing eu. It's sort of how like there's a difference between a nation and a state. That's the first most important thing to understand that like in Georgia, there is this articulation of the national idea through Europeanization and joining the European Union. That's like one issue. The second issue that you alluded to was about how Georgian Dream in 2018 passed a constitutional amendment in alliance with Western funded NGOs in the country because they were essentially in alignment to enshrine EU and NATO membership into the constitution. But 2018, 2019, up until the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia, there started to be a fracture between the NGO sector and the ruling party. And a lot of this had to do with the fact that there were a number of different moments that I think exacerbated this conflict where the NGOs moved away from saying, we are going to work with the government to try to help ensure certain types of reforms to becoming basically an oppositional political force. Right. And those are two different positions.
- [44:36]
Martin DeCar
Do it our way, do it this way, or else basically is what they say, right?
- [44:41]
Brian Gigantino
Because civil society in Georgia was developed through the view of the European Union and the United States in terms of democratization and anchoring this Western orientation in a sphere that was institutionalized with foreign money as something separate from the state. You basically have this institutionalization of a form of pressure on the state that now the state is trying to sort of assert its own political sovereignty from for different reasons. Now, the current crisis, I think, has a lot to do with this Article 78 in the Constitution. I'll say it very plainly. In 2022, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia received. They applied, excuse me, they applied for EU membership. Georgia was by all metrics ahead of Moldova and Ukraine in terms of being ready for extension talks with the European Union. But the European Union had been unwilling to extend possible candidate status or extension talks to Georgia for years, and only now were they willing to do it. As I write in the article, because of what many other commentators and scholars have observed, the European Union's geopolitical turn, and what I mean by that is that the war in Ukraine has basically encourage the European Union to try and assert something that looks like a more geopolitical posture.
- [46:18]
Martin DeCar
Part of that has to be anti Russian front, basically, right?
- [46:21]
Brian Gigantino
An anti Russian front in the current conditions. Because I work from the position that at Some point they're probably going to make up with Russia. But I digress. The European Union basically saying right now we want to assert this kind of anti Russian front. We're also the European Union, since the Obama years has come under pressure from the United States to begin paying more for its own security and other actors inside of the European Union. Whether we talk about the French government or others like currently the Orban government, saying we need strategic distance from the United States because we cannot rely on the US for all of our security needs and we want to integrate more with China. And if the US and China are involved in what is an emergent new Cold war, then we need to actually protect our economic connections to the east in this era of rising multipolarity. So that is a problem where Georgia wants to be in the eu, but it does not want to align. Currently the current government does not want to align with the geopolitical EU in a moment where it's mobilizing against Russia because it has been key to the Georgian Dream's policy to have strategic patience with Russia. And that has actually proven very beneficial for the country. The Russian Federation, for example, has removed sanctions that it imposed on Georgia in regards to direct flights. Georgia has dependencies on Russia for exporting wine, tourism for the import of other raw materials. So the benefits have actually proven to stabilize the Georgian economy in a moment when other powers, like for example other countries, excuse me, like Germany most famously is suffering quite a bit because of the sulfur inflicted wounds of severing economic ties with Russia.
- [48:10]
Martin DeCar
Russia's too large and important a country. And how would Georgia cut itself off from Russia anyway? As you just say, has economic relationships, historical relationships, shares a border with a much more powerful country that has shown itself to be willing to use massive violence to get its way over its post Soviet periphery, to use that term again.
- [48:31]
Brian Gigantino
Right. And I think it's important also to understand that I don't believe the Georgian Dream government nor anybody in Georgia thinks that the country should become some kind of province of Russia or over depend on Russia. It's just that there has to be peace between Russia and Georgia in order to get any kinds of concessions on the territorial issue. There has to be peace between Georgia and Russia for Armenia to take advantage of the Georgia Russia border. There has to be peace between Georgia and Russia for Azerbaijan to also be able to integrate in some of the key transit routes. So it's actually crucial that the whole south caucus sort of has this more neutral leaning position on this Ukraine Russia war in order to sort of facilitate regional economics cooperation. There's also another factor which I think your listeners might find interesting, which is the China question. This has also been, in my personal view, one of the key reasons that the west is acting so aggressive towards Georgia. Georgia has, for example, given the rights to build and control a port on the Black Sea to China. Georgia has assumed a very important role in the middle corridor, which is the export of Chinese goods through Central Asia to Azerbaijan through Georgia and to be exported either through the Black Sea or into Turkey. Georgia's trying to take advantage of Chinese economic power and engagement in order to sort of not only this is the interesting thing and maybe counterintuitive not only for the economic benefits it can have in the country, but actually to try to balance with Russia. Because the, the idea is that the closer you are with China, the actual less willing that the Russians would be to cause problems. Because two things. Number one, China and Russia have a very close, important and deepening relationship. But two, it actually shows that the Georgian state is less concerned about serving the Americans and is more concerned about its own kind of national sovereignty and economic development, which is a key foreign policy position of the Georgian government currently.
- [50:47]
Martin DeCar
And China won't say don't pass that anti gay law or you won't get our investment. They don't make any qualms.
- [50:55]
Brian Gigantino
I think that this is very true. They're not going to make demands. Also I want to mention at least one thing about the LGBT legislation. This is a very complex topic because in Georgian society there's actually the opposition that supposedly pro EU liberal opposition also does not embrace LGBT rights. Right. Georgia is an incredibly conservative society and you have this very uncomfortable reality that I think is still not widely understood, which is that in countries like Georgia, when the Western governments support NGOs, a small elite minority in the country pushing cultural types legislation, I think it actually alienates part of the population who would otherwise not even engage with this question of LGBT rights. Georgians are very open and accepting people and I think are not. There's no inherent homophobia among the Georgian population. It's just that the government tries to use the cultural question and some of the NGOs also try to use the cultural question for other political ends and it actually kind of foments, I think, hostility in places that would otherwise not be.
- [52:10]
Martin DeCar
This has popped up in other post Soviet Eastern European states. A cultural conservatism that doesn't align with the view from Brussels. So last question, Brian Gigantino about where this is going. So Georgia's Prime Minister Irakli Kobakiche. He is pledging to stamp out the liberal fascism he claimed was fueling the mass anti government protests that have roiled the country since the announcement that the talks to join the EU will be put off until 2028. I'm reading from an article in France 24 here. The Prime Minister has refused to back down in the face of international condemnation, instead escalating a feud with the pro EU opposition groups that are demanding a rerun of the election. Not just the EU issue, the elections in October. The Prime Minister says he wants to stamp out or put an end to liberal fascism in Georgia. He called on parents to protect their kids from the influence of liberal fascist hubs, a reference to the young protesters that have taken to the streets of Tbilisi. So one thing that has brought on international condemnation is the use of force and violence by the police on peaceful protesters. Where do you see this going? Well, only fools try to predict the future, but give it a shot.
- [53:31]
Brian Gigantino
Only fools try to predict the future. I think it's very difficult to say from today where I think this is.
- [53:37]
Martin DeCar
Going well, I guess in the eyes of the west or people anywhere, they want Georgia to join, quote, the west, unquote. But when they see, I mean, of course, police violence isn't unique to Georgia, but when they see things like this, they're concerned, right, that this has taken a more authoritarian turn.
- [53:54]
Brian Gigantino
Right. Let me, let me comment about the police violence a little bit. The police in Georgia have done both, Right. On the one hand, I actually think they've been fairly cautious. If you look at actually the dynamics that are going on right now, where the state is under insane pressure from abroad and internally massive protests every day, they don't crack down on peaceful protests, really. They kind of are fairly reserved. For example, I would argue that the Georgian police in these moments are not necessarily any more aggressive than Western European or American police. I would say, though, they have used excessive force in cases where they're detaining people and then beating them after they're detained and. Right. And that should be condemned, obviously. At the same time, the protests also became very, very radical and militant, and only after they became that way would they try to stop them. So I will never support police violence under any circumstances. So I condemn it 100%. I don't think that it's something morally wrong with protesters being aggressive towards the police. You know, around the world, people have the right to do that if they feel mad. That aside, it's important to keep it in context that, like I don't believe that on the overall, that the Georgian police have acted in a way that really moves away from some of the ways that German, French or American police conduct themselves. Or I don't really know that that should be the thing upon which to claim there's like a new authoritarianism in Georgia. Now, that's just my opinion, because I don't think there really is a new authoritarianism in Georgia. That aside, I also would like to say about the EU question, which is that the Georgian government did not stop its desire to join the European Union. It has simply said that we are going to table domestic discussions about extension talks because the issue has become a destabilizing force inside of the country where every single time the EU leadership meets, there is a new political crisis that emerges, new condemnation. And so in a sense, what they're trying to do, it's a political move move, right? It's like they're trying to basically say, okay, fine, we want to be part of the eu, but we want the EU to engage with us on our terms. That's the whole basis of this entire conflict, which is that, look, we have a nation, we have red lines. We're not going to start conflict with Russia. We want the EU to accept that and deal with us on our terms. And because the EU is fractured, right, There are different positions inside of it. There are actors inside of the EU who understand that and are willing to engage on those terms. And then there are other actors who are not for different reasons. For example, Georgia has close relationship with Orban in Hungary. One of the reasons that they have this relationship is precisely because the Orban government has similar conflicts with Brussels. At the same time, the relationship between the Georgian government and the Baltic states, right, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia have become very tense because in their mind, the only reason Georgia should be in the EU is, is to be an anti Russian proxy. There's a disagreement about the whole posture of the EU that's fracturing the actors on how they relate to the red lines that the Georgian government is trying to assert without being an anti EU state. Right? Because they're not saying we want to join an anti EU coalition. They're saying we want functional neutrality in the war and we want some of our red lines to be protected. Because again, you have to remember, and this is something that I think is important for everybody to remember, joining the European Union is also not simply about democratic reform. It's about economic integration, it's about trade, it's about geopolitics, it's about security it's about all kinds of things. And the context in the south caucus is not the same as in Denmark. This is a completely different set of circumstances. And the question is, is the EU going to be willing to understand that or are they going to keep pressing? And if they keep pressing, my fear is that basically what's going to happen is that they keep pressing. They'll actually see Georgia take a more aggressive stance because they're not going to move on some of these red lines.
- [58:09]
Martin DeCar
In 2014, what sparked the uprising against Yanukovych in Ukraine was that he re nagged on a trade deal with the EU to placate Moscow's concerns. He was under pressure from the Kremlin. I don't think Putin wanted Ukraine to join the eu. Has he laid down a red line, if you will, about Georgia joining the eu?
- [58:30]
Brian Gigantino
No. And I have my own opinion on this. And I'll tell you, first and foremost, it seems pretty clear that the red line is going to be NATO membership in Georgia. That will probably be the longer term red line for Georgia Russia relations. But it's not an issue right now because of the posture of the Georgian state and the fact that the Georgian government has since 2022 especially removed focus on the NATO question. So that's the first part. In terms of the eu, there's two ways to look at this. Why would Russia oppose a state like Georgia being in the eu? Well, I think they would oppose it being in the EU precisely because Georgia and Russia have certain types of trade relationships, certain types of economic relationships that could be undermined by joining the EU Common Market.
- [59:17]
Martin DeCar
And that was the case in Ukraine in 2014. But go ahead.
- [59:21]
Brian Gigantino
So there would have to be certain kinds of negotiations to protect, for example, Georgian wine exports to Russia if Georgia was to actually join the eu. Right. That's like one issue. So the second one is a political one. And it depends on how you understand the Kremlin. Right. There's debates about this. If you think that the Kremlin is set out to basically try and destroy the European Union or is out to to undermine it by any means necessary, well, then you would think that the Russians would do everything they can to try to undermine Georgia's EU membership, but at the same time, in my view, if the EU had a different posture, if you have a state like Hungary which is able to actually kind of bolster, in a sense, the Russians standing inside of a very hostile EU and can actually maintain good relations economically and politically with Russia, my sense is that they would not have a problem with Georgia joining the European Union if certain security and economic conditions were met. And some people disagree with me on this. But in general, that's sort of how I see Russia viewing a state like Georgia, that if they are not a military proxy of the west and if they join the EU under different circumstances, then it would be not a problem. And basically the question is also what is the EU going to become? Because I work from the position that the EU is headed in a direction where it's actually going to maybe transform into some other type of political polity. It's going to become some other type of union. Because it seems to me that the geopolitical orientations, the national political and economic interests of the states are becoming harder and harder to unify.
- [61:06]
Martin DeCar
It's unwieldy. The size.
- [61:07]
Brian Gigantino
It's unwieldy. So when you have states like Poland that have a very different type of geopolitical posture than a state like Hungary or a state like, I don't know, even Italy or France or Spain becomes difficult to know how that can be maintained in the medium to long term, especially when the war in Ukraine ends and we start to see the trickle. In my view, this will happen, the trickle trickle of various corporations, maybe even states, working to rehabilitate ties economically and politically with the Russian Federation.
- [61:45]
Martin DeCar
On the next episode of History as it happens, we're going to turn our focus to the culture wars. We're going to go back to the 1970s and television and Archie Bunker and try to drive, draw a line between past and present Archie Bunker to Donald Trump. That's next. As we report history as it happens. New episodes every Tuesday and Friday. My newsletter every Friday. Sign up at historyasithappens. Com.