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- [00:00]
Roham Alvandi
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Narrator/Archive Voice
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- [00:18]
Roham Alvandi
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- [00:23]
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of $45 for three months, $90 for six months or $180 for a 12 month plan required $15 per month equivalent taxes and fees Extra initial plan term only greater than 50 gigabytes me slow when network is busy. See Terms. Summer is here, which means we all want to look and feel our best. A GLP1 may be right for you. Visit orderlymeds.com to learn more about which GLP1 you could be eligible for. Getting started is fast, easy, and happens virtually through telemedicine from licensed professionals. Check it out for yourself. Go to orderlymeds.com podcast that's orderlymeds.com podcast taking care of yourself feels great. Compounded medications are not FDA approved. Eligibility required and determined by a licensed provider. Individual results may vary. See website for details.
- [01:03]
Martin DeCaro
History as it happens Jul 7, 2026 why Mossadegh matters Mohammad Mossadegh, premier of
- [01:12]
Narrator/Archive Voice
Iran, meets the press to reaffirm his government's unwillingness to arbitrate with Britain over nationalizing the Anglo Iranian oil company. Not to brood unduly on old imagined wrongs, but to concentrate on the broader aspects and to show by his attitude that he too, welcomes a constructive solution. Mossaddiq and his government were swept from power in favor of General Zahidi for the first time.
- [01:34]
Martin DeCaro
Now the CIA has released documents that show its role in the 1953 coup, that is the coup that toppled Iran's democratically elected prime minister. In making war on Iran, the Trump administration hoped the Iranian people would rise up and topple their government, a fantasy that never materialized. And the authoritarian regime in Tehran has survived, confident, possibly even stronger. But then, the history of U. S Iran relations is full of cruel ironies. More than 70 years ago, a democratic nationalist named Mohammad Mossadegh tried to free his country from foreign domination, only to be undermined by the United States. That is next, as we report History as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro.
- [02:17]
Narrator/Archive Voice
Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world.
- [02:29]
Roham Alvandi
Ayatollah Khomeini returns to a country teetering on the brink of civil war.
- [02:34]
Narrator/Archive Voice
The government of Iran must recognize the gravity of the situation which it has itself created.
- [02:40]
Roham Alvandi
Finally, to the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand.
- [02:47]
Martin DeCaro
When we are finished, take over your government.
- [02:49]
Roham Alvandi
It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.
- [03:01]
Narrator/Archive Voice
There was a densely packed session of the Security Council at New York when Persia's ailing Premier, Dr. Mosaddegh arrived on the arm of Mr.
- [03:08]
Martin DeCaro
In October 1951, Iran's frail, dramatic 69 year old Prime Minister visited the United States to defend at the United nations his country's decision to nationalize its oil industry which had been dominated by Great Britain through the Anglo Iranian Oil Company.
- [03:27]
Narrator/Archive Voice
Their mission fruitless, the Anglo Iranian oil delegation led by Mr. Jackson returns to London as Persia gives the company's employees one week to decide whether to stay and work for Persia. Invited to negotiate, the delegates flew to Tehran. What happened is told by Mr. Jackson as pressman asked for news about the oil position almost immediately. At the outset we were asked to accept the Pershing Law. As it stands. I replied that we could not do that, that we would recognize a form of nationalization.
- [04:00]
Martin DeCaro
Mohammad Mosaddegh had been elected Prime Minister by Iran's Parliament, the Majlis, in the spring of 1951. By August of 53 he would be overthrown in a CIA backed coup, tried for treason, sentenced to prison and after three years in prison, Mosaddegh spent the rest of his life under house arrest. He died in 1967. The Shah's regime forbade newspapers from mentioning his name. Newsreels on the 1953 coup made Mossadegh out to be the villain in Tehran.
- [04:30]
Narrator/Archive Voice
It looked as if Mosaddegh would soon be named President and on his orders, troops occupied the Shah's palaces and surrounded Parliament and then the people themselves took a hand.
- [04:42]
Martin DeCaro
While the man did make mistakes during his tumultuous two years in power, he was intransigent in negotiations with Great Britain. He assumed emergency powers and dissolved the Parliament and alienating important constituencies whose support he needed to survive. Despite those and other missteps, Mohammad Mossadegh in the years after the Second World War galvanized the Iranian people. As the historian John Ghazvinian writes in his book America and Iran. For Iranians, the election of Mossadegh and the nationalization of the oil industry were only the first steps in what everyone knew was going to be a long and difficult battle with the Anglo Iranian Oil Company. But they also represented something never before seen in Iranian politics. For the first time in history, the nation's parliament had acted truly independently and stood up for the wishes of the Iranian people. And as Christopher de Beleague writes in his biography the Patriot of Persia, Mosaddegh was the first liberal leader of the modern Middle East. He was a rationalist who hated obscuritism and believed in the primacy of the law. His understanding of freedom was exceptional in Iran and the wider region. Indeed, the west would have liked him more if he had been less committed to freedom. And he would not back down from his demand for economic independence from Britain. He would not lock up communists to please Washington.
- [05:58]
Narrator/Archive Voice
Former Premier Mossadegh's ruined house is a mute testimony to three days of bloody rioting culminating in a military coup from which the one time dictator of Iran fled for his life. His car as well as his home
- [06:10]
Martin DeCaro
is a shambles as Americans celebrated the semi quincentennial in their experiment in self government. I thought of Mosaddegh as the US made war on Iran this year, hoping for some kind of democracy to blossom under the weight of missiles and bombs. I thought of Mossadegh and what could have been had the CIA not conspired with MI6, the Shah and the Prime Minister's opponents in a coup.
- [06:34]
Narrator/Archive Voice
The Shah, who had fled to Rome, comes home backed by General Zahedi, military strongman who engineered his return to power. The General will now have a strong voice in the newly formed government whose cabinet is seen here with Shah Pahlavi.
- [06:47]
Martin DeCaro
So I did an episode on the coup itself a couple of years ago. I'll share a link to that in the show notes to this episode. Today we're going to answer the question, who was Mohammad Mossadegh and why does he matter today? Roham Alvandi is the director of the Iranian History Initiative at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He's the author of Nixon, Kissinger and the the United States and Iran in the Cold War. Roham Alvandi, welcome back to the podcast.
- [07:16]
Roham Alvandi
Pleasure to be with you again.
- [07:17]
Martin DeCaro
When Donald Trump announced the start of the war against Iran, he said this is the time for Iranians to take back their government. There's a cruel irony in there, isn't there?
- [07:30]
Roham Alvandi
Well, yeah, particularly to Iranian ears. I mean, anybody in Iran can recount the history of the 1953 coup against Mossadegh. I think it's less well known in the United States, although I did see that Mossadegh even Made an appearance at Coachella this year, believe it or not. He is sort of there in the ether, in the sort of public consciousness, even though we're talking about events that happened in Iran 60, 70 years ago.
- [07:59]
Martin DeCaro
Do Iranians talk about him?
- [08:01]
Roham Alvandi
Absolutely. Absolutely. But, you know, what he means to Iranians, I think has changed a lot over the years. And the way people talk about him has probably changed a lot as well. And what he sort of represents and what he stands for, he is the kind of national hero of Iran, you know, in the same way that, I don't know, George Washington is in the United States. He is the kind. He was a historical figure who kind of stands in for certain values. Constitutionalism, liberalism, democracy, national independence, national sovereignty. So he becomes a shorthand for all those kind of political values, I think, for a great many Iranians. But he also has his critics, particularly amongst the supporters of the Shah and of the monarchy. You know, he's a very reviled figure. And there is a whole kind of Mossadegh revisionism that has emerged, particularly in recent years, which is attempting to challenge this heroic kind of image of Mossadegh. But still, I would say he very much occupies that space of a national hero.
- [09:09]
Martin DeCaro
You know, I don't like to idealize or make heroes out of historical figures, especially politicians, but I have said in the past that Mosaddegh is one of my heroes. Yeah. For what he tried to accomplish in the face of opposition on the part of the United Kingdom, his own internal enemies in Iran and the United States. But you know, about Mosaddegh. He was a political superstar in the late 40s and early 50s, but. But he went back a long way in Iranian politics. He was born in the 19th century. He received a Doctor of Law degree from the University of Lausanne in Switzerland. And then he returned to Iran. In 1914, he was appointed Governor General of the important Fars Province, according to the Encyclopedia Iran during this time. This is important context. The late Qajar dynasty and Iran, or Persia, trying to be an independent nation. But its independence had been compromised by Britain's economically dominant position in the oil industry. This goes back to the early 20th century, and it's important for shaping Iranian sensibilities about not really having control over their own sovereignty, their own economic fortunes. Right?
- [10:20]
Roham Alvandi
Yeah. Iran was one of the sort of handful of countries in Asia that basically managed to preserve its very precarious independence in the era of European empires. So if you think of Iran, the Ottoman Empire, Japan, China, Siam, you know, these were the few countries that resisted this kind of wave of European colonial expansion. So for the Iranians, that meant the Russians in the north and the British in the south. You know, the British are in India. They're in the Persian Gulf. So Iran is very important to them. And then, of course, once oil is discovered in Iran in the early 20th century, the British have a vital stake in Iranian oil, which fuels their navy, the Royal Navy, which is the whole basis of their empire. So when Mossadegh comes along as this nationalist figure, you know, you can kind of think of him in the category of people like Sun Yat Sen in China or Mustafa Kemal in Turkey. He, you know, he really threatens their interests. He's basically saying, Iranian oil should be in Iranian hands, it should be controlled by Iranians. It's not okay that the biggest industry in the country, the most important source of income for the Iranian government, is basically controlled by a foreign power, which gives them too much, say, too much power and too much control over Iran's national affairs.
- [11:47]
Martin DeCaro
All that wealth was leaving the country going to Britain.
- [11:50]
Roham Alvandi
Absolutely. Absolutely. On the one hand, he's a figure who stands for national sovereignty and independence against British imperial influence in Iran. But there's another side to Mossadegh that's probably less well known, particularly outside of Iran, which is that Mossadegh was a child of the constitutional revolution in Iran. This was the effort in the early 20th century to create a parliamentary democracy in Iran to limit the powers of the shah, the king, with a constitution. Mossadegh really believed in this. You know, he was fully committed to this idea of constitutionalism.
- [12:33]
Martin DeCaro
Sorry to interject there, Roham. You said that Mossaddaq was really committed to that. Yeah. The shah at the time, reza Shah Pahlavi, that is the father, not the son, who was toppled in 1979. He becomes a dictator. He was crowned in 1925. Mossadegh was in the government at this time, but he had a falling out with the Shah. I guess that was a harbinger of what was to come in the 1950s. Right. What happened in 1925, and where did Mossadegh go when he left government?
- [13:02]
Roham Alvandi
Mossadegh came from a very noble kind of elite family. He was related to the Qajar dynasty, the previous dynasty that had ruled Iran. And he held various ministerial positions and provincial positions. But he was a unique person for his time and amongst his peers, he was not corrupt. So he didn't take these positions in order to fill his pockets or exploit whatever government position he had for his own personal gain. And he was a Stickler for laws and rules, which was also unusual. Most people who held these kind of positions understood that politics was a kind of game. The British and the Russians were the two big powers in Iran. And you know, you had to make all of kinds, kinds of compromises in order to stay in power and exploit your position. Mossadegh wasn't like that. He was this kind of rebel in a way, who demanded that the law has to be respected and the constitution has to be respected. That inevitably brought him into conflict with Reza Shah. It's ironic because, you know, Reza Shah was also a patriot in his own way. Reza Shah's vision for Iran was a very authoritarian one. His idea was that this country needs a firm hand. It needs somebody to kind of pull it together. It's in chaos. Napoleonic type figure, you know, man on horseback. Mour Sahadel came from a very different tradition. He comes from this constitutionalist tradition. He believes in the rule of law, he believes in elections, he believes in constitutions. So that inevitably brings them into conflict with one another. And Mossadegh basically recuses himself from any government position after Reza Shah is crowned.
- [14:56]
Martin DeCaro
So mossadda could be dramatic.
- [14:59]
Roham Alvandi
He didn't sort of play the game of politics. And that's what made him very attractive to people because he spoke very plainly and directly. But it also terrified the political climate, class, because a lot of people looked at him and thought, oh my God, this, this guy has the potential to be a demagogue. You know, he's rabble rouser, you know.
- [15:19]
Martin DeCaro
But in the mid-1920s, when he leaves government, as you mentioned, where does he go? Doesn't he at this point in his life think, that's it, he's not going back to politics?
- [15:28]
Roham Alvandi
He was really fed up. I think he was very dispirited at what had become of Iran, what had become of the constitutional movement. He basically at one point says, you know what, I'm just going to emigrate. I'm just going to live in Switzerland. I've had enough of dealing with all of this. But of course, you know, history had other plans for him. All of the dramatic events that take place in Iran in the 1930s and 1940s, particularly during the Second World War, weaken the Shah and create another opportunity for a kind of resurrection of this constitutionalist figure.
- [16:05]
Martin DeCaro
I want to jump into the late 1940s. But we cannot neglect the Second World War. As you say, the Shah abdicates during the Second World War. That creates an opening for a different kind of politics. After the war is over, remind us why did Reza Shah Pahlavi abdicate during the war?
- [16:23]
Roham Alvandi
Reza Shah was trying to steer a middle course between Germany and the Allied powers during the. He was trying to keep Iran out of the war. Basically, Iran was officially neutral. You have to understand from the Iranian perspective, Britain and the Soviet Union were the imperial powers in the region. You know, Iran had a border with the Soviet Union. Iran was experiencing British imperialism in the south of the country with British control of Iranian oil. So there was a kind of sympathy for the Germans in the sense that if Germany won the war, that would weaken these two imperial powers that threatened Iran. And that sympathy was Reza Shah's downfall. Essentially, the British and the Soviets invaded Iran and forced Reza Shah to abdicate and leave the country because they accused him of being pro German. The reality of course, was that they wanted to control Iran as a land bridge between the Persian Gulf and the Soviet Union. It played a very important role role in the Allied victory in the war. But the demise of Reza Shah, this very powerful autocratic figure, creates an opportunity for politics to re emerge in the country. Some kind of democratic politics to emerge after 1941. And that's when Mossadegh re emerges. The only position he will take is as an mp. He says, I don't want any ministerial post, I don't want anything like that. He runs for parliament and is elected from Tehran and is basically a backbench MP in the fledgling Iranian Parliament, railing against British imperialism in Iran, Soviet imperialism in Iran, and you know, quickly develops a public profile and a reputation as a patriot and as a nationalist.
- [18:16]
Martin DeCaro
Yeah, his national front. At first they only had eight seats in the parliament out of about 100 overall. I want to talk more about the political milieu now, after the war in Iran. So the Shah is succeeded by his son, but the Majlis comes back to life. And John Gazvinian, in his excellent book America and Iran, published a few years ago, talks about what he refers to as the Tehran Spring. Yes, you had a communist doctrinaire Marxist party, the Tuda Party. There was also conservative religious establishment, but. But in between those two poles you had a increasingly potent, says Ghazanian, increasingly potent source of opposition. A lively, eclectic coalition of secular liberals, democrats and progressive nationalists, of which Mossadegh was one. In the late 1940s, Ghazanian says Iran had a small but growing middle class of skilled professionals, bankers, lawyers, student idealists and intellectuals. This large and varied group increasingly found itself intoxicated by a blend of nationalism and Western style liberalism. Mossadegh was already pushing 70 when he emerged as the de facto leader of this liberal opposition, he was as bald as a melon, walked with a cane and suffered from a nervous condition that often manifested itself in the form of fainting spells. But he was also one of the most charismatic, free spirited and uncompromising figures of the 20th century. So here he is in the majlies in the 1940s and something happens that gives him a platform. That is the oil deal with Britain now under the Anglo Iranian Oil Company, used to be the Anglo Persian Oil Company. The oil concession comes up for a renegotiation and it's terrible. Well, as far as the British are concerned, Roham, it's great. But this is something that the opposition rails against. Pick it up from there.
- [20:10]
Roham Alvandi
The concession basically that the British had for Iranian oil was up for renewal in 1933. Reza Shah essentially agrees to extend the concession and manages to get slightly better terms from the British. But the concession agreement is hugely controversial. Just the tax that the British Exchequer was collecting from the Anglo Iranian Oil Company, forget about the profits, just the tax that the British government was collecting was bigger than the royalties that the Iranian government was getting from Iranian oil. It becomes this lightning rod of Iranian nationalism. If you think of these other countries where there were sort of independence movements because they were formal colonies, you know, the oil nationalization movement is sort of the equivalent of that in Iran. Iran was an independent country, but what does it mean to be an independent country if you don't control the most important industry in your own country? Right. So oil nationalization becomes this essentially national movement. And the Prime Minister of the day, Ali Rasmara, General Hajj Ali Rasmara is trying to sort of negotiate better terms with the British and ends up signing a deal that is hugely controversial and rejected.
- [21:29]
Martin DeCaro
It was rejected by the Parliament.
- [21:31]
Roham Alvandi
Exactly, exactly.
- [21:33]
Martin DeCaro
I just want to remind people this is 1949. There had been number of prime ministers coming and going. The Shah could not find somebody who could, as you put it before, steer that middle course, keep the British happy without inflaming sentiment on the Iranian street. And that proved impossible.
- [21:49]
Roham Alvandi
Very difficult. You know, this is the era of nationalism. And so it's in that context, you know, Mossadegh as the opponent of these concessions to the British, that's what propels him into the national spotlight. As you say, he has this charisma, but more importantly than that, he has this very clean reputation. He's somebody who's from the upper class of the country, comes from a very privileged background, but he has sort of foregone all of that in order to commit himself and devote himself to the cause of liberty and independence for Iran and that especially for this new middle class in Iran that's emerged, you know, during the 1920s, 30s, 40s, you know, he becomes the representative of their way of thinking and of their aspirations for Iran. You have to understand, this issue was so hot, you know, it was so intense that Rasmora is assassinated. Radical Islamists, which were one of the many sort of political groups that had reemerged after Reza Shah's abdication, actually assassinate Rasmara. And that is what then opens the field for Mossadegh to become prime minister.
- [23:07]
Martin DeCaro
I want to return to the oil concession issue on that 1949 agreement and also the election rigging the Shah was attempting in the 1940s to understand the context in which Mossadegh became popular. But about the general who was made the prime minister, as you said, he was assassinated. Then the Shah picks another figure to be prime minister. The Parliament rejects him. And that's when the parliament chooses Mosaddegh to be prime minister in the spring of 1951. And this gets to a question here, Roham, about whether Mosaddegh was a democratically elected prime minister of Iran, whether Iran was becoming a democracy. Would that count as democracy, the parliament picking him instead of the person the Shah wanted?
- [23:54]
Roham Alvandi
Well, it's a good question. What do we mean when we say Mont sainterre was democratically elected? I mean, the first thing you have to understand is Iran had a parliamentary democracy. I think this is something that a lot of Americans maybe aren't familiar with, because, of course, the American republic didn't want that model and went for a directly elected president who's independent of Congress, not elected by Congress. Whereas in the Iranian system, like a lot of constitutional monarchies, you have a king who is the head of state and you have parliament who elects the prime minister. But the parliament was elected, you know, Mossadegh was elected to parliament as an mp. Now, were those elections perfect? By no means. There was all kinds of shenanigans that went on. You know, you have to imagine, you know, what was Iran like in the 1940s? It was still a kind of feudal society, in many ways primarily agrarian. So in a lot of districts, you know, who's getting elected to this Parliament? It's whoever is the big landowner in that region, you know, and all their peasants who farm on their lands, you know, show up to the polls and dutifully vote for their. Their representative. But what it changed was really, and this is very important is that the representatives who came from the big cities in Iran, especially Tehran, represented this kind of burgeoning middle class. The school teachers, the government, civil servants, the university professors, the, I don't know, journalists, the engineers. You know, Mossadegh's National Front was a tiny fraction in the Parliament. They didn't have a majority, as you said, there were only seven or eight of them. But what they could do is they could cobble together a majority in Parliament because of how important this oil nationalization issue had become. When we say Mossadegh is democratically elected, what we mean is that he was a prime minister who could command a majority in Parliament. He wasn't just somebody who was plucked out of the air by the Shah. He was somebody who commanded a majority in Parliament according to the Constitution. Unprecedented, really.
- [26:09]
Martin DeCaro
He had a mass following in the late 1940s. Tap subscribe now in the show Notes to skip ads, get early access and enjoy all of our bonus content or go to history as it happens.com.
- [26:35]
Orderly Meds Advertiser
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- [27:07]
Martin DeCaro
You mentioned nationalization. That was a new issue. What I mean by that, just a couple of years before it became the issue, no one was really talking about it. What the Iranians wanted was just simply a fair deal from the British. But it was British stubbornness, obdurance that pushed the Iranians, or at least this faction of them. In 1950, Anglo Iranian oil made 1 billion in profits from Iran, paid only 80 million out of that billion to the Iranian government. It wasn't just that disparity. It was at the oil workers in Abadan. I guess it is. I guess that's still where the oil's done today. We're living in tents and horrendous labor conditions. It was just very exploitative. Around the same time, the United states struck a 5050 profit sharing deal with the Saudis. So in Iran they're looking at that and saying, well, why won't the British give us something even close to this?
- [28:02]
Orderly Meds Advertiser
Right?
- [28:03]
Roham Alvandi
You know, Britain is an empire in decline. Ostensibly The British were one of the victors in the Second World War. In reality, the war had devastated Britain. And the irony was that the British themselves had elected a socialist government. Clement Attlee's government, after the war had thrown Churchill, the staunch imperialist, out of office, had elected Attlee. And what was the Attlee government doing in Britain? It was nationalizing industries, the coal industry, others. So what the Iranians were saying is that why can't we as a sovereign country, nationalize an industry in our own country? They were willing to pay compensation to the British government for the assets that they had built. You know, for example, the Abadan refinery was the biggest refinery in the world. The British had built it.
- [28:55]
Narrator/Archive Voice
Right.
- [28:56]
Roham Alvandi
So Iranian government's position was, we're willing to pay reparations for that. The problem was that the British simply would not accept anything, any kind of deal that would accept the principle that the Iranians have the right to nationalize Iranian oil. Because, of course, if they agreed to that, it would be the first step towards the dismantling of their entire empire.
- [29:21]
Martin DeCaro
Yeah, they were broke. They needed the money.
- [29:23]
Roham Alvandi
Well, if the Iranians can nationalize the Anglo Iranian Oil Company, why can't the Egyptians nationalize the Suez Canal? And why can't. You know, it would be the thin end of the wedge. That was correct. I mean, that was a correct reading. It's no accident that Abdel Nasser, a few years later, you know, nationalizes the Suez Canal in Egypt.
- [29:44]
Narrator/Archive Voice
President Nasser delivering his fiery speech telling of his nationalization of the Suez Canal, a seizure from private interests that the Egyptian says is his answer to the west for refusing to finance the Aswan Dam. It's a situation fraught with implications, but undeterred.
- [30:02]
Roham Alvandi
President Mossadegh understood this, the British understood this. And there was a massively important economic dimension because, as you say, this is a bankrupt country. Food is rationed in the. In Britain, you know, after the war, up until the 1960s.
- [30:16]
Martin DeCaro
Think about that.
- [30:17]
Roham Alvandi
This is not 1950s America, you know, with the big cars and the. Everybody's got a washing machine and a television. You know, this is decimated Britain. And so the idea of losing the jewel in the crown of the empire that provides this vital revenue from. For Britain, keeps the value of the pound afloat, provides cheap fuel for the Royal Navy. I mean, that was really unthinkable. And even this socialist government in Britain, the Atlee government, opposed nationalization in Iran, even while they were giving independence to India, tried to hold on to their imperial sort of presence in Iran. That's how important it was.
- [30:58]
Martin DeCaro
And they're using the Shah now, again, it's the son at this time, not the father. Using the Shah as their tool to try to get their way in Iranian politics, pressuring him to appoint these prime ministers. As we mentioned, there was a number of them. And then that General Rasmara was his last name, as you said, he was assassinated. That led to another choice rejected. Finally, Mosaddegh in spring of 1951, elected Prime Minister by the parliament you earlier mentioned. It was that 1933 deal that Reza Shah, he demanded a fresh contract with the big oil company. It was the supplemental agreement of July 1949 that basically represented no change in the status quo, which inflamed opinion in the Majlis and on the street. And that is where Mossadegh made his stand. We're not going to let this stand.
- [31:48]
Roham Alvandi
Mossadegh was an idealist. You know, he wasn't a realist. He wasn't a kind of pragmatist who played political games. And that's a criticism that many people make of him. But, you know, he was too idealistic and didn't understand global power politics. Someone like the Shah, the young shah, this is Mohammad Reza Pahlavi we're talking about. You know, he's in his 20s. Mossadegh is in his 70s. Okay, so this is very two very different men, right? But, you know, most of the people, the Shah himself, the people that were around him, the people that had been around his father, you know, these were sort of pragmatic people. And they looked at this problem and said, you know, it's madness to take on the British. They're too powerful. You know, this is not a very clever strategy. Let's compromise. Let's come up with some kind of, you know, solution that satisfies them and calms everything down. And, you know, that was the kind of pragmatic approach that they took. Mossadegh says no. You know, he digs in his heels and he says, look, once and for all, we have to declare our independence from the British. You know, we have to throw them out of the country and we can do it. We shouldn't be afraid.
- [32:58]
Martin DeCaro
He had an idea called negative equilibrium.
- [33:01]
Roham Alvandi
Negative equilibrium, basically, was the idea that for centuries, essentially, ever since the British and the Russians began encroaching onto Iran's sort of sphere of influence, a lot of Iranian politicians have kind of adopted this idea of balancing. How do we preserve our independence? Well, we give one concession to the British and we give another one to the Russians and the British can have the oil and the Russians can have, I don't know, this other industry. And so by sort of balancing the influence of these two great powers, you preserve Iran's independence. You don't end up falling under the sway of either one of them.
- [33:40]
Narrator/Archive Voice
Right.
- [33:40]
Roham Alvandi
Mosaddev's point was, well, this is nuts. If you do this, you keep doing this, there's nothing left. Eventually you give away every aspect of the country's economy and independence. I mean, in what meaningful sense is the country independent anymore? So he not only opposed British control of Iranian oil, he also opposed giving the Soviet Union an oil concession in northern Iran, which is something Stalin was demanding after the Soviet victory in the Second World War. He also had a particularly positive view of the United States. Moussadegh and a lot of the nationalists around him, the National Front people, thought that at the end of the day, the United States is not an imperial colonial power.
- [34:24]
Martin DeCaro
I'm glad you brought that up because you mentioned the Soviet Union who occupied northern Iran after the war. The United States came to Iran's defense, not militarily per se, but diplomatically, insisting that the Soviet Union. Yeah, and America. This might sound hard to believe today. America and Americans individually were held in high esteem in Iran. But here's another cruel historical irony, Rohan. As Iranian democratic, lively, boisterous, tumultuous democratic politics are shaking society in the late 40s, early 50s, in the face of the shahs craven surrendered outside powers, American diplomats are saying Iranian people are not ready for democracy yet, which is why they stood by the shah.
- [35:10]
Roham Alvandi
Ultimately too, I think that same pragmatism, realism, whatever you want to call it, cynicism that the Iranian politicians had, I think, you know, was also the, you know, many American statesmen and figures had the same view, you know, that Iran and Iranian oil is just too important to risk instability in this country. This oil rich country that's a neighbor of the Soviet Union. Do we really want to play around with political instability in this country or do we just put this autocrat in power and he preserves our interests there? And it's unfortunate that the Eisenhower administration came to that decision ultimately, but. But it wasn't, as you said, it wasn't always the case. I mean, Harry Truman supported Mossadegh. Mossadegh came to the United States.
- [35:59]
Martin DeCaro
I was going to ask you about that next.
- [36:01]
Narrator/Archive Voice
Truman's luncheon guest. For their first meeting, the premier is urged to try for peaceful agreement in the quarrel over Iran's nationalization of British oil holdings. And the world hopes that because in
- [36:12]
Martin DeCaro
1949, the young Shah visited Truman, but Mossadegh made a trip to the United States as well. So what was Truman's view of Mossadegh?
- [36:22]
Roham Alvandi
I think Harry Truman, a. He understood that Mossadegh was not a communist. He was a nationalist and a Democrat and a liberal. He was essentially Iran's answer to kind of America's Founding Fathers, you know. You know, Mossadegh comes to the United States, he appeals to that history. You know, he tells the Americans, you know, you guys fought a war of independence against the British. This is exactly what we're doing. We're trying to preserve our independence against the British. He goes to Philadelphia. There's a famous picture of Mossadegh, you know, touching the Liberty Bell. He goes to Independence Hall. You know, these Iranian nationalists had great admiration for the American Revolution, for the founding fathers of the United States, for also for Abraham Lincoln and the Republican cause during the Civil War. Their understanding of America was that, you know, this is a country that is different to the European powers. And the hope was that, you know, now that the United States is kind of triumphant after the Second World War, that it's this global superpower now. The Iranians can kind of leverage that to protect themselves from the British and the Russians. I think that was the kind of strategy Mossadegh adopted. And with Truman, he had some success. But I think even Truman became frustrated with Mossadegh's stubbornness in his negotiations with the British. And the Truman administration, they sent Avril Harriman to Iran. They really did try to mediate between the Iranians and the British, and they were hopeful that there could be some kind of deal. But you had these kind of maximalist positions on both sides. The British couldn't accept the principle of nationalization, and Mossadegh, who couldn't live without nationalization.
- [38:09]
Martin DeCaro
Well, Mossadegh gave a nationally televised speech at the United nations during his trip here when he met the President. That was in 1951.
- [38:19]
Narrator/Archive Voice
The United nations once again confronts a grave problem as Premier Mohammad Mossadegh of Iran arrives with Secretary Trigger at the Security Council to present his side of the explosive Iranian oil case. The ailing statesman electrifies the Council as he denies the right of the United nations to intervene in what he calls a purely internal matter.
- [38:38]
Martin DeCaro
Time magazine made him man of the Year for 1951. So let's return now to the. Really the key piece of this story, and that is the decision in the spring of 51, when Mosaddegh is made Prime Minister, to nationalize the oil industry immediately Right. Mosaddegh tries to calm people's fears about what's about to take place. He's been criticized. You alluded to this earlier about the way he comported himself when he was in office. He was only prime minister for 28 months. But before we get to some of his personality quirks, what was his message to the world about nationalization?
- [39:12]
Roham Alvandi
He essentially was saying, look, this is a company that's operating within Iran. This is a commercial company that's operating within Iran. Iran is a sovereign country. The Iranian parliament has passed a law nationalizing this company, and we're going to pay compensation to the shareholders of that company, one of whom happens to be the British government. This is not an issue that should cause any conflict between Iran and any other country. It's a domestic Iranian issue. That was essentially the Iranian position. And Mossadegh even goes to the International Court of Justice in the Hague, where Britain brings a complaint against Iran. And, you know, Mossadegh himself goes to Holland. You know, he was a lawyer, after all, and presents the Iranian case. The judges at the International Court of Justice vote in Iran's favor. And even the British judge there votes in favor of Iran and says, yes, this is correct. You know, we don't have any jurisdiction here. This isn't an international dispute. You know, this is a sovereign country, and it's passing a law to nationalize a commercial company, you know, operating inside Iran. The British position was that basically the Iranian government is stealing British property. Anglo Iranian Oil Company is a British asset. Britain has a concession for all this oil that's under the ground. And so anybody who purchases any of this oil from the Iranians is basically purchasing stolen goods.
- [40:42]
Martin DeCaro
And the British withdrew. Right? They took every step possible to undermine Iran's economy, to destroy Mossadegh's government.
- [40:50]
Roham Alvandi
They try everything they can. They pull all their engineers and all their sort of technical experts out of a Baadan. They think that, you know, these Iranians, they'll never be able to run this thing without us. They'll never be able to run Obadan without us. But the Iranians manage, you know, slowly, slowly they manage to keep, you know, some oil production going. The problem was not the production. The problem was marketing the oil, selling the oil. Because any country or any company that would try to purchase this oil from Iran, the British would take them to court immediately in whatever jurisdiction it was. And that created immense economic problems for Mossadegh's government. You know, they. You know, they had to pay people
- [41:30]
Martin DeCaro
salaries, civil servants salaries, and fodder for his internal opponents. We'll get to who those people were in a second. But can you address Mossadegh's behavior in office? Because he's been criticized for this. He wore pajamas in public. He gave speeches to the Parliament while he was on his bed. He was lying on his bed. The bed was carted into the chambers. He would cry in public quite a bit, too, right? To an outsider, he would look unstable, maybe.
- [41:56]
Roham Alvandi
And the British press, you know, played this up quite a lot. You know, he's crazy. He's a madman. You know, this kind of thing. Well, look, he was a very old man. He was in his 70s. You know, when he was prime minister, he was quite frail. He had a variety of illnesses and that he'd had most of his life. And so it wasn't uncommon for him to be bedridden in the middle of some political disaster. I think in an Iranian sort of cultural context, he also tried to take advantage of this. You know, presenting himself as this kind of frail old man is not a threat to anyone and, you know, is deserving of sympathy. And, you know, I think it's a. It was a way of kind of disarming his opponents. But he. He was famous for this kind of thing. I mean, you know, people would go to negotiate with him, and he'd be sitting in bed, and he. He would bring his granddaughter in, and his granddaughter would sit next to him, and he would, you know, they would ask him something, and he would say, oh, let me ask my granddaughter. Let's see what she thinks. You know, he used all these kind of tactics. I mean, another was. Was very common, for example, because in Parliament, when, you know, they were going to lose a vote, for example, the National Front, remember, There are only seven MPs, basically, if they were going to lose a vote, Mossadegh would faint, and then the Parliament would have to recess, and then that would give them time to go and whip the votes, you know, until Dr. Mossadegh recovered, you know, so he was not beyond these kind of tactics, which I guess are the tactics of the week. I think they came across very differently to a Western audience than they did to an. They kind of endeared him to an Iranian audience, but I think to a Western audience, they were kind of bizarre or baffling or somehow also kind of unmanly or un, you know, unmasculine.
- [43:44]
Martin DeCaro
Yeah, well, I mentioned before this coalition of secularists, progressive nationalists, lowercase D Democrats. That was Mossadegh's milieu. But he obviously had interlike in any country, right? Not everyone's on the same page. There are opposing political groupings or parties. This comes to a head, right, when the British convince the Shah, as he had done in the past, to just get rid of the Prime Minister. I mean, I guess that was a constitutional dispute in Iran. Who could appoint and remove prime ministers? Parliament could elect someone, but the Shah could remove that person. But when the Shah tries to remove Mossadegh in 1953, it backfires on him badly, right?
- [44:24]
Roham Alvandi
This is the huge point of contention until today, really, between supporters of the Shah and supporters of Mossadegh. Supporters of the Shah will say, the Shah had constitutional right to remove the Prime Minister. Supporters of Mossadegh will say, well, Mossadegh commanded a majority in Parliament, so the Shah had no right to remove him as long as Parliament supported him. This dispute was never resolved in any democratic fashion because there was a military coup that ended it all. And it's become the source of bitter acrimony ever since. It's really a tragedy because in many ways, the Shah and Mossadegh really ultimately wanted in many ways, the same thing for Iran. National independence, sovereignty, really. The difference was that Mossadegh was willing to confront these foreign powers and take that risk and base his support on the people, whereas the Shah was simply unwilling to do that. He was not willing to confront these foreign powers. Remember, these are the same foreign powers that had invaded the country and removed his father. So you can imagine his kind of mentality.
- [45:34]
Martin DeCaro
Let me ask you, another point of historical dispute is in 1953, considering how powerful or how many enemies Mosaddegh had within the country, because they may have sympathized with the cause, but Iran was a mess. So when you consider how strong the opposition was, how important, in the final analysis, was the CIA's involvement in toppling
- [45:59]
Roham Alvandi
him, it's another big question, big debate in the historiography, the historians kind of debate this endlessly. My own view is that the CIA role was crucial to toppling Mossadegh for a number of reasons. I mean, yes, it's absolutely true that Mossadegh had enemies. He had political enemies. His support within the National Front had weakened considerably, but he had huge domestic support amongst the people, maybe not so much amongst the political class. But, you know, you have to remember Mossadegh resigned in protest in 1952. He had enough of the Shah and the British and all these people, and he said, you know what? I resigned. And within five days, he was swept back into office, you know, on a tide of kind of popular support. The Shah really had no choice but to give him another mandate. So the CIA's role was crucial because these actors who were against Mossadegh had very little popular support. The most significant amongst them really were the Communists, the Tudeh Party, who were not willing to. Who didn't want to participate in toppling Mossadegh. You know, they did a lot to undermine him for a whole. They didn't really like Mossadegh's pro American attitude, for one thing.
- [47:18]
Martin DeCaro
That's ironic, considering Eisenhower bought into the idea that Mossadegh might be a commie stooge.
- [47:25]
Roham Alvandi
They created a lot of problems for Mossadegh, but ultimately they were not in favor of, you know, toppling Mossadegh or anything like that. The forces that toppled him, the military, in particular, the clergy, conservative elements of the clergy, the landowning class, you know, these kind of people hadn't. Didn't have sort of anywhere near the kind of popular support that Mossadegh had. And they were also quite disparate, you know, forces who felt very demoralized by Mossadegh's popularity. So the CIA's role in actually bringing all these people together, coordinating them, actually writing a script for this coup plan, putting it into motion, distributing money to bring these crowds into the streets, all of this was basically orchestrated behind the scenes by the CIA. And we know this. I mean, this is not a matter of dispute. I mean, all of this is documented. And the United States government, to its credit, has declassified.
- [48:25]
Martin DeCaro
Yeah, not the UK Government, but you're right, not the uk.
- [48:28]
Roham Alvandi
No, I mean, you really have to give, you know, the US Credit for this. I mean, you know, successive American administrations have declassified. Even the Trump administration, you know, has declassified vast amounts of documents showing this. You know, the British, of course, are quite happy for the Americans to take the blame, and they don't want to get any kind of attention to their own role in the coup. So they don't release anything. But they. The Americans have been pretty transparent about it, and it's there for anyone to see.
- [48:58]
Martin DeCaro
And another cruel irony here as we wrap up is that ultimately, when the Shah is back in power, the British come back into the company and they do sign a 5050 agreement.
- [49:07]
Roham Alvandi
They lose their monopoly, essentially. But the Iranian government signs a deal with a consortium of companies, including what's now called British Petroleum, which used to be the Anglo Iranian Oil Company. You know, they get a share. The main effect of the coup is that essentially the United States replaces Britain as the most important kind of foreign power in Iran.
- [49:29]
Martin DeCaro
The dominant Power and supporter of the Shah. So, Rohan, my final question here. Many historians say history doesn't operate in a straight line, but I think we can draw a straight line between the coup in 1953-1979, especially when you consider during the middle, the heat of that year, 1979, during the Islamic Revolution, that many Iranians were worried the United States was going to install the Shah again and put an end to another popular uprising, if you will, in the country. You can't get 79 without the destruction of Iranian democracy by the United States in 1953.
- [50:09]
Roham Alvandi
1953 did enormous damage to the Shah. Let me give you a hypothetical scenario, right? Imagine in Britain today if there was a Russian intelligence operation to bring down, to pressure the king, King Charles, to dismiss an elected government. You would have millions on the streets. I mean, it would be the end of the monarchy, right? I mean, people would be outraged. Unconstitutional, gross violation of our national sovereignty. You know, the coup and the Shah's kind of begrudging, you know, role in the coup and his collusion with Britain and the United States. Tophal Mossadegh did huge damage to his legitimacy. You know, the king, the monarch is supposed to embody the nation. The monarch, the crown is supposed to be the symbol of the nation. And instead it becomes associated with this idea of foreign interference and imperialism and so on and so forth. And the Shah never really gets out from under that stain. You know, he tries, he tries very hard to project an image of himself as a champion of Iran. And in some ways he becomes that later on, you know, in 70s, but he can never shake, you know, 1953. And so to that extent, I agree with you, it does have a dramatic impact. It is one of the sort of causes of, you know, what comes in 1979. It doesn't mean that, in my view, that 1979 was inevitable. I think if the Shah had made different decisions, you know, in the 1970s, who knows what could have happened?
- [51:48]
Narrator/Archive Voice
It caused me to be reminded again of the value of ancient friendships and the importance of close ties that bind us as we face difficult problems. Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, your majesty, and to your leadership and to the respect and the admiration and love which your people give to you.
- [52:27]
Martin DeCaro
President Jimmy Carter toasting the Shah. New Year's Eve, 1977. On the next episode of History. As it happens, we're going to dive back into isms. How do we understand political ideology and apply it to today's problems. Roger Griffin will be back with us. That's next, as we report History as it Happens. And make sure to sign up for my free newsletter or just go to Substack and search for History As It Happens. Marketing is hard, but I'll tell you a little secret. It doesn't have to be. Let me point something out. You're listening to a podcast right now and it's great. You love the host. You seek it out and download it. You listen to it while driving, working out, cooking, even going to the bathroom. Podcasts are a pretty close companion. And this is a podcast ad. Did I get your attention? You can reach great listeners like yourself with podcast advertising from Libsyn Ads. Choose from hundreds of top podcasts offering host endorsements, or run a pre produced ad like this one across thousands of shows. To reach your target audience in their favorite Podcasts with Libsyn ads, go to Libsynads.com that's L I B S Y N ads.com Today,
- [53:40]
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