The Putin Dance (Clinton to Trump)

Summary

History As It Happens: The Putin Dance (Clinton to Trump) – Detailed Summary

Podcast Information:

• Title: History As It Happens
• Host: Martin Di Caro
• Episode: The Putin Dance (Clinton to Trump)
• Release Date: July 22, 2025

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Introduction

In the episode titled "The Putin Dance (Clinton to Trump)," Jeffrey Engel, the founding director of the Center for Presidential History at Southern Methodist University, alongside David Kramer, executive director of the George W. Bush Institute and an expert on Russia and Ukraine, delve into the intricate and evolving relationship between Vladimir Putin and five American presidents over a span of 25 years. The discussion unpacks how these interactions have shaped contemporary US-Russia relations, culminating in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

Early Relations Under Bill Clinton (June 2000 – 2001)

The relationship between the United States and Russia took a pivotal turn with Putin's ascension to power. In June 2000, during a meeting at St. George's Hall in the Kremlin, President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin sought common ground. Clinton viewed Putin as a potential partner to foster stability and cooperation between the two nations.

• Jeffrey Engel notes, “Clinton believed Russia under Putin could become a reliable partner for the West. His intentions were generally honorable and straightforward” (02:14).

However, underlying tensions existed, particularly concerning NATO enlargement and the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, which Moscow opposed vehemently. Rubin Kramer adds, “The Clinton administration hoped to normalize relations despite several points of friction, such as NATO’s eastward expansion” (19:37).

George W. Bush Administration (2001 – 2009)

George W. Bush's tenure marked a mix of engagement and escalating tensions. The initial meetings between Bush and Putin were cordial, with Bush expressing a desire for partnership.

• Vladimir Putin stated, “I found it to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue” (06:49).

Despite this, critical issues emerged. The Bush administration’s push for a missile defense system in Europe clashed with Russia’s security concerns. Additionally, Russia's intervention in Chechnya and later in Georgia in 2008 underscored the growing unpredictability of Putin's Russia.

• George W. Bush reflected, “NATO's action in 1999 demonstrated Russia’s decreased power within its self-perceived sphere of influence” (02:46).

Obama Administration Reset (2009 – 2017)

Barack Obama’s presidency was characterized by an attempt to "reset" US-Russia relations. The Obama administration sought cooperation on various fronts, including nuclear non-proliferation and climate change.

• Barack Obama emphasized, “America's most significant national security interests and priorities could be advanced most effectively through cooperation, not an adversarial relationship with Russia” (09:31).

However, the reset faced significant challenges. Russia’s actions, such as the 2014 annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine, severely strained relations. The Obama administration's reluctance to provide lethal aid to Ukraine and insufficient sanctions against Russia contributed to a decline in trust and cooperation.

• David Kramer critiques, “The Obama administration’s sanctions were not tough enough, and their refusal to supply lethal aid to Ukraine left Russia emboldened” (56:25).

Trump Administration (2017 – 2021)

Donald Trump’s presidency introduced a complex dynamic in US-Russia relations. Trump oscillated between praising Putin and facing allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 US election.

• Donald Trump asserted, “Russia doesn’t respect our president... I have nothing to do with Putin” (01:26).

Despite initial rhetoric aimed at mending fences, Trump's administration continued policies that both challenged and sought to cooperate with Russia. The provision of limited military assistance to Ukraine and targeted sanctions indicated a nuanced approach, yet pervasive mistrust remained.

• David Kramer observes, “Trump did not prioritize Ukraine and his impeachment over Ukraine-related issues influenced Putin’s perceptions of US vulnerability” (14:47).

Biden Administration (2021 – Present)

Joe Biden inherited deeply strained US-Russia relations, marked by accusations of election interference and aggressive stances on Ukraine.

• Joe Biden declared, “Putin is the aggressor. Putin chose this war and now he and his country will bear the consequences” (01:35).

The Biden administration took a more adversarial stance compared to its predecessors, emphasizing sanctions and diplomatic isolation. However, efforts to engage in dialogue continued, albeit with limited success in curbing Russia’s expansionist policies.

Current Conflict and Analysis (2025)

As of July 2025, Russia remains embroiled in a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with ongoing debates about responsibility and possible resolutions. The podcast emphasizes that Putin's strategic miscalculations and persistent authoritarianism have hindered diplomatic efforts.

• Jeffrey Engel summarizes, “Putin’s inability to partner with US leaders has led to an unnecessary war in Ukraine, highlighting failures on both sides” (01:42).

Key Insights:

• Evolution of Trust: Initial hopeful partnerships between Putin and early 2000s US presidents deteriorated due to conflicting interests and actions.
• Missile Defense and NATO Expansion: Central issues that consistently strained relations, perceived by Russia as direct threats to its sovereignty and security.
• Authoritarian Resurgence: Putin’s consolidation of power within Russia and aggressive foreign policies undermined previous cooperative efforts.
• Impact of Domestic Politics: US internal politics, including Trump's tumultuous relationship with Russia, influenced the broader diplomatic landscape.
• Ongoing Conflict in Ukraine: Represents the culmination of decades-old tensions, with no clear path to resolution as of the podcast’s release.

Conclusion

"The Putin Dance (Clinton to Trump)" intricately maps the trajectory of US-Russia relations over a quarter-century, illustrating how initial attempts at partnership were repeatedly undermined by strategic disagreements, power struggles, and conflicting visions for regional and global order. The episode underscores the complexities of diplomatic engagement with an authoritarian regime and the enduring impact of historical policies on present-day conflicts.

Notable Quotes:

• Bill Clinton: “I do not believe the decision before me is a threat to strategic stability and mutual deterrence.” (03:56)
• Vladimir Putin: “Russia must respect the freedom of its neighbors.” (08:38)
• Donald Trump: “What do I have to get involved with Putin for? I have nothing to do with Putin.” (13:14)
• Joe Biden: “We should be able to cooperate where it's in our mutual interest and where we have differences.” (15:32)
• George W. Bush: “The United States is one of our main partners and as far as Russia is concerned, we will not choose confrontation.” (03:22)

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For those interested in understanding the historical context of current US-Russia relations and the pivotal role played by Vladimir Putin, this episode offers a comprehensive and insightful exploration.

Transcript

[Martin DeCaro]

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[Jeffrey Engel]

History as it happens July 22, 2025 the Putin dance in Russia Today, the.

[David Kramer]

Clear winner of the Russian presidential election.

[Vladimir Putin]

Vladimir Putin, began to establish the Putin era.

[Bill Clinton]

President Yeltsin led Russia to freedom. Under President Putin, Russia has the chance to build prosperity and strength while safeguarding that freedom and the rule of law.

[Jeffrey Engel]

It's a new millennium, but the same.

[David Kramer]

Old savage war in Chechnya.

[Vladimir Putin]

Russia is not the enemy of the As a matter of fact, after our meeting today, I'm convinced it can be a strong partner and friend.

[Donald Trump]

Today, Russia has launched a full scale.

[George W. Bush]

Military invasion of Georgia.

[Barack Obama]

We want to reset our relationship. I know the press likes to focus on body language and he's got that kind of slouch, looking like the bored kid in the back of the classroom.

[George W. Bush]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russian troops spreading out throughout the strategic Crimean Peninsula.

[Donald Trump]

President Obama, Russia if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing.

[Joe Biden]

Putin is the aggressor. Putin chose this war and now he and his country will bear the consequences.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Over 25 years, Vladimir Putin is tangled with five American presidents, navigating the highs and lows of US Russia relations, objecting to American primacy while trying to restore Russian hegemony through violence in its near abroad. If US Leaders fail to convince Putin to become their partner, the autocrat in the Kremlin misjudged Russian power too. His army stuck in Ukraine, fighting an unnecessary war. Where it went wrong and who's responsible Next as we report history as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro.

[George W. Bush]

During the cold War, neither side could essentially move very far into each other's sphere of influence because of the fear of retaliation. In essence, each side kept the other side from moving. One of the things that the NATO action in 1999 demonstrated was that the Russians, for all their complaints, were not capable of forcing their own way. We're not capable of preventing NATO from acting the way it was. So it's a vivid demonstration of their decreased power within their own self perceived sphere of influence.

[Jeffrey Engel]

June 2000, St. George's hall, the Kremlin.

[Bill Clinton]

The President and I also discussed our common commitment to prevent the proliferation.

[Jeffrey Engel]

President Bill Clinton meets Russia's new president, Vladimir Putin, who's not the first time they'd met. The previous year they'd been face to face twice when Putin was Prime minister under Yeltsin. But in the new year, a new millennium. The former KGB officer was now at the top and looking for ways to work with the United States. They held a news conference with Putin speaking through an interpreter for today, the.

[George W. Bush]

United States is one of our main partners and as far as Russia is.

[Vladimir Putin]

Concerned, and it will never choose or.

[George W. Bush]

Make the choice regarding the United States in order to start once again confrontation. Never.

[Jeffrey Engel]

During those two days in Moscow, Clinton and Putin reached some agreements. For instance, to destroy weapons grade plutonium. But in a harbinger of future disagreements, Putin balked at a US plan to build a missile defense system. Not for the last time. What Western leaders viewed as defensive was seen as provocative, even hostile, by Moscow.

[Bill Clinton]

On the national missile defense stage one it is premature. I have the statement of principles that we have agreed to, I thought reflected an attempt to bring our positions closer together. I do not believe the decision before me is a threat to strategic stability and mutual deterrence. The Russian side disagrees, but we had a lot of agreement here. And again let me say, I urge you all to read that I do not want the United States to withdraw from the ABM regime because I think it has contributed to a more stable, more peaceful world.

[Jeffrey Engel]

In his 850 page biography of Putin, the author Philip Short says the defense system the Clinton administration proposed was on a modest scale, designed to stop a small number of incoming missiles carrying either nuclear or non nuclear warheads launched by rose states or even in theory, non state actors. The downside was that it would violate the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, which Russia regarded as the foundation of the entire edifice of nuclear arms control that had been painstakingly erected treaty by treaty since the first agreements had been signed in Moscow by Brezhnev and Richard Nixon 30 years before. In public, Putin tried to put a good face on it. Russia, he said, was ready to contribute to building a non strategic defense system that would be able to deal the medium range missiles that were all that countries like Iran, Iraq and North Korea would have for the foreseeable future. If Russia and the US pooled their efforts, they would protect both their territories and Western Europe. We hope, Putin said, that we'll be able to find a mutually acceptable solution. In private, he was much blunter. The US position was a major strategic miscalculation. He told Clinton, it amounts to cutting off your nose to spite your face. Again, that is Philip Short, and the book is titled Putin, published in 2022. So, on the issue of a new missile defense system, Washington and Moscow would never really see eye to eye. But even allies do not agree on everything. The US and Russia were not allies, but Presidents Clinton, Bush, Obama and Trump all hoped, at least at first, to cement better relations with the leader of this nuclear armed state. By the time Joe Biden entered the White House in 2021, the relationship had hit rock bottom.

[Joe Biden]

The fact is that I've gone head to head with Putin and made it clear to him we're not going to take any of his stuff.

[Jeffrey Engel]

In this podcast, we're going to try to cover 25 years of history, a story with a lot of surprises. You know, Donald Trump's been criticized for praising Putin despite his horrendous record. The wars in Chechnya, Georgia and Ukraine, the murders of regime opponents, you name it. Well, a quarter century ago, many of these crimes were yet to be committed. And in their first meeting in June 2001 in Slovenia, President George W. Bush gave Putin a rhetorical hug.

[Vladimir Putin]

I looked the man in the eye. I found it to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul, man, deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country. And I appreciated so very much the frank dialogue. There was no kind of diplomatic chit chat trying to throw each other off balance. There was a straightforward dialogue, and that's the beginning of a very constructive relationship. I wouldn't have invited him to my ranch if I didn't trust him.

[Jeffrey Engel]

A couple months later, after. After 9 11, Putin pledged his full support in the war on terrorism. But the invasion of Iraq angered the Kremlin, among other disagreements. As Bush's presidency wore on. So in 2007, at the Munich Security Conference, Vladimir Putin let the world see into his mind. We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law, said Putin. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming, coming increasingly closer to one state's legal system. One state, and of course, first and foremost, the United States has overstepped its national borders in every way, he said. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this? The following year, in the final months of Bush's presidency, Russia invaded Georgia. August 2008. So much for Putin's concern for international law, and this crisis would echo well into the future.

[Vladimir Putin]

Only Russia can decide whether it will now put itself back on the path of responsible nations or continue to pursue a policy that promises only confrontation and isolation. To begin to repair its relations with the United States and Europe and other nations, and to begin restoring its place in the world. Russia must respect the freedom of its neighbors.

[Jeffrey Engel]

As George W. Bush gave way to Barack Obama, it was time for another reset, because there were still plenty of reasons to find common ground. In anticipation of this important meeting and.

[Barack Obama]

Our time here together, I wanted to.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Present you with a little gift which.

[Barack Obama]

Represents what President Obama and Vice President.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Biden and I have been saying, and.

[Barack Obama]

That is we want to reset our relationship.

[George W. Bush]

Let's do it together.

[Jeffrey Engel]

So we will do it together. Back to Philip Short for a moment. Obama wrote a letter to Dmitry medvedev in mid February 2009. If Russia would help to ensure that Iran did not develop a nuclear weapon, he wrote, there would be no need for America to install a missile defense system in Europe, and Russia would then not need to install a countervailing force in Kaliningrad. So President Obama believed Russia was important. How important? Well, maybe not as important as it used to be. After all, the Cold War was long over, and Medvedev's rise to the presidency, with Putin taking the role of prime minister for four years, seemed to indicate cooperation was possible.

[Barack Obama]

We just concluded some excellent discussions, discussions that would have been unlikely just 17 months ago. As we've both said before, when I came into office, the relationship between the United States and Russia had drifted perhaps to its lowest point since the Cold War. There was too much mistrust and too little real work on issues of common concern that did not serve the interests of either country or the world. Indeed, I firmly believe that America's most significant national security interests and priorities could be advanced most effectively through cooperation, not an adversarial relationship with Russia.

[Jeffrey Engel]

So let's Skip ahead now four years. October 2012. Putin had already returned to the presidency that march sparking massive street protests in Russia. It is weeks before the American election, and Obama is debating Republican Mitt Romney.

[Barack Obama]

Governor Romney, I'm glad that you recognize that Al Qaeda is a threat, because a few months ago, when you were asked, what's the biggest geopolitical threat facing America, you said Russia, not Al Qaeda. You said Russia in the 1980s are now calling to ask for their foreign policy back because the Cold War has been over for 20 years.

[Mitt Romney]

Russia, I indicated, is a geopolitical number one. Excuse me, it's A geopolitical foe. And I said in the same, in the same paragraph, I said, and Iran is the greatest national security threat we face. Russia does continue to battle us in the UN Time and time again. I have clear eyes on this. I'm not going to wear rose colored glasses when it comes to Russia or Mr. Putin. And I'm certainly not going to say to him, I'll give him more flexibility after the election. After the election, he'll get more backbone.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Eighteen months after this exchange, Russian troops invaded Crimea March 2014, prompting President Obama.

[Barack Obama]

To say, America has got a whole lot of challenges. Russia is a regional power that is threatening some of its immediate neighbors not out of strength, but out of weakness. Ukraine has been a country in which Russia had enormous influence for decades, since the breakup of the Soviet Union. And we have considerable influence on our neighbors. We generally don't need to invade them in order to have a strong cooperative relationship with them. The fact that Russia felt compelled to go in militarily and lay bare these violations of international law indicates less influence, not more.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Like Clinton, Bush and Obama before him, Donald Trump wanted to mend Russian fences. But Trump, as we know, was dogged by allegations that his campaign had worked or colluded with Russian intelligence to help him win. And Trump did not help his image with moments like this.

[Donald Trump]

What do I have to get involved with Putin for? I have nothing to do with Putin. I've never spoken to him. I don't know anything about him other than he will respect me. He doesn't respect our president. And if it is Russia, which is probably not, nobody knows who it is. But if it is Russia, it's really bad for a different reason, because it shows how little respect they have for our country when they would hack into a major party and get everything. But it would be interesting to see. I will tell you this, Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing, or this one. People came to me. Dan Coats came to me and some others. They said they think it's Russia. I have President Putin. He just said it's not Russia. I will say this. I don't see any reason why it would be.

[Jeffrey Engel]

And meanwhile, during Trump's entire first term, Russia continued its separatist war in eastern Ukraine. The the one that had started right after Crimea. In his book Collisions, the historian Michael Kimmage writes, trump did not care about Ukraine. President Trump believed the annexation of Crimea and incursion of Russian soldiers elsewhere in Ukraine were of no consequence to the United states. And Kimmage argues Trump's Ukraine related impeachment in late 2019 also influenced Putin's sense that the US was too decrepit and divided to block him. Putin was glad to equate polarization under Trump with the decrepitude of democracy per se, says Kimmage.

[Donald Trump]

All of us here today do not want to see our election victory stolen by emboldened radical left Democrats, which is what they're doing and stolen by the fake news media. That's what they've done and what they're doing. We will never give up. We will never concede. It doesn't happen. You don't concede.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Whether it's U.S. russia relations did not improve under Joe Biden, who entered the White House committed to a more adversarial approach after calling Trump Putin's puppy relationship.

[Joe Biden]

That has to be stable and predictable and it should be able. We should be able to cooperate where it's in our mutual interest and where we have differences. I want a President Putin to understand why I say what I say and.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Why I do what I do. That was after the Biden Putin Summit in Geneva 2021. The following year, Russia launched its full scale invasion of Ukraine, a war Donald Trump promised to end in 24 hours after returning to the White House this January. As of this podcast, Russia has about 40 days left to end the war or face consequences.

[Donald Trump]

And I'm disappointed in President Putin because I thought we would have had a deal two months ago, but if it doesn't seem to get there. So based on that, we're going to be doing secondary tariffs. If we don't have a deal in 50 days, it's very simple and they'll be at 100%.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Well, that is not the entire story of the past 25 years, but we did cover a lot of ground and we've come a very long way not in the right direction since those heady days of the 1990s and early 2000s when Vladimir Putin was seen as a partner to make the world a more peaceful, stable place, with each side pointing the finger of blame at the other for why it did not turn out that way. Jeffrey Engel is the founding director of the center for Presidential History at Southern Methodist University and the author of when the world seemed George H.W. bush and the End of the Cold War. David Cramer is the executive director of the George W. Bush Institute and a leading expert on Russia and Ukraine. He worked in the State Department for the eight years of the George W. Bush Press presidency. Our conversation next History is defined by.

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[Jeffrey Engel]

Jeffrey Engel, welcome back, my friend.

[George W. Bush]

It's always good to see you.

[Jeffrey Engel]

And David Kramer, welcome your first time on the show. Great to have you here.

[David Kramer]

Thanks very much for having me. Appreciate it.

[Jeffrey Engel]

So Donald Trump is now the fifth or sixth if you count the non consecutive term separately, fifth president to deal with Vladimir Putin and the difficult contradictions in US Russia relations, why don't we begin with the Clinton administration? When Putin becomes Interim President in 2000, Bill Clinton calls him. They have a phone call. He considered him a potential partner with the west to pursue common interests. They weren't going to agree on everything, but they had some common interests after the disastrous Yeltsin years. David, since this is your first time on the show, I'll start with you. Why did Bill Clinton feel this way?

[David Kramer]

The Clinton administration had put forward several policies that were sources of great irritation for the Russian government. That started with NATO enlargement going back to 1997 when the offer was made, and then the formal accession into NATO for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. But then in particular, before Putin even became prime minister In August of 1999, there was the NATO bombing of Serbia going from March until June of 99. Really, the Russians strongly opposed. So there were sources of real friction in the relationship. The Clinton administration on its last year was hoping to restore some semblance of normalization in relations between Russia and the United States. That those two issues had caused some problems with secretary of State at the time. Madeleine Albright first traveled to Moscow, met with Putin, viewed him as someone that the United States could do business with, sounding a little like UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher talking about Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s. And then President Clinton also met with Putin twice. And the feeling was that this was somebody who was young, energetic, on top of his portfolio, and someone that the United States and the west could do business with.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Clinton telephoned Putin on New Year's Day 2000 to congratulate him on his appointment as acting president. According to Philip Short and his excellent biography of Vladimir Putin, Clinton believed Russia under Putin could become a reliable partner for the West. His intentions are generally honorable and straightforward. Clinton told Tony Blair, Jeffrey Engel, one big issue carrying over from the 1990s, and it lingered through the first decade of the 2000s and really probably into well into Obama's second term. And that is, where is the Russian Federation after the Cold War gonna fit in to the new security architecture of Europe? Warsaw Pact is gone, NATO is enlarging, and where is Russia gonna fall into this? If not a member of the club, then maybe a partner that would be consulted or have some decision making power in how the new security structure is gonna look.

[George W. Bush]

Partnership is really the right word that you use because we have to remember the broadest context possible, I think, which is that we're still in the Clinton years, still in the first few years of an embryonic suffering through economic strain and political strain. At the time I happen to have been In Russia in 1994, there was no food and there was chaos in the streets and there was pensioners selling their possessions on the streets. And as Clinton is dealing with trying to integrate Russia into the new security architecture, as you mentioned, and as Putin is trying to figure that out as well, remember that there's hope that there'll be another election after Putin. That's not an assured thing, in my opinion. The broader issue is NATO didn't have to enlarge, but the truth of matter is countries of Eastern Europe really desired NATO to enlarge. I look back on Vaclav Havel is the best example of this. When he first took office after the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, he immediately said, well, Czechoslovakia should be neutral. Within about a year he had completely changed his mind and said, I've thought about this more and we need to be integrated into the Western orbit. And Eastern Europeans were really quite explicit about this. Yes, there was going to be potential for gain and speedy democratization, speedier democratization by integrating into NATO, by integrating into the. Simultaneously into the European, European Union, if possible. But the truth of the matter is there was just a general sense that Russia was inevitably going to be revanchist, that Russia considered the Eastern Europe its sphere of influence. And the sooner that Eastern Europe managed to build a fence, not a wall, but a fence, fence you can kind of see through sooner that they would be able to build their own democracy. I go back, as everyone does, to the famous 1990 meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and James Baker, Secretary of State, in which, of course, Baker did famously say NATO would not move one inch to the eas. But I encourage people to read the entire transcript of that discussion that Discussion about NATO moving to the east also included discussion of the Soviet Union at that time, potential membership in NATO. Baker and Mikhail Gorbachev discussed whether or not, well, maybe we should include the Soviet Union. And they didn't say no. This is such a fluid moment in history, building a new security architecture while simultaneously trying to build the houses within it. And I'm unimpressed by the argument that Russia was forced into some kind of defensive posture, recast of NATO expansion. When people around you feel that they need protection from you, I think it's better to ask what's going on inside your head as opposed to theirs.

[David Kramer]

Jeff touched on the economic situation in Russia when he was there in 94.

[Jeffrey Engel]

He even got worse than that after. Yeah, go ahead.

[David Kramer]

The United States was widely criticized by many in Russia for its shock therapy approach to economic reform in Russia. Now, Russian government officials didn't have to take US advice, but they did. And so that contributed to a sense of resentment toward the United States. The United States was trying to weaken Russia. When you add that on top of NATO enlargement, when you add that on top of the bombing of Serbia, by the end of the Clinton administration, there was a view in Russia that the United States, after the Soviet Union collapsed, was trying to exploit Russian weakness that was exacerbated by the doddering, weak and drunken leadership of Boris Yeltsin. And so I think there were Russians, including Putin himself, who felt now is the time for Russia to reassert itself after being taken advantage of in the 90s decade.

[Jeffrey Engel]

George H.W. bush said, we won, they lost. Bill Clinton said, yeltsin's just gonna have to eat his spinach. So the United States did, to some degree, rub Russia's nose in it. There was humiliation there. But I just wanna. And Jeff, I know you wanna jump here, touch on an important point about NATO enlargement that began under Clinton and continued under George W. Bush. David, your former boss, you worked at the State Department for eight years of his preside. Putin opposed all of that. But he even said at the time, this is not the end of the world. Right. So there are contradictions in US Russia relations. Growing tensions on certain fronts, seeking cooperation on others. So Putin opposed those NATO enlargements, but he even said, it's not the end of the world. In effect, we're not gonna invade the Baltic states. Something that's underappreciated today is, as you say, the bombing of Kosovo in 1999. That seemed to anger the Russian establishment more so than the NATO enlargement would you agree? Bombing of Serbia, bombing of Serb, the assistance to the Kosovo. What was it? The Albanian ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

[David Kramer]

At the end of the Bush administration, of course, we recognized Kosovo independence. But just to back up a bit, Martin, if I can't. George H.W. bush was very careful in not declaring victory. I don't remember the Clinton administration telling the Russians to eat their spinach, although we did provide economic advice and this shock therapy approach that Jeffrey Sachs and others were involved in, and the United States was trying to be careful about not rubbing Russia's nose was in it. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were a number of initiatives undertaken, including the NATO Russia Council. As NATO was enlarging, there was the decision to bring Russia into the G7, making it the G8. So there were a number of efforts to welcome Russia into the international community, to try to find a rightful place as long as it abided by democratic norms and practices. And that's where I think the rub comes in. NATO enlargement, of course, was an issue that the Russians, Russians didn't like. But Jeff's point, I think is spot on, which is people in Moscow needed to figure out, why is it that Poles and Hungarians and Czechs, and the list goes on and on. The Baltic states felt the need to seek security guarantees and reassurance from NATO because of Russian revanchism. And their fears, as it's turned out, have been proven right.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Chechnya, the center of Grozny, is ablaze as Chechen rebels mount a desperate defense against.

[George W. Bush]

Against the Russians.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Russia's new leadership has intensified hostilities in Chechnya. Moscow claims to have made inroads against rebel. Engle. Go ahead, Jeffrey ENGEL.

[George W. Bush]

Yeah. The H.W. bush administration tried extraordinarily hard never to make the Soviets feel as though they had lost. In fact, this is a key point, because if we want to understand Soviet and then subsequently Russian psychology, we have to understand that the Soviet people did not think that they lost the Cold War, or at least did not think that they surrendered in the Cold War. They thought that they had voluntarily taken on the incredibly difficult task of transforming themselves in order to be better partners for the future. Remember, Mikhail Gorbachev, throughout his last years in office, spoke frequently about a common European home bridge, east and West. And the Soviet people thought by taking on perestroika and glasnost and other reforms, that they were going to essentially concede that the other side had a better policy, had a better approach, and themselves make the change. You know, I. I keep thinking about Woodrow Wilson, as I often do, his point at the end of World One, where he said it, stressed that it's very important that the German people not feel that they were defeated, because if they feel that they were defeated and subsequently embarrassed and so on, that would create a revanchist desire, that would create unsettled anger that would linger until the next war. Well, the truth of the matter is the Clinton administration tried very hard, the Bush administration tried very hard to make sure that the Russian people did not feel defeated. But the truth is, things sucked. It was an extraordinarily difficult economic and political time. And it's not hard to understand the psychology of the average Russian who says to himself, we did not surrender. We held out our hand in partnership, and look, now I'm starving, and look, now I have chaos in the streets. It must be the West's fault. And there were a lot. At one point, there were a lot of calculations done by the Bush administration and earlier Clinton administration. Yes, we need to find some amount of money to give as aid to the Soviets and then the Russians to show that we are cooperative partners, but there literally is not enough money in the world to make that transition from communism to democracy, that any money you put in is essentially going to be lost. So where can we find the sweet spot where the Russian people will feel that they have been helped, even though we know we're not actually helping?

[David Kramer]

Keep in mind what you've referenced several times about what was happening inside Russia, and that's critically important. In October 1993, Yeltsin ordered Russian forces to fire on the Russian parliament. In 1994, Russia invaded Chechnya, a republic that was part of Russia, and thousands of Chechens were killed. And the 1996 presidential election was largely rigged after Yeltsin was suffering from terrible health problems. So over the period of the 1990s, the United States was clearly giving Russia the benefit of the doubt and in some respects, almost sweeping the human rights problems in Russia under Yeltsin, not just waiting until Putin, but under Yeltsin, under the rug in the interest of trying to maintain good US Russian relations as much as possible.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Russia was never a democracy, truly. I mean, after the firing on the Russian White House. And what was that again? 93, I think that was it. Now, about the bombing in Serbia, 1999, it wasn't only that the Russians saw the Serbs as brothers, it was the principle of it. NATO operating outside theater is what it is called. And I'm not sure the UN Security Council gave the okay to that operation. Too, that really rankled, killed the Russians and was returned to a point that Putin and others returned to repeatedly over time. Maybe we'll, we'll get back to that in a bit because I do want to move on here. So Clinton gets, I'll just say very.

[David Kramer]

Quickly though, if I can. Of course, the U. N. Security council didn't give authorization because Russia would have vetoed that.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Sure, that's right. Well, yeah, that is a good point.

[George W. Bush]

But again, the, the example you come to is actually that you offer is really important because during the cold war, neither side could essentially move very far into each other's sphere of influence because of the fear of retaliation. And essence, each side kept the other side from moving. One of the things that the NATO action in 1999 demonstrated was that the Russians, for all of their complaints, were not capable of forcing their own way. We're not capable of preventing NATO from acting the way it was. So it's a, it's a vivid demonstration of their decreased power within their own self perceived sphere of influence.

[David Kramer]

Let's also be careful not to give Slobodan Milosevic a pass on this. It isn't as if NATO woke up one day and decided, hey, let's bomb.

[George W. Bush]

Serbia, that'd be fun.

[David Kramer]

Milosevic was trying to destroy Kosovo as a province of the broken up Yugoslavia and basically obliterate any independence movement there. And so this was in response to what Milosevic was doing. It isn't as if NATO just woke up one day and said this would be nice to do. Let's screw the Russians in the process.

[Jeffrey Engel]

No, it's important context to add. My point here is just trying to understand why there were feelings of resistance, resentment, humiliation on the part of the Russians. You know, the way we see things is not the way we United States. It's not the way they view it from Moscow. Right. And that's what we're trying to understand here, continuities from one era to the next. We think of the past as discrete eras, but the Soviet Union was gone, but you still had a Russian federation and a country that wanted to be powerful again. I mean, there was no, in my view, no systematic ideology underpinning Putinist. It was simply a restoration of Russian state power and Russian greatness. So Putin and Bush, Slovenia, June 2000. This is their first meeting six months into 2001. 2001, yes. The election was in 2000. So 2001, we're still not in the 911 era here. They meet in Slovenia. George Bush looked into Vladimir's soul And.

[Vladimir Putin]

I believe what people will see is a stretch, a joint strategy. The president is a history major, and so am I. And we remember the old history. It's time to write new history in a positive and constructive way.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Condoleezza Rice after this. David said she cringed when she heard those lines, but apparently the President, your former boss, was just trying to relax the mood and get along well with somebody that he thought that he'd have to work with over the next four or eight years. Did President George W. Bush see Putin as Clinton did? A potential partner?

[David Kramer]

A couple things. One, this was the first meeting the two had, and you're absolutely right. It's important to put in the context that it was before 9 11, which, by the way, Putin was the first foreign leader to contact President bush after the 911 terrorist attacks. The issue about a cross that Putin had came up in the course of their conversation. And I think that's what triggered the President's comments about looking into his eyes and getting a sense of his soul.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Putin had told them a story in their private meeting before the news conference that a crucifix or a cross that he had been wearing was recovered from a fire that had burned down his house at some point. And that touched George W. Bush, who was a born again Christian. But go ahead.

[David Kramer]

It's obviously an indication of the research Putin, who came up through the ranks, although not at the highest levels of kgb, had done in preparation for his meeting with President Bush, appealing to his religious faith. And so the two had the meeting in June. Slovenia. Putin came to the United States in November of 2001 following the 911 attacks. And President Bush already had in mind the idea in June when they first met, that he wanted to create a missile defense system that he also understood would require the United States to withdraw from the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty. That was something that would be a source of friction between the United States and Russia. So in. In mid-2001, President Bush had an interest in trying to get off on a good foot with Putin, giving him the benefit of the doubt. Again, one could argue critics of the early approach. Late Clinton administration, early Bush administration was the second invasion of Chechnya, starting in 1999, following four very suspicious bombings in Russia that killed 300 people that the Kremlin blamed on Chechen terrorists. So from the end of the Clinton administration to the beginning of the Bush administration, we kind of looked the other way amid what was happening in Chechen, which was an unmitigated human rights disaster.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Yeah, Grozny was destroyed and thousands were killed. But you know, Jeff, I know you want to jump in here, but from the Russian point of view, the Putin point of view, after the 1990s, they were angry about what Philip Shorp refers to as a drat de regard. The United States felt it had a right to inspect Russia's near abroad. And Putin said, this is our backyard. Now, as I mentioned, Grozny was flattened, but from Moscow's point of view, this is our backyard. You have your backyard and now you're pushing this missile defense system that's going to throw off, well, not only violate the abm, but throw off the nuclear balance in the world. The relationship had strains already.

[George W. Bush]

Yes. And I think it's important to remember that before the shocking and tragic events of 9 11, ballistic missiles were the big issue that the Bush administration was confronting, or at least that the world perceived was the biggest issue for the Bush administration going forward. So this is not a small concern. Turn. But I'm on record as finding some places to critique George W. Bush's foreign policy, but this is not one of them, because I think we need to remember again that this is an effort by Bush when he says, I looked into his soul. Not a great line, I'll grant you, but an effort to help the Russians feel welcome and to not rub their nose in it. To not tell them to eat their spinach, do not tell them, we won, you lost. It was a public statement at the end of a meeting. This is a line where he said, look, I'm new to this job. He's been in this job a relatively short time, too. It's a new 21st century. Let's work together. And saying that your partner is a guy who you can work with is the lowest hanging fruit possible.

[Jeffrey Engel]

From Putin's perspective, he thought terrorism was a. Was a problem that the United States should have been paying more attention to going back years into the Clinton administration, not these old Cold War type issues like ballistic missiles and things like this and NATO enlargement that he saw as unnecessarily provocative. Whether that's right or wrong, that's how he saw it. So this anti terrorism partnership springs up, but this also eventually sours as well. Why do you think that happened?

[David Kramer]

We had very different definitions and approaches to terrorism. The Russian authorities viewed Chechens as terrorist. They considered any method whatsoever as permissible to deal with that kind of threat. After 9 11, Putin was hoping that the United States would change its thinking, agreed that Chechens were terrorists and should be dealt with. However, the Kremlin felt appropriate. There was, as Jeff mentioned, and the support for our efforts in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was a source of embarrassment for Russia and the Soviet Union, of course, with the withdrawal from Afghanistan just a little over a decade before. For Putin, he was hoping that the United States and Russia could get on the same foot and deal with this threat. The problem is the way the Russians approached it versus the way we approached it. There was clear evidence that the 911 attack came from Al Qaeda based in Afghanistan with the Taliban support. So Russia initially was supportive of what we were trying to do. That didn't last terribly long because the Russians wanted us to approve what they were doing in Chechnya and we were not going to do so.

[Jeffrey Engel]

And Jeffrey Engel, Putin opposed the Iraq invasion by the United States, as we.

[George W. Bush]

All know, as did many other countries. Two things. First, he was concerned about destabilizing an inherently unstable region, but also the presumption for most people in 2001, or rather the question was, is it right and proper and a good policy for the United States to lead a coalition to remove Saddam Hussein, excuse me, 2003, nobody was really questioning whether or not the United States and its coalition would win. What Putin did not need, in his opinion, was another demonstration of US power. You know, to, to the earlier point about Afghanistan. Remember the Russians, the Soviets left Afghanistan with their tail between their legs in the late Gorbachev period. Here it was that the United States came in and at least in the first year, in 2002, going into 2003, look like they had managed to restabilize and perhaps even get on the road to democratization for Afghanistan with remarkably little loss and resources of American lives and, and treasure. So the last thing that Putin wanted in 2003 was another demonstration that here the Russians had failed in a place that the Americans could be successful.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Yeah, I'm not defending Russian imperialism, but from Putin's perspective, he says the west is hypocrites. You're telling us we can't do what we want. You're going to go ahead and do these things.

[George W. Bush]

I really have to just double down on David's point that Vladimir Putin was more than happy to say we are in the anti terrorist business with you because that gave him rear reign to use tactics and methods against his own opponents by calling them terrorists than he would have had otherwise. And giving the United States access to bases and to overflight rights to get to its forces in Afghanistan was an easy way to buy, he thought, you know, the opportunity to not only a, yes, build goodwill, b he didn't mind when Al Qaeda was killed, and C, make sure that the United States owed him something, if you will, to overlook his own war crimes.

[Jeffrey Engel]

David Kramer One theme that comes up in Philip Schwartz treatment of Putin's life is, is during the Bush administration, Putin was often puzzled about who was making decisions in Washington because he did seem to get along on a personal level with George W. Bush, and he didn't understand why, from his perspective, there continued to be these points of tension or these contradictions or unnecessarily provocative moves. I mean, you can answer this definitively. It was Bush who was making the decisions, not other people inside the administration or wherever.

[David Kramer]

I have no doubt it was George W. Bush who was making decisions in his administration without question. But it's also important to remember that there was, I think, an important moment in October 2003 that President Bush understood as reflecting on Putin's character and who he really was. And that was the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the richest oligarch in Russia. And Putin's view was going after the biggest fish in the pond would send a signal to the other fish, he doesn't have to arrest everyone. But for President Bush, and I described this in my book Back to Containment, dealing with Putin's regime, this was an important point because it reflected that Putin was going to do pretty much anything he had to in order to stay in power. Early on, starting with Chechnya, continuing with the arrest of Khodorkovsky, the crackdown on media, the takeover at TV stations, Putin, increasingly, early in his tenure, not just when he came back after serving as prime minister, early in his tenure, was showing authoritarian tendencies and cracking down inside Russia. And that complicated the relationship that President Bush was trying to establish with him.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Let me stay with you, David. The 04 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Putin saw this as Western interference, said the same thing in 2011 when Russians took to the streets to protest the Duma elections. That may have been corrupt. And also his decision to return to the presidency after four years of Medvedev. And he also said that 2014 protests, the Maidan Revolution, were inspired by the west or paid or orchestrated by the CIA, what have you. But let's stay with the 04 Orange Revolution. How important is this in this story we're trying to tell on this podcast?

[David Kramer]

You have to back up actually to even 2003 with the rose Revolution in Georgia. That was the first Color Revolution, then the Orange revolution revolution in November 2004 in Ukraine, followed by the Tulip Revolution, which was a little different in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Putin, of course, rejected the idea that Georgians, Ukrainians, Kyrgyz, on their own could rise up against corrupt authoritarian leaders. And Viktor Yanukovych was a corrupt prime minister under the presidency of Leonid Kuchma. When Yanukovych tried to steal the November 2004 Ukrainian election, Ukrainians on their own turned out in the streets. By the way, it wasn't George W. Bush who went and stood with Victor Yushchenko, who was Yanukovych's opponent in that election several times during the election. It was Vladimir Putin who stood with Victor Yanukovych several times during that election. It was the Russians who were trying to tip the election in yanukovych's favor in 2004, not the United States. And the United States didn't give any, Any signal for Ukrainians to turn out in the streets. I was in the State Department at the time, and I can tell you we were struggling to keep up with what was happening in Ukraine as Ukrainians on their own were moving out into the streets to protest a stolen election. And then if you fast forward to the other events, 2011 and December 2011, falling rigged parliamentary elections in Russia, there were massive protests against that. And then Putin's announcement, of course, that he was planning a return to the presidency in what would be a rigged election in 2012. Russians were getting fed up with it. Putin, of course, refuses to believe that Russians on their own, just like Ukrainians on their own, are capable of doing so. Unless Hillary Clinton, who was the Secretary of State at the time, gave the signal for them to turn out in the streets. It's preposterous. But the Russians have to go with that narrative because they don't want Russians to believe, believe people in the countries along their borders are capable of doing such things.

[Jeffrey Engel]

It's also a reflection of how Putin sees the world, right? He sees all politicians the way I guess he might see himself. Cynical, manipulative, in it for themselves, and willing to foment unrest in somebody else's country.

[George W. Bush]

Can I go back to our good and classic friend George Kennan for a.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Moment, who was against NATO expansion, as we know, because it would be provocative. But go ahead.

[George W. Bush]

Yeah, that's later.

[Jeffrey Engel]

That's the Kenan view, but go ahead.

[George W. Bush]

By the way, one important lesson on Kennan. He's against whatever everybody else is in favor of. That's just the rule.

[Jeffrey Engel]

NATO's expansion to Ukraine in the Russian mindset is a lot different than these other countries which the Russians were willing to swallow. Ukraine is A different category, but go ahead.

[George W. Bush]

I just want to say that one of the things that Cannon pointed out underlying his entire career in many ways, is that we need to understand that the Soviets are basically Russia. And the Russians going back through the czars have a basic level of security perception, and the most important of which is in the 20th century, making sure that no one else dominates the European continent but them. The more power that is concentrated, whether it's American power, whether it's Nazi power, whether it's subsequently NATO power, the more power that's concentrated, the less freedom of action the Russians are going to have. We shouldn't be surprised in some way that whether or not it's friendly or unfriendly, you know, Canon would tell us, looking in the long picture, that of course the Russians are going to be upset because of a concentration of their adversaries that's not even used word adversaries of their cohabitants on the continent. Doing well does not bode well for Russia's sense of its own power.

[Jeffrey Engel]

It doesn't want a free and democratic Ukraine next week. Go ahead, David.

[David Kramer]

Oh, absolutely right. Look, Putin and the Kremlin deny agency of the people in their countries next to them. They think these people are second class, that they are incapable of doing anything on their own own. And the only way that they would turn out in the streets and protest for an end to corruption, an end to authoritarianism, is if some outside force, I. E. The United States, was urging them on. But. But your point, Martin, is exactly right. A democratic, thriving, successful Ukraine integrated into the Euro Atlantic community would, in Putin's mind, pose a threat to the corrupt authoritarian system that he was runs in Russia. He worries that should Russians see Ukrainians succeed, Russians would say, fellow Slavic nation people, why are they succeeding and we can't? And so to him, I think that was the main source and reason for his decision to move into Ukraine in 2014.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Some of the other Russian specialists and experts I've had on the show have echoed your view there. When you look at what not just Putin, Russian politicians, military figures, commentators have said, it's not all about feelings of insecurity when it comes to NATO enlargement. There's also imperialism in what they say and in their attitudes as well. One more point, though, about Bush and Putin, because this is a really important sequence of events. The 2007 Munich Security Conference speech where Putin says, enough of unipolarity. We want the same autonomy the west claims for itself. At least that's how I interpret his Munich security conference speech followed. The next year, 2008, George W. Bush at the Bucharest conference where he calls for a NATO membership action plan for Georgia and Ukraine. Months later, Russia invaded Georgia on a pretext.

[Vladimir Putin]

Bucharest. We must make clear that NATO welcomes the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine for their membership in NATO and also offers them a clear path forward to meet that goal.

[David Kramer]

The flare up's the worst fighting in years between the former Soviet republic of Georgia and a breakaway region called South Ossetia, which Moscow supports and has vowed to protect.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Do you see causal connection between these things, David Cramer?

[David Kramer]

Well, let's be clear. Georgia in Ukraine asked for a membership action plan. It wasn't as if President Bush woke up one day and said this would be nice to do, in fact.

[Jeffrey Engel]

But he didn't necessarily have to make that announcement, did he?

[David Kramer]

Ukraine and Georgia formally requested a membership action plan and the President of the United States felt that doing so was in the best interest of the United States. The NATO alliance, in response to what the Ukrainians and Georgians wanted. The NATO summit, however, in Bucharest in 2008 couldn't find agreement on that. So Chancellor Merkel of Germany and President Bush went to the side and came up with language that said Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO. NATO. It didn't say when, didn't say how, and it did not offer either country a membership action plan. Russia, in my view, was so focused on three letters, MAP Membership Action Plan, that when NATO didn't offer that, my interpretation is they viewed that as backing off in support for both Georgia and Ukraine. And as a result, they felt the door was open for them to move against President Saakashvili of Georgia, whom Putin despised. And they invaded Georgia in August 2008. I think it was the failure to offer a membership action plan rather than the language that came out of the communique that triggered the Russian invasion of Georgia.

[Vladimir Putin]

These two nations inspired the world with their Rose and Orange revolutions, and now they're working to consolidate their democratic gains and cement their independence. Welcoming them into the Mato and through the membership action Plan would send a signal to their citizens that if they continue on the path to democracy and reform and reform, they will be welcomed into the institutions of Europe.

[George W. Bush]

Essentially, they said, we are worried about our neighbor and we would like to have some assurance against our neighbor. And the Russian response is, oh, we'll give you something to worry about. We struggle, I think, as Americans, because there is such an ingrained over many centuries sense that we can control our own destiny. It bothers us that we can't find something that, you know, if we had done this better, then the Russians would have acted really differently, perhaps nicer. But at the end of the day, one country is belligerent and has invaded its neighbors and said that its neighbors are not legitimate countries, are not actual countries, countries that are in the United nations and countries that have asked us to respect their sovereignty. That's where I think the onus of the conflict needs to lie.

[Jeffrey Engel]

However, Georgia in NATO. So, first of all, how is the west, how is Europe going to defend Georgia? Given the geopolitics and where Georgia is on the map, isn't it fair to say that the Russians and Putin understood the west is not going to die for Georgia? Same with Ukraine as well. It's a difficult place to defend.

[George W. Bush]

It's not their choice to make. The Kremlin does not get to decide how Georgians want to live their lives, nor how who Americans think they want to aid.

[Jeffrey Engel]

But if you throw this idea out there and then, as David said, back off from. From it, it's the worst of both worlds. You've kind of left Ukraine. Ukraine and Georgia are now in a limbo. Russia's been antagonized and the west is not going to spill blood. I mean, there are no European troops fighting in Ukraine now three and a half years into the war. We should move on, though. Jeffrey Engel, what was the Obama reset supposed to accomplish? What were they Resetting?

[George W. Bush]

Resetting. The fact that there had been tensions that had built up. We had gone from 2001 to President Bush saying, you know, I looked into his eyes and saw a good man all the way to 2007, 2008, where that same good man is declaring that the end of the Soviet Union is the greatest calamity of the 20th century and also declaring that the west is acting unilaterally. List and we don't want.

[Jeffrey Engel]

And the Georgia war is happening. It happened in 08. Anyway.

[George W. Bush]

What Obama was trying to do and remember Obama's entire foreign policy for his first two years was to reset everywhere. Reset everything. Obama wins the Nobel Peace Prize. In his first years in office, the only accomplishment he had was that he was not George W. Bush. The world wanted a reset, or at least Europe or at least the people who made the Nobel Peace Prize decision wanted a reset. So the fact that Obama and Secretary Clinton would come in and say, boy, you know, the previous guys had a lot of tension. Let's see if we can work together better, I think that's only a natural response.

[Jeffrey Engel]

David it seems to me that President Obama did not want Russia to be a foreign policy priority. He wanted to focus on other parts of the world. And he did have have big things on his plate when he entered office. Wars in Iraq, Afghanistan. He also wanted to do a pivot to Asia. But he also didn't seem to want to take Putin seriously either. What is your view of the Obama view? It doesn't seem that Obama really ever took Putin as seriously as he should have.

[David Kramer]

Well, no, because he was focused on Dmitry Medvedev. And I think mistakenly, President Obama and his administration believed that developing closer ties between Obama and Medvedev, Medvedev would boost Medvedev, when in fact, I think the opposite was the case. That painted a bigger bullseye on Medvedev in Putin's mind. The Obama administration was interested in working with Russia on Iran, arms control, climate, other kinds of issues. And they viewed Russia as a vehicle to accomplish their aims. You're right that the reset was announced In February of 2009, just months after the Russian invasion of Jordan. That was viewed as giving Russia a pass on that. The main thing was that President Obama was focused on his counterpart. So I get that Medvedev was sitting in the seat of the president, but Putin, of course, was not just lurking nearby, but he was really calling the shots. Except when it came to one issue, at least in Putin's telling, and that was the decision to abstain and the UN Security Council. When the issue of Libya came up in 2011, and that may have been the final tipping point for Putin to determine that Medvedev was finished as president and that he, Putin, was going to come back. That then basically ended the reset, which was already weakening quite a bit by that point. And then, of course, you have the situation in Ukraine in 2014, when President.

[Barack Obama]

Putin, who was Prime Minister when Medvedev was president, came back into power, I think we saw more rhetoric on the Russian side that was anti American, that played into some of the old stereotypes about the Cold War contest between the United States and Russia. And I've encouraged Mr. Putin to think forward as opposed to backwards on those issues, with mixed success.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Obama did, did drop the missile defense system that was planned for Eastern Europe, right?

[David Kramer]

He did. And he didn't view recognition of Kosovo independence as the right thing, although he did not undo that. But he did drop the missile defense system. And there were efforts to try to placate the Russians and address their concerns and criticism of the policy of the Bush administration. But that too didn't work because Putin was never Happy. You have to remember also that in addition to the invasion of Georgia in 2008, Putin had given the orders essentially to poison Alexander Litvinenko. In 2006, in London, he had a Russian journalist, Anna Politkovskaya, killed. The domestic situation inside Russia continued to deteriorate from President Bush's administration to President Obama's administration. And that too became a source of friction, including the Porsche Ford war passage in the U.S. congress of the Sergei Magnitsky legislation that imposed sanctions on Russia. Needless to say, that became a source of friction between the US And Russia.

[Jeffrey Engel]

I'm sensing from both of your comments here that through these years, Clinton, Bush, Obama, Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin viewed itself as acting in good faith. They want to be partners or have a say in the new emerging security structure in Europe and all these other issues we've talked about in Middle East, North Africa, what have you. But he really wasn't operating in good faith.

[George W. Bush]

Well, I think he, like, honestly, basically every leader in history put his own country's priorities first. When Donald Trump said, by the way, taking a line from Woodrow Wilson, though I'm not sure Trump realizes that was the case. American policymakers and American citizens should be America first, he was basically articulating the basic fundamental line that every policymaker around the world has. So, yes, Vladimir Putin perceived the world through how to make make Russia best. So did every other leader around the world. And it's also important to remember by the end of the Obama administration, President Obama, who granted had grown frustrated with Russian policy, also said the quiet part out loud, which is that Russia at that time was not a global power, it was a regional power.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Putin was the bored kid in the back of the classroom, just took over Crimea. The board kid did, but was whatever.

[George W. Bush]

The United States has influence in the Middle east, has influence in Southeast Asia, have influence in Taiwan, et cetera, et cetera. And the the Russians as a regional power are working in their own backyard.

[Jeffrey Engel]

But what was the United States supposed to do about this issue in 2014? Not just the invasion of Crimea, but then the war in Eastern Ukraine as well.

[Barack Obama]

We're not going to go to war with Russia. The Ukrainians don't want that. We don't want that. Russia's decision to send troops into Crimea has rightly drawn global condemnation. And what Russia has done in Crimea and what they have been threatening to do with respect to other parts of Ukraine is a violation of Ukrainian sovereignty.

[Jeffrey Engel]

I mean, do either of you have have an alternative to the tact that not just Obama, but Angela Merkel as well took, and that was not to come down too hard on Russia.

[David Kramer]

You have to remember that the Obama administration at that time was still interested in working with Russia on an Iran nuclear deal and, and didn't want to do anything that would ruin that possibility. What I think the Obama administration should have done is to have provided lethal military assistance to Ukraine to help it defend itself against Russia's invasion of the Donbass region. That's what the Ukrainians were asking for. And the Obama administration repeatedly said no. The sanctions regime, while pretty significant, was not tough enough either. And so the red line that the Obama administration drew in Syria that got released, increasingly, Putin was of the view that he could get his way. And so I think the whole series of events led to a situation that continued into the Trump administration. It was interesting that it was President Trump in December 2017 who did agree to provide lethal military assistance, even as he was trying to establish very cordial relations with Putin. And then, of course, things continued into the Biden administration with a full scale invasion. The withdrawal from Afghanistan by the United States and allies in August of 21 did not help the situation in discouraging Putin from thinking that he could get away with a full scale invasion.

[Jeffrey Engel]

So the 2016, 2017 Trump Putin dance. I hesitate to touch on this because it is such a fraught subject. Tulsi Gabbard is now accusing the Obama administration of treason. Blah, blah, blah. If we believe that Putin wanted Trump to win, regardless how effective or ineffective Russian disinformation was in the 2016 campaign, why would Putin want Trump to be the president?

[George W. Bush]

I think. I don't think that the Russians expected Trump to win. I don't actually think that they helped Trump, which they clearly did, with their disinformation campaigns and whatnot. Not so much in hope that they would tip the outcome, but in hope that they would sow the seeds of dissent within the United States, that the United States would be less stable, and that Hillary Clinton would therefore be less powerful when she came into office. I'm still of the belief, though he would never admit it, that President Trump, when he began running in 2015, didn't actually think he was going to win.

[Jeffrey Engel]

And not unlike his predecessors, Trump also comes into office wanting to improve relations with Russia. Why? It continues to be the subject of ferocious debate. What we do know is bad enough, right? There was a Russian disinformation campaign. The journalist Tim Weiner says on social media, Russian accounts were able to spread tens of millions of falsehoods. Now they may not have changed a single vote, not one when Trump defeated Hillary Clinton. But the point is the intention. What mistakes is Donald Trump making today? Maybe repeating the mistakes of past presidents and trying to deal with Vladimir Putin.

[George W. Bush]

You know, I don't know that he is in the sense that again, I put the onus for bad behavior on the perpetrator, not on the victims or not on the victim's neighbors.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Sure. But negotiation involves two sides and Trump does want to try to end, at least this is what he said. He wants to end the war.

[George W. Bush]

And I think it's very clear that no matter what Donald Trump says at this particular moment In July of 2025, Vladimir Putin appears uninterested in ending the war. In the same way that you just said it takes two to negotiate and it takes two to have a relationship. It also takes two to make peace. If either side chooses not to stop fighting, the fighting will not stop, no matter what the President United States says.

[Jeffrey Engel]

So I've been thinking about what it might take to mediate an end to the war, if not a complete peace treaty, at least a ceasefire here. And yes, to date, Putin has not been interested in ending the war if he believes that he's winning. Right. I think from the American President, we should expect at least some consistency, some real considered thought and work on the issue. And I think it is a positive that President Trump now seems to believe that it is Putin, not Ukraine, who's responsible for what's happening.

[George W. Bush]

I agree 1000%. And the Russians, by the way, are aware of this. When President Trump earlier this month announced a 50 day deadline for a ceasefire, the Russian Foreign Minister responded by saying, we've had deadlines of a day, we've had deadlines of a week, we've had deadlines of a month. Numbers are just numbers. Deadlines are just deadlines.

[Jeffrey Engel]

So the tariffs on Russian exports to the U.S. the amount of trade between the U.S. and Russia is really small. It's insignificant. So that would not hurt the Russian economy. However, the secondary tariffs on business Russia does with China, India, Turkey, that could cause trouble. And there's also now the issue of having Europeans send their weapons to Ukraine for its defense and then they will buy to replenish their own stocks. They'll buy weapons from U.S. weapons manufacturers. So that's the new Trump policy for now. Even a skilled statesman would have difficulty mediating an end to the war. But from my point of view, going on is pointless. But neither side seems capable of a breakthrough. Right. The front lines have barely moved since mid-2020. Two, so there is an incentive, if not again, for a final settlement of the whole thing, for at least a ceasefire. And while on the one hand that could benefit Russia, gives it time to regroup. It also gives Ukraine valuable time to regroup. It is the smaller country. It has more manpower issues. Issues. Right. It relies for all of its weapons on outside powers. Russia's also relying on some outside help as well. Iran, the drones, North Korea missiles, et cetera. Right. However, I think it would benefit Ukraine to have a pause in the action. So there is, I think, an opening there.

[George W. Bush]

I will go back to something you said earlier, that American policy is generally, historically, traditionally benefited from consistency and from openness and from a willingness to live up to whatever we say and then not change what we say. Say with the next tweet. Donald Trump would of course say, if you say that previous administrations did it this way, I want to do it differently because my administration is different. I am different. I am a different kind of player. But when Donald Trump said on the campaign trail that he could end the Ukrainian Russian fight in 24 hours, he has subsequently said he was speaking sort of broadly, metaphorically. Nobody should take him literally. That was not how it was interpreted and that was not how it was meant. Remember, Donald Trump said he was going to do any number of things. He was going to improve health care immediately, bring down prices immediately, stop the.

[Jeffrey Engel]

War immediately based on his personal relationship with Putin.

[George W. Bush]

This is classic. It's just that Donald Trump takes it to another level. The candidate that is the opponent to the administration, they can say whatever the heck they want. They can promise whatever the heck they want because they don't have to prove it unless they win, which is the point of saying things in the first place. So the candidates who are fighting to get a position don't have to live with as much reality, if you will, as others. Now, again, Donald Trump takes that to a whole nother level. Had he said, when I get into office, I will make it my first priority to bring Ukraine and Russia to the table and try to solve this problem. And I have personal relationships with both and I think I can do this, that would have been a same meaning as saying, I can end this in 24 hours. But Donald Trump prefers the latter. Bombastic language.

[Vladimir Putin]

We have a unique opportunity to address the true threats of the 21st century century together. We have a great moment during our tenures to cast aside the suspicions and doubts that used to plague our nations. And I'm committed to do so. I said in Poland, I'll say it again. Russia is not the enemy of the United States. And as a matter of fact, after our meeting today, I'm convinced it can be a strong partner and friend, more so than people could imagine.

[Jeffrey Engel]

On the next episode of History as it happens, the living hell in Haiti. Remember new episodes every Tuesday and Friday. My newsletter every Friday. Sign [e-mail] and we're on Facebook now, too.

[George W. Bush]

It.