History Extra Podcast: "America in Korea: A Failed Occupation?"

Date: September 25, 2025
Host: Rob Attar
Guest: Professor Cornell Chang, author of A Fractured Liberation

Overview

This episode of the History Extra podcast examines the US occupation of southern Korea (1945-1948) and explores the historical roots of the peninsula’s persistent division. Drawing from his book, A Fractured Liberation, shortlisted for the Cundill History Prize, Professor Cornell Chang shares both his family’s personal history and deep scholarly research. The conversation challenges the familiar “either/or” narrative – that Korea had to choose between authoritarian communism or decades of US-backed dictatorship – and uncovers missed opportunities for a better outcome.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Personal Connection to Korean History

• Cornell Chang’s Family Experience
  • Chang reflects on how stories of war and migration, particularly his grandparents’ flight from Pyongyang in 1946, shaped his understanding of Korean history.
  • Quote:

    “My oldest uncle... would consistently say, 'If it wasn’t for the Americans, we would all be living under the Communists now.' That statement... stayed with me.” (03:48)

  • As a scholar, Chang was motivated to challenge binary narratives and explore complexities surrounding occupation, division, and missed historical opportunities.

2. Korea under Japanese Occupation (1910-1945)

• Colonial Context & Resistance
  • Korea was annexed in 1910 after an initial protectorate status in 1905.
  • The March 1st Movement (1919) sparked political organizing both in Korea and abroad.
  • Different independence activists (Syngman Rhee, Kim Gu, Kim Il Sung, etc.) developed divergent political visions during exile.

3. Why Was Korea Divided and Occupied?

• Ambiguous Promises & Trusteeship
  • WWII declarations (Atlantic Charter, Cairo Declaration) vaguely promised Korean independence “in due time.”
  • FDR’s concept of a “trusteeship” posited that the US, USSR, China, and Britain would collectively oversee the transition to independence.
  • Koreans were unwilling to accept an extended period of tutelage after 40 years of colonial rule; Stalin backed a shorter timeline.

4. The Origins of Division (The 38th Parallel)

• Last-Minute Decisions and Geopolitics
  • US planners, fearing an all-Soviet occupation of Korea (as the Red Army was closer), hastily drew a dividing line at the 38th parallel to keep Seoul under American control.
  • The Soviets unexpectedly accepted this partition, likely preferring control of half the peninsula to limit future Japanese threats.
  • Quote:

    “Dean Rusk... admitted in his own memoirs that there was no real logic [to the 38th parallel] other than... wanting Seoul on the American side.” (09:10)

5. ‘Asia’s Spring’: Brief Interregnum of Korean Self-Rule (Aug-Sept 1945)

• Korean Grassroots Initiatives
  • US troops were delayed; for several weeks, Koreans governed themselves, seizing Japanese property and debating reforms.
  • Broad support existed among Koreans for land reform, workers’ rights, and a reckoning with collaborators.

6. Arrival and Aims of the American Occupation

• Initial Korean Reception
  • US troops were mostly welcomed as liberators, with the expectation that they’d quickly depart and enable Korean self-determination.
• Confusion & Lack of Planning
  • The original plan for multinational trusteeship was scrambled by FDR’s death and hurried postwar events.
  • General John Hodge, the occupation’s leader, arrived with little clear guidance and defaulted to prioritizing stability.

7. American Response to Korean Aspirations

• Split Within US Military Government
  • Some US reformers understood and supported Korean demands, while Gen. Hodge—an anti-communist seeking order—retained much of the colonial police and bureaucracy, including collaborators.
  • Initial consideration was even given to leaving Japanese administrators in place, but Korean outrage made this untenable.
  • Quote:

    “Hodge... prizes stability and order. When he arrives... he sees [change] as chaos... and thinks the best way is preserving the pre-liberation status quo.” (20:03)

8. Missed Opportunities (1946-1947)

• Centrist Coalition
  • US advisors supported a centrist coalition (Kim Kyu Sik & Yo Han Yong) committed to reform, winning brief endorsements from Hodge.
  • Popular unrest (the Autumn Uprisings, 1946) erupted in response to the continuity of oppressive colonial-era policing and inequality.
  • US-backed repression deepened the crisis, and public polling found some Koreans preferred Japanese colonial rule to US occupation.
  • Plans to purge the police of collaborators were drafted but never signed; Yo Han Yong’s assassination in 1947 spelled the end for moderate politics.
  • Quote:

    “By the end of 1946... what you had... was a police state in the South.” (25:12) “There was a very embarrassing poll... where a slight majority said they preferred Japanese colonial rule over US military occupation.” (25:40)

9. Comparison: Occupation of Japan vs. Korea

• Role of Leadership
  • Gen. MacArthur pursued ambitious reforms in Japan (land reform, labor rights, new constitution) with personal zeal, while Hodge was inflexible and fixated on stability.
  • Reformers sent from Japan to Korea (e.g., Wolf Wodzinski) found themselves sidelined by the American command.
  • Quote:

    “MacArthur... empowers the reformers. ... Hodge is almost... the direct opposite... sees the world in black and white and has very little flexibility.” (29:23) “Wolf Wodzinski... helped design land reform in Japan, is sent to South Korea and his agenda is not enacted... due to opposition by the military high command.” (32:01)

10. Relations with the Soviet North

• Early Flexibility and Later Stalemate
  • In 1945-46, Soviets were more accommodating regarding reunification; Americans were more rigid and supported conservative elites.
  • Attempts at creating a unified government (through trusteeship and joint commissions) failed due to mutual suspicion, hardening positions, and local resistance.
  • The US eventually threw support behind a separate election, solidifying division as Soviets consolidated power in the North under Kim Il Sung.

11. Why Did Division Become Permanent?

• Strategic Calculations and Indefinite Separation
  • Once separate elections and governments were created in 1948, long-term division became entrenched, mostly for strategic reasons linked to the US security perimeter and Japanese reconstruction.
  • Quote:

    “Once they decide... to hold separate elections... at that point, almost every major figure understands how this is going to play out.” (39:15)

12. Lingering Legacy: Why Can’t Korea Reunify?

• Entrenched Hostility and Missed Opportunities
  • Despite other Cold War rifts healing (Vietnam, China), Korea’s division persists due to longstanding mutual demonization, failure to normalize relations, and a lack of incremental trust-building.
  • The armistice (1953) ended fighting but not the war, leaving the peninsula in a frozen conflict.
  • Chang argues for “baby steps” (dialogue, suspending military threats) before serious reunification can be contemplated.
  • Quote:

    “Talking about reunification is almost silly... first steps must be normalization, peace, increased interaction. ... Until those baby steps are taken, reunification is just so distant.” (44:00)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Partition:

  “Dean Rusk... admitted... there was no real logic [to the 38th parallel] other than... wanting Seoul... on the American side.” (09:10)

• On Collaborators:

  “The Korean police were acting no differently than the colonial police under Japanese colonial rule...” (24:33)

• On Historical Irony:

  “Wolf Wodzinski... helped design land reform in Japan, is sent to South Korea and his agenda is not enacted... due to opposition by the military high command.” (32:01)

• On Enduring Division:

  “The groundwork of increasing interactions, normalization... having some semblance of peace on the peninsula... hasn’t happened yet. Until those baby steps are taken, the idea of reunification is just so distant.” (44:00)

Timestamps for Key Segments

• Personal Connection & Family History – 02:11–05:14
• Japanese Colonial Rule & Korean Exiles – 05:14–06:59
• Plans for Postwar Korea & Trusteeship – 06:59–09:24
• Drawing the 38th Parallel – 09:24–12:39
• Koreans’ Short-lived Independence (‘Asia’s Spring’) – 12:39–15:28
• US Arrival and Korean Expectations – 15:28–16:32
• Occupation Strategies & Divisions within US Command – 16:32–21:46
• Missed Opportunities & The Rise of Dictatorship – 21:46–27:35
• Japan vs. Korea: Contrasting Occupations – 27:35–33:25
• American and Soviet Zones: Initial Flexibility and Collapse of Cooperation – 33:25–39:08
• Why Division Persisted and Pathways Forward – 39:08–45:08

Summary

This frank and searching episode reframes the story of Korea’s postwar division as neither inevitable nor simply a product of Cold War “superpower rivalry.” Through Chang’s personal and academic lens, listeners gain insight into the aspirations of Korean society, the bureaucratic inertia and anti-communist inflexibility of US commanders, the paradoxes of occupation, and the enduring tragedy of a peninsula still divided by the errors and missed chances of 1945-48. The conversation concludes with a plea for pragmatic steps toward peace, suggesting that even after seventy-five years, history’s mistakes might still be partially redeemed.