Lebanon's Long Agony

Summary

History As It Happens – “Lebanon’s Long Agony”
Host: Martin Di Caro | Guest: Maha Yahya (Director, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center)
Episode Date: May 12, 2026

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Overview

This episode of History As It Happens delves into Lebanon's decades-long turmoil, analyzing the roots and ongoing cycles of violence, political deadlock, and economic catastrophe that have plagued the small Mediterranean nation. Host Martin Di Caro speaks with Maha Yahya, a Beirut-based expert on Lebanon and director of the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, to unpack the legacy of sectarian power-sharing, foreign intervention, and the enduring impacts of groups like the PLO and Hezbollah. The conversation weaves together current events, history, and lived experience—explaining why Lebanon finds itself in perpetual crisis, and what hope, if any, remains for the country's future.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

The Current Situation in Lebanon

• Ceasefire amidst ongoing war: Despite a so-called ceasefire, violence continues with Israeli forces occupying and destroying large swathes of southern Lebanon, while the Lebanese government is overwhelmed by displacement and destruction.

  • Notable quote:
    "There's palpable anxiety, a sense of being stuck between a rock and a hard place. We don't know where this is going to go."
    — Maha Yahya [08:48]

• Mass displacement: Over 1.2 million people displaced—more than 20% of the country's population.

  • “Lebanon is 10,452 square kilometers…one without real palpable defenses in any shape or form.”
    — Maha Yahya [09:10]

• No place to hide, even in the capital: Israeli airstrikes reach even neighborhoods of Beirut, targeting residential buildings and causing hundreds of deaths in a single day.

  • "There was no rhyme or reason to the attacks...Scores of people dead. More than 300 people died that day. Just to get one person. It was terrifying."
    — Maha Yahya [09:59]

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Historical Context: Cycles of Conflict

Sectarian System and Roots of Civil War

• Lebanon’s political structure was set after independence in 1943, dividing power among Maronite Christians (President), Sunni Muslims (Prime Minister), and Shia Muslims (Speaker of Parliament) ([03:04]).
• This system held until the outbreak of civil war in 1975, facilitated by sectarian tensions, weak government control, and the rise of armed non-state actors.
  • "Religious identity rather than national unity was what mattered."
    — Martin Di Caro [03:04]

Civil War Aftermath and Foreign Influence

• Syrian and Israeli invasions, PLO and later Hezbollah as non-state armed actors ([03:56], [11:14]).
• Civil war ended with reforms designed to reduce sectarian gridlock, but these were only partially implemented.
• Syria remained until 2005, Israel until 2000.
• “Foreign interference continued. Israel occupied southern Lebanon until 2000. Syria stayed in the country until 2005.”
  — Martin Di Caro [04:11]

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Comparing the PLO and Hezbollah

• The PLO was a largely non-Lebanese group; after 1982 they could be exiled (“The solution at the time was to exile the PLO to Tunisia.” — Maha Yahya [15:24])
• Hezbollah, rooted in Lebanon’s Shia community, cannot simply be exiled:
  • “You cannot exile Hezbollah. They are Lebanese. This is a Lebanese-grown entity which again grew out of the 1982 Israeli invasion.”
    — Maha Yahya [15:51]
• Key differences: Hezbollah’s deep ties to Iran, the Lebanese army’s current unity, and living memory of civil war make a return to large-scale conflict more daunting for Lebanese society ([12:01]).

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Lebanon’s Paralyzed Political System

Sectarian Power Sharing and Dysfunction

• “The Lebanese state itself does not adopt a single religious identity, but presents itself as a civil state that is equidistant from all religious groups.”
  — Maha Yahya [16:59]

• President must be a Christian Maronite, Speaker of Parliament a Shia Muslim, Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim.

• Parliament is highly fragmented (18 recognized sects), elections held every four years, but politics are dominated by confessional parties ([16:59], [19:32]).

• Hezbollah’s parliamentary presence:

  • “Hezbollah and Amal together have 27 seats. And these are all the Shia seats that are allocated in Parliament.”
    — Maha Yahya [19:32]

Corruption and Economic Collapse

• Political elite accused of “gross mismanagement”—a term echoed repeatedly ([05:17], [22:12]).
• “There’s a certain number of elite making a lot of money at the expense of the rest of the country...Gross inequality.”
  — Maha Yahya [22:12]

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Economic Crisis and Social Trauma

• 2019: Economic collapse triggered by a failed tax proposal on WhatsApp calls; mass protests ensued.
  • “It was a proposed tax by the Minister of Telecommunications...WhatsApp calls are free. You can’t tax them.”
    — Maha Yahya [26:40]
• Lebanon’s Ponzi-like financial system collapsed, with immense impact on ordinary citizens:
  • “You walk down central Beirut, you go to small towns and villages in the north and the south, public spaces, public libraries, municipal areas. People were sitting down and having debates. It was remarkable, the energy at the time.”
    — Maha Yahya [27:13]
• Middle class and civil servants lost their savings due to banking insolvency.
  • “My aunt...retired, collected her pension, put it in the bank—in the blink of an eye, she had no access to her money anymore.”
    — Maha Yahya [32:19]

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Protests, Stymied Change, and Obstacles

• 2019 protests (“Everybody means everybody!”) highlighted shared discontent but lacked a unified, actionable platform.

  • “Everybody was unhappy...But there was no real alternative roadmap...No national political movement emerged...”
    — Maha Yahya [29:16]

• 13 independent MPs elected—significant, but they also lacked policy alignment, limiting their impact ([31:01]).

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Hezbollah’s Calculations and Iranian Influence

• Miscalculation in joining Gaza war:

  • “Their expectation was they open up a front—it would remain a kind of managed conflict...it was meant to be a signal...”
    — Maha Yahya [35:06]
  • “Gross miscalculation.”
    — Maha Yahya [34:57]

• Iranian control:

  • “IRGC literally deployed people to Lebanon to manage the military side of the conflict...That micromanagement continued throughout the past year and a half, since the end of the 2024 conflict.”
    — Maha Yahya [37:28]

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Disarming Hezbollah: Progress and Limits

• After 2024, Lebanese army made progress in establishing operational control south of the Litani River, clearing known weapons depots.

  • “According to them, the army had operational control over the south of the Litani...At least 80 to 85%, if not more, of the big weapons had been removed.”
    — Maha Yahya [37:28]

• Unrealistic international pressure to resolve the issue rapidly. Comparisons made to other prolonged disarmament processes globally ([39:43]).

• Continued Israeli attacks:

  • “Israel did not stop its bombardment, not for a second. There were close to between 10,000 or 15,000 infractions on the part of Israel of the 2024 ceasefire.”
    — Maha Yahya [40:55]

• Growing disgust, even among the Shia community, at Hezbollah’s continued violence:

  • “Who the hell is going to rebuild all that has been destroyed?...There’s a lot of anger and angst today because who the hell is going to rebuild our homes?”
    — Maha Yahya [42:06]
  • “And will you please stop firing rockets?”
    — Martin Di Caro [44:15]

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “People are exhausted in Lebanon. Literally. We just want to live a normal life.”
  — Maha Yahya [12:01]

• “There is very little romanticism about what a militia conflict would do to this country.”
  — Maha Yahya [12:01]

• “When there’s a civil war, there are no winners or losers. Everybody loses. Everyone, without exception.”
  — Maha Yahya [13:31]

• “There was no rhyme or reason to the attacks...Just to get one person. It was terrifying.”
  — Maha Yahya [09:59]

• “The aftermath once. Once the guns fall silent, the aftermath for Lebanon and for Hezbollah is going to be huge. They will have to address questions by their own constituency as to who's going to rebuild our homes, who's going to help us recuperate.”
  — Maha Yahya [44:06]

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Timestamps for Important Segments

• 00:28–02:17 – Audio montage: Arafat, Yahya, DeCaro—framing Lebanon’s cycles of war, civil strife, and foreign interference.
• 06:53–10:45 – Maha Yahya describes daily life in Beirut during ongoing conflict and mass displacement.
• 12:01–16:14 – Comparing today’s crisis with the Civil War era; the evolution from PLO to Hezbollah.
• 16:59–20:34 – Yahya explains the structure and flaws of Lebanon’s sectarian political system.
• 25:49–28:35 – Details on the 2019 economic collapse, Ponzi scheme banking, and mass protests.
• 29:16–32:19 – Why the 2019 protest movement failed to translate into systemic change.
• 35:03–37:28 – Hezbollah’s rationale for joining the Gaza conflict and Iran’s influence.
• 37:28–40:50 – Ceasefire, progress toward disarmament, ongoing Israeli violations, and Hezbollah’s declining popularity.
• 42:06–44:06 – The political isolation of Hezbollah and the challenge of national rebuilding.

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Conclusion

This episode offers a sobering, richly detailed exploration of the roots and realities of Lebanon’s agony. From war and economic meltdown to the complexities of sectarian politics and foreign intervention, Maha Yahya unpacks why Lebanon is caught in this endless crisis—and why easy solutions are impossible. Still, there are signs of hope: a reform-oriented president and prime minister, small but meaningful progress in disarming militias, and a public that—despite exhaustion—remains resilient and demanding of change.

As Yahya powerfully summarizes: “People are exhausted in Lebanon. Literally. We just want to live a normal life.” [12:01]

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Transcript

[Martin DeCaro]

Remember, you can help make history as it Happens sustainable by becoming a subscriber today. You'll get ad free listening, all of our bonus content, and early access to every new episode. Plus, you can say you're supporting the important work we're doing here. Just tap subscribe now in the show notes or go to historyasithappens.com history as it happens May 12, 2026 Lebanon's long agony.

[Yasser Arafat]

The war has lasted 12 months. It has ruined a country and destroyed a nation. What is at stake now in the

[Maha Yahya]

invasion of Lebanon is the future of

[Martin DeCaro]

Lebanon itself

[Yasser Arafat]

could be disastrous and very bad if after seven years of civil war, after so many people killed, to

[Maha Yahya]

go back to the old archaic system.

[Yasser Arafat]

While Syrian troops are said to be massing for a new assault on a strategic Christian stronghold, Hezbollah fired more than 4,000 rockets to Israel, an average of 120 rockets a day.

[Martin DeCaro]

In Israel, it was dubbed the Second Lebanon War.

[Yasser Arafat]

This new bloodshed comes less than 24 hours before a ceasefire is to take effect.

[Maha Yahya]

They accuse their leaders of looting and bankrupting the country, which is in a severe economic crisis. Carried out dozens of airstrikes across Lebanon in the hours following its assassination of Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

[Martin DeCaro]

A small country on the Mediterranean coast of fewer than 6 million people, Lebanon is caught in a hellacious binding between Hezbollah's fanaticism and Israel's destruction. Its people are desperate for a normal life after years of economic mismanagement, political paralysis and gross corruption. How Lebanon got here and where it may go next is next, as we report history as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro.

[Yasser Arafat]

Scenes that the whole world witnessed this past weekend were among the most heartrending in the long nightmare of Lebanon's agony.

[Maha Yahya]

Echoes of 1975 mounting polarization between communities, sectarian tensions, the extent to which regional countries and international entities are involved, the presence of armed non state actors. In 1975, the PLO where today it's Hezbollah.

[Martin DeCaro]

For as long as I can remember, Lebanon has been synonymous with civil war, sectarian hatreds, poverty and misery. Now, that's not the whole picture of any country, but it's what dominates my picture of Lebanon as I speak into this microphone. A ceasefire that really isn't a ceasefire is in place. After Israel invaded in early March, in response to Hezbollah rocket fire, the IDF ordered pretty much everyone south of the Latani river to evacuate and then obliterated dozens of villages. There is nothing for the Lebanese, most of them Shia Muslim, to return to.

[Maha Yahya]

In reality, most of these villages and

[Yasser Arafat]

all of the homes in them have been razed, and Most sit roughly 10 kilometers inside Lebanese territory, a swathe of

[Maha Yahya]

land which Israel is calling its security zone.

[Martin DeCaro]

This brutal war today is part of a long historical pattern whose roots can be traced to Lebanon's independence in 1943, when its new leaders cemented sectarian power. Sharing religious identity rather than national unity was what mattered. Amaronite Christian president, Sunni prime minister and Shia speaker of the parliament. Those were the rules. This system held together until 1975, when tensions exploded into civil war.

[Yasser Arafat]

This was once the richest part of the richest city in the Middle East. Now it's the front line of the war. In the Lebanon, buildings where last year the money makers of the Western world exchanged their millions are now the barricades of Beirut. The war has lasted 12 months. It has ruined a country and destroyed a nation.

[Martin DeCaro]

It lasted 15 years. During it, Syria and Israel invaded.

[Yasser Arafat]

Unless Israel moves quickly and courageously to withdraw, it will find itself ever more deeply involved in problems that are not its own and which it cannot solve.

[Martin DeCaro]

It ended with reforms that were meant to reduce sectarian tensions and gridlock. But they mostly were not implemented and foreign interference continued. Israel occupied southern Lebanon until 2000. Syria stayed in the country until 2005. The following year, Hezbollah guerrillas kidnapped two Israeli soldiers after ambushing an IDF patrol. What followed was ferocious Israeli retaliation lasting 34 days. Hezbollah survived.

[Yasser Arafat]

The Lebanese people were to pay dearly. Israel bombarded Lebanon from air, land and sea. They mounted an air and naval blockade underground invas.

[Martin DeCaro]

Now, after the 2006 war, there was relative calm at the border with northern Israel for the next 17 years, as Lebanon's domestic problems festered and were left untreated. The result was economic collapse and massive protests in 2019. This fractured society defined by sectarian allegiances. But now people united under the Lebanese flag, all pointing the finger at their politicians.

[Maha Yahya]

The leaders are liars. They promised us reforms.

[Martin DeCaro]

According to the World bank, the Lebanon economic crisis ranks among the most severe financial collapses in the world since the mid 19th century. Then in 2020, Covid hit and an explosion at the port of Beirut destroyed parts of the capital.

[Maha Yahya]

Former port worker told the Guardian newspaper he warned for years, years it was a disaster waiting to happen and says nothing was done.

[Martin DeCaro]

The country had scarcely recovered from these calamities when Hezbollah attacked Israel following the hamas atrocities of October 7, 2023, pitching Lebanon and its nearly 6 million people into another war. They didn't want their own central government and armed forces. Having failed to fully disarm Hezbollah, the powerful Iran backed militia and political party that refuses to do normal politics. Now this is a brief and incomplete history of the past 50 years, but it should have us ready to listen to Maha Yaha, the director of the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle east center where she focuses on political violence and identity politics, pluralism, development and social justice after the Arab uprisings. She is an expert on Lebanon. Our conversation next Tap. Subscribe now in the show Notes to skip ads, get all of our bonus content and early access or go to historyasithappens.com to sign up. Mahaya, welcome to the podcast.

[Maha Yahya]

Thank you for having me, Martin.

[Martin DeCaro]

It's great to be with you joining us from Beirut. Before we dive into the questions here, what is it like in the city today?

[Maha Yahya]

On the one hand, there's a very heightened sense of anxiety. Despite a so called ceasefire, the war continues. The destruction in the south of the country is immense. We're talking about scores of villages that have been completely vaporized. There's been a systematic gasification of entire areas in South Lebanon, basically dynamiting villages, throwing phosphorus on agricultural land, places where life used to be and no longer is economic centers eradicated. The Israeli army says it is now controlling something along 60 towns and villages with talking about hundreds of thousands of people whose lives have been uprooted from these towns and villages. And the impact is very felt in Beirut itself, where yesterday there was a targeted assassination in the southern suburbs by Israel traffic and the visible displacement of people who are now sleeping in tents in public spaces across the city. Even though the government has moved very quickly to create shelters for the internally displaced. There's only so much you can do with 1.2 million people and a large number of those may not be able to go back home given the level of destruction in their areas. So there's palpable anxiety, a sense of being stuck between a rock and a hard place. We don't know where this is going to go. We don't know how far Israel is going to maintain its military campaign, how extensive the occupation of Lebanese territory will be, what the future of Lebanon would look like in a scenario like this. And of course, part of this is connected to what's happening in Islamabad with the Iran US negotiations. But at the same time, people are going about their daily lives and people

[Martin DeCaro]

have to remember Lebanon is a small country geographically and population. You mentioned about a million people displaced. The population is what, 5 million?

[Maha Yahya]

Yes, it's about 20%, more than 20% of the population that's been displaced. Lebanon is 10,452 square kilometers. All in all, it's the smallest country in this region. It has more expatriates than actual resident populations. Lebanese expatriates are around the world. And one without real palpable defenses in any shape or form, whether it's an air force, whether it's shelters. I mean, we're in the midst of a conflict and there's nowhere for people to run.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, I mean, I'm just a distant observer, but the Israeli attack the day of the ceasefire, or just as it was supposed to go into effect, that attack was so disturbing, I couldn't stop thinking about it for days. So I can only imagine what it was like for the people where you are in Beirut.

[Maha Yahya]

It was horrific, Martin. I mean, I am in Beirut and it was absolutely horrific. There was no rhyme or reason to the attacks. Entire buildings in areas that were supposed to be relatively safe in the sense that there's no visible military presence for Hezbollah or anyone else in these areas were targeted. And even when the excuse was that there is someone in, you know, there was one building where they said, oh, it's the Secretary General of Hezbollah, of Navin Asim, his nephew was in this building. You don't bring down the building. An entire building, scores of people dead. More than 300 people died that day. Just to get one person. It was terrifying.

[Martin DeCaro]

Thank you for sharing that story because, you know, I've been discussing Lebanon's agony on recent shows in the context of the 1982 Israeli invasion, which took place in the context of a civil war that went from 1975 to 1990, and Lebanon has really never recovered. Do you agree with that? The kinds of problems that are dividing Lebanon today, their origins can be traced to the start of the Civil War in 1975.

[Maha Yahya]

Yes and no. I mean, while we see echoes of 1975, mounting polarization between communities, sectarian tensions, the extent to which regional countries and international entities are involved in the local domestic decision making, the presence of armed non state actors. In 1975, the PLO, where today it's Hezbollah.

[Yasser Arafat]

This was a sad day for Yasser Arafat. He wasn't going to let it show. Before leaving, he went to say his farewells to his most valued friends. And the people of West Beirut came to say goodbye to him. The first call was on Walid Jumblat, the leader of the left wing Muslims in Beirut who've supported him since he brought the PLO headquarters to the city in 1970.

[Maha Yahya]

And there was socioeconomic discontent. A weak central state that did not have monopoly over the use of force. So all of these are similarities, but today it's a different time, it's different circumstances. And maybe the key differences today are a Most Lebanese still remember the civil war either directly because they lived through it or through family trauma. There is very little romanticism about what a militia conflict would do to this country. People are exhausted in Lebanon. Literally. We just want to live a normal life. There is no equivalent to the plo, which was operating at the time semi autonomously. Hezbollah. It's a different dynamic. Hezbollah's role, its regional role, its connections to Iran is quite different structurally, if I may say. The Lebanese army, which split in 1984 as a result of domestic pressures today, remains intact, even though it's under tremendous pressure as an institution. But it remains the one institution that brings the Lebanese together. And there's a lot of trust in the army. And internally, I would say that the same leadership that took part in Lebanon since civil conflict continue to lead the country politically. Three of the principal political leaders themselves were part of Lebanon's civil conflict, and the fourth, which is Hezbollah, while the leadership is not there, but the militia itself, the political party, slash military force, was born out of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, was created in 1904 and came to fruition at that point. Point, I mean, it's gone under a lot of transformations, but that's when it came to be. So it's the same actors. The reason why I mentioned this also is that they also understand what the cost of civil conflict is on everyone. When there's a civil war, there are no winners or losers. Everybody loses. Everyone, without exception. And finally, I would say regional actors today, at least I'm speaking about Syria, which played an important role in Lebanon at the time, but also Saudi Arabia, other Gulf countries, the US would prefer not to have a total collapse in Lebanon with Israel, I'm not so sure, given that some of its actions, and maybe we can talk about this, is fueling and amplifying the tensions on the ground in ways that are very detrimental to Lebanon's recovery, but also to strengthening the central state.

[Martin DeCaro]

When you displace a million people in a small country, that would happen. And there is an echo there to the 1982 calamity where Israeli shelling into southern Lebanon to deal with the PLO displaced a lot of Shia who had moved to the slums of Beirut. That is where Hezbollah originated. But many Lebanese were just sick and tired of the fact that their state, their central government, couldn't deal with the problems in the Southern part of the country. The cross border incursions by both sides, PLO and Israel. But as you pointed out, there is a major difference between the PLO and Hezbollah and that is the PLO were not Lebanese. Hezbollah is a Lebanese militia. Even though, and we'll get to this, many people in the country are sick and tired of their act.

[Maha Yahya]

The solution to the PLO in 1982, after Israel's invasion, which by the way cost Lebanon $20,000 dead, the solution at the time was to exile the PLO to Tunisia.

[Yasser Arafat]

the port, the PLO had prepared a guard of honor and short ceremony to see their chairman off. Some more of their colleagues were going too. But when Mr. Arafat's motorcade arrived, all thought of ceremony was forgotten as his supporters surged forward.

[Maha Yahya]

You cannot exile Hezbollah. They are Lebanese. This is a Lebanese grown entity which again grew out of the 1982 Israeli invasion. The whole narrative of Hezbollah is around the right to resist an occupying army. Israel maintained an occupation in southern Lebanon all the way to the year 2000.

[Martin DeCaro]

So I mentioned that I've spent some time on recent episodes discussing the Israeli Lebanon conflict. But what I hope to accomplish here is to help people understand. Because most people, myself included, don't understand the internal politics of most countries. We see them through the lens of US foreign policy. But as far as what's going on inside a country and the origins of Lebanon's political paralysis that was only recently broken with the election of a new president, the economic crisis, that's what I hope to accomplish here. Explain those dynamics. So maybe it would be wise to start by having you just briefly explain, you know, how does Lebanon's government work? There are 18 recognized confessional groups. The parliament has many, many different parties in it.

[Maha Yahya]

The governance system is based on a power sharing between the major. If you want sectarian groups in the country, as you mentioned, Lebanon has 18 officially recognized religious sects and the state is equidistant from all these groups. So the Lebanese state itself does not adopt a single religious identity, but presents its as a civil state that is equidistant from all religious groups. The power sharing formula that was put in place on the eve of Lebanese independence but then got modified after the end of the civil war effectively says that power sharing will be 50, 50 between Christians and Muslims. But what is important about this is that it says that the Lebanese president can only be a Christian Maronite. This is the only country actually in the region that has a Christian president. The speaker of parliament is a Muslim, Shia and The prime minister is a Sunni. The bulk of power is with the Council of Ministers under the leadership of the prime minister, who has to coordinate with. This is the executive power, who coordinates closely with the president. The president often every two weeks, I think, or every two meetings, he leads the Council of Ministers. That's the executive power. And then you have the speaker of Parliament and parliament as the legislative power. Most of the political parties in the country are represented in parliament. Lebanon is a democracy, a flawed one, but it is a democracy. There are parliamentary elections that happen every four years and the parliament is where voting happens for a president. So it's not a direct vote from the people.

[Martin DeCaro]

And there were years without a president that was recently resolved.

[Maha Yahya]

I mean, we've gone for two years sometimes without a president because there was complete deadlock within parliament on the selection of the president. Often this is also partly because of the involvement of external countries in Lebanon, their influence in Lebanon's domestic affairs via their partners in Lebanon, whether it's Iran and Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia through others, the Americans, I mean, etc. Etc.

[Martin DeCaro]

And Hezbollah has about half, roughly half the seats in Parliament.

[Maha Yahya]

No, no. Hezbollah and Amal have 27 seats out of 128 seats in the. In the government. It's Hezbollah with the Amal movement, which is the other predominantly Shia movement. What is different about the Lebanese political parties? It's not the system, it's the existing political parties, is that there's often an overlap between political and sectarian representation. So Hezbollah and Amal are predominantly Shia. The Lebanese forces is predominantly Christian. The Future movement was predominantly Sunni. The Socialist Party is predominantly Druze. But you'll find in some of them members of other communities. But the leadership very much represents, if you like, a sectarian identity. Hezbollah and amal together have 27 seats. And these are all the Shia seats that are allocated in Parliament.

[Martin DeCaro]

Is Parliament effective? How does day to day governance take place? You know, simple things like picking up the garbage. Wasn't there a garbage crisis in Beirut a few years ago?

[Maha Yahya]

There was one indeed, in 2015, but this is not related to Parliament. Not too long ago there was a garbage crisis. It was called Tul at Rihatkon, which means you smell. It's a reference to the political parties.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, it was more metaphorical, but yeah, I mean, I guess it speaks to how the populace is disgusted with the estab, no matter who we're talking about here. Right. The parties that run the country.

[Maha Yahya]

The disgust is with the political elite, with the leadership, but also with the extent to which the country is being mismanaged. Lebanon is truly, I mean, the way it's governed and the way it has been governed until recently is the alliances that we see, the connections between businesses, political parties and their involvement in the day to day running of the country and access to privileged information, deals that are made. There's a, there's a phrase for it, quid pro quo. Not even a quid pro quo. I'll find the, I'll find the phrase. No, it's basically when you get access to privileged information, you're able to get lucrative businesses with government, for example, garbage collection, with very little either oversight or quite a bit of gerrymandering in the procurement process.

[Martin DeCaro]

Pay to play is one way of putting it. No bid contracts, there's a lot of that in the United States right now. But go ahead.

[Maha Yahya]

Yeah, yeah, something along those lines. There's gross mismanagement, there's quite a bit of corruption, business leaders who are closely affiliated with the political leadership and you end up with a system that is not only paralyzed, there's a certain number of elite making a lot of money at the expense of the rest of the country. So if you look, for example, there was a study on inequality a while back. 10% of Lebanon's elite had more than 40% of its wealth or something along those lines. I mean, it's shocking.

[Martin DeCaro]

Gross inequality is what you're describing there. So what can you tell us about Joseph Aoun? I want to talk about the 2006 war in the 17 years leading up to October 7, 2023. But since we're talking about the leadership right now, what can you tell us about Aun, his background and whether he's effective.

[Maha Yahya]

President Town is the former chief of the army and he was elected president in January of 25. His background is literally as a military person, a military man who also understands. And I think part of the choice was because here is someone who has dealt with the US with many of Lebanon's international partners as chief of the army. He's a well known entity to them had the reputation of being squeaky clean at a time when Lebanon needs someone who's squeaky clean, but also who is understands the security challenges that the country is facing today. The Prime Minister, Nawaf Salaam is a kind of similar background minus the security. He is a former ambassador to the UN, a political scientist, has double PhDs, and the former president of the International Court of Justice, the ICJ in the Hague also has a stellar reputation. No, no hints of skill, scandals around him. And he's someone who comes from a very well known political family, but he himself had not been involved in politics and is not connected to any of the political parties. The selection of those two people gave hope to the Lebanese that, okay, Lebanon was now beginning to move to a new era where reform would be top of the agenda. That's the promise, that reform would be a fundamental pillar. Reform of administration, reform of the security sector, reform of the banking sector, of governance. So at every single level, reform was meant to be a central pillar of this new ruling elite.

[Martin DeCaro]

So back into the history here, Maha. We talked earlier about how Israel occupied southern Lebanon until 2000 and then with withdrew. Hezbollah did not respond to that by saying, okay, mission accomplished. We're done with armed resistance. We're going to just do normal politics now. There was a 2006 war that was provoked by a Hezbollah attack. Israel had a ferocious and brutal response over 34 days. That war ends with a ceasefire. Correct. A UN resolution that Hezbollah was supposed to disarm. It never did. But for that period of 17 years, up until 2023, there is relative quantum calm on the border. Right. But at the same time, Lebanon's internal problems were growing worse, leading to massive demonstrations in 2019. What caused the economic crisis again?

[Maha Yahya]

Mismanagement. What we saw was a Ponzi scheme that was put in place by the central bank governor at the time. It literally was a Ponzi scheme where key bankers and key politicians made a lot of money at the expense of ordinary depositors in the bank. And when the collapse happened in 2019, I mean, it began with we were already seeing signs that the country was moving towards insolvency. It was very clear when a country starts offering banks, start offering 10 and 11 and even 12% interest rates on deposits in order to keep money in the bank. Alarm bells should be going off left, right and center.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, I think the savings rate in the United States is less than 1%. But go ahead.

[Maha Yahya]

We could smell it. We could see that we were moving very fast towards the country's insolvency. The trigger for all of this was something totally almost inconvenience. It was a proposed tax by the Minister of Telecommunications at the time, something that he even mentioned. It wasn't properly discussed in government on WhatsApp calls. Technically you can't even propose. I mean, WhatsApp calls are free. You can't, you can't tax them. But the idea was that there would be a 6 cent or something tax on WhatsApp calls. And people went to the streets and the Demonstrations started, and the rest is history. What was remarkable about these demonstrations or that period was the energy. It really highlighted. And it was an accumulation of years of discontent. Demonstrations in 2011, 2013, 2015, each time under another banner. In 2011 and 2013, as part of the broader Arab Spring movements we were seeing, there was an accumulation. And in 2019, the largest demonstrations we've seen. And across Lebanon, without exception, everything is expensive. We can't. We have to pay the man and the woman, the wife, all they have to work in order to pay to live in a good way. We can't stay like this. The government must do something for the people. It was like the genie came out of the bottle. People were on the streets. I remember the energy during that period. There was a lot of positive energy, the sense of, we're going to be able to make a difference. You walk down central Beirut, you go to small towns and villages in the north and the south, public spaces, public libraries, municipal areas. People were sitting down and having debates. It was remarkable, the energy at the time.

[Martin DeCaro]

And you told another interviewer recently, the great Isaac Chotiner at the New Yorker, that you yourself had big hopes for those protests, but they fizzled out. What happened?

[Maha Yahya]

Well, they fizzled out for a number of reasons. One is Covid hit. This was 2019, early 2020. Lebanon, like the rest of the world, had gone into shutdown. So it was physically impossible to keep the momentum while the spirit, if you like, of the demonstrations remain. The discontent, the reasons why people went to the street, none of this was resolved. But at the same time, we saw two things happening. One was significant pushback in the period when people were on the street by all the political parties, but Primarily Hezbollah. The 2019 demonstrations and the pushback against these demonstrations showed the extent to which all the political parties, even those that hate each other, we're complicit in protecting the system. The way they had all carved out spaces for themselves within Lebanon's institutions where they all had vested interest in protecting this system of power sharing, but also the footholds they had in the country's various institutions, in the ministries, et cetera. No one wanted to give that up. The other, I think, to my mind, was equally crucial, if not even more crucial, is that it was multiple demonstrations under one banner. Everybody was unhappy. The slogan at the time was, which means everybody, means everybody. But there was no real alternative roadmap. There was no sense of, okay, we're all unhappy with the system, then how do we change it? There were various ideas, but no national political movement emerged out of that, that could run in the elections as a national political party and not the sectarian political party, and that could garner votes across the country. There were attempts to do that, but it didn't happen.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, you anticipated my next question. Because the nature of the Lebanese political system, the way power is divided, would seem to make that alternative a very difficult, if not impossible. We talked before about all the different parties in the parliament and the paralysis that ensued.

[Maha Yahya]

I don't think it's impossible. I just think that the way the various, the leadership that emerged during that period, effectively the Lebanese managed to elect 13 parliamentarians who were unaffiliated with any of the political parties. Thirteen, which is significant. This is huge. And had not happened since the end of the civil war. This was a huge accomplishment. But those 13 individuals, they were called the Change MPs at the time, were not elected on a unified platform in the sense where they all shared, at least, for example, even if politically they were not aligned. They weren't even aligned on how to deal with the economic crisis. Lebanon had gone and was still going through a massive economic collapse. They're not aligned on how to deal with the country situation, social challenges. This is a country that went from a 12% extreme poverty rate, around 30% regular poverty rates, to 60% regular poverty rates. The currency was, saw a 97% devaluation. Inflation went up to 200 and something percent. The social impact of the economic crisis

[Martin DeCaro]

was huge, mind boggling figures.

[Maha Yahya]

People lost their savings, their entire savings. I mean, I, I'll just give one example. My aunt, who was a public school teacher all of her life, retired, collected her pension, put it in the bank in the blink of an eye. She had no access to her money anymore.

[Martin DeCaro]

That's traumatizing.

[Maha Yahya]

It's traumatizing. And her story is just a story of scores of civil servants. You're talking about judges who spent their lifetime. And these are people I've met, I know, who spent a lifetime in the system, impeccable reputations, who now live on $200 a month. This is insane. And this is the equivalent of their pension. The eradication of Lebanon's middle class, if you like, amongst the civil servants is very traumatic. Professors at the Marin universities who all of a sudden found themselves going from salaries of thousands of dollars a month to something like $800 a month. And yet there was no, within Parliament, there was no unified vision or at the government level of how to address this and what kind of reforms were needed. We know what kind of reforms are needed. But the intersection between business interests and political interests also in parliament made sure that these reforms never took place.

[Martin DeCaro]

So why did Hezbollah join hamas after the October 7 attacks and fire rockets at Israel? It seems they miscalculated badly, or maybe they did this to provoke an Israeli attack. What can you tell us about the reasons there?

[Maha Yahya]

A year earlier, the former Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah had announced the unity of front strategy which basically brought together, I used to joke and say it was their NATO of sorts. If any of Iran's partners or proxies was attacked, they would all jump to the fore and protect each other. And it brought together basically the popular mobilization forces in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah and Hamas. This was the unity front strategy on the part of Iran. It was part of their forward defense strategy. Should Iran get attacked, these entities were supposed to also step in and defend. When the horrific October 7th attack happened and then the bombardment of Gaza began, the Secretary General or Hezbollah at the time, took the decision that they have to jump into the fray as part of this unity of front strategy.

[Martin DeCaro]

But to accomplish what exactly?

[Maha Yahya]

There was a complete misreading and misunderstanding of the extent to which internally Israeli society had shifted and expectations around what that would mean. My sense is that at the time, their expectation was they open up a front, it would remain a kind of managed conflict, they keep it at the border, they relieve some of the pressure of Hamas and they say, look, we've activated the unity front strategy. At the time, also the Syrian parts of Hezbollah, where Hezbollah had some influence, particularly near the Golan Heights, was the idea that they also would get involved. They never did. So that was the, if you want the logic of this move at the time, gross miscalculation. I think also it was meant to be a signal because if you recall, this was at a time when Iran, at the beginning of the civil war in Syria, Hamas took the step of moving away from Iran and aligning itself with the rebels that were against Syria's president at the time, Bashar Al Assad, who was supported by Iran. So the move to reincorporate Hamas into the fold, if you like, was a signal from Iran to say we have influence not just on Shia, we're not just a Shia driven or an identity based alliance. It includes Shias and Sunnis. And it's about resistance. And for Iran to say, I also have influence in multiple places. I mean, Iranian parliamentarian who came out and was boasting that they had influence at least in at least 4, 4 Arab capitals. Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad and Yemen. Sanaa.

[Martin DeCaro]

So Hezbollah has been under pressure to disarm. And the new president, you argue, actually was making progress on that front until the most recent bout of violence in Israel, now occupying a large part of the country. Even Shia Lebanese had just gotten sick and tired of Hezbollah. What can you tell us about Hezbollah's popularity today and the effort to disarm it by the Lebanese state, which is a very difficult task. It can only go so far on that.

[Maha Yahya]

Right after the assassination of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, the former Secretary General and the heads of the Ridwan forces at the time, Iran went from a macro involvement in Hezbollah's affairs to a micromanagement, particularly of its military arm. Prior to his assassination, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah was Iran's man in Lebanon, but also Iran's man in the region. He had significant trust relation, very good relations with the Houthis, with the Popular Mobilization forces in Iraq. In terms of Hezbollah, what we saw was in the conflict in 2024, IRGC literally deployed people to Lebanon to manage the military side of the conflict at the itself. And that micromanagement continued throughout the past year and a half, since the end of the 2024 conflict. The efforts by the Lebanese president, the army and the government to decommission Hezbollah's weapons south of the Litany, as per the American representation, French, the un, it's the mechanism that was put in place to monitor the ceasefire and to deal with any emerging issues. According to them, the army had operational control over the south of the Litany, that they had dismantled all the known weapon depots, where they had not been able to go was where it was, into private property, but that effectively the army had operational control south of the lithani. At least 80 to 85%, if not more of the big weapons had been removed. And in fact, when the six rockets were fired a month and a half ago, now they were fired north of the litany, not from the south of the litany. The majority of the drones, well, drones is a different story. But the missiles that have come out or the rockets have really come out of the north of the Litany, not the south. I would say that the Lebanese army was doing its job. Job.

[Martin DeCaro]

That's significant.

[Maha Yahya]

That is huge. This comes at a time when, again, the Lebanese government had taken some real historic decisions. Unprecedented. I mean, we never thought that we'd see this in our lifetime, honestly. To decommission and assert the state's monopoly over arms. A decision Taken In August of 2025, they were starting to expand this process beyond the Litania river to the north. So the process was ongoing. The idea that you could achieve this in the space of six months was ludicrous. This is a political party and an armed force that Iran has been invested in building for the past four decades. You're not going to dismantle it in six months. Look at international experience, whether it's in Ireland, whether it's in various countries in South America. These things take time. And you need a military track as well as a political track. They don't happen in the blink of an eye. So there were unrealistic pressures that were being put on the Lebanese government to do this in a very quick manner.

[Martin DeCaro]

And Israel was continuing to attack during this time as well, made life more difficult.

[Maha Yahya]

Israel did not stop. I mean, the ceasefire was announced in 2024. Israel did not stop its bombardment, not for a second. There was a report recently there were close to between 10,000 or 15,000 infractions on the part of Israel of the 2024 ceasefire. Hezbollah did not react during this period. It was rebuilding itself, in a sense, its military capacities. What we're seeing today on the ground and all the arguments of Hezbollah to say that we knew Israel, Israel was going to attack and so we're preempting it. This came after they said we were. We did this to avenge Khamenei. This did not fly with the Lebanese population. Why are we getting involved in a war to avenge a foreign leader? Yes, it's visible on the ground. They don't have the same capacities they had before.

[Martin DeCaro]

Can you see a future for Lebanon where Hezbollah doesn't wield as much power as it had, where it is marginalized politically because it's not just a militia, it's a powerful political party in the Lebanese parliament where it's disarmed. And that could potentially lead the way to Lebanon having a peace treaty with Israel.

[Maha Yahya]

Look, I think that Hezbollah has been politically weakened in the sense that it's very isolated today. It has no allies internally, political allies, so to speak. But what this is doing is it's having a tremendous impact on the shift Shia community. And goes back to your original question about polarization between communities in Lebanon. The community today feels that it is being signaled out and it is being targeted. There is a point where the question of Hezbollah's arms is going to be on the table for discussion. A majority of Lebanese don't want that. There's a lot of anger and angst today because who the hell is going to to rebuild all that has been destroyed? We're talking entire areas that have been destroyed. Is there a future for Hezbollah to turn into a purely political party without the military? Yes. But that requires significant introspection on the part of its local leadership, but also of Iran's interests and involvements in Lebanon. Even for the ceasefire today, the Lebanese government is stuck between a rock and a hard place. It wants a ceasefire, but it cannot deliver on the Lebanese end. Because the decision to go to war was an Iranian decision, an IRGC decision. Hezbollah leadership had given assurances to the Prime Minister, to the President, and to the speaker of Parliament the night before these six rockets were launched that they would not get involved in this conflict. So the decision was not made locally. We knew Israel was preparing a ground invasion. This had been in the press, it had been part of the public, but there was no need to preempt it. And I think this is where a lot of the anger and anguish is coming. The aftermath once. Once the guns fall silent, the aftermath for Lebanon and for Hezbollah is going to be huge. They will have to address questions by their own constituency as to who's going to rebuild our homes, who's going to help us recuperate.

[Martin DeCaro]

Sure. And will you please stop firing rockets?

[Maha Yahya]

Exactly.

[Yasser Arafat]

The legitimate security concerns of neighboring states, including particularly the safety of Israel's northern population, must be provided for. But this is not a difficult task if the political will is there. The Lebanese people must be allowed to chart their own future. They must rely solely on Lebanese armed forces who are willing and able to bring security to their country. They must be allowed to do so, and the sooner the better. I am especially anxious to end the agony of Lebanon because it is both right and in our national interest. But I am also determined to to press ahead on the broader effort to achieve peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The events in Beirut of last week have served only to reinforce my conviction that such a peace is desperately needed and that the initiative we undertook on September 1 is the right way to proceed.

[Martin DeCaro]

On the next episode of History As It Happens, historian Omer Bartov returns to discuss his new book, what Went On Wrong? That is next as we report History as it Happens. Make sure to sign up for my free newsletter. Just go to Substack and search for History As It Happens.