Regime Change: Kennedy and Diem in Vietnam

Summary

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History As It Happens: Regime Change – Kennedy and Diem in Vietnam

Host: Martin DeCaro
Guest: Jack Cheevers, author of Kennedy’s Coup: A White House Plot, a Saigon Murder and America’s Descent into Vietnam
Release Date: May 22, 2026

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Episode Overview

This episode explores the United States’ pivotal role in the 1963 coup against South Vietnam’s President Ngo Dinh Diem, orchestrated during John F. Kennedy’s presidency. Host Martin DeCaro and guest Jack Cheevers dissect the complexities of regime change, using the fall of Diem as a cautionary tale about the unpredictable consequences and enduring temptations of foreign intervention. The conversation relies on new archival research and declassified documents, weaving together the personal, political, and military factors that led to the coup and profoundly shaped American involvement in Vietnam.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Dangers and Temptations of Regime Change

[02:20] Jack Cheevers:

"I think the lesson is that regime change is a very tricky business. It's a dangerous business. Even if you do have a well thought out plan, things can go sideways very quickly."

• Regime change remains a persistent, risky temptation in U.S. foreign policy.
• American policymakers often fail to appreciate the cultural and political complexities of distant nations.

2. Who Was Ngo Dinh Diem?

[11:20] Jack Cheevers:

• Diem: staunch nationalist, anti-communist, ardent Catholic.
• Spent years resisting the French and promoting Vietnamese independence.
• Built significant U.S. connections—met JFK, Supreme Court Justice Douglas, and others.
• Became Prime Minister in 1954 under head of state Bao Dai, then sidelined Bao Dai to consolidate power.

[14:56] Cheevers:

"He was very popular with the South Vietnamese public... He had very high standing with the South Vietnamese people in 1954, 1955, and all the way through the 50s, actually."

3. Religion and the Buddhist Crisis

[15:13–15:33]

• Diem was a Confucian at heart, ruling a Buddhist majority nation (about 70% Buddhist, 10–12% Catholic).
• Tried to be seen as a leader of all, not just Catholics; initially gave support to Buddhist institutions.

[28:16] Jack Cheevers:

• Trigger incident: May 1963, security forces fired upon protesting Buddhists at a radio station, killing eight.
• This sparked widespread outrage among Buddhists, culminating in dramatic protests, including the self-immolation of monks.

[29:42] Cheevers:

"One of [the burning monk] photos... became one of the most famous photographs ever taken ... President Kennedy saw it the next day and exclaimed 'Jesus Christ.' ... And it really damaged Diem's reputation in the United States."

• August 1963: Government raids on pagodas, arresting 1400 monks and nuns—deepened the regime’s crisis and damaged U.S. public support.

4. The U.S. Relationship with Diem

[23:14] Jack Cheevers:

• Despite Diem’s repressiveness, Washington valued his anti-communist stance.
• Early on, he was seen as a modernizer, with significant achievements in the 1950s, but his authoritarianism worsened.

[26:19] Cheevers:

"It’s kind of sad the way the whole thing unraveled... he started to gravitate toward a more authoritarian style of governing."

• Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and sister-in-law, Madame Nhu, were liabilities, contributing to the negative press.

5. Military Failures and Rising Discontent

[18:22] Jack Cheevers:

• Diem targeted Viet Minh "stay-behind" agents, initially with success, but insurgencies persisted and grew.
• Heavy-handed military strategies, slow land reform, and corruption isolated his regime.
• U.S.-equipped Army (ARVN) was built for conventional warfare, not counterinsurgency.

[20:34] Cheevers:

"You couldn't apply conventional tactics to a guerrilla war... they were hitting lots of innocent people, killing innocent people. And then guess what, their relatives... joined the Vietcong to get vengeance."

6. The Kennedy Administration’s Dilemma

[34:01] Cheevers:

• Kennedy admired Diem but became increasingly embarrassed by him, especially as TV and news coverage showed repression and unrest.

The “Green Light” for Coup

[35:53] Cheevers:

"Cable 243, also known as the Green Light Cable... told Lodge to start looking for replacement for Diem, start thinking of ways to get rid of Diem..."

• August 24, 1963: While Kennedy was grieving his son’s death, his team (notably Roger Hillsman) sent a cable to U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to explore leadership alternatives and quietly back a coup by South Vietnamese generals.

[39:24] JFK (Secret Tape):

"I was badly drafted should never have been sent on a Saturday. I should not have given my consent to it without a roundtable conference..."

• The cable went out amid confusion and poor communication; debate within the Kennedy administration (pro- vs. anti-Diem) grew fractious in the weeks that followed.

7. The Coup and Assassination of Diem & Nhu

[42:34] Martin DeCaro:

• Cut-off of economic aid in October 1963—meant as a pressure tactic—was interpreted by coup plotters as a sign the U.S. would not intervene to save Diem.

[44:58] Cheevers:

"I think Kennedy’s people didn’t really devote nearly enough thought to what are the long term consequences of this coup... Not a lot of time and effort was devoted to the big questions of a post coup government."

[46:15] JFK:

"I was shocked by the death of Diem and Nhu. ... While he became increasingly difficult in the last months, nevertheless over a 10 year period he'd held his country together, maintain its independence under very adverse conditions."

• The generals’ coup began Nov 1, 1963; Diem and Nhu were killed the next day, despite Kennedy’s stated wish for their safety.

[47:41] CBS:

“President Diem killed by gunfire, his brother killed by stabbing.”

• After the coup, South Vietnam endured repeated governmental instability without regaining legitimacy.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Jack Cheevers [02:20]:

  “Regime change is a very tricky business. ... It's hard to know in Washington what's going on in another country thousands of miles away with a completely different culture, completely different history.”

• Martin DeCaro [09:36]:

  “Coup’s, regime change. I mean, that's part of a larger pattern, is it not?”

• Jack Cheevers [10:14]:

  “Yeah, I think it's temptation that has faced a lot of American presidents ... We saw that happen in Guatemala in 1954. We saw it happen in Iran in 1953. ... We're seeing it again today.”

• CBS News [05:38]:

  “A struggle of another sort was born in the Buddhist temples of Vietnam. ... They chose a violent and grisly form of protest, suicide by fire...”

• John F. Kennedy [06:02]:

  “In the final analysis, it’s their war. They're the ones who have to win it or lose it. ... But I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort.”

• Jack Cheevers [48:18]:

  “I think the lesson is that regime change is a very tricky business. ... Even if you do have a well thought out plan, things can go sideways very quickly.”

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Timestamps for Key Segments

| Time | Topic | |-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 01:08–02:20 | Introduction; audio clips contextualizing Diem’s presidency and Kennedy’s shifting support | | 11:20–15:33 | Diem’s rise and early legitimacy among South Vietnamese and U.S. | | 18:22–21:57 | Problems with the Viet Minh/Viet Cong and ARVN’s approach to the insurgency | | 28:16–31:20 | The Buddhist crisis, protests, and international outrage | | 33:03–39:39 | Kennedy administration debates, “Green Light” cable, and ambiguity in U.S. policy | | 41:56–44:58 | The cutoff of U.S. aid and South Vietnamese generals’ decision to proceed with a coup | | 44:58–47:57 | The assassination of Diem and Nhu, lack of post-coup planning, and aftermath | | 48:18–49:25 | Reflections: enduring lessons of regime change and contemporary parallels |

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Long-Term Lessons and Contemporary Parallels

[48:18] Jack Cheevers:

“If a president decides to indulge in this thing, beware of history and beware of how these things have gone in the past.”

• Regime change, no matter how “well planned,” is fraught with unforeseen dangers—often creating more instability than existed before.
• U.S. policymakers frequently underestimate the depth of local dynamics and the potential for unintended consequences.
• The Diem episode resonates with current events involving U.S. and Western attempts to influence or topple regimes elsewhere (as noted in references to Iran and others).

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Flow & Tone

• The dialogue is nuanced, sober, and reflective; DeCaro asks pointed, historically grounded questions while Cheevers provides detail-rich, balanced, often candid responses.
• The tone is analytical, not polemical—emphasizing lessons and providing context rather than assigning simple blame.
• The use of historical audio, secret White House tapes, and declassified documents deepens the episode’s investigative, documentary-style quality.

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Summary Takeaways

• The U.S.-backed coup against Diem—intended as a strategy to salvage American aims in Vietnam—precipitated a cycle of instability and deepened U.S. entanglement.
• The episode remains a case study in the perils of regime change, powerfully echoing across decades of U.S. foreign policy.
• Documented confusion, divided policymakers, and the lack of a clear post-coup plan fatally undermined both Diem’s regime and subsequent South Vietnamese governments.
• The story is both a historical deep dive and an urgent reminder of how international interventions can go awry, with lessons that resonate in today’s geopolitics.

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Transcript

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[CBS News Reporter]

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[John F. Kennedy]

I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it's their war.

[CBS News Reporter]

Washington became increasingly concerned that the religious issue would jeopardize new anti communist military campaigns.

[John F. Kennedy]

He's been counted out a number of times. I'm hopeful that he will come to see that they have to re establish their relationship.

[CBS News Reporter]

The only thing they have done, they have barbecued one of their monks all night. The shells had fallen on or near the presidential palace where President Ngo Dinh Diem and his advisor Brother Ngo Dinh Nhu refused to surrender.

[John F. Kennedy]

I was shocked by the death of Diem and Nhu.

[Martin DeCaro]

Ngo Dinh Diem was a Vietnamese nationalist, a Catholic anti communist who had unflinching US Support and in the war against the Viet Cong until that support crumbled as Yem lost control of his country. A coup ensued for which President Kennedy was responsible. After giving a green light. An ultimately reckless gamble to try to save the American cause in Southeast Asia. And a cautionary tale as the US pursues something like regime change in multiple places today. That's next as we report history as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro.

[Jack Cheevers]

I think the lesson is that regime change is a very tricky business. It's a dangerous business. Even if you do have a well thought out plan, things can go sideways very quickly. It's hard to know in Washington what's going on in another country thousands of miles away with a completely different culture, completely different history. A cast of characters that you may not really understand. Their backgrounds and their motives.

[CBS News Reporter]

Services head the parade up Broadway as New York City gives a traditional hero's welcome to Vietnamese President Diem. It's a warm and cordial greeting for President Diem, democratic leader of 11 million South Vietnam people. At City hall, the visiting 56 year old statesman who brought a stable government to the Far east Nation.

[Martin DeCaro]

In mid August 1963, President Kennedy met face to face with his new ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, who is about to head to Saigon. Their conversation secretly recorded on Kennedy's White House taping system. As they went over the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam, the lack of progress in the war, the repression of the Buddhists and the apparently insane behavior of top government figures there. Kennedy suggested it might be time for a change. At the top, listen closely.

[John F. Kennedy]

The time may come. We're going to just have to try to do something about Vietnam. I think that's going to be only critical period. I don't know how well prepared we got for that out there. Who we would sort of support or who we would.

[Martin DeCaro]

That was hard to understand. Here is what Kennedy said to Lodge. The time may come though. We've got to just have to try to do something about Diem. And I think that's going to be an awfully critical period. Oh yes, interjected Lodge, Kennedy continued, I don't know how well prepared you are for that out there or who he would sort of support. And I think that's gonna be key. Your key problem this year. Well yes, if you get rid of President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nu who ran the secret police and Nu's out of control wife Madame Nu, who might replace him was a pretty important detail. Well at this point in time, mid August 1963, Kennedy and some on his national security team still hope Diem could convince his brother and Madame Nu to leave South Vietnam. For a bunch of reasons, including interviews like this one Madame Nu gave to CBS News during a trip to the United States when she mocked the Buddhist monk who self immolated in protest at the autocratic Saigon regime.

[CBS News Reporter]

What have the Buddhist leaders done comparatively? The only thing they have done, they have barbecued one of their monks whom they have intoxicated, whom they have abused the confidence. And even that barbecuing was done not even with self sufficient means because they they use imported gasoline.

[Martin DeCaro]

Following Kennedy's talk with Lodge in Mid August were 10 weeks that changed the course of history. Secret decisions, covert plots, political intrigue and violence, much of it caught on newsreels relayed to the American public like this one from CBS News.

[CBS News Reporter]

A struggle of another sort was born in the Buddhist temples of Vietnam. The country's religious majority claimed oppression by the Catholic minority. They chose a violent and grisly form of protest, suicide by fire, as the

[Martin DeCaro]

President tried to keep American public opinion on his side in a war he wanted South Vietnam to win. As he mentioned to Walter Cronkite in September 1963.

[John F. Kennedy]

I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it's their war. They're the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisors. But they have to win it. The people of Vietnam against the communists. We're prepared to continue to assist them. But I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort. And in my opinion, in the last two months the government has gotten out of touch with the people.

[Martin DeCaro]

It ended in a couple and the murder of two South Vietnamese leaders. November 1, 1963.

[CBS News Reporter]

No one has said officially what happened to the two men who held out there so long. President Diem and his brother and advisor. The story in Saigon is that they escaped from this palace through a tunnel, perhaps dressed as Catholic priests, and then were seized by soldiers three hours later in the Catholic church. President Diem killed by gunfire, his brother killed by stabbing.

[Martin DeCaro]

A couple days later, Kennedy expressed his regret into the Dictaphone.

[John F. Kennedy]

I was shocked by the death of Diem and new I'd met Zim with Justice Douglas many years ago. He was an extraordinary character. While he became increasingly difficult in the last months, nevertheless over a 10 year period he'd held his country together, maintain its independence under very adverse conditions.

[Martin DeCaro]

And Kennedy himself would soon be gone.

[CBS News Reporter]

In Dallas, Texas, three shots were fired at President Kennedy's motorcade in downtown Dallas. The first reports say that President Kennedy has.

[Martin DeCaro]

The demise of Ngo Dinh Diem is dramatically portrayed in the award winning author Jack Cheevers. Kennedy's coup, a White House plot, a Saigon murder and America's descent into Vietnam. Jack Cheevers, welcome to the show.

[Jack Cheevers]

Thanks, Martin. It's a pleasure to be here.

[Martin DeCaro]

Your first time on. We're talking about an old story that has been augmented by a lot of new information. You spent about a decade writing this book, right? And you, you were able to dive into new declassified documents Right, yeah, I did.

[Jack Cheevers]

I filed scores and scores of Freedom of Information requests with all sorts of agencies in Washington. The CIA, the State Department, the National Security Agency. Also had access to an unpublished memoir by one of the. The characters in the book that very helpful in reconstructing certain episodes. And the State Department published a wonderful series of books called Foreign Relations of the United States is made up almost entirely of declassified cables between Washington, the State Department of Washington, the White House and the Saigon Embassy. Also extremely, extremely helpful in reconstructing what happened here.

[Martin DeCaro]

Well, your book is a feat of clarity because at the time people were confused as to what was happening. There was deliberate deception, competing propaganda, rumors, innuendo, lies, what have you. There were major events that caught, say, the U.S. embassy off guard, or the CIA said we didn't see that coming, or no one was quite sure who made the order. So you really had to discern what was true fact from fiction. That's difficult at a distance of a half century, or maybe not. Maybe it's easier with access to the documents.

[Jack Cheevers]

No, you're right. I mean, I think that's a problem with, for all historians is first of all finding the evidence, unlocking the evidence, and then weighing the evidence. You know, is this source a credible source? Is that source a credible source? Is there a preponderance of the evidence? Is the evidence too thin to really make a judgment? That's a problem we always face.

[Martin DeCaro]

And as I read your book, I reflected on current events because coup's regime change. I mean, that's part of a larger pattern, is it not? The coup d'? Tople? No, Dinh d gem. Wouldn't you say that's part of a larger pattern in history?

[Jack Cheevers]

Yeah, I think it's temptation that has faced a lot of American presidents down through the decades. And you can do these things, can pull these coups off. And we saw that happen in Guatemala in 1954. We saw it happen in Iran in 1953. We saw the Kennedys trying to get rid of Castro in the early 60s with Operation Mongoose and the Bay of Pigs. We're seeing it again today.

[Martin DeCaro]

Do you think the coup d' tople diem, which was then followed by more coups inside Vietnam, it took them a while to settle on one ruler. Do you think it's received enough attention?

[CBS News Reporter]

No.

[Jack Cheevers]

I mean, obviously I felt there was a gap there, you know, that I could push a book through. It's something that is always mentioned, at least in passing, in any kind of Vietnam history you read, people devote a few Paragraphs or maybe a couple pages to it. But the more I got into it, the more I researched it, the more I realized that it was really a book unto itself, just a fascinating episode that also helped to set the stage for the major US intervention under Lyndon Johnson in 1965.

[Martin DeCaro]

Now, the problems the US was having with Djem were a symptom or maybe a reflection of a larger problem or crisis. And we're going to get into that now. But let's first begin with who was Ngo Dinh djem? Your portrait of him was fascinating. It was appropriately unsparing. He was an autocrat, and he had a repressive regime. How was he in a position to even become premier in 1954 under the Absent emperor Bao Dai?

[Jack Cheevers]

He was a well known figure in South Vietnam. He was a staunch nationalist. He was a staunch anti communist. He was very ardent Catholic. He'd spent his whole adult life resisting the French, trying to get the French out of Vietnam, trying to get the French to grant full independence to Vietnam. And he'd been in and out of Vietnamese governments at various times in his career. In 1950, he went to the United States and lived in the United States for a couple of years. And in the process met a number of people who were either very prominent at the time or who would become very prominent, including a young congressman named John F. Kennedy, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, Senator Mike Mansfield from Montana. And he promoted the idea that the United States should start giving aid directly to the Vietnamese government, rather than the French colonial government. And that went over very well in Washington. You know, he made contacts in Catholic circles in Washington. In 1954, when he became prime minister. Minister and really rose to power, Bao Dai was serving as the. The head of state. And so Zim was one level below him as prime minister. And I think Bao Dai realized that he needed Zam's help. 1954 was a very pivotal year in Vietnam. It was the year that the French finally conceded defeat to the Vietnam Communist guerrilla army that was led by Ho Chi Minh. They were exhausted. They wanted to get out of Vietnam. They'd ruled it as a colony for almost a century at that point. Their army was fully withdrawn. By 1956, the Star is raised over

[CBS News Reporter]

Hanoi, capital city of the new communist state. As the tide of tyranny surges southward and the people, young and old, make ready to greet the victorious Red armies. The conquerors come with promises of peace and no new aggression against the South.

[Jack Cheevers]

And I think Bao Dai realized that he needed some outside help in resisting Ho Chi Minh. Another thing that happened in 1954 was an international conference at Geneva that resulted in a ceasefire between the French and the Viet Minh. It also partitioned the country into north and South. Ho Chi Minh wound up as the leader of North Vietnam, and Bao Dai and Diem wound up as the leaders of South Vietnam. And I think Bao Dai understood that, you know, he was going to face ongoing aggression from Ho Chi Minh. Ho Chi Minh was very dedicated to reunifying the country under his communist leadership. And they needed a replacement for the French. Diem presented a wonderful opportunity. With his American contacts, they could reach out to the. To the US government and say, please come here. The French are leaving. We need your help. And I think that's what Diem's major utility was for Bao Dai. And that's why Bao Dai appointed him as prime minister.

[Martin DeCaro]

And Diem would eventually sideline Bao Dai and become head of state and head of government. But when he becomes president, prime minister in 1954, as you say, he was necessary in the eyes of Bao Dai. He was a playboy who was living in France, wasn't he? And he really had no real connection to the people. Did Diem have a connection to the South Vietnamese? Because we have to point out there's no such thing as South Vietnam or North Vietnam. Those are inventions on a map. In 1954, at the end of the French war, the Viet Minh had actually controlled a lot more of the country, but they only got half of it. And there was an agreement to hold elections in a couple of years that DJEM ultimately backed out of. I think the United States was on board with that decision, too, because they understood Ho Chi Minh would win an election. They didn't want to have a Communist Vietnam. So back to my question, Jack. Did Diem have public legitimacy even at this early stage?

[Jack Cheevers]

Yeah, he was very popular with the South Vietnamese public. You know, as I mentioned earlier, he was a very strong nationalist. The Catholic population certainly knew him very well. He had very high standing with the South Vietnamese people in 1954, 1955, and all the way through the 50s, actually.

[Martin DeCaro]

Well, even though he was a Catholic in a majority Buddhist country, he wasn't an ideologue. He wasn't discriminatory or bigoted against Buddhists. And we'll get to the Buddhist crisis. That really was the beginning of the end for him. He wasn't entirely fair either. But he wasn't bigoted against Buddhist. He saw himself as a Confucian more than anything. Right.

[Jack Cheevers]

And he declared this publicly that he saw Himself as. As the leader of all the South Vietnamese people, not just the Catholic South Vietnamese people. At the time, the Buddhists were by far the biggest majority in South Vietnam. At least 70% of the population identified at least nominally as Buddhists. Maybe 10 to 12% of the people identified as Catholics. Sam obviously understood that he was in, you know, in charge of a majority Buddhist country, and he tried to work with the Buddhists in. In the 50s. He gave financial support to the Buddhists so that they could build pagodas and schools. He resisted putting too much Catholic wordage into the Vietnamese constitution at the. At the expense of the Buddhists. He never displayed any. Any bigotry toward them. As you mentioned, he was a Confucian, which is a code of ethics that focuses on loyalty to family and subordination of individual rights for the collective welfare. He very much wanted to move South Vietnam into the modern age, and he knew that he couldn't do that without the Buddhists.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah. And his brother tried to introduce this idea called personalism, which really never caught on. It's a strange political philosophy. We don't really have to get into it here, because I don't think most people even subscribe to it. But didn't most South Vietnamese people want their new government to move toward a representative form of government?

[Jack Cheevers]

Absolutely. And that's how Diem was able to replace Bao Dai as president in 1954.

[Martin DeCaro]

But that referendum was rigged. Wasn't.

[Jack Cheevers]

Was a very interesting election, let's put it that way. I mean, as you mentioned, Bao Dai was sort of an absentee ruler at the time. He was hanging out in Cannes on the French Riviera and living. Living the life, you know, going to casinos and so forth. And he never even bothered to come to South Vietnam to campaign. And, you know, in his own favor, that left the door wide open for Xiamen, his brother Nhu to say anything they wanted. I mean, they painted him as, you know, an absentee ruler. They painted him as a, you know, somebody who basically devoted his life to his own pleasures and sensuality. Diem managed to oust him as president, as chief of state and take over the government in 1955.

[Martin DeCaro]

So it would have been difficult for Diem if no war had restarted to rebuild Vietnam. He wanted to modernize Vietnam, and he was going to get American aid to do this right. He. He would have had a tough job had no war resumed, which it did. There was supposed to be a truce. An international control commission from North Vietnam guerrillas started to infiltrate the south again. But we should also point out that the revolt or the insurgency was indigenous as well. Was it heavy handedness on the part of the Diem regime that alienated peasants in South Vietnam, or is it the other way around? Because this is where he starts to get into trouble.

[Jack Cheevers]

Ho Chi Minh had been fighting the French since 1946. And his organization, his army, the Viet Minh, was throughout the country. When the Geneva Accords took place in 54. Part of the deal was that the Viet Minh cadre and their families would migrate north under Ho Chi Minh's government. But there are several thousand of them who remained as stay behind agents. And their mission was to subvert the Diem government and as you mentioned, pave the way for the elections in 1956. And Diem recognized that them as, as a danger. And he went after them very seriously with his army and police and managed to capture or imprison or kill most of them by the end of the 50s. But there was still a small group of them and they were, you know, facing extinction. They started to fight back and they formed guerrilla bands in the countryside and they started to take on South Vietnamese army outposts in the, in the boonies and, and overrun them and scoop up their weapons. And over time they managed to expand to, they became better armed. They were taking advantage of various flaws with SEM's government. His land reform program, for one thing, was very slow, didn't benefit a lot of people. The Viet Minh, who were the predecessors of the Viet Cong, would just seize land and give it to the peasants, no strings attached. Diem wanted to sell the land to the peasants. So which is the better deal there? So gradually the insurgency grew to the point where Diem went to President Kennedy in 1961 and said, I really need your help in fighting these people.

[Martin DeCaro]

And the US began to send advisors. That total reached about 16,600 on the eve of Kennedy's assassination later in 63, November of 63. But earlier than this, the ARVN, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, which was the South Vietnamese army, heavy handed, counterproductive, abusive in South Vietnam, that alienated the peasantry. And they weren't very good at fighting the Viet Cong itself. You do point out that the army was capable of winning battles when properly motivated and taking on the right tactics. That didn't happen very often. And Diem seemed incapable of getting the army to fight the insurgency correctly.

[Jack Cheevers]

Yeah, and ARVN is a very interesting organization. It was very, very profoundly shaped by the US Army. American strategists in the 1950s thought that the biggest threat to South Vietnam was an invasion from the north. So they helped build ARVN as a very conventional military force. It was structured very closely along the same lines as the US Army. The idea was that Ho Chi Minh came, you know, if you cross the 17th parallel in an invasion, US forces could link up smoothly with the ARVN and try to push him back. The Korean model, basically. So you had a very conventional military organization trying to fight a very unconventional army in, in the Viet Minh, which morphed into the Viet Cong by the early 60s. You couldn't apply conventional tactics to a guerrilla war. As you mentioned, ARVIN was very heavy handed. You know, they would march into an area and if, if they ran out of food, they'd start stealing, you know, ducks and chickens from the peasants. And they sometimes use the peasants as human shields. When they were going into an army that they thought, an area that they thought was booby trapped by the Viet Cong, they would start shelling a village from miles away, not knowing who they were hit. And of course they were hitting lots of innocent people, killing innocent people. And then guess what, their relatives, you know, joined the Vietnam to get vengeance.

[Martin DeCaro]

And also JEM started to promote generals who were good at avoiding combat because that would keep casualty numbers down.

[Jack Cheevers]

Right. He was always concerned that there'd be a mutiny in the army and the army would come after him. And so he always promoted people that he really believed in their loyalty. A lot of Catholics were promoted. That was one of the major objections of the generals who overthrew him, that he was promoting people not on the basis of merit, but on the basis of a political litmus test.

[Martin DeCaro]

And the reason I'm going over all these items is because I want our listeners to understand or set the stage for them as to why the US then started to sour on gem during the Kennedy administration. But for the 1950s, Eisenhower in the early Kennedy years, insofar as Kennedy was paying attention to Vietnam early on in his presidency, he really wasn't every day. But in those early years of the Diem regime, despite his repressiveness, chucking people in jail, silencing dissidents, censoring the press, despite all that, because of his anti communist credentials, he was still getting positive press in the United States. And his US backers, again, beginning with Eisenhower, hoped right, hoped that he would straighten himself out, make the necessary domestic reforms and fight an effective war against the Viet Cong. They believed in him.

[Jack Cheevers]

Yeah, they did. And they, they saw him making genuine progress in South Vietnam. I mean, South Vietnam was a mess after the French left There'd been a lot of devastation as a result of the war. You know, bridges were knocked out, roads were torn up. Schools had been blown up. Canals were clogged with debris. Farmlands had been abandoned by their owners. A lot of people in the United States didn't think that Diem's government would last more than six months. But he proved the naysayers wrong and pulled the country together. He had. He started out with virtually no money in his treasury. He started out with a very small, untested army. But he got the country moving again. He had the economy moving. Rice production soared. Fisheries output increased. He started rebuilding the education system. He introduced modern agricultural methods. He opened universities in Saigon and Hue. He Zim was very intent on pulling South Vietnam into the modern era. He had a program for industrializing the country. In 1963 with US aid. He actually had a nuclear research reactor going in South Vietnam. I think he understood where he wanted to go. He wanted to modernize the country. And I think that he genuinely wanted to introduce democracy, but at a very, very slow pace, because he was afraid that if he opened the door too quickly, the communists would use that to subvert his government. You know, ultimately he might have. Have moved in the same direction that South Korea did in the. In the 60s. I mean, South Korea, there was a military takeover by General park, who later dropped his military uniform and ran for president as a. As a civilian. South Korea became a very strong democracy and an economic powerhouse. And I think the same thing might have happened in Vietnam. Who knows? I mean, that's pure speculation, but Diem wanted to go in that direction.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, that's interesting, because during the Cold War, as you point out, the United States was never bashful about backing autocrats as long as they were on our side. Side against the Communists. I'm not sure Eisenhower or Kennedy believed Zhem would turn into Thomas Jefferson, but they seem to want more from him than other dictators. I don't know. The press coverage people were able to see very clearly what was going on in South Vietnam. The crackdown on the Buddhists even before that, the political prisoners, the censoring of the press. And we have to point out Diem's brother Nuke and his wife, Madame Nhu, were serious liabilities when it came to positive publicity in the United States. Madame Nhu is mocking the Buddhists and saying a lot of other horrible things about people in interviews on television.

[CBS News Reporter]

What have the Buddhist leaders done comparatively? The only thing they have done, they have barbecued one of the. Their monks whom they have intoxicated whom they have abused the confidence. And even that barbecuing was done not even with self sufficient means because they, they use imported gasoline.

[Jack Cheevers]

It kind of sad the way the whole thing unraveled because he was doing very well in the, in the 50s. Unfortunately, he started to gravitate toward a, a more authoritarian style of governing. I mean, as you mentioned, he was shutting down newspapers and in jailing dissidents and torturing people in prison. Those tendencies got worse over time. You know, for all his strengths, the strengths of his personality, he had some pretty serious flaws too. He was very stubborn, took advice only from a very small circle of people, most of whom were family members like New and Madame Knew. He seemed constitutionally unable to delegate authority to the point where he would review individual passport applications.

[Martin DeCaro]

There seemed to be some personal insecurity there. And then loyalty, as you say, to his family, his brother and his sister in law were counterproductive to say the least. You know, they shared his view though. I mean, he could have fired them or gotten rid of them or sent them packing to ambassadors, some distant country like Egypt, right, something like that. So let's talk then about the Buddhist crisis because really two things happen that sour the Kennedy administration on Diem. One, the prosecution of the war which we've discussed was not going well. The strategic Hamlet program, which was supported by the United States also was counterproductive. But on the home front, the Buddhists. So as you point out in the book, there was not systematic persecution by the regime of the Buddhists. However, there was discrimination or favoritism. And then there was an incident. Government forces, or was it the police, open fire on Buddhists who are protesting outside a radio station over the flag. A flag ban. You weren't allowed to fly the Buddhist flag or any other flag other than the South Vietnamese national flag. On certain days, whatever the cause, bunch of Buddhists get shot down and killed. I think it was nine fatalities, right? And this was an opportunity for Dzhem to do the right thing. Apologize, make amends, prosecute the people who pulled the trigger.

[Jack Cheevers]

This was an incident that took place in May of 63 diem. Security forces, who were basically police and militiamen, went out to a radio station, a government radio station, where several thousand Buddhist protesters were. They were demanding that the radio station broadcast a commemorative program marking the Buddha's birthday. And the station manager refused. The protesters refused to leave. Security forces moved in, opened fire and wound up killing eight people. That just enraged the Buddhists. And the following month there was an even more Momentous event. Several hundred Buddhist monks and nuns marched into an intersection in Saigon. An elderly monk came out, sat in the middle of this human circle which was blocking all traffic. A couple of other monks came out with gasoline cans, poured the gasoline over his head. They stepped back, he dropped a match in his lap and went up as a human torch.

[CBS News Reporter]

Buddhist monks and nuns are joined by thousands of symbols to protest the government's restrictions on the practice of their religion. In South Vietnam, 70% of the population is Buddhist. And the demonstrators clashed with the police again and again during the week long series of incidents like this. The government retaliated by closing temples and forbidding the display of the Buddhist flag. This in turn led to further demonstrations. Monks pray at the spot where one priest set himself a fire in protest.

[Jack Cheevers]

And there was an American newsman there that day, Malcolm Brown of the Associated Press. He started taking pictures of this. And one of his photos in particular, which was titled the Burning Monk, became one of the most famous photographs ever taken. News photographs ever taken. It was printed in magazines and newspapers around the world. President Kennedy saw it the next day and, and exclaimed Jesus Christ. And I think a lot of Americans shared that reaction. Americans had never seen such a, such a spectacle before where an old man set himself on fire as a form of political protest. And it really damaged Zim's reputation in the United States because people started thinking of him as a religious bigot, which I think was a huge exaggeration of his actual views. But it was easy to look at him that way. I mean, why would this, this elderly monk set himself on fire to protest this guy if he wasn't the worst, most oppressive tyrant you can imagine? The final Trump really came in August of 63, when protests had grown to the point that Zimmen knew viewed them as a national security threat. They decided that they wanted to stamp out the Buddhist movement completely. So they sent their police and army into pagodas all over the country, into Saigon and Hue and Da Nang, and wound up arresting 1400 monks and nuns, putting them in jail. And they thought, great, we finally put this thing down. But of course, that only reinforced Diem's image as a religious bigot in the rest of the world. People couldn't believe that he had cracked down on a religious minority in his own country that way. You know, that set a number of things in motion in Washington which eventually resulted in the coup.

[Martin DeCaro]

The conversation continues. Tap subscribe now in the show Notes to skip ads, get early access and enjoy all of our bonus content or go to historyasithappens.com. Discover Top rated stays Loved by guests

[Jack Cheevers]

Rated highest by real guests through authentic reviews Verbo Book a vacation rental Loved

[Martin DeCaro]

by guests Save on family essentials at Safeway and Albertsons this week at Safeway and Albertsons enjoy eight piece double breaded famous chicken fried or baked dark meat featuring four legs and four thighs for just $5.99 each. Member price available in the deli and sweet red cherries are $2.97 per pound limit 6 pounds. Member price with digital coupon plus 24 ounce selected varieties of fresh cut fruit bowls are $5 each. Visit safeway or albertsons.com for more deals and ways to save in a short period of time the shooting outside the radio station, eight dead. That was in May. The crackdown, the arrests of thousands of people was in mid to late August of 1963. During this critical few months, May through August, the entire time, American officials in Washington and Saigon, right, are pleading with Zhem, just give the Buddhists what they want. So every day the Buddhists are out in the street making demands. They had a list of five demands. They weren't unreasonable. Why didn't DJEM just give them what they wanted?

[Jack Cheevers]

I think for a couple reasons. I think one of them is rooted in his personality and his stubbornness. He wasn't the sort of person who was gonna back down in the face of pressure. He'd resisted pressure from the French, he'd resisted pressure from Washington in the past, and he was going to resist pressure internally as well. The other thing is I think that he was worried that if he did give in to the Buddhist demands, that would open the door to other dissident groups coming to him with their own list of demands and the whole situation would just spiral out of control. So he resorted to a tactic that he had found useful in the past, which was using force against the protesters. And that's what led to the pagoda raids in August.

[Martin DeCaro]

So there are now pro and anti gem factions within the US Government during this period of time. July, August and we will now discuss the Aug. 15 meeting in the White House. Kennedy and his secret tapes talking to Henry Cabot Lodge. What's Kennedy's mindset during this period?

[Jack Cheevers]

Kennedy started out as pro Jim in the in the 50s. He liked Zim. He admired Zim. Zam was a fellow Catholic head of state. He admired the fact that Zim had pulled South Vietnam together under extremely difficult circumstances. He had started supplying a massive amount of U.S. aid, economic and military aid to South Vietnam in response to Diem's plea in 1961. But by 63, Diem had become a pretty serious political embarrassment to the White House. Kennedy was always very sensitive to the way religion factored into politics. As the first Catholic, Catholic president.

[Martin DeCaro]

War is not going well either, and

[Jack Cheevers]

the war is not going particularly well, even with the infusion of modern US weapons and so forth. Kennedy started to think that the Diem government might be in its terminal phase. And as he mentioned to Henry Cabot Lodge in this meeting, we might have to do something about Diem. Was boy told Lodge, what.

[Martin DeCaro]

So this is the issue here, and you do a great job of this in the book, really focusing in on the ambiguity or the lack of clarity in Kennedy's instructions and other instructions that were made by key figures. And so there's this meeting mid August. It's actually August 15, 1963. Lodge is about to go to Saigon, where Kennedy says, you might have to do something about djem. But the key is finding out who might take over for him. They're also musing about whether Madame Nu might be a lesbian, or maybe we can just get rid of her and her husband. If Diem agrees to exile his family, who he's relying on, then maybe it'll work out for him. So it's not quite clear yet. They want to get rid of Zhem. They're hoping he'll finally do what they're asking. There's a cable that goes out. Lodge is now in Saigon. This is like a week later. Cable 243, you say? This is one of the most important diplomatic cables in American history. Pick it up from there.

[Jack Cheevers]

Cable243, also known as the Green Light Cable. And it was drafted by one of Zim's most serious antagonists in Washington, a man by the name of Roger Hillsman, who was the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs at the time. He felt that the Diem government was just. It was just falling apart. It was a big embarrassment to the Kennedy administration, and Zim really had to go. So he sat down and drafted a set of instructions to Cabot Lodge, who, by the way, had been in Saigon all of two days at that point. And the bottom line was that Hillsman told Lodge to start looking for replacement for zm, start thinking of ways to get rid of Diem, also to reach out to Diem's own generals, who, by the way, were plotting against him already at that point, and tell them that if ZM's government just happened to collapse overnight and they just happened to take over the US would continue to give full military and economic support to the generals. It's drafted in Washington. This is. This is August 24th on a Saturday, you know, in deep summer in Washington. Most people are out of town. They're either on vacation or they're. There's elsewhere. Kennedy himself was up in Cape Cod with his family. His, his little son Patrick had just died after just a couple of days of life in the Boston hospital. So the family's in mourning. Cable goes up the line to Kennedy and he starts reaching out to his senior advisors for, you know, what do I do about this thing? And most of them were unreachable that day. Robert McNamara, the defense secretary, was mountaineering in the Grand Tetons in Wyoming. Dean Rusk was in New York attending a Yankees game and attending meetings at the United Nations. John McCone was yachting in Puget Sound, so forth and so on. Kenny finally got hold of one of his Under Secretaries of State, George Ball, and said, what do you think of this, George? And Ball came back and said, I think this is okay if we send this, Mr. President. So the cable goes out that night, Saturday night, and Lodge was completely on board with getting rid of. Of Diem. So he immediately started reaching out to the generals at that point.

[Martin DeCaro]

This is extraordinary. Roger Hillsman was an Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs. He basically rams this through. And as you say, Kennedy's mind was not entirely on Vietnam. His prematurely born son had just died. Hillsman also was a little dishonest too, Right. About who he claimed agreed to going ahead with this cable on a Saturday.

[Jack Cheevers]

Yeah. And some of the people that he claimed had signed off and approved the cable later came and said they felt they'd been hustled. The CIA in particular felt that it had never been consulted on the cable. So, yeah, he came in for a fair amount of criticism later.

[Martin DeCaro]

There were generals, as you mentioned, who wanted to get rid of Diem. They were about to attempt a coup, or remind me, did they actually try it? But it falls apart, so nothing actually happens.

[Jack Cheevers]

In August, the generals were plotting against Diem. They had their own set of grievances. They felt that the war was being lost under his leadership. They felt that he was meddling too much in military matters, for instance, promoting people based on political loyalty rather than military merit. They were actively trying to get rid of him. And there was an abortive coup in August. They felt that they just didn't have the strength to overwhelm Zemp's loyalist forces at that point. But Kennedy quickly realized that the, the cable was a mistake. It had been hastily drafted. It hadn't received nearly as much, you know, top level review within the government as it should have.

[John F. Kennedy]

Period. In my judgment, that why I was badly drafted should never have been sent on a Saturday. I should not have given my consent to it without a roundtable conference in which mcnamara and taylor could have presented their views.

[Jack Cheevers]

But he didn't rescind it. He, at no point did he rescind it, okay? And he called his, his senior leaders together at the white house the following Monday to go over the cable and to go over zm and so forth. And I think you mentioned earlier that the advisors divided into two pretty bitterly opposed camps, the prozeum camp and the anti zam camp. The pro people felt he was doing a good job, that they thought he was winning the war. They thought that the strategic hamlet program was working. They wanted him left in place. Despite what was happening with the buddhists, the khan people thought that he was losing the war. He was too unpopular and weak to sustain his government and that he didn't deserve u. S. Aid anymore. So they wanted him gotten rid of. The two camps became very antagonistic, very bitter. There were the debates over this thing went on for weeks and weeks and weeks. People were yelling at each other in these white house meetings. At one point, one of them said to another one, shut up, shut up. We've heard enough. We've heard enough from you already. You've already stated your case. We don't need to hear any more from you. And the debates went all the way through the fall, right up until the day of the coup.

[Martin DeCaro]

But despite these disagreements, pretty much everyone is on board with trying to save the american project in south vietnam. I mean, kennedy made this point in an interview with Walter Cronkite on September 2, 1963. We're not getting out of vietnam, he said publicly, even though covertly he's thinking about getting rid of diem.

[John F. Kennedy]

These people who say that we ought to withdraw from Vietnam are wholly wrong. Because if we withdrew from Vietnam, the communists would control vietnam. Pretty soon, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Malaya would go, and all of southeast asia would be under the control of the communists and under the domination of the chinese. Then India, Burma would be the next target. So I think we should stay. We should make it clear, as ambassador lodge is now making it clear, that while we want to help, we don't see a successful ending to this war unless the people will support it. And the people will not support the effort if the government continues to follow the policy of the past two months.

[Martin DeCaro]

So then in November, there's a critically important decision that often gets overlooked in this story. The Kennedy administration cuts off some aid to South Vietnam. That could be seen as, you know, a pressure point to get Diem to do what they want. But the generals take that as a signal that the US Is giving up on. Jim.

[Jack Cheevers]

The US Cut off what was known as the Commercial Import Program, and it was the main pipeline for sending economic aid to South Vietnam. And it was done without Kennedy's knowledge or permission. Interestingly, there were people in the State Department who felt that the situation had become so embarrassing to the US that they kind of, on their own authority, cut off US Aid. And when Kennedy heard about it, he thought, oh, my God, there's nothing we can do about this. It's a done deal. And, of course, the press quickly found out about it. Actually took place in October. October. And, yeah, you're right. I mean, the idea was to pressure Diem into making the reforms that the US wanted.

[Martin DeCaro]

But the generals took it as a sign that they can go and get rid of jem. Talking about the South Vietnamese generals, that this was their moment.

[Jack Cheevers]

Right? I mean, they had asked the US Government to do that. They had said they wanted a sign from the US Government, from Washington that Washington was actually behind their coup. And inadvertently, they received that signal.

[Martin DeCaro]

What's your answer to how badly Kennedy handled all of this?

[Jack Cheevers]

It wasn't Kennedy's finest hour, let's just put it that way. I mean, I think overall, Kennedy was a pretty good president. He had managed other crises pretty well. I think he would have made a lot more progress had he been reelected in 1964. He didn't handle this very well. He never really came to a complete decision. You know, was he for the coup? Was he against the coup? He saw some value in getting rid of Diem, certainly, but he wasn't convinced it was the right thing to do. Some of his advisors were very strongly arguing that it was exactly the wrong thing to do. You know, as a master politician, he tried to keep his options open as long as he could. So even on the eve of the coup, he was cabling Henry Cabot Lodge, saying that. That he wanted to reserve the right to cancel the coup at any time. And Lodge, who I think had a much more pragmatic view of the situation on the ground, cabled back and said, you know, Mr. President, I'm afraid you're not going to have that power. This is a Vietnamese operation. The generals have planned this very carefully. They've calculated their chances very carefully. And if this thing fails, they could easily wind up at the end of a rope or with a bullet in the back of their heads. So they're going to be the ones to give the go signal, not you, Mr. President. And of course that's what happened. The generals did decide to move forward with the coup.

[Martin DeCaro]

I think listeners can draw parallels to this situation to any number of other US foreign policy fiascos. So Dong Van Minh becomes the new leader. Well, he was the leader of the Revolutionary Military Committee of the dissident generals who got rid of djem on November 1st. That's the date of the coup. Min does not last very long. He's overthrown in a bloodless coup by a different general in January 1964. How carefully did the anti djem faction weigh the possibility that there'd be even more chaos, things would get worse without djem? That's part one of the question. Part two is, should Kennedy have anticipated that Jem and his brother would be murdered?

[Jack Cheevers]

I think Kennedy's people didn't really devote nearly enough thought to what are the long term consequences of this coup. A lot of the debates within the White House were secretly taped by Kennedy. He had installed a taping system, the Secret Service had put it into the White House and he had microphones in the Oval Office and in a cabinet room with a lot of these debates took place. A lot of the tapes have been declassified. They're at the Kennedy Library in Boston. You can call them up on your laptop and listen to them and they're fascinating. And one of the things that really struck me was how little time and effort was devoted to the big questions of a post coup government. Who was going to run that government? Was the government going to be any more inclined to make the democratic reforms that Washington had been pushing for years? Was the new government going to be any better at prosecuting the war against the Vietcong? Those kind of issues are to me incredibly obvious. But when you listen to these debates, not a lot of thought and discussion is devoted to them on the issue of Zim's murder. I think Kennedy was genuinely shocked and appalled that that Zim had been murdered. At one point during these deliberations, he told his advisors that he didn't want any harm to come to Zim and his brother Nu.

[John F. Kennedy]

I was shocked by the death of Zim and Nu. I'd met Zim with Justice Douglas many years ago. He was a extraordinary character. While he became increasingly difficult in the last months, nevertheless, over a 10 year period he'd held his country together, but

[Jack Cheevers]

at the same time, there was no firm plan in place to get Diem out of the country and into exile in one piece. If a coup went down, I'm not sure Diem, as a lifelong nationalist, would have run. I don't think he would have run even if there had been such a plan. But he was murdered on the orders of the general. You mentioned Dong Bin Minh, more popularly known as Big Min because he stood about 6ft tall, much bigger than the average Vietnamese. I think his fear was that if Diem and Nu were allowed to escape, they would come back at some point with some sort of a counter revolutionary movement. So he thought maybe it was easier and cleaner just to get rid of them, just to liquidate them on the spot. And that's what happened. Zimmen knew surrendered at a church in the Chinese district of Saigon the day after the coup started. They were herded into the back of an armored personnel carrier. Their hands were tied and they were. They were murdered. Zam was shot a couple of times. Nu wasn't just killed, he was viciously butchered. He was bayoneted more than 30 times, shot a couple times for good measure.

[CBS News Reporter]

The story in Saigon is that they escaped from this palace through a tunnel, perhaps dressed as Catholic priests, and then were seized by soldiers three hours later in the Catholic church. President Diem killed by gunfire, his brother killed by stabbing.

[Martin DeCaro]

And throughout the rest of the long American nightmare in Vietnam, no South Vietnamese government ever enjoyed any popular legitimacy. So, Jack, let's wrap up with this question. What are the long term lessons? What should we learn from this episode? I don't actually think Washington has learned. You look at headlines today trying to shape outcomes in other countries, but go ahead.

[Jack Cheevers]

Right. I think the lesson is that regime change is a very tricky business. It's a dangerous business. Even if you do have a well thought out plan, things can go sideways very quickly. It's hard to know in Washington what's going on in another country thousands of miles away with a completely different culture, completely different history, a cast of characters that you may not really understand. Their, their backgrounds and their motives. Yesterday the New York Times had a story about Israel's plan to have regime change in Iran. They were gonna. They wanted to bring a politician named Aminijad back into power. An anti west hardliner. In the last few years, he'd become very critical of the Molas in Iran to the point where he was under house arrest. And Israel's plan was to kill the guards at the end of his street and liberate him. And there was an airstrike which killed the guards and also apparently injured ahmainejad, who has not been seen in public since that strike. And if a president decides to indulge in this thing, beware of history and beware of how these things have gone in the past.

[Martin DeCaro]

Finally, to the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand. Stay sheltered. Don't leave your home. It's very dangerous outside. Bombs will be dropping everywhere. When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations. For many years you have asked for America's help, but you never got it. No president was willing to do what I am willing to do tonight. Now you have a president who is giving you what you want. So let's see how you respond on the next episode of History As It Happens. We'll return to our America 250 series. Historian Lindsay Chervinsky of the George Washington Library at Mount Vernon will be our guest to discuss civics and conflict then and now. That's next as we report History as it Happens. And make sure to sign Sign up for my free newsletter. Just go to Substack and search for History as it Happens. Marketing is hard, but I'll tell you a little secret. It doesn't have to be. Let me point something out. You're listening to a podcast right now and it's great. You love the host. You seek it out and download it. You listen to it while driving, working out, cooking, even going to the bathroom. Podcasts are a pretty close companion. And this is a podcast ad. Did I get your attention? You can reach great listeners like yourself with podcast advertising from Libsyn Ads. Choose from hundreds of top podcasts offering host endorsements or run a pre produced ad like this one across thousands of shows. To reach your target audience in their favorite podcasts with Libsyn ads, go to Libsynads.com that's L I B S Y N ads.com today

[Jack Cheevers]

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