Martin DeCaro (2:15)

The story of Soviet influence in the Middle east after the end of the Second World War begins with a setback. Under US and international pressure, Stalin withdrew the Red army from northern Iran.

News Reporter (2:28)

This is the climax to the meeting convened to preserve world unity. The Russians leave, vowing not to participate in any discussion that concerns the Iranian question at this time. With the Russian position left unoccupied, the meeting continues while the representatives prepare to consider Iran's presentation.

Historical Narrator (2:46)

Iran has suffered and is at this moment, suffering from interference in its internal affairs through the intervention of Soviet agents, Soviet officials and armed forces. The presence of foreign forces in any country constitutes not only an infringement of the sovereignty, but also a heavy burden on the people and an interference in their daily life.

Martin DeCaro (3:10)

After Stalin's death in 1953, under new leadership, the USSR would gain a foothold, if that's the right term, in the eastern Mediterranean by selling arms to Egypt's Nasser and taking his side in the suez crisis of 1919 56. The 1950s and 60s may have been the height of Moscow's influence in the greater Middle East. But in seeking influence or a presence there, the Kremlin had to manage difficult relationships with clients who had their own agendas. With influence comes entanglements and the possibility of getting involved in an unnecessary war, as the United States has experienced to its lasting detriment after decades of Middle east involvement. So where is Russia today? Sure, it signed a strategic partnership agreement with Iran in early 2025. The two countries sought to firm up their economic ties as both tried to work their way around sanctions. But it was not a defense treaty, and Russia is in no position anyway to come to Iran's defense now. The Cold War days. These are not, as Sergei Radchenko writes in his amazing book about Soviet foreign policy, to Run the World. One might think of the Middle east as a stage where the Soviet leaders asserted their greatness against the claims of rival powers, first and foremost the United States. They built up clients, supplied weapons, provided economic aid, weighed in on questions of war and peace. In other words, stayed relevant, seeking recognition as an indispensable player on par with the Americans. Rechenko goes on to say this was a policy Nikita Khrushchev had pursued since the 1950s. And once Khrushchev was dethroned, Brezhnev stepped into his shoes, inheriting commitments to willful, often unreliable clients. Such commitments carried with them the danger of entrapment. Crises could spin out of control, endangering detente, potentially even bringing the two superpowers to the brink of war. This is precisely what happened in October 1973.

Sergei Radchenko (5:07)

It is an all out war. That's how Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan describes an invasion of the Golan Heights and the east bank of the Suez by Syria and Egypt. The surprise attacks came early this morning, in the air and on the ground,

Martin DeCaro (5:21)

and Sergei will be here in a minute to discuss Soviet and now Russian influence or non influence in the Middle east today. Maybe it's for the better, but Russia is playing no visible role in negotiations to end the war on Iran. Its representatives are not invited to Islamabad. When he came to power 25 years ago, Putin wanted to turn Russia into a great power again.

Barack Obama (5:46)

But Russia is a regional power.

Martin DeCaro (5:50)

This is a story of imperial folly, the highs and lows that come with trying to keep one's fingers in too many pies. Sergei Radchenko teaches history at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He's written extensively on the Cold War and Russian and Chinese foreign and security policies, and he's the author of the aforementioned To Run the the Kremlin's Cold War Bid for Global Power Tap. Subscribe now in the show Notes to skip ads, enjoy early access and get all of our bonus content or go to historyasithappens.com Sergei Radchenko, welcome back to the podcast.

Sergei Radchenko (6:26)

Thank you for having me, Martin. Always happy to be on here.

Martin DeCaro (6:29)

Since this war began in Iran, I've been wondering, where's Russia? Russia and Iran did sign something. We'll discuss that. You wrote this article for Foreign policy. Russia is irrelevant. So I have to decide now, as the interviewer, if I'm going to start in the past or start with the present. Maybe we'll start with the past. In the Middle East, Soviet foreign policy was not driven so much by ideology as it was, well, you tell us

Sergei Radchenko (6:57)

the past is always a good place to start. But if you were to start with Russia's involvement in the Middle East, I would even suggest going beyond the Soviet Union because, of course, the Russian Empire had interests in the Middle east and was engaged for for a long time in competition, often with other great powers, namely Great Britain. In fact, much of the 19th century was characterized by what's known as the Great Game, a state of competition between the two empires, Russia and Great Britain, for the fate of the Middle East, Central Asia, et cetera. They competed in different theaters. And it was then already that the Russians were interested, for example, in what is today Iran. They were making inroads in into parts of southeastern Europe, the Balkans, effectively at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. So they had strategic interests and they had ideological interests, If I may put it this way, although that time, differently from the Soviet times, ideology was what protecting Christians, right? So they wanted to get in there, maybe using that idea of protecting Christians as an excuse to promote their geopolitical interests. But one way or another, St. Petersburg at that time, you know, Moscow later, but St. Petersburg at that time was trying to get into the Middle east and was actually heavy player, heavy hitter there, an important successful Player in competition with other great powers for influence.

Martin DeCaro (8:26)

And there's a history in Iran as well, geopolitical oil. We're talking, say, before World War II here.

Sergei Radchenko (8:34)

So if we're talking about before World War II, in fact, if we go back to the 19th century, there's a very sad story which touches on the subject of Russian Empire's involvement in Persia at that time. Because, of course, the Russian ambassador in Persia and the great Russian playwright Alexander Gradu, who's known to any Russian schoolchild. Well, I hope he is or he should be, because he's the greatest Russian playwright or one of the greatest. He was an ambassador there and was killed by a mob. I guess at that time showed just how precarious, how dangerous engagement with the Middle east could be. A dramatic moment. Imagine losing your ambassador to mob.

Martin DeCaro (9:15)

Sure, I'm not familiar with that story. I'll have to look it up, but go ahead.

Sergei Radchenko (9:18)

Meanwhile, in the 20th century, we're talking here, around the Second World War, the Soviet Union began to develop a very keen interest in Iran. Why? Because Iran could be occupied by or could at least come under German influence during the Second World War. And that oil that Iran had vast amounts of could then be redirected towards the German war effort. And it is in those circumstances during the Second World War that actually this time the British and the Soviets cooperated for once in Iran, occupied different parts of it. By a mutual agreement, the Soviets were supposed to withdraw their troops from Iran. Of course, they failed to do that at the end of the Second World War, which set the stage for the famous Iran crisis of 1946, which some historians see as the first real crisis, the first real crisis of the Cold War. Why? Why is that? Well, because, you know, Stalin was interested in the oil. Actually, even before the end of the Second World War, he was trying to get an oil concession in Iran. And this is. At one level, this seems bizarre because of course, the Soviets at that time had oil available to them in Baku in Azerbaijan, and did not really require all that much new oil. But Stalin was obsessed with question of oil. Oil is important because it drives the war machine. It's important to have it for your own war machine. It's also important to deny it to the enemy. And so he thought in the mid-1940s, he thought that he could perhaps get a concession in Iran similar to what the British had. The Soviets actually tried to bribe the Iranians and presented to the Iranian government, saying, hey, sign off on this concession. Of course, the Iranians refused to do that. And at that time that Stalin chose to manipulate Azeri ethnic movement in the northern part of Iran around the area of Tabriz and effectively sponsor an anti Tehran rebellion there. In this context, separate republic was established there and unrecognized republic. You know, some of these things that the Russians do, they're kind of the same throughout history, right?

Martin DeCaro (11:33)

I hear some echoes, I hear echoes there.

Sergei Radchenko (11:35)

Yeah, I know unrecognized republic, you know, rich with oil, but ethnic Azeris. And of course Stalin was playing those ethnic Azeris against the Persians effectively. And I was then hop to bufferize Iran. And it is in this context in 1946 that the Americans actually were putting a lot of pressure on the Soviet Union. Threatening the Soviet Union. So you better get your troops out of there now. We still don't know why Stalin made that decision to pull back from Iran. He did. It may be because he was promised by Tehran that the concession document would eventually be signed. It never was. Or it may be that he actually genuinely was worried about the American pressure and American threats. Because of course the United States at that time had nuclear monopoly one way or another. After a crisis involving Soviet troops in Iran and you know, the support for this breakaway regime in northern part of Iran, Stalin actually withdrew and the regime collapsed, the breakaway regime and Tehran still controls that part of its country. So you can see how interesting historically Moscow's engagement has been with this country.

Martin DeCaro (12:38)

Oil is important today, although the current war wasn't started because of oil. It became an issue after Iran took control of the Strait of Hormuz. But about Stalin, you argue in your book convincingly that he was willing to deal on certain matters. Eastern Europe, not so much Iran. Ultimately, yes, he decided to withdraw under US pressure. So you say here on page 392 of your book, there is a popular theory that Richard Nixon wholeheartedly embraced the that Soviet interest in the Middle east was but a desperate scramble for warm water, ports and oil. It was not. You go on to note that of course the military did appreciate the region's geopolitical importance. You go on to discuss the role of Marxism, Leninism. Well, not really. I mean, was Nasser a Marxist, A communist? No, he wasn't. And the Soviets were on Nasser's side during the 1956 crisis. I just covered that in a podcast. When would you say was the height of Soviet influence post 1945, the height of Soviet influence in the Middle East?

Sergei Radchenko (13:45)

The Soviets really started getting their influence in the Middle east from the mid-1950s with decolonization unfolding and you mentioned Nasser. Egypt was the first real test for the Soviets. They established a very good relationship with Nasser, provided him with arms and took his side in the suez crisis of 1956. And so from 56 onwards, this relationship between Nasser and the Soviets grew ever closer. And it is also from the 1960s that you can see the Soviets getting involved in Syria, then also with Iraq. Iraq became, I wouldn't say an ally, but almost something like a client after the 1958 revolution which overthrew the monarchy in Iraq. So the Soviets get into Iraq as well and they like those regimes. They like the, you know, revolutionary sort of Arab nationalist regime. They're not necessarily communists. For example, Nasser was not a communist and later, you know, Saddam Hussein was certainly not a communist. But the Soviets felt like they could deal with those regimes because they were anti Western and they, you know, bought Soviet arms and some of them could even pay for those arms. Like, for example, Iraq paid for arms, which was a good, A good thing as far as the Soviets were concerned. Yeah, well, they didn't have to give them away for free, which they did in other cases. Iran was a big exception because in 1953 you had the coup in Iran and the kind of nationalist firebrand prime minister was overthrown with American and British involvement. Now, by the way, that's an interesting story in itself because the reason for American involvement in what by all accounts as a nefarious undertaking that still has echoes in today's U. S Iranian relations was the fear on the part of Washington that Mossadegh would actually sell out to the Soviets or that he was a Soviet puppet. What we know today from the archival documents, you know, the Soviets at that time were very skeptical of Mossadegh. They thought that Mossadegh was basically an American stooge.

News Reporter (15:49)

How about that?

Martin DeCaro (15:49)

Because on the American side, John Foster Dulles planted the seed in Eisenhower's head that Mosaddegh might be a commie.

Sergei Radchenko (15:57)

Well, exactly. So it's a clear case of misperception or miscalculation. So the Americans get involved in overthrowing Mossadegh thinking that he's a Soviet stooge. The Soviets actually think he's an American stooge. And I think in reality, Mossadegh was nobody's stooge, obviously a nationalist, somebody who was very keen on nationalizing Iranian oil one way or another. Once you have this coup in Iran,

News Reporter (16:24)

former premier Mossadegh's ruined house is a mute testimony to three days of bloody rioting culminating in a military coup from which the one Time dictator of Iran fled for his life. His car as well as his home is a shambles. In the quick shift of power, Mossadegh was finally apprehended and awaits trial for treason. The Shah, who had fled to Rome, comes home backed by General Zahedi, military strongman.

Sergei Radchenko (16:47)

Soviet relations with Iran were never quite that good again. Right. There was no development like in the case with some of those Arab nationalist regimes. It is true that later the Shah tried to engage with the Soviet Union. There was even economic cooperation. For example, the Iranians supplied the Soviet Union with gas. It's actually very interesting economic story. Iran exported gas to the Soviet Union and the Soviets then re exported it to their European allies. It's a very interesting Cold War story, but one way or another, until the end of the Shah's regime. So until the revolution, there was very little there in terms of political relationship between the Shah and the Soviets.

Martin DeCaro (17:25)

And that's definitely true. After the revolution, Khomeini was not a communist. Both the Soviets and the United States helped out Saddam Hussein, similar to how they were both on the same side during the Suez crisis. Eisenhower, I would say.

Sergei Radchenko (17:40)

There's nuance there. So first of all, when Khomeini obviously, you know, installed himself in power, you know, in Iran, the Soviets actually thought that they could deal with Khomeini because they thought that Khomeini was not a real thing. They thought, they thought that. I mean, how can you actually run a government on the basis of some ancient creed from the. So that's what the Soviets were saying. Well, that cannot have a Muslim state. And so clearly Khomeini was a temporary figure. That's how the Soviets saw that. By the way, the Americans also were of the same opinion. And so they both actually misjudge Khomeini. But the, the way the Soviets misjudged Khomeini is they thought that the Iranian Communists, that is the two death party, that they would actually capture power eventually and that Khomeini would just be some kind of a figurehead and would be a sideline. But even, you know, when this did not happen, the Soviets still try to reach out to Khomeini. And so one of the things that I don't really make much use of in the book, but what I have as well, I think on my substack, I even translated the whole correspondence between Brezhnev, the Soviet leader Brezhnev, and Khomeini, which is hilarious and kind of sad as well. You have this exchange of letters between Khomeini and Brezhnev and the Soviets clearly tried to engage with Khomeini, kind of been flattering him, etc. All of that fell apart, by the way, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, because Khomeini could not, you know, at that. Once that happened, he was like, okay, this is a little Satan. The Americans are the great Satan, but the Soviets are a little Satan. They're also invading Muslim countries. But even after that, you mentioned Saddam Hussein. Because once in 1980, when the Iraqis invaded Iran and you have the beginning of the Iran Iraq war, you would sort of expect the Soviets, especially given their bad relationship with Khomeini, that they would back Saddam Hussein, who's buying their weapons and expecting support. But they are not doing that. In fact, they are. They kind of take a distance. It's almost like they follow Kissinger squib. Yeah, it's too bad. They. How did he say it? They both. Cannot lose. Yes, cannot lose.

Martin DeCaro (19:37)

I mean, Even during the 1980s, Reagan was selling weap to Iran while the US was backing Iraq in the Iran Iraq war. Not a major shipment of weapons that would have tilted the balance one way or the other. It was the TOW missiles. During the Iran Contra scandal, we did

Sergei Radchenko (19:53)

not, repeat, did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages, nor will we.

Martin DeCaro (20:00)

And I do want to just amend one thing I said about Eisenhower and Mossadegh. If Eisenhower didn't believe Mossadegh himself was a communist, it was probably more that he feared under Mossadegh's leadership, Iran would be susceptible to the Tudor Party.

Sergei Radchenko (20:15)

Exactly. This was the fear. This was the fear from the Americans that Mossadegh would basically let the Tudeh from the back door. And, you know, that would be a huge strategic loss for the West. And there was a fear of losing that oil. Right. That was from the American side, that Iranian oil was always a big thing. They really worried about it. The Soviets were not so concerned about oil. And so through that period, obviously, as I mentioned to Stalin, this was important. But later on to the Soviets, they were not really all that worried about it because they had their own oil in the region. For them, the concern was more about how to deny to the potential adversaries. So that is another issue.

Martin DeCaro (20:57)

Yeah, and we're going to move along the timeline here. I'll never get to the current moment, but this is important background because I really want to get to the bottom of. I mean, we've discussed this on past shows. Not everyone listens to every show. I mean, why what was driving, what were the reasons behind Soviet interests in the Middle East? It was really about great power, prestige. And Brezhnev's idea was that he would reach an accommodation with the US where they'd run the region together. Right? But the US never shared that desire. They still wanted to be top dog in the Middle East.

Sergei Radchenko (21:29)

Well, this was for Brezhnev, the Middle east was a test case of great power cooperation. He thought that the Soviets had their clients and their allies. By the way, those clients and allies were very difficult sometimes to control. Case in point was Egypt under Anwar Sadat after the death of Nasser. And he wanted to undo the humiliation of 1967 when Egypt was roundly defeated by the Israelis. And so Sadat was very keen to return this territory and kept talking about, you know, this is the year of decision, we'll do it, we'll do it. And Brezhnev was really concerned about it. So he, he reached out to the Americans saying, hey, let's cooperate, let's see if we can work it out. And you put pressure on your clients, that is Israel. We put pressure on our clients and then we'll work it out, right? We'll co manage the Middle East. But the Americans would not have any of that because as Nixon had put it, they say they want peace in the Middle east, we want peace, they want the Middle East.

Martin DeCaro (22:32)

And Sadat kicked the Soviet advisors out in 1970 too.

Sergei Radchenko (22:37)

That's right, he did. But what's more important, I mean, this was not the end of Soviet Egyptian relationship because it was only after 1973 that Egypt really decisively turned towards the United States. What happened is you had the Yom Kippur War. In the aftermath of that war, Sadat turned to the Americans, understanding that the Americans could quote, unquote, deliver Israel in the way that the Soviets never had. Because the Soviets did not have a diplomatic relationship with Israel after an active 1967. Right. They broke off diplomatic relations during the Six Day War. And it was the Americans who could actually quote, unquote, deliver Israel, at least in Sadat's imagination. And so you have this beginning of the peace process that leads to Camp David and the establishment of a reasonable relationship between Israel and Egypt, which lasts even today. From the Soviet perspective. This was a really problematic development. And here's what's problematic about it. The Camp David process separated out the Palestinian issue from the quote, unquote Egyptian issue. So Egypt and Israel were able to fix their relationship, but the Palestinian problem remained unsolved.

Camp David Document Reader (23:40)

It deals specifically with the future of the west bank in Gaza and the need to resolve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The framework document proposes a five year old transitional period in the west bank and Gaza during which the Israeli military government will be withdrawn and a self governing authority will be elected with full autonomy. It also provides for Israeli forces to remain in specified locations during this period to protect Israel's security.

Sergei Radchenko (24:22)

The package was untied and the Soviets were always in favor of this comprehensive approach. And their other Arab allies and clients also supported the comprehensive approach. So a lot of them actually saw Sadat for traitor, that he kind of decided to look after Egypt's interests and kind of forget about the Palestinian problem altogether. But also that's a moment in the mid to late 1970s when the Soviets start to lose influence in the Middle East. How do they start to lose it? They are pushed out by the Egyptians, right? Egypt turns to the United States, you have Camp David. The Soviets are not a part of that. They lose Sadat. And by the way, and here's a fun fact, it's not so fun, it's actually very tragic. When the Soviets invade Afghanistan in December 1979. One of the main reasons why they do is because they fear that the Afghan leader Amin Hafid Zullah Amin, allegedly communist, but they are worried that he will do a Sadat on them, that he will turn to the United States and the Soviets will also lose influence in Afghanistan. So you see this kind of game, the Soviet American game that is happening. The Soviets are losing in Egypt. They're interested in getting into Iran when the Americans are kicked out. They're hoping to get in there, but they're not able to get there. They invade Afghanistan because they fear that Afghanistan will go the way of Egypt. That is the Cold War, right. It remained very tense and there was no real prospect for the condominium that Brezhnev had in mind.

Martin DeCaro (25:45)

Yeah, the Afghanistan war. 79. The causes of that, it's tricky because there were several different Afghan communist leaders murdered, assassinated one after another. The Soviets did not invade to install a communist. They went in there to save a communist regime that would be friendly to Moscow because as you say, there was a concern that they wouldn't be so friendly.

Sergei Radchenko (26:07)

Yeah, well Afghanistan is actually a very strange case because it was basically a neutral country, but very much under Soviet influence, Soviet economic influence, et cetera. I mean the Soviets were developing gas deposits there. They actually had very good relations with Afghanistan. And then in 1978 the Afghans had the so called April Revolution, right? The communist Revolution, which it's not super clear to me even now. I mean I've looked at all these documents. It's not really clear to what extent the Soviets actually were supportive of that revolution that happened. It was like, oh yeah, let's have built communism in Afghanistan. It's so prepared for communism like, like no other country in the world. Right. So they, I don't think the Soviets were so happy about building communism in Afghanistan. And by the way, when the Afghan clients started their radical policies there, the, the pdpa, People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, they started carrying out this radical anti Muslim policies, you know, communization, etc. The Soviets were like, what are you guys doing?

Martin DeCaro (27:07)

Because it triggered a revolt, it triggered the Mujahideen, who? The United States.

Sergei Radchenko (27:11)

Exactly. By the way, already in the spring of 1979 the Afghan Communists were trying to get the Soviets to rescue them because they were facing rebellion. And the Soviets actually did not invade on that occasion, but later they did as, as you mentioned in December 1979 for fear of losing Afghanistan.

Martin DeCaro (27:28)

Brezhnev was pretty much in a coma by then.

Sergei Radchenko (27:31)

It's not clear how much influence he actually had at that point. Speaking of health and leadership, you know, this is, this is a guy who's basically on his last legs and his advisors and various people make decisions for him.

Martin DeCaro (27:43)

Yeah, I shouldn't laugh because the consequences were horrendous. So I think everyone would understand that Soviet influence collapses in the Middle east with the exit of the Soviet Union from the stage of history. You said that key turning point was the 1970s in Egypt. Gorbachev tells Bush and James Baker in 199091 that the USSR will not stand in the way of the US led coalition to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. After he invaded Kuwait In August of 1990, Gorbachev wanted to take a chance on the so called new world order.

Sergei Radchenko (28:18)

A new world order can emerge, a new era, freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace.

Martin DeCaro (28:33)

So I think we've established here, Sergei, that a main reason, maybe the most important reason for Soviet interest in the Middle east was prestige. Great power prestige. Sure, there were material interests or geopolitical interests, what have you today. It seems that Russia would like to be a player in the Middle east. But you're arguing it's incapable for a number of reasons. It just can't, it just doesn't have the strength anymore. Is that right?

Sergei Radchenko (28:59)

That's right. And as you mentioned correctly, you had this real rapid decline of Moscow's influence after the Soviet collapse. Gorbachev going along, for example, with Operation Desert Storm was a sign, perhaps it was almost like a forced measure in the sense that he, of course, he wanted to have the Soviet Union in a position to mediate some kind of peace, but he realized that actually the Soviet Union really no longer played much of a role. He sent one of his key Arab specialists, Yevgeny Primakov, who later in the 1990s was the foreign minister and even later prime minister. He sent him to try to negotiate some kind of a peace deal. All of that failed. Right. And the Soviet Union, well, the Soviet Union itself collapsed and had to look after its own problems, and Russia had to look after its own problems in the 1990s. Although at that time, by the way, you already have the beginning of a return return or an attempted return to the Middle East. And if, in fact, if you go back to the mid-1990s and you look at the Russian American relationship, which, by the way, was not that bad at that time, right. You had Bill and Boris who were cooperating in various ways, but there were already tensions emerging, for example, over NATO enlargement. Another attention. If you look closely at the record of Russian American relations in the mid-1990s, guess what the tension is. The Americans are concerned that the Russian are giving the Iranians nuclear technologies constantly. It's there because the Russians are saying, well, we're helping their civilian nuclear program. That is the Busher, what eventually became the Bush nuclear power plant.

Martin DeCaro (30:31)

I forgot about that.

Sergei Radchenko (30:32)

Well, it's the. It's the nuclear element. I mean, you still have that cooperation, the civilian cooperation. The Russians, I think now they've curtailed their presence there significantly. They pulled out their experts. But the Bush nuclear power plant is still there. But as you say, Martin, it's in part, I guess, in part part it's an economic interest on the part of the Russians. Obviously, you're selling something to Iran, for example, but at a different level, it also was about finding a seat at the table, and they were sort of not really able to do that because Russia was not particularly strong. What you see on Vladimir Putin's during his term is Russia's return to the Middle east, especially to Syria. You know, Russia was obviously key player in helping Bashar al Assad survive. If you remember, during the Syrian civil

Martin DeCaro (31:19)

war, that was the big first step back into the region, the Syrian civil war.

Sergei Radchenko (31:22)

This was a very interesting moment because at that time, Barack Obama, President Obama drew certain red lines which he allowed the Syrian regime To overstep that, I think resulted in a certain kind of loss of prestige almost for the United States in the region. And Russia's prestige simultaneously grew significantly because Russia was able to, to stand for a very hideous client. It doesn't matter that the client was hideous. The Russians saved the guy. Right. So they maintained that presence in Syria, you know, and so their stature broadly in the region grew and their relations with Iran as well developed and became closer, etc. And all of that continued until fairly recently. What changed the situation was the beginning of the Russian war against Ukrainian, Ukraine, Russian full scale invasion of Ukraine, because at that point the Russians simply had no more bandwidth for anywhere else in the world. They try to keep their finger in every pie, but we have seen what happened to Bashar Al Assad, you know, where is he? He is in Moscow. Right. So his regime fell and the Russian influence in Syria, although it has not collapsed entirely, they're still trying to maintain some sort of token presence there, but significantly decreased. And so if the previous effort to save Assad actually increased Russia's influence, this time being sort of kicked out unceremoniously just like this decreased Russia's influence.

Martin DeCaro (32:46)

Yeah, There is no, let me just interject here. Was there any thought at all of trying to save Assad at the end? Because it doesn't look like they made much of an effort at all. They just simply said come to Moscow and permanent vacation.

Sergei Radchenko (33:00)

I mean, how could they do that? Right? They cannot. There is stretched so thin their entire military is engaged in Ukraine. They pull forces from everywhere. They pulled forces from, you know, Kaliningrad, from the border with Finland, they pulled forces from the border with China, they collected their weapons from across the country, put it all in Ukraine. They want to fight that particular war and they're not doing a very good job. Of course, obviously they're not winning this war. And so they don't have any bandwidth to save anybody else or do anything about any of those.

Martin DeCaro (33:32)

How about Venezuela? It's not like the Russian navy was going to show up in the Caribbean, the South Caribbean and try to save Maduro diplomatically. Soft power in terms of prestige, the United States. I mean, I don't know this for a fact, but it doesn't look like the Trump administration was even worried at all about how Russia would feel about that.

Sergei Radchenko (33:53)

Exactly. And you can see the tremendous decline in Moscow's capabilities, in Moscow's standing in Latin America, America. If, for example, during the Cold War, the Russians could project influence, creating a base, for example, in Cuba, maintaining a base you know, have a military force even sending nuclear missiles, as we know, not very successfully in 1962, to Cuba. Today, Russia just cannot do this kind of thing. On this note, I remember I was in Moscow before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and I had some meetings at sort of like foreign ministry associated think tanks. One of the guys there said, well, just watch, you know, we will re establish our presence and we'll create, recreate a military base of Cuba. And I thought at that time it was entertaining. Well, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this just became a completely impossible proposition. Russia has no logistical ability to project power that far away from its borders. And Venezuela, which you mentioned, is a key development here because Maduro, who has long been a Russian client, was just taken out just like that. Right. And Russia couldn't do anything. They could complain that also diminished their standing.

Martin DeCaro (35:04)

The conversation continues after this short break. Tap subscribe now in the show Notes to skip ads.

1-800-Flowers Advertiser (35:25)

When Mother's Day means celebrating your mom, your wife, maybe even your daughter as a new mom. Trust 1-800-FLOWERS to help you celebrate every important woman in your life with Double blooms from 1-800-Flowers. Order one dozen roses and get another dozen for free. It's a simple way to give beautifully with colorful blooms that make Mother's Day feel meaningful for every mom you're celebrating. Order with confidence and get double blooms at 1-800-FLowers.com podcast. That's 1-800-FLowers.COM podcast.

Martin DeCaro (35:55)

You know, I think countries can be peaceful, prosperous, happy without an empire. But we know that countries don't like to lose their empires. Well, Putin doesn't like to lose the empire. He's always talked about how the collapse of the Soviet Union was a catastrophe of the 20th century. Well, he finds himself impotent today. I want to return to Iran and ask you what the Iranian Russian relationship was on the eve of this current war. Who benefited from who? And tied into everything we've been discussing here as we wrap up. But I want to just play you a clip first.

Barack Obama (36:29)

America's got a whole lot of challenges. Russia is a regional power that is threatening some of its immediate neighbors not out of strength, but out of weakness.

Martin DeCaro (36:44)

You know, Dr. Rodchenko, I have probably played that Barack Obama sound bite from 12 years ago on this podcast more than any other sound bite because it's an important.

Sergei Radchenko (36:55)

It's an important.

Martin DeCaro (36:56)

Russia's a regional power. Obama was right.

Sergei Radchenko (36:59)

Obama was right. And I think the Trump administration actually agreed. You know, President Trump obviously hates President Obama, but if you read the national Security Strategy, you can see it's right there. They don't actually think that Russia poses any existential threat to anyone, least of all Europe. And so there's disagreement between the Europeans and Americans on the extent of the Russian threat. Why is it? Because basically the Trump administration too thinks that Russia is a regional power. And I think what's happening in Iran

Martin DeCaro (37:28)

decisively proves that we know the problem is convincing the country that it is a regional power because it could do a lot of damage trying to become a superpower again. And it does have 6,000 nuclear missiles. So on the eve of this current war, February 27th, how would you describe the Iran Russia relationship? Who benefited from who and how?

Sergei Radchenko (37:51)

Obviously the relationship has been fairly close, despite the fact that ideologically the regimes are very, very different. Politically they're very, very different. But they have a similar, I guess they perhaps had a similar view of the world and, and a shared sense of anti American resentment. There was a robust economic relationship, not anything greater than what the Russians had with the Europeans, for example.

Martin DeCaro (38:19)

They had some kind of alliance, not alliance, some kind of agreement though not a security.

Sergei Radchenko (38:24)

Well, they got the strategic partnership. Now that happened actually, that happened last year. Before that. However, it's important to note that, that Iran played an important role in supplying Russia with shahed drones. When the Russia invaded Ukraine, it looked around for somebody who could help them, the likes of North Korea and you know, Iran. So North Korea, for example, provided ammunition, missiles and so on and so forth. Obviously soldiers for the battle in Kursk and Iran provided shahed drones, which later then they opened co production sort of thing in Russia and Russia eventually became less dependent on Iranian drones. But those Iranian drones actually played a very important role in the early stages of the war. So it was a robust partnership that had a clear military component. However, when they signed the treaty, it's called a comprehensive partnership treaty, entered into effect in October 2025. It's important to know that this was not actually military alliance. Right. So that treaty does not make Russia and Iran military allies. Now they've conducted some naval exercises together and I guess now we can say there's a certain level of intelligence sharing between them because as we know from when the American began their latest round of attacks on Iran, the Russians, according at least to some information, such as, you know, this provided by the Washington Post, the Russians allegedly supplied some targeting information to the Iranians to target American bases in the Middle East. It's a close relationship, has an economic component, has a military component. It is not an alliance.

Martin DeCaro (40:00)

However, Russia does not seem to have or be in a position to influence the outcome of this current war. I mean, I'm not even sure there's any Russian involvement in the ongoing peace talks. I mean, it's so much different than like the Cold War era where the big shots would sit down together around a table and, you know, shuttle diplomacy. Kissinger.

Sergei Radchenko (40:19)

Exactly. I mean, exactly.

Martin DeCaro (40:21)

The Russians invited to Pakistan, they are

Sergei Radchenko (40:23)

not invited to Pakistan. They're not at the table, they're not even anywhere near the table. And they have no real influence. They're not in a position to help Iran militarily. They're hardly in a position to help Iran politically, except for maybe, you know, raising the question of Iran and the United Nations Security Council. How much will that do to Iran? It's not so clear. So in effect, Russia has proven in the context of this conflict that it is really an insignificant player in the Middle east and its stocks have plummeted further. But it's kind of clear actually because they are so involved in the war in Ukraine that they simply cannot do, they simply cannot do anything else about any other place in the world. And Iran is one of those places they can't really have any time for at the moment.

Martin DeCaro (41:13)

Talk about the unintended consequences of a badly thought out idea. Putin thought he was gonna march upon history's stage as a great conqueror and restore Russian power.

Sergei Radchenko (41:24)

And now look, and now he's, well, he's a regional power battling, fighting a war in a quagmire in Ukraine. And as for the rest of his aspiration, his global aspirations from around to Venezuela to Africa, all of that seems to be dissipating in some kind of in fog.

Barack Obama (41:43)

Russia is a regional power that is threatening some of its immediate neighbors not out of strength, but out of weakness. Ukraine has been a country in which Russia had enormous influence for decades since the breakup of the Soviet Union. And we have considerable influence on our neighbors. We generally don't need to invade them in order to have a strong cooperative relationship with them. The fact that Russia felt compelled to go in militarily and lay bare these violations of international law indicates less influence, not more.

Martin DeCaro (42:31)

On the next episode of History as it Happens, we're going to stay with Russia or really Soviet history. Chernobyl. 40 years later. We'll be joined by Mariana Bujrin from Ukraine. That is next. As we report History as it Happens. Make sure to sign up for my free newsletter. Just go to Substack and search for History as it Happens.