The First Palestinian Uprising

Summary

HISTORY AS IT HAPPENS

Episode: The First Palestinian Uprising

Host: Martin Di Caro
Guest: Ted Swedenberg, Professor Emeritus, University of Arkansas
Date: May 8, 2026

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Episode Overview

This episode delves into the historical significance of the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt in British Mandate Palestine, often overshadowed by the events of 1948 and after. Host Martin Di Caro and guest historian Ted Swedenberg explore the deep roots of contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict by tracing it back to this formative uprising—what led to it, why it nearly succeeded, and the devastating aftermath for the Palestinian national movement. They also discuss the revolt’s impact on Palestinian identity, British colonial policy, and Zionist state-building, connecting historical echoes to the present-day situation.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Why the 1936–1939 Revolt Matters

• Neglected in Historiography: The revolt is a pivotal but often underappreciated event in modern Middle Eastern history (10:19).
• Colonial Context: Palestine, largely a society of peasants, confronted the world’s preeminent imperial power (02:18, 11:32).

  “[Palestinians] took on the greatest imperial power in the world at the time. By the summer of 1938, they really had the Brits on the ropes and they controlled much of the country. So it was defeated, but kind of an amazing and heroic event…”
  — Ted Swedenberg (02:18; repeated at 11:32)

• Lasting Impact: The crushing of the revolt left the Palestinian national movement decapitated, with repercussions still felt today (06:53, 44:40).

2. Formation of Palestinian National Identity

• Nascent Nationalism: Palestinian identity was still coalescing in the 1930s, shaped by Ottoman and British administrative borders and evolving through newspapers, mass protests, and education (12:25).

  “It was something that was developing… But I think by the time of the revolt, it’s pretty clear that most people thought of themselves as fighting for their nation.”
  — Ted Swedenberg (12:25)

• Shift from Local to National Loyalties: By the outbreak of the revolt, self-identification as Palestinian was widespread, though some still viewed Palestine as part of Greater Syria (13:23).

3. Causes of the Revolt: Land, Immigration, Marginalization

• Land Sales and Dispossession: British-era land policies and Jewish immigration (especially post-Nazi Germany) led to massive land transfers from Arab tenantry to Zionist buyers, expelling thousands and spurring deep grievances (15:24).

  “When the Zionists came into these places… they would expel the tenant farmers and then put in their own colonies.”
  — Ted Swedenberg (15:24)

• Economic Marginalization: Combined effects of land loss, exploitative taxation, and declining agricultural conditions radicalized the peasantry (17:57-19:40).
• Immigration as Existential Threat: The population ratio shifted dramatically toward Jews due to immigration; Palestinians feared outright displacement (17:57, 20:22).

4. Escalation: Protests to Armed Revolt

• Frustrations with British Policy: Years of petitioning and nonviolent protest left Palestinians feeling ignored and desperate (20:47).

  “By 1935, 1936, they had been protesting, often in great numbers, for 15 years. The needle had not moved. Now there are more people coming, you know, even more people coming in and even more land is being sold.”
  — Ted Swedenberg (20:47)

• British Favoritism: British authorities viewed Zionists as “compatriots and equals”—Europeans—while Arab perspectives were marginalized (21:48).
• Triggering Events: Smuggling of Zionist arms and the shooting of Jewish passengers (April 1936) sparked a cycle of reprisals and ignited a general strike (27:50–29:20).

  “General strike is everyone decides not to go to work. Everything is closed down.”
  — Martin De Caro (29:20–29:25)

5. Aims and Nature of the Revolt

• Demands:
  1. Political independence
  2. End to Jewish immigration
  3. End to land sales to Jews
     (31:28)

  “So to boil it down, national independence, an end to settler colonial[ism] … and end to settlers. … Those were the demands.”
  — Ted Swedenberg (31:28)

• Revolt Dynamics: Decentralized, guerrilla warfare. Rural armed bands, often self-organized, ambushed British forces; urban/rural divides evident (33:35).
• Repression: The British responded not just militarily but with harsh collective punishments—summary executions, punitive house demolitions, and “concentration camps” (30:25, 42:02).

  “They have torture centers. They round up masses of people from villages and towns and put them in what they called concentration camps.”
  — Ted Swedenberg (42:02)

6. Factionalism and Leadership

• Divided Leadership: The Arab Executive and Supreme Muslim Council—factions led by notable families—often undermined unity. The British exacerbated divisions for control (23:20).
• Limits of Leadership: Haj Amin al-Husseini (the Mufti) was not as uncompromising as depicted, and was often pressured by grassroots militancy (25:26, 25:46).

7. Revolt’s Peak and Defeat

• Palestinian Advances: By summer 1938, rebels controlled large swaths, operated parallel courts/postal systems, and temporarily expelled the British from cities (37:10, 39:13).

  “…by summer of 1938. Palestinians are, on the one hand, going into and taking over cities for periods of time, driving the British out. … They have a court system, a rebel court system … They have a postal system with stamps.”
  — Ted Swedenberg (37:10, 39:13)

• British Overwhelming Force: 30,000 troops (nearly 20% of Britain’s military) crushed the uprising via martial law, summary executions, and recruitment of Jewish and Arab auxiliaries (39:45).

  “…almost 20% of their military force is now in Palestine. It’s kind of amazing.”
  — Ted Swedenberg (39:45)

• Use of Counterinsurgency: British methods (e.g., Special Night Squads, collective punishment) would later be employed by Jewish militias in 1948 (42:02–44:10).

8. Aftermath & Consequences

• For Palestinians:
  • Leadership killed, exiled, or forbidden from returning.
  • Military capacity destroyed.
  • Social and economic structures broken (44:40).

  “There’s no military or very little military capacity left for the Palestinians after this. I mean, they don’t have weapons, they don’t have training, they don’t have leadership.”
  — Ted Swedenberg (44:40)

  • By some accounts, 14–17% of adult Palestinian males were killed, wounded, jailed, or exiled (44:22).
• For Zionists:
  • Strengthened institutions and militias.
  • Gained military training from the British, which proved decisive during the 1947–48 conflict (40:19, 44:10).
• For the British:
  • Realization that the Mandate was ultimately unworkable, but World War II delayed immediate changes (46:51).
  • Postwar, Jewish armed revolt forced the British withdrawal (47:08–47:56).

9. Long-term Legacies

• Absence of a Palestinian State: The annihilation of effective Palestinian leadership during the revolt contributed decisively to their defeat in the 1947–48 War and the Nakba (47:56–49:33).

  “Yeah, that’s the first thing that comes to mind, is that it’s a terrible defeat, and it’s hugely consequential for what happens in 47, 48.”
  — Ted Swedenberg (49:33)

• Memory, Symbolism, and Hamas:
  • The Qassam legacy (name of both a rebel leader and today’s Hamas armed wing) is a primary modern reference to the 1936–39 revolt (49:55).

  “When I was doing research, and this is before there were Qassam Brigades, before there was Hamas … that notion of what the revolt was all about … has become even stronger because of the rise of Hamas, because their military force is called the Al Qassam Brigades.”
  — Ted Swedenberg (49:55)

  • The keffiyeh, now an international symbol of Palestinian solidarity, gained prominence during this insurgency (41:24–41:49).
• Lessons of Violent Revolt: Debate over the viability of armed struggle versus nonviolence (51:11–52:09).

  “Personally, I would prefer that things be done nonviolently. And I think the Intifada is a great example of successes of that.”
  — Ted Swedenberg (52:09)

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Notable Quotes & Moments with Timestamps

• On the near success of the Revolt:

  “…they really had the Brits on the ropes and they controlled much of the country. So it was defeated, but kind of an amazing and heroic event, you know, seemed like near success, but it had all the odds against it.”
  — Ted Swedenberg (02:18)

• On Palestinian identity formation:

  “…by the time of the revolt happens, people really thought of themselves… as Palestinians.”
  — Ted Swedenberg (12:25)

• On economic and social marginalization:

  “…the conditions of small proprietors also worsened. During the Mandate, British taxation policy, which required direct cash payments…”
  — Martin De Caro, quoting Cleveland (17:57–19:40)

• Trigger for the revolt:

  “…Arab dock workers in Jaffa discover weapons and arms that are being smuggled in. … Great scandal and outrage because the Arabs justifiably feel that the Zionists are smuggling in massive amounts of weapons so they can take over the country.”
  — Ted Swedenberg (27:50)

• On British counterinsurgency:

  “They have torture centers. They round up masses of people … and put them in what they called concentration camps…”
  — Ted Swedenberg (42:02)

• Symbolism of the keffiyeh:

  “…the kafiyehs that people who are supporting Palestine are wearing all over the world. This comes from that moment in the revolt.”
  — Ted Swedenberg (41:24)

• On the continuing struggle:

  “Yeah, that’s the first thing that comes to mind, is that it’s a terrible defeat, and it’s hugely consequential for what happens in 47, 48.”
  — Ted Swedenberg (49:33)

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Timeline of Major Segments

• [01:01] Episode begins: framing of 1936–39 as a lost epic in Palestinian history
• [09:35] Guest introduction and setting scope of discussion
• [10:03] Terminology: “Arab Revolt,” “Palestinian Revolt,” or “1936–39 Revolt”?
• [12:05] State of Palestinian nationalism prior to the revolt
• [15:24] Economic and demographic background; origins of land dispossession
• [20:47] Years of protest and British unresponsiveness
• [27:50] Events precipitating the uprising; arms smuggling/finding, general strike
• [31:28] Goals and demands of the revolt
• [33:35] Structure and tactics of rebel resistance; decentralized guerrilla war
• [37:10] Pivotal turn: 1938 rebel control over much of the country
• [39:45] British response: troop surge and harsh repression
• [42:02] Defeat and expulsion of rebel leadership
• [44:22] Losses and devastation among Palestinian male population
• [46:51] Long-term impact on the British Mandate and emergence of the Zionist advantage
• [49:55] The revolt’s memory today: Qassam, keffiyeh, and lessons learned
• [51:11] Reflections on violence vs. nonviolence in anti-colonial resistance

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Conclusion

The 1936–1939 uprising was not only a searing, nearly-successful bid for independence but also a foundational trauma for the Palestinian people. Its suppression shattered the political and military infrastructure required for later struggles, and its memory endures as both symbol and warning. For the Zionist movement, the rebellion provided tactical lessons and political openings that set the stage for statehood. As Martin De Caro and Ted Swedenberg emphasize, the current contours of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—and its cycles of hope, frustration, and violence—are inescapably rooted in this crucible of the pre-World War II Middle East.

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For further research:

• Memories of Revolt: The 1936-1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past by Ted Swedenberg
• A History of the Modern Middle East by William Cleveland
• The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine by Rashid Khalidi
• Palestine 1936 by Oren Kessler

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Next episode: Lebanon’s Agony with Maha Yaha of Baby Beirut

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End of content summary. All timestamps reference the original audio transcript.

Transcript

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[Martin DeCaro]

history as it happens. May 8, 2026 the first Palestinian revolt.

[Historical Archive Voice / Narrator]

The present Arab attack on the Jews is another and unhappily periodic attempt to undermine the right of the Jews to resettle in Palestine. Main case of the Arabs is against the British government's policy in Palestine. We are persuaded that the ruinous reign of murder, ambush, arson and poisonous incitement must be dealt with more vigorously by the British. For weeks past, armed bands have been filtering into the city. Some secretly through underground passages, others in disguise through the old City gate. The members of the Commission to investigate the situation in Palestine. Lord Peel is the chairman. I am well aware that we have to deal with difficult and delicate problems. Yet so great is the tragedy that even here the wandering Jew can find no rest.

[Martin DeCaro]

A decade before the State of Israel was born, a revolt rocked the British Mandate of Palestine. An uprising of Arab peasants against their colonial overlords, incoming Zionist immigrants and Arab elites. It nearly succeeded before it was crushed by overwhelming force. A setback from which the Palestinian national movement has truly never recovered. That's next as we report history as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro.

[Ted Swedenberg]

It's really hugely important in terms of the although not maybe acknowledged as much in terms of the history of colonialism. Palestine is a small country. Most of the people living there are were peasants and they took on the greatest imperial power in the world at the time. By the summer of 1938, they really had the Brits on the ropes and they controlled much of the country. So it was defeated. But Kind of an amazing and heroic event, you know, Seemed like near success, but it had all the odds against it.

[Martin DeCaro]

The story of 1948 has been told many, many times. A historic triumph for the Zionist national movement, a catastrophe or nakba for the Palestinians.

[Historical Archive Voice / Narrator]

Although in times of comparative peace, Jews and Arabs live side by side and go about their business in the old City of Jerusalem with apparent calm beneath the surface, bitter enmity has continued to smolder for years

[Martin DeCaro]

after the Second World War, Jewish militants, in a campaign of violence, launched their revolt to force the British to leave Palestine.

[Historical Archive Voice / Narrator]

The Jewish terrorist organization openly admitted responsibility for the bombing. Many arrests have been made. Leaders of the Jewish Agency have expressed horror at the dastardly crime perpetrated by

[Martin DeCaro]

a gang of desperados in early 1947. The British referred the matter to the United nations, whose member states later that year voted to partition the land into two states, one Jewish, one Arab.

[Historical Archive Voice / Narrator]

The map shows what partition means. The Jewish state colored light, the Arab state dark. Jaffa. To go to the Arabs. Jerusalem internationalized. Saudi Arabia, no. Soviet Union Yes. United Kingdom abstain. The United States yes. The resolution of the Duck Committee for Palestine was adopted by 33 boats, 13 against, 10 abstentions.

[Martin DeCaro]

The Arabs boycotted. Civil war ensued two days later.

[Historical Archive Voice / Narrator]

This was the typical scene. Arabs advancing on the center of Jerusalem at the beginning of a three day strike and an orgy of wrecking, looting and bloodshed. Isolated police were more or less powerless to deal with the riot, which, beginning as a demonstration, quickly led to the burning of Jewish shops and the general destruction of Jewish property.

[Martin DeCaro]

The British departed. The following year, May 1948, David Ben Gurion declared Israel's independence. And as historian William Cleveland writes in A History of the Modern Middle east, units from the armies of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq invaded Israel, launching a regional war interspersed with several truces that lasted until December 1948 and that resulted in the defeat of the Arab forces, the enlargement of Israeli territory and the collapse of the UN proposal for a Palestinian Arab state.

[Historical Archive Voice / Narrator]

Records from Palestine show heavy damage in and around the Arab city of Jaffa as Haganah troops move up to new positions along the war scarred roads. Jaffa itself has become an almost deserted city, Most of the 70,000 inhabitants having left when the state of Israel was proclaimed.

[Martin DeCaro]

At the end of the fighting, says Cleveland, not only was there no Palestinian Arab state, but the vast majority of the Arab population in the territory that became Israel, over 700,000 people had become refugees. The Arab flight from Palestine began during the civil war it was at first the normal reaction to a civilian population to nearby fighting, a temporary evacuation from the zone of combat with plans to return once hostilities ceased. And that civil war he mentioned took place in the months between September 1947, when the British announced they would leave, and May 15, 1948, when the British completed their withdrawal.

[Historical Archive Voice / Narrator]

Haganah, the force first legally raised for the defense of Jewish settlements, appears to function hand in glove with Irgun Svaileomi, the outlawed terrorist army.

[Martin DeCaro]

So a big reason why the Palestinian Arabs were routed from their homelands in 1948 is that their national movement never recovered from the shattering consequences of what is called the Great Revolt or Arab revolt of 1936-39, the subject of this podcast episode, an event whose consequences ripple to this day. You can still hear the echoes two peoples vying for control the same sliver of land. Zionist immigrants were also colonists trying to create a new Jewish majority state where they were a minority among the Arabs.

[Historical Archive Voice / Narrator]

The members of the Commission to investigate the situation in Palestine, Lord Peel is the chairman. I am well aware that we have to deal with difficult and delicate problems. The problems will not be rendered less difficult by the news which comes to hand as the photographers get busy and as the train stands waiting with steam up that the Arab Hire Committee will boycott the Commission. The main case of the Arabs is against the British government's policy in Palestine, a policy which, if continued, will surely have, as a result, the replacement of the Arabs by the Jews.

[Martin DeCaro]

Ted Swedenberg is an expert on the revolt, professor emeritus of anthropology at the University of Arkansas, and author of Memories of revolt, the 1936-1939 rebellion, and the Palestinian National Past. Tap subscribe now in the show Notes to skip ads, get early access and enjoy all of our bonus content or go to history as it happens.com what

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[Martin DeCaro]

Ted Swedenberg welcome to the podcast.

[Ted Swedenberg]

Thank you. Thanks for having me.

[Martin DeCaro]

You know, since October 7, 2023, I've done a lot of episodes on the origins of today's conflict, today's crisis, but I've yet to dedicate an episode entirely to the subject we're going to discuss here. I've mentioned the revolt of 1936. Maybe we'll start with this question. What is this event called? Was it an Arab uprising? A Palestinian revolt? How do you refer to it?

[Ted Swedenberg]

I usually call it the 1936-39 revolt. I don't know if they still do it. When I was in Palestine especially, older people would call it the Great Rev. Some people will call it the Arab Revolt. I just prefer the 3639. And Palestinians, of course, know what that is.

[Martin DeCaro]

That's not a very dramatic title. The 1936-39 revolt, right? Do you think this revolt has been neglected or doesn't receive as much attention as it should when we chart the origins of how we got to where we are today?

[Ted Swedenberg]

Yeah, probably so. Although I think with Ann Marie Jasser's film coming out, I think it's going to get a lot more and deserved attention. There's a lot of good Scholarship on the revolt, a lot of it done since I did publish my book back in 1995. But I'm not sure that, you know, how much that scholarship is used and it's circulated or taught.

[Martin DeCaro]

The movie is titled Palestine 1936. There's also a book came out a couple of years ago by Oren Kessler with the exact same title, Palestine 1936. But I noticed on Twitter Kessler said the movie was terrible because it's inaccurate. I haven't seen the movie yet.

[Ted Swedenberg]

Yeah, I haven't either. And I'm aware that he wrote a piece, but I haven't really. I need to see the movie before I look into.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, we don't have to litigate the piece. Yeah. Now. So before we talk about what happened and why it happened, how important, building on my last question, just how important is this in the long story of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, in your view?

[Ted Swedenberg]

It's really hugely important in terms of the. Although not maybe acknowledged as much in terms of the history of colonialism. Palestine is a small country. Most of the people living there were peasants and they took on the greatest imperial power in the world at the time. By the summer of 1938, they really had the Brits on the ropes and they controlled much of the country. So it was defeated, but kind of an amazing and heroic event, you know, seemed like near success, but it had all the odds against it.

[Martin DeCaro]

The consequences for the Palestinian movement were terrible because their leadership was scattered, sent to the Seychelles island. Some of them did the Arabs of Palestine refer to themselves as Palestinians. What was the state of Palestinian nationalism? Was there a self aware Palestinian national movement?

[Ted Swedenberg]

It was something that was developing. The boundaries were not declared Palestine until the British occupied. So 1918, 1919. It takes a while for people who may have thought of themselves in different ways. Maybe primarily as, you know, I'm from this village, I'm from this city, I'm from this region, I'm a Muslim, I'm a Christian, I'm Greek Orthodox. So for it to cohere took some time. And we know from the history of nationalism that mass media, newspapers, education play a role in that. But I think by the time of the revolt, it's pretty clear that most people thought it themselves as fighting for their nation. Some of the rebel leaders talked about Palestine as, and in their communiques as southern Syria, because many people did have aspirations for Palestine to be part of something, a greater Arab independent entity. But I think you could say by the 19, by the time the revolt happens, that people really thought of themselves. You know, they're living in a place called Palestine. They're fighting as Palestinians.

[Martin DeCaro]

Was there an idea for a Palestinian state? So there was nascent Palestinian nationalism, but as far as creating an independent state, you refer to being part of a Greater Syria, I mean, across the Arab world, right, there was hopes of throwing off the yoke of British colonialism. We know that the Middle east was carved up after the First World War.

[Ted Swedenberg]

The idea of being part of a broader confederation, I think, was more aspiration. In terms of practical, everyday terms, the Brits and the French carved up somewhat arbitrary boundaries. There's a mandate in Syria, there's a mandate in Iraq, there's a mandate in Lebanon, mandate in Palestine, a mandate in Transjordan. These are all new entities with new boundaries. But in each place, the populations were struggling for independence. And there was a famous newspaper called Philistine, or Palestine, one of the most widely read. So the Greater Syria is more of an aspiration, I would say, because it

[Martin DeCaro]

seems in the inner war period, Zionism or Jewish nationalism was more cohesive, was stronger, of course, had the backing of a major power relative to the Palestinian national movement, where they were not ready for statehood. Some historians have said on my show, when the time came in the 1940s, let's not get ahead of ourselves here. So I have William Cleveland's book in front of me, A History of the Modern Middle East. My listeners know this one well. I talk about it a lot. He said the two major eruptions of communal violence during the interwar years of the Mandate, meaning the British Mandate, the Wailing wall disturbances of 1929 and the Great Revolt of 1930 were directly related to the dislocations caused by immigration, meaning Zionist immigration and land transfers. Repeated British investigations into the causes of these incidents only serve to highlight the unworkable nature of the mandate. So my first question to you, Ted, how were Zionist immigrants able to purchase so much land from Arab notable families or absentee landlords?

[Ted Swedenberg]

So, first of all, the late Ottoman period, the Ottomans were trying to modernize, to develop the empire along modern lines, to develop in particular commercial agriculture. They were able to impose greater and greater security on provinces like Palestine or areas like Palestine which had been in previous decades less secure. And they were interested in those being turned into sources of agriculture and being developed and being settled. So they sold or gave concessions to people with money, mainly in Lebanon, or what is now today Lebanon and Syria, Damascus and Beirut. And these individuals purchased fairly large swaths of land with the idea that they would clear the land that Gone into disuse. They would drain it to mitigate threats from malaria. There was better security now, fewer Bedouin raids and so on. And then resettle areas that had been farmed in the past with tenant farmers. I mean, in some cases this wasn't really carried through. But the Zionists had money. It was attractive to sell for good price to buyers. And then when the Zionists came into these places, unlike the absentee owners who'd had them in the past, they would expel the tenant farmers and then put in their own colonies. But eventually those large land holdings were sold. They wanted more land. And so the situation begins to change. By at least 1930, by then, the majority of land sales are to Palestinians. Larger owners and smaller owners. Smaller farmers were selling for a variety of reasons. I mean, the economic situation was not good. There was a depression. Commodity prices had fallen. Jews were coming into the country, especially after the Nazis come to power. The Nazis allow them to bring their capital with them. So there's a lot of money to buy land and you have impoverished peasants or they're attracted by being offered money. So land purchases really ramp up to their largest extent in 1934 and 1935. So it's, you know, originally it's large, especially absentee landowners, and later it's smaller plots from mostly Palestinian owners.

[Martin DeCaro]

And this was done to promote Zionist self sufficiency. Right, Excluding the Arab peasants from the land so they could be worked exclusively.

[Ted Swedenberg]

Absolutely. Once they got the land and established colonies, then the ideology of the Zionist movement was that Jews did work themselves and they did not hire Arab labor for the most part.

[Martin DeCaro]

So I'll just note here that in 1931, you mentioned the 1930s. In 1931, the Arab population of Palestine was 82% Jewish, 16% other, 2%. By 1936, that ratio has come down. It's 71% Arab, 28% Jewish because of immigration. I'll just share another passage from William Cleveland here. I'd like to hear your response. He says the transfer of cultivated land from Arab to Jewish ownership had a devastating effect on the Palestinian peasantry, as you alluded to, which in 36 still composed two thirds of the Arab population of the Mandate. The usual outcome of such a transaction was the eviction of the Arab tenant farmers in their addition to the growing ranks of the unemployed. The conditions of small proprietors also worsened. During the Mandate, British taxation policy, which required direct cash payments in place of the customary Ottoman payment in kind, forced peasant farmers to borrow funds at high rates of interest from local money, lenders who were frequently the large landowners. And as a result of the crushing burden of indebtedness, many small proprietors found it necessary to sell their lands, sometimes to Zionists, but often to one of the landed Arab families. So just to wrap up my point here, he says there was a cumulative effect, the land transfers, British policy, Arab notable attitudes that led to the increasing impoverishment and marginalization of the Palestinian Arab peasantry. So it's one thing to be marginalized, to be have resentments and grievances that are legitimate, then to go from there to open violent revolt. How did that transformation take place?

[Ted Swedenberg]

I would just add one thing about, I think, an important point about Jews coming into Palestine, which is that, you know, the Nazis come to power, German Jews are fleeing persecution. The United States and Britain don't take them. Like Palestine is the only place, one of the few places that they can go.

[Historical Archive Voice / Narrator]

The Jews are turning more and more to their promised land, to the land which they were told once would be flowing with milk and honey. On the quayside of the Jewish port of Tel Aviv, more and more families are being reunited. More and more children who have come to prepare the way are welcoming mothers and fathers turning with them towards the new life in the only land in the world where there seems a hope of living in peace.

[Ted Swedenberg]

If the United States and Britain and France, you know, took them, this would not have been happening.

[Martin DeCaro]

Let me just interject as I have Rashid Khalidi's book here. He quotes David Ben Gurion at the time. Immigration at the rate of 60,000 a year means a Jewish state in all of Palestine. Many Palestinians came to similar conclusions. I mean, they could see what was happening around them. So how do you go from resentment, marginalization to open revolt?

[Ted Swedenberg]

Palestinians had been protesting the mandate and especially the provisions of the mandate, which meant that the British were to, as written into the mandate, British were to support the creation of a. And facilitate creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine, which meant facilitating immigration and facilitating land, land sales. By 1935, 1936, they had been protesting, often in great numbers, for 15 years. The needle had not moved. Now there are more people coming, you know, even more people coming in and even more land is being sold.

[Martin DeCaro]

What were these protests like? Were they just mass demonstrations or civil

[Ted Swedenberg]

disobedience demonstrations that sometimes turn to violence? You know, what the leadership preached and the population mostly followed was the idea that they should be nonviolent. Especially by the late 1920s, early 30s, they were taking their inspiration from Gandhi. This is not seeming to move the needle.

[Martin DeCaro]

No Are they making entreaties to the British in London? Do they have a strong lobby?

[Ted Swedenberg]

No, they do not have a strong lobby. I mean, the British would send out commissions to investigate when there was an uprising or violence and a problem of whatever. They would pay minimal attention to what the Palestinians were saying and maybe make very minor concessions or decide on something that just made them furious. The Zionists had the ear of the British, the Zionists in London, the Zionists in Palestine. The British thought of the Zionists, the Jewish Agency, which was their representative body, as basically their compatriots and equals. They were Europeans, unlike the Arabs, who were backward and uncivilized. So the Zionists had the ear of the British and the Arabs could talk to them, but they didn't. It didn't result in much other than, you know, they got to say something.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah. The remarkable thing about all those commissions, the royal commissions that were sent to Palestine to investigate what was going on, they all pretty much came to the same conclusion. It was the Zionist immigration that was causing the friction. Yet at the same time, they continued to facilitate that immigration until the very end. They did eventually say no more, but by then it was too late. So you mentioned the Jewish Agency. That's one of the pillars of a state. Right. There was also militias like the Haganah on the Arab side. They had institutions. But there are also factional divides. Right?

[Ted Swedenberg]

Right.

[Martin DeCaro]

The Palestinian Arabs are not unified. Can you tell us about who their leaders were and about these factions that I guess came down along the lines of the notable families? Is that right?

[Ted Swedenberg]

The Ottomans had really had developed a system of ruling not through their own bureaucrats that they sent out because they were had been relatively weak as an empire, especially in relationship to the provinces. So they ruled through notables whose power was based in holding land or having religious positions or higher learning. Big families are still there with their land and their prestige when the British come in. The tragedy really, I think, of the Palestinian national movement is that they never figured out a way to really unite all the leaders in a cohesive political movement. The British tried to manipulate those divisions. They had something called the Arab Executive, which was dominated by the elite, not a kind of mass and modern organization like the Jewish Agency, which was much, you know, had much wider reach. Then the British set up another institution called the Supreme Muslim Council, headed by Hajimeen Hosseini, as a kind of counterweight or alternative source of power to the Arab Executive. So you had, you know, in the 20s, kind of rival organizations vying for power and control and so on. And I think it's telling that the British established this organization. You know, it's a religious organization. They are imagining and thinking and organize things along the lines that, you know, the Palestinians think of themselves primarily as religious body rather than a national body. The rival family with its own kind of faction and supporters. The Nashashibis, rivals to the Hosseinis, they became known by the 1930s as the opposition. They were much weaker, especially as the revolt got going, much weaker in terms of their support. They were much more willing to compromise with the British as a result. I mean, maybe we'll get into this more as a revolt develops. The British are really supporting the Nashashibis and their faction eventually supporting them to the extent that they're helping them organize counter revolutionary militias and bands to fight the rebels. But maybe we're getting ahead of ourselves.

[Martin DeCaro]

Hajimen Husseini, he's been depicted often as an unbending, uncompromising leader of, well, the Supreme Muslim Council and then his nation, if you will. Was that accurate about him or was he more pragmatic than some people give him credit for? Because he was in a tough situation. Right, with the British playing divide and conquer.

[Ted Swedenberg]

Yeah, he's put in power by the British. He tries to make himself the leader of the national movement. He is not involved in organizing to any extent, you know, real serious confrontation with the British. He, like most of the notables, think that the way you deal with them is you try to talk to them and reason with them and, and so on. So I think uncompromising is really not accurate. You know, what happens to him in the course of the uprising and revolt is that it's very much from below the leadership being pushed to take harder positions like Hosseini. But there's great agreement on the part of, of the population and the leadership when it comes to two issues. One, the heavy repression that the British are imposing needs to stop, and two, that they need national independence. So the, you know, the population and the national leadership, even if they were compromising or, you know, less militant like Hosseini, they agree on those. On those basic issues. The British always, the British and the Zionists from the onset of the revolt, blamed Hosseini, blamed the notable leadership for orchestrating everything and paying people to do it. They really didn't think that the pop, you know, they claimed the population wasn't in favor of this. It was just the leadership sort of manipulating them through various means.

[Martin DeCaro]

Sure, the Mufti, as he was called, the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin, he urged restraint after the outbreak of violence in 1936. And according to Cleveland, he demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the British in seeking a negotiated solution to the question of Jewish immigration. But, you know, his offices depended on the goodwill of the British. So we just discussed why Arab peasants were becoming so marginalized and angry, losing their livelihoods, losing their land, the increase in Jewish immigration by the mid-1930s. The Jewish economy is actually stronger than the Arab economy because of these changes, even though the Jewish population is still quite small relative to the Arab one. What sparked the revolt in 1936?

[Ted Swedenberg]

First of all, in November, Arab dock workers in Jaffa discover, I don't know how many cement barrels, weapons and arms that are being smuggled in. This causes a great scandal and outrage because the Arabs justifiably feel that the Zionists are smuggling in massive amounts of weapons so they can take over the country. This is a very big deal. This is probably a major factor in inspiring or inciting Sheikh Ezzeddine Al Qassam, who is a Muslim preacher in Haifa who's been organizing and training guerrillas to launch armed revolt. Eventually, he goes out in revolt in November. He and his band are found and killed after a few days. But this really inspires masses of people because they think, you know, this guy's finally doing something. This guy and his men are finally. They're doing something that needs to be done to really take on the British. What we've been doing has been inadequate. His men attack a convoy and pull off some Jews who are in this. A bus kind of way, going between Tulikaram and Ablis and kill a couple of them. And then there are reprisals. And so there's kind of a tit for tat. But there's a sense that the reprisals are, you know, way beyond what the original assault has been. And so a general strike is called. And this is really launched from below. And doing a general strike is way beyond what has been done before. What the leaders are saying and the people involved and are saying, we're doing Gandhi stuff here. We're doing nonviolent. Sure.

[Martin DeCaro]

So general strike is everyone decides not to go to work.

[Ted Swedenberg]

Everything is closed down.

[Martin DeCaro]

Everything's closed.

[Ted Swedenberg]

And the British respond with incredible amounts of violence in villages and neighborhoods all over. Their claim is that they're looking for weapons and looking for military and stuff like that. But really, it's clear, and their documents show this, that this is just a pretext for trying to intimidate and bully the population. They have very poor intelligence. They don't know what's going on. The only way that they can figure out and that they think will crush this opposition is to intimidate the population, right? So they're going into villages, they're tearing up houses, they're destroying the goods that people have set aside so that they can survive their food and so on. Crazy amounts of repression. So the armed revolt. And a guy named Matthew Kelly has really studied this. The armed revolt emerges in response to British oppression against the general strike.

[Martin DeCaro]

So we start in April with a couple of violent incidents. Armed Arab ban shoots a Jewish passenger on a bus. There's then Jewish reprisals. And then this general strike.

[Ted Swedenberg]

The general strike. And the British retaliate with force because the only way they know how to crush it is through violence because they have no connections in villages and with the population and they have terrible intelligence. So they just use the most brutal means.

[Martin DeCaro]

I'll just note that Rashid Khalidi mentions the Sheikh Farhan Al Saadi. He was executed by the British in 1937 for possessing a single bullet under the martial law enforcement. At the time, that bullet was sufficient to merit capital punishment. There are well over 100 such sentences of execution handed down after summary trials by military tribunals. And many more Palestinians were executed on the spot by British troops. So you can understand why people get pissed off and take up arms. My question, though, before we get into the revolt itself, who were they revolting against? What were the aims? Was it to drive Zionists out of the country? Was it to topple the British mandate?

[Ted Swedenberg]

The aims were simple from the beginning and really very clear. One, independence, political independence for the people living there. Two, stop Jewish immigration. Three, stop land sales to the Jews. Right? So to boil it down, national independence, an end to settler colonial, end to colonialism and end to settlers. And that was clear and consistent throughout the period that those were the demands.

[Martin DeCaro]

Was that seen as attainable? I mean, after all, the Arabs had a population majority there. Was it seen as a long shot at the time? Maybe they thought they could do it because again, they were in the majority.

[Ted Swedenberg]

I think they thought it was attainable because again, they were looking around them. They were ruled under a mandate. It was a special kind of a mandate because it included this provision that at the same time you have this mandate, you develop a Jewish national home. The notion of the mandate was that this was the last stage of people living under them before they. They gained independence. So they're looking around in Egypt, the British are still there, but they have elections and, you know, there's A claim of a kind of independence in the 1920s. The Syrians and the Lebanese and the Iraqis are moving towards independence with prime ministers and elections and parliaments. And the Palestinians have none of that. And they think, you know, well, we're looking, you know, these other Arabs have it. It seems like we should be able to have it. Well, who's to criticize them? But, you know, the fact that the full weight of the British Empire, you know, the strongest colonial power in the world, you know, they were facing them. And the British had lots of experience putting down colonial revolts all over the world at this time.

[Martin DeCaro]

And there were Jewish militias, except for

[Ted Swedenberg]

Ireland, except for Ireland.

[Martin DeCaro]

But there were Jewish armed groups as well that were effective in battle. So you mentioned how the revolt breaks out after the British crackdown on the general strike. Can you explain the violence? Or an organized army's, you know, like the American Revolution, the continental army facing the British. Talk about how the revolt or the war, really how it unfolded, what did it look like?

[Ted Swedenberg]

So it's very decentralized. For my book, I interviewed with a Palestinian partner, a lot of guys who fought in the Revolt. This was 1980s. I was doing field work. Qassam had trained men and bands, especially up in the north. And they would go around and say, hey, villagers, you need to give us a coup. Your men to join our bands. They would encourage, or maybe villagers would do it on their own. You know, we're going to start our own band in this village. People have weapons in rural areas in Palestine at the time. You know, they use them for hunting, they use them for protection. And so to some degree there are, you know, it's organized by groups that exist already in other places. It's guys just like, yeah, well, everybody, you know, this is happening. We're going to. We're going to organize our own band in our own village, and then we're going to figure out ways to take on the British. And as it develops, then local commanders or sub commanders would come to the fore, put several villages under. Under their control. It was pretty decentralized. There were regional commanders in throughout Palestine and sometimes competing for power.

[Martin DeCaro]

And so it wasn't quite mob violence, or maybe there was, but there were also armed, organized armed bands. And it was ambushes, assassinations.

[Ted Swedenberg]

The British are moving their troops and resources around on roads, going through rural and especially mountain areas. They knew something's coming at a certain time during the day. So you go and you block the road with big boulders and rubble and stuff like that. And so the troops have to stop. They get out and you shoot at them from the hills around them. Right. And then they mobilize and come after you. And you hide in caves. You know the terrain. They don't. You hide your weapons, go back to the village, look like just a regular civilian. You know, it's guerrilla warfare. Right. It's not. They're not doing pitched battles. Sure. In sort of normal warfare with battle lines and so on. It's also a matter of taking control of areas make it very difficult for the British to even penetrate or get in there. So it's kind of classical guerrilla warfare. Unfortunately, they don't have the mountains are not that high. They don't have great, always great cover. So the Royal Air Force, the RAFA was very active and they're responsible for killing about half of the fighters.

[Martin DeCaro]

The conversation continues. Tap subscribe now in the show Notes to skip ads.

[Commercial Narrator]

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[Martin DeCaro]

Was there a point, say, where it looked like the Arabs were winning?

[Ted Swedenberg]

The Arab rulers convince the leadership of the Palestine revolt to call off the strike in September 36. And then they send out a commission, the Peel Commission. The Peel Commission probably is the worst of all the commissions because it recommends partition, which had never been recommended before. And most importantly, the partition called for the quote, unquote transfer of populations, which meant that over 200,000 Palestinians would have been removed from where they live. Everybody hates this. Among the Palestinians. A Palestinian Mandate official in the north is assassinated. He's been somebody that's very Close to Zionists involved in land sales. After that, things are quiet. But the British respond by, again, really clamping down. I think this is when they put in new regulations that you were talking about, where any Palestinian who's caught with a weapon or a bullet can be summarily tried and executed, right? They really clamp down. And this, again, this clamping down and repression of all sorts, it's in response to this. The armed revolt really picks up again. By summer of 1938. Palestinians are, on the one hand, going into and taking over cities for periods of time, driving the British out. They are assaulting all of the British trappings of government. They have to close post offices, the railroads can't move, they are assaulting banks. They're setting up really, what are the rudiments of alternative state. They have a court system, a rebel court system, and all the Palestinians are boycotting the British legal system and going to the courts. And the courts are considered to be very fair and honest and much better than going to the British courts. They have a postal system with stamps. So they're taking control of vast swaths of the country. And the British don't have. The British are not in control. It's in the fall. And really, the treaty that the British sign, Chamberlain signs with the Nazis at Munich.

[Historical Archive Voice / Narrator]

This morning, I had another talk with the German Chancellor, Herr Hitler, and here is the paper which bears his name

[Ted Swedenberg]

upon it as well as mine, allows them to transfer a lot more troops to Palestine. 1938, eventually, it's about 30,000 troops. Almost 20% of their military force is now in Palestine. It's kind of amazing.

[Martin DeCaro]

Twenty thousand troops, that's how many.

[Ted Swedenberg]

Thirty thousand. Thirty thousand.

[Martin DeCaro]

Thirty thousand troops.

[Ted Swedenberg]

And police. They've recruited police, the notorious Black and Tans, who were involved in all kinds of atrocities in Ireland. They basically turned them into a paramilitary force. And they're training Jewish, what they call supernumeraries who are guarding their colonies, but also some who are actively fighting the Palestinians. So it's a huge military operation. You know, the gloves are off. They can do whatever they want.

[Martin DeCaro]

And that training for the Jewish militias, that would come in handy a decade later.

[Ted Swedenberg]

They learned effective and brutal counterinturgency techniques that they used in 47, 48, 49.

[Martin DeCaro]

So just to recap here, the Peel Commission makes its announcement in July 1937. You mentioned that it was partition and then population transfers. Arab violence is renewed because no one found that acceptable. Truly amazing is that the rebels only numbered about 5,000 at their height. But they had the Support of the countryside and Cleveland notes that in addition to the anti British, anti Zionist thrust of the revolt, it also contained elements of a peasant social revolution against the established nobility. In villages under rebel control, rents were canceled. Debt collectors were denied entry. Wealthy landlords were coerced into making donations to the rebel cause. Local resistance committees banned the tarbush, the headgear of the Ottoman administrative elite, and insisted that men should instead wear the keffiyeh, the checkered head cloth that has become a symbol of Palestinian national identity. I didn't know it was originated then. I remember as a kid, every time I saw Yasser Arafat on television, he had one of those.

[Ted Swedenberg]

The origin of, you know, the kafiyehs that people who are supporting Palestine are wearing all over the world. This comes from that moment in the revolt. The peasants take over control of the city and tell the urban dwellers, you guys need to put these on, too. Peasants are now in control. Right? The tarbooshes you're wearing or the fact that you don't have any hat on, the poor people are running the show now.

[Martin DeCaro]

So a couple more things here. How did the British finally get the upper hand in 1939? Well, you mentioned how the Munich Agreement allowed them to transfer more troops. But tell us how this comes to an end in 39, and then we'll move on to the consequences.

[Ted Swedenberg]

The repression is absolutely. It's phenomenal. I mean, I talked about the numbers. The police and the military can use any kind of force. They have torture centers. They round up masses of people from villages and towns and put them in what they called concentration camps. They were surrounded by barbed wire, and they're just sitting in there for weeks and months. They established punitive posts in villages that were considered to be problematic. So the army would just go in and set up a center there. They made Palestinians ride on the hoods of trucks or put them in a flatbed on a train to serve as human shields because of the threat of mines or the threat of snipers. A guy named Orda Wingate, who was a Christian Zionist and officer in the British army, was given leeway to set up something called the Special Night squads, mostly manned by men from the Haganah, from the Jewish military, and then a few Brits. And Wingate was a psychopath, and he hated Arabs. They would go out at night and do preemptive assaults on villages or retaliation for something. You know, like there's an operation and, okay, we're going to go blame this nearby village and go in and sometimes line up men from the village and then shoot to kill, you know, every fifth or every seventh one or maybe the whole lot of them. Or force men to eat sand if they were near pipelines that have been blown up. Force them to, you know, eat sand and oil. Officers like Dayan, Moshe Dayan and Yigal Alon were part of the special night squad. And then they used these methods during the war 1947, 48, when they were driving Palestinians out of their villages.

[Historical Archive Voice / Narrator]

The city of Haifa and its harbor become the center of bitter conflict as a new Jewish state is born. In the tense atmosphere of civil war, Hagana troops search for Arabs after, after capturing the city. Arab strong points are taken after being blasted to rubble. During the mopping up operations, Hana forces seek out every Arab and barricades are set up to screen those who had not already fled the city.

[Ted Swedenberg]

Soldiers would go in and then take out all the men and, you know, shoot every fifth one of them or every seventh one of them to terrorize people and get them to, to leave their villages.

[Martin DeCaro]

Those men would become heroes later in the Israeli military.

[Ted Swedenberg]

You got this from Khalidi, but he estimates 14 to 17% of adult males in Palestine were killed, wounded, jailed or exiled.

[Martin DeCaro]

I mean, it was a huge 14 to 17%. Wow. Yes. I was going to ask you about the consequences here for the Palestinians. We'll start with them. Their leadership, right, is scattered.

[Ted Swedenberg]

They're scattered and mostly not allowed back. The commanders are either killed, the most famous of them were all killed, or they're in exile. Hundreds of them killed regular fighters. So there's no military or very little military capacity left for the Palestinians after this. I mean, they don't have weapons, they don't have training, they don't have leadership.

[Martin DeCaro]

What happens to Hajimeen?

[Ted Swedenberg]

And Hajimeen? Well, Hajamin is not a great story because he ends up in Nazi Germany. I mean, I think the stories about him that exaggerated in terms of what he actually did, but he was collaborating with the Nazis. I'm not sure where else he could have gone, but I'm not defending him

[Martin DeCaro]

for that enemy is my friend. Something like that.

[Ted Swedenberg]

The economy is under assault and wrecked, especially in villages and rural areas where they've blown up houses or entire villages and sacked people's homes and jailed their men for long periods of time. I mean, it recovers to some extent during the war, but it's really put under a great deal of pressure. Meanwhile, the Zionist economy has flourished and very much developed. It is much stronger by 1939.

[Martin DeCaro]

And in 1939, there's the white Paper saying no more Zionist immigration. But this seems to have come way too late. If you're on the side of the

[Ted Swedenberg]

Palestinians, it doesn't say no more, but it limits it. So the idea is Jewish population should not be. More than a third of the population of Palestine should be. Should be Jewish. More or less about the same. You know, World War II is about to break out and the British feel like they need to make some concessions because they need all the Arabs, that's true. Countries to support them and what they can tell is going to be a global struggle.

[Martin DeCaro]

So what an irony, right? The White Paper comes out and says the problem is Zionist immigration, among other things, while they've just crushed a revolt that rose up in part because of Zionist immigration. So talking consequences here for the British, did this episode from 36 to 39, did it convince them that the mandate was truly unworkable because they do hold on to it for another 10 years?

[Ted Swedenberg]

Yeah, I think it's. The war changes everything. And then really, I mean, what makes the mandate unworkable is the revolt coming from inside the Jewish population after the Second World War against those limits on immigration and limits, you know, efforts to limit immigration and arms sales.

[Martin DeCaro]

That's right. The Zionist movement decided that if they're going to get a state, the first thing they have to do is get rid of the British after World War II.

[Ted Swedenberg]

Right. Especially the far right is attacking them and so on and so forth. The. The King David Hotel being blown up.

[Historical Archive Voice / Narrator]

The hotel housed the British army headquarters and the Palestine Government offices. And casualties were very heavy. 65 deaths are reported. And there is little or no hope of survival for any of the 58 missing. Nearly 50 others were injured. The Jewish terrorist organization openly admitted responsibility for the bombing. Many arrests have been made. Leaders of the Jewish Agency have expressed horror at the dastardly crime perpetrated by a gang of desperados.

[Ted Swedenberg]

They really clamped down on the Jewish community or the far right of the Jewish community.

[Martin DeCaro]

Guy by the name of Menachem Begin.

[Ted Swedenberg]

Right? Yeah.

[Martin DeCaro]

Comes a Prime minister later. He was behind the King David Hotel. So the consequences then for the Zionist side are they're in a much better situation to pursue their state when that moment comes because they come out of the revolt in a stronger position relative to the Palestinians whose leadership is shattered their population. They've lost so many people. I mean, they lost a very serious revolt in a very brutal way. So it's understandable how it would be difficult to come back from something like that.

[Ted Swedenberg]

You also can't discount the impact of the war, Holocaust, the sympathy that people have for the Jewish population of Europe. And again, the fact that there are, I don't know, hundreds of thousands, tens of thousands of Jews in camps that have been liberated. And do the Americans take them? No. Do the British take them?

[Historical Archive Voice / Narrator]

No.

[Ted Swedenberg]

Do the French take them? No. Very limited numbers. Right. It's easy for the Zionists to go and recruit people to go to Palestine because you want to stay in the camp or you want to go to Palestine. Well, you don't know. I'm not sure we want to go to Palestine and, you know, fight and go to war, but, you know, we don't have any choice. Right. So the success of 47, 48 is also a product of the fact that there was massive numbers of people who had survived the Holocaust that end up in what becomes Israel.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah. A lot of stuff happens between 39 and 48. My last question. What are the enduring consequences of this episode other than the obvious that there's a Jewish state and no Palestinian state?

[Ted Swedenberg]

Yeah, yeah. That's the first thing that comes to mind, is that it's a terrible defeat, and it's hugely consequential for what happens in 47, 48.

[Martin DeCaro]

I guess I just don't hear a lot of Palestinians referring to it. Although, of course, it was 100 years ago almost, and there is a movie about it now. But maybe more recent events matter more in Palestinian memory, like First Intifada. Second Intifada.

[Ted Swedenberg]

Go ahead. Right. The way it is mostly remembered, and this is, of course, only a very partial memory, but it has to do. It has everything to do with the way politics have evolved in Palestine over the last couple decades. Is that the name Qassam is really associated very much with the revolt. When I was doing research, and this is before there were Qassam Brigades, before there was Hamas. Right. He had this reputation in the early 80s, and they would associate. Many people thought, oh, yeah, Qassam was fighting in the revolt and say, hey, actually, no, his men played an important role. His death sparked it. But he wasn't actually commander in the revolt. But that notion of what the revolt was all about, that was prevalent in 84, 85, when I was there, has become even stronger because of the rise of Hamas, because their military force is called the Al Qassam Brigades, named after Sheikh Zeddin Al Qassam. I mean, they've kind of captured him and his memory. Thirty years ago, Qassam was more shared by everybody. You know, he wasn't simply seen as a Muslim brother figure. And also the rockets that they fire or Hamas used to fire into Israel, the Qassam rockets. Right. So that is probably the biggest way in which the revolt has resonance in the present.

[Martin DeCaro]

Maybe one other linkage we could talk about here is the failure of armed resistance.

[Ted Swedenberg]

You wonder at the time how people could have thought their way through it in a different way. Because if the repression from the military is so intense and, you know, your non violent, peaceful resistance along the lines of, you know, Gandhian resistance in India is not working, you can understand why people would take up arms and we're

[Martin DeCaro]

celebrating America 250, a violent revolt.

[Ted Swedenberg]

But you could also understand why somebody might have said, you know, the British are too strong and which, you know, ended up being the case. I don't know if Rashid writes this in a book in his book or not, but I'm sure that he's observed this, that, you know, in. In the interwar period, there were very few colonies that gained their independence, except for the Irish. Right. And the Irish. It was armed struggle. So I don't, you know.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, I'm not coming down on one side or the other. Although, of course.

[Ted Swedenberg]

Oh, no, no, it's a terrorism. I think a really interesting point to think about. Personally, I would prefer that things be done nonviolently. And I think the Intifado is a great example of successes of that.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, I mean, it got the Israelis to the negotiating table. Ultimately, although the Israelis violently crushed the first intifada too.

[Ted Swedenberg]

Ever since Harry Truman first recognized Israel, every American president, Democrat and Republican, has worked for peace between Israel and her neighbors. Now the efforts of all who have labored before us bring us to this moment, a moment when we dare to pledge what for so long seemed difficult even to imagine. That the security of the Israeli people will be reconciled with the hopes of the Palestinian people. And there will be more security and more hope for all.

[Martin DeCaro]

On the next episode of History As It Happens, Lebanon's Agony. We'll be joined by Maha Yaha from Baby Beirut. That is next. As we report History as it Happens, make sure to sign up for my free newsletter. Just go to substack and search. Well, you know it by now.

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