Churchill's toughest decision

Summary

HistoryExtra Podcast
Episode: Churchill’s Toughest Decision
Date: June 9, 2026
Host: Spencer Mizzen
Guest: Edward Abel Smith (author of A Hateful Decision)

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Episode Overview

This gripping episode examines one of the Second World War’s most fraught and consequential moments: Winston Churchill’s decision to order a Royal Navy attack on the French fleet stationed at Mers el Kebir in July 1940. With the fate of Britain hanging in the balance following France’s surrender to Germany, the attack cost nearly 1,300 French lives and sent shockwaves through Anglo-French relations. Historian Edward Abel Smith offers fresh insights into the lead-up, the decision, the harrowing events, and the aftermath, asking: Was Churchill right to launch this “hateful decision”?

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

Why Attack an Ally? Setting the Scene

[02:29]

• Smith recounts the critical context: Just after France’s surrender to Germany, Churchill feared the formidable French Navy could fall into German hands, given the armistice terms.
• “This was an extraordinarily contentious act. For a start, it was perpetrated against an ally, and a stricken ally at that.” — Spencer Mizzen [03:12]
• The attack was the deadliest confrontation between Britain and France since Waterloo.

The Strength of the French Navy & the British Dilemma

[05:33]

• In 1940, France’s Navy was the world’s fourth largest: 800,000 tons, more than double Germany’s fleet.
• Its centerpiece, capital ships Dunkirk and Strasbourg, alarmed Churchill: loss would tip the naval balance to Germany.
• “The only strength that Britain really had at that point was the fleet... So for Churchill, this was a strategic threat to Britain's overall survival.” — Edward Abel Smith [07:07]

French Resistance & the Ultimatum

[08:47]

• Despite British fears, the French navy had explicit orders to scuttle ships rather than let them fall to Germany. But British trust was lacking.
• The British delivered their ultimatum at Mers el Kebir: join Britain, sail to a neutral port, scuttle the ships, or be attacked.
• “The ultimatum was really asking Gensoul to commit an act of treason...” — Smith on the agonizing position of French Admiral Gensoul [09:34]

Churchill’s “Hateful Decision”

[10:43]

• Churchill called this his “toughest decision” and “the most unnatural and painful in which I’ve ever been concerned.”
• He was under immense pressure after Dunkirk, faced divided cabinet opinions, and reportedly wept with the burden of responsibility.
• “There are several diaries that people write that they saw him in tears. And as you say, he describes it as the hardest decision that he’s ever had to make, but also probably the most essential.” — Smith [11:46]

The British Naval Side & Negotiations Breakdown

[12:49–18:50]

• Force H, led by Admiral James Somerville, was hastily assembled; Somerville himself was reluctant, believing others better suited for negotiation.
• Negotiations were tense and ultimately fell apart due to mistrust, delays, and an insulted French command.
• Captain Cedric “Hooky” Holland, seen as too junior by French Admiral Gensoul, tried to parley but was nearly shot; both sides misread intentions.
• “He had a heavy machine gun trained on his boat, ready to open fire.” — Spencer Mizzen [15:49]
• “A lot of this unfolded because the communication wasn’t clear... They were singing from the same hymn sheet, they just probably didn’t realize it.” — Smith [34:25]

The Attack: Sudden, Deadly, and Devastating

[20:15–23:47]

• On July 3, 1940, at 6pm, the British opened fire. The attack was short—minutes long—but deadly; nearly 1,300 French sailors killed instantly.
• “It was obviously a huge amount of shock and disbelief when they found out that it was the British that they were being put into action stations to face against.” — Smith [21:01]
• The battleship Bretagne was destroyed immediately; Dunkirk and Provence soon after; Strasbourg managed to escape, a fact initially unknown to the British.

Fallout: Fractured Allies, Global Impact

[23:47–29:52]

• The attack nearly triggered war between Britain and Vichy France and provoked French airstrikes in Gibraltar, but France was too weak for extended retaliation.
• In 1942, French sailors later scuttled their fleet at Toulon, proving their intent never to hand ships to Germany—validating their earlier protest.
• In Britain and the US, the action signaled resolve:
  • “The defining moment for Roosevelt and the American administration that showed Britain would continue the fight at all costs.” — Smith [25:57]
• “This was the defining moment when they realized that Britain was going to fight on until the end.” — Smith [29:30]
• The German response was both strategic and propagandistic—used for anti-British messaging but also reinforcing the necessity of a military rather than diplomatic solution for Britain’s resistance.

Historical Judgement & Reflection

[31:03–33:39]

• Historians generally now see the attack as justified and essential to British survival, though acknowledge that poor diplomacy and communication made it bloodier than necessary.
• “It was essential that this was done, but it could have been delivered in a peaceful way because fundamentally both nations...were on the same page.” — Smith [33:09]

Personal Reflections & Lessons

[33:39–35:21]

• Smith was struck by Churchill’s raw emotional struggle and the tragedy of miscommunication.
• “The importance of clear communication. A lot of this unfolded because communication wasn't clear...when you put that in a compressed period of time, just in one day...you just have a complete breakdown in communication.” — Smith [34:21]

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “He describes it as the hardest decision that he’s ever had to make, but also probably the most essential.” — Edward Abel Smith on Churchill’s private turmoil [11:46]
• “I don't think anyone, probably on both sides, but in particular on the French side, really believed that it would come down to actual attack.” — Smith [21:07]
• “Both sides were singing from the same hymn sheet. They just probably didn’t realize it at the time. And that was all down to a lack of communication.” — Smith [34:25]
• “The British left little option but to go ahead with this… [but] it could have been delivered in a peaceful way.” — Smith [33:09]

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Timestamps for Key Segments

| Segment | Timestamp | |-------------------------------------------|------------| | Main episode introduction | 02:29 | | French navy’s strength/context | 05:33 | | French response & mentality | 08:47 | | Churchill’s state of mind | 10:43 | | Force H and British command | 12:49 | | The fraught negotiations | 15:34 | | The attack & aftermath | 20:15 | | Anglo-French and US-British fallout | 23:47 | | American and German reactions | 26:59–30:04| | Historical and moral appraisal | 31:49 | | Smith’s personal reflections | 33:54 |

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Conclusion

This episode delivers a nuanced, richly detailed exploration of an agonizing moment in Allied wartime diplomacy, dissecting the motives, the pressures on Churchill, and the harrowing consequences for both French and British sailors. It highlights the perils of miscommunication, the fog of war, and the weight of leadership decisions when national survival is at stake. For listeners, it’s a compelling case study in how even “justified” actions can have tragic and unintended costs.

Transcript

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[Edward Abel Smith]

In the summer of 1940, the Royal Navy attacked a French fleet moored off the coast of North Africa, killing almost 1,300 sailors. Winston Churchill described his decision to greenlight the operation as the toughest he ever had to take. But was it the right decision? In this episode of the History Extra podcast, Edward Abel Smith talks to Spencer Mizzen about an episode that would shake Britain's wartime relations with France. Hello, Edward. Thank you very much for joining me today. Your new book is called A Hateful Decision, and it tells the story of one of the most controversial decisions that Winston Churchill took as wartime prime minister, and that was to order the Royal Navy to attack the French feet while it was moored at Mers el Kabir in July 1940. Now, this was an extraordinarily contentious act. For a start, it was perpetrated against an ally, and a stricken ally at that. It was the deadliest act between the two nations since, I believe, the Battle of Waterloo 125 years earlier. And it resulted in the deaths of some 13 French sailors. And obviously it sort of cast a shadow over Anglo French relations. And yet, despite all this, it's an event, I think, Edward, that many of our listeners won't know a great deal about. So I was wondering if you could start by giving us a quick introduction, an overview of what happened at Mirz El Kabir in the summer of 1940.

[Spencer Mizzen]

Yeah, of course, Spencer, as you say, it's largely a forgotten episode, but one that arguably helped tip the balance of the entire war at a moment when Britain was at its weakest. So the British sent a fleet known as Force H to Mers el Kebir, where some of the most powerful French battleships were stationed. And this was just weeks after France had surrendered to Germany. And Churchill's big fear was that this mighty French fleet might fall into German hands. And this was something that would spell disaster for Britain. So Force H arrived at Mers El Kebir on the morning of the 3rd of July, 1940, and they issued an ultimatum to the French ships there. Either join the Allies and effectively defect from France, sail to a neutral port, or scuttle their ships. And the French had until the end of the day to decide, and they ultimately ref. So the Royal Navy opened fire, and as you say, 1297 French sailors were killed, multiple ships destroyed or damaged, over 300 wounded, and relations between the two nations, Britain and France, completely shattered because of the events that day.

[Edward Abel Smith]

So what exactly were the British so worried about? Why were they so terrified by the prospect of the French fleet falling into German hands? I mean, can you tell us a little bit about the strength of the French navy and its potential for wreaking sort of havoc on the British war effort? If it was deployed against the Royal Navy?

[Spencer Mizzen]

Absolutely. And it's not very well known that. It's certainly something I wasn't fully aware of. By 1940, the French Navy was the fourth largest in the world, behind only the Royal Navy, the United States and Japan. And it included an impressive collection of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and they had a combined displacement of roughly 800,000 tons. And just to put that into context, that's over double the size of the German Navy at the time. So it wasn't only the size, but it was also the power and the jewels. At the center of the French naval crown, as it were, were two capital battleships, the Dunkirk and the Strasbourg. And these were described by Churchill as two of the finest vessels ever built. And Churchill knew that if the Germans gained control of the French fleet, or even part of it, or even some of those capital, one or two of those capital ships, they could dramatically shift the balance of power at sea, because they bolster their own navy and also leave gaps in Allied defences. And what we need to remember at the time is that this took place just after Operation Dynamo, the famous evacuation at Dunkirk, where, yes, 330,000 troops were whisked across the Channel, but the British left behind huge supplies and 700 tanks, over 80,000 military vehicles. So Britain no longer had dominance, or they were certainly weak when it came to army and ground power. The RAF was a fourth of the size of the German Luftwaffe, so the only strength that Britain really had at that point was the fleet, and that was the only weakness that the Germans had. So should the French fleet fall into German hands, they would then have supremacy over land, air and sea. So for Churchill, this was a strategic threat to Britain's overall survival. And the Franco German armistice was signed. It was signed on 22 June 1940 and came into effect three days later. And within that there was a specific article. It was Article 8 of the Armistice, which said that Germany would not use French fleet in combat, but would take control of it. And understandably, Churchill and the British Admiralty didn't trust that assurance. And they believed that Hitler had every intention of using the French navy to defeat Britain and also cut off the supply lines. So it was both the impact on merchant shipping as well as on the navy.

[Edward Abel Smith]

One question some of our listeners might be asking here is, what did the French simply comply to British demands? The countries, as we said, were allies. It was surely in French interest that the fleet wasn't employed against the Royal Navy and that Britain was able to stay in the fight. What was French thinking in Regards to its fleet in the summer of 1940.

[Spencer Mizzen]

Yeah, it's a really good question. Ultimately, the French Admiralty did not want their fleet to fall into German hands and they had issued orders to that effect, that their ships were to be, as last resort, be scuttled rather than fall into German hands. The challenge that the British had was they were therefore putting all of their faith in crews of individual ships to follow through with those. With those orders. So the French absolutely wanted to. And as I said, the challenge for Britain was almost sort of a timing behind it and the lack of control. And when it came to the actions at Mirz el Kebir, when the British arrived and they delivered an ultimatum to Admiral Jensol, who was the Admiral in charge of Force de Red, the raid force, which were based at Mers el Kebir, the ultimatum was really asking Gensoul to commit an act of treason to turn against the French Admiralty and to join another foreign power. So it put him in an incredibly difficult position and history has judged him very harshly on the way that he refused the British demands. But from my research and reading into it and reading his accounts from the day he was ultimately following orders, which was that his fleet shouldn't fall into a foreign power, and albeit Britain was an ally, it was a foreign power.

[Edward Abel Smith]

Great. I'd like to come back to the negotiations in a bit, but first, can we chat about Winston Churchill? Because not only as the title of your book sort of alludes to, did he describe the attack on Mayor Zel Kabir is a hateful decision. He also referred to it as the most unnatural and painful in which I've ever been concerned. What does your research and what did a Prime Minister's diaries and public utterances at the time sort of tell us about his state of mind as he wrestled with the decision of whether or not to order the attack at Mels el Kebir?

[Spencer Mizzen]

What we need to remember is Churchill had only recently been installed his prime minister, and in that short period of time, he had faced the evacuations at Dunkirk that I already mentioned, Italy joining the war, the fall of France fall apart, other parts of of Europe. So he was working at breakneck speed. There were multiple war cabinet meetings about what should be done with the French fleet, and there were almost sort of two different sort of sides of the same argument. One was the kind of Churchill, Lord Beaverbrook approach, which was there needs to be absolutely no concessions, the French fleet needs to be captured and taken immediately. And then there was the other side, which came more from parts of the Admiralty and other parts of the War Cabinet, which was to give France more time and allow more of a diplomatic a solution. But really it came down to the point of if these ships fall into German hands, that spells the destruction of Britain. And for Churchill, it ultimately came down to victory at all costs. And, you know, his rhetoric of never surrender, so they went with the more extreme version. But it impacted him hugely during the decision making. There are several diaries that people write that they saw him in tears. And as you say, he describes it as the hardest decision that he's ever had to make, but also probably the most essential.

[Edward Abel Smith]

Okay, can you tell us about H force and the British force charged with sailing to Mers El Kebir and, if necessary, attacking the French fleet there? And also can you introduce us, Edward, to the British commander charged with leading the operation, James Somerville, because it seems that he had a fairly jaundiced view of this entire operation right from the get go.

[Spencer Mizzen]

Absolutely. So Force H was pulled together only a matter of days before the attack took place. And leading Force H was Vice Admiral James Somerville. And this was really a second coming for him because he had been mistakenly diagnosed with tuberculosis a year before, and his naval career came to a sudden end. But because of the rise in hostilities, he was effectively the only member of the Navy of enough seniority to be able to lead this new force. So he found himself almost by accident leading Force H, and he had no idea what he was being sent to do initially. The sort of rumour was that they were there to shore up some of the supply lines that the French had been protecting up to that point before they entered into the armistice negotiations. So he was a huge amount of shock when he received the orders that he was to provide this ultimatum and ultimately attack the French fleet. He sort of knew where his strengths were and knew where his weaknesses were, and he decided right from the start that he was not the right person to actually lead the negotiations directly with the French and with Admiral Gensoul, who was leading force to Red in Moselle Kebir. So he appointed Captain Holland, Cedric Holland, who was known as Hooky because of his misshapen nose. And Hooky Holland had been based in France. He had been the naval attache in Paris for two years and had built really strong relationships with French officers and other members of the Navy. And he was highly respected and highly trusted. So it made sense that he, as the kind of committed Francophile that he was, would lead the negotiations. But actually, although it came from a very good place, from Vice Admiral Somerville, it was the wrong decision. And ended up causing a huge amount of angst with the French, who saw it as an insult that someone, a captain, so for about four ranks below, Vice Admiral Shenzou, was being sent to negotiate with him.

[Edward Abel Smith]

Okay, so let's look at those negotiations in a little bit more detail then, because chapters 12 and 13 of your book entitled Parley and Stalemate drop us, like, right into the heart of these incredibly tense, fraught negotiations between the British and French that took place just off the North African coast ahead of the attack. You relate how Huggy Holland approached the French vessels, genuinely believing that they wanted to talk to him, wanted to see him, wanted to negotiate with him, when in fact he had a heavy machine gun trained on his boat, ready to open fire. So can you talk us through these negotiations and maybe just explain in a bit more detail, I know you've already kind of talked on a bit, why they ultimately broke down?

[Spencer Mizzen]

Yeah, I mean, they broke down for a few reasons. So the negotiations, they all started on the morning of the 3rd of July. Captain Hooky Holland was sent ahead of the rest of Force H aboard HMS Foxhound, and they approached the French fleet at Mers El Kebir. And it actually took several hours to even be allowed to have a meeting with the French. They were initially asked to leave. Admiral Jensoul was insulted because of Captain Holland's rank, but was also obviously very insulted by the insinuation that the British didn't trust that he would not hand his ships over to Germany. So Holland was initially sent away, he refused to leave, and he decided to actually try and make access to the harbor directly, not. Not by force, but uninvited. And what he didn't realize, and I'm not sure he ever realized, seen any record later on in his life actually, how close he got to being gunned down by the French because they told him to leave, informed him that he shouldn't enter the harbour, and yet he was still trying to do so. He was eventually invited aboard Dunkirk, the battleship, to meet with Admiral Genso, where he was received with a very sort of frosty, understandably frosty reception, sort of late in the afternoon. But the delays were not all. The French being stubborn, that was certainly part of it, but it wasn't the full extent of it. Admiral Gensoul was planning to either retaliate to an attack or ideally try and escape from the harbour after dark. So he was deliberately trying to delay negotiations. He wasn't able to make contact with the French Admiralty, so he wasn't able to receive instruction on what to do so. He needed to delay for that, but also he had absolutely no intention of succumbing to a threat from a foreign nation. So up to that point they had been disarming due to the armistice and following the requirements of the armistice. So they tried to delay the British as much as possible that day so they could rearm to fight back.

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[Edward Abel Smith]

and so negotiations break down. Captain Holland is eventually driven away from Dunkirk and then at 6pm on 3 July, the British attack on the French fleet commences. Can you tell us about how the attack unfolded and kind of talk us through the experience, if you can, of being a French sailor under attack? Because for all the kind of diplomatic wrangling, there's a very human story here. A lot of people lost their lives. What did your research into the book tell us about the experience of the French sailors who came under attack that day?

[Spencer Mizzen]

Well, the French sailors before they came under attack, they were called to action stations earlier that day because of a threat. And initially, understandably, they assumed it was the Germans, maybe the Italians. And some of them were quite excited by the idea of avenging or trying to avenge what had happened on mainland France up to that point. So it was obviously a Huge amount of shock and disbelief when they found out that it was the British, that they were being put into action stations to face against. I don't think anyone, probably on both sides, but in particular on the French side, really believed that it would come down to actual attack. And as you say, the negotiations failed. Somerville from the British side had clear instructions that the fleet needed to be put out of action before sunset. So that was his, his deadline. And at six o' clock he ordered that fire would be, would be opened. And the attack only lasted for a matter of minutes, really, it wasn't hours, it was, it was minutes. And some of the first shells that, that came into the harbor struck the battleship the Britannia, which was one of the older but still incredibly powerful battleships there. The shells which hit it almost destroyed it instantly. And just under a thousand sailors were killed in that kind of early strike. And then aboard Dunkirk, Provence, which were the other battleships, the French were initially trapped. They were desperately trying to remove themselves from their awnings to be able to escape the harbour. And from Provence they did fire back and managed to get close to one of the British battlecruiser, HMS Hood, which was firing on them. But they were knocked out before they could actually make any impact. One of the battleships, Strasbourg, did manage to escape and this was an absolute disaster for the British because, you know, they wanted to put all of the ships out of action. But the two which they were really desperate about were Dunkirk and Strasbourg. So that managed to escape. And actually no one, Admiral Somerville, and any of the naval leaders for the British didn't realize that happened. They actually thought it had been sunk. And it was only later on when it was spotted by one of the biplanes that they realized that it had managed to escape. For the French sailors, it was over very quickly. So when the smoke cleared that day after the attack that only lasted minutes, that was only when they really noticed the level of destruction that had happened. And then there was the gory task of retrieving the bodies of those that had been thrown from their ships. And in that initial wave of attack, over a thousand sailors were killed.

[Edward Abel Smith]

Okay, so with that in mind, that really leads us to the question of the fallout from the attack. This must have caused an enormous amount of outrage and anger and shock among the French. Can you talk us through what happened over the next few weeks and how the attack impacted Anglo French relations?

[Spencer Mizzen]

Absolutely. First thing to say is that clearly this was a time where France was going through absolute turmoil in all aspects. So the attacks at Mirz el Kebir were almost another blow to an already beaten down nation. The initial response was almost to declare war effectively between France, or what remained of France and Britain. And there were some initial retaliation. There were some French airstrikes at Gibraltar straight after the. The attacks killed a few civilians and injured a few more. Then there were some later attacks or some skirmishes at Dakar, for example. But really France was in such a weak position and the formation of the Free French was opposed to Vichy France. So there was almost. There was already an internal struggle going on there. So I'm not trying to say it went unnoticed, because it didn't, but it was in the context and the backdrop of so many other events. What really struck me when, when I was reading accounts from those not necessarily involved at Moselkabir, but reflections afterwards was that the French were adamant that they would never let their ships fall into German hands. And this was put to the test in November 1942. So two years later, German forces launched what was known as Operation Anton, and that was to seize the remaining French fleet at Toulon. And at that point the French sailors scuttled all of their. I think there were just under 80 ships in the harbour at the time and scuttled all of them and prevented their capture. So really that was a sign that this lack of trust that the British had in the French was unfounded. So I think the ramifications after that point almost kind of shone a spotlight on what happened at Mirs el Kebir. The reaction around Britain was relatively subdued, if not positive. The view of victory at all costs and never surrender action speaking louder than words, I think was a very important moment for the British people and also the British Allies. So in the us, I think one thing that has often been overlooked with what happened at Mos el Kebir was this was the defining moment for Roosevelt and the American administration that showed that Britain would continue the fight at all costs.

[Edward Abel Smith]

Can we talk about that in a little bit more detail? Because Churchill cling, didn't he, that part of the rationale for attacking the French feet was that it showed to the rest of the world, especially Americans, that Britain meant business, that they would stop at nothing to win the war. Do you genuinely believe that that was one of the reasons Churchill ordered the attack? And I guess you are kind of arguing that actually, if that was the case, it really works. The Americans were impressed.

[Spencer Mizzen]

Absolutely. So what we know up to the point of the attack is that Churchill's, I don't want to say his number one priority because he had so many of them but one of his absolute key priorities was American involvement in the war. And he saw that as the path to victory. So he was busy courting Roosevelt and had a very good open channels of communication with him. And he saw in Roosevelt someone who, like Churchill, knew the importance of naval power and the significance of naval power. So he understood and he knew that Roosevelt was concerned himself about Germany gaining dominance at sea, because what that would do, despite the fact, to quote the current U.S. president, there's a big, beautiful ocean between Europe and America. Roosevelt saw the danger that would come from Germany having dominance in the Atlantic. So I can't say for certain that Churchill knew that by doing this attack that it would help the relations with America ultimately. We know that in the buildup to it, he was hoping for a diplomatic solution. But what we do know for sure is that the American response to the attack was, as you say, that Britain was serious about continuing the war. And very understandably, and this was coming from Kennedy, the American ambassador to the uk Very understandably, there was a strong belief that if Britain was offered a peace deal with Germany, given that Britain was on its knees at this point, that they would take it. And for Roosevelt and for the Americans, they were concerned about sending supplies and providing their support to Britain if it was ultimately going to end up falling into German hands one way or another. So this was the defining moment when they realized that Britain was going to fight on until the end. That wasn't the reason Churchill went into this in the first place, but it certainly helped justify the action that was. That was taking place at Moselkabr.

[Edward Abel Smith]

And what about the Germans then? Did Operation Catapult change in any way? Hitler's thinking when it came to Britain and the prospect of it putting up significant military resistance?

[Spencer Mizzen]

Hitler really wanted to agree a pact with Britain. I think it was up to this point that he believed that Britain would come to the. Come to the table. So this was certainly a sign of strength from the British and their intention. But within Germany, this was obviously an absolute gold mine when it came to propaganda, so showing that the British were war criminals and were willing to attack their allies and so forth. So it was greeted by surprise and shock within the German leadership, but also was taken full advantage of when it came to the perception of Britain. I think the. The other thing to say as well is it really showed that the only way to stop Britain being a problem for Germany was through fighting and defeating Britain. A peaceful solution was not going to be possible, certainly not with Churchill at the helm.

[Edward Abel Smith]

Okay. By the way, Listeners, this isn't the first time that Edward has appeared on the History Extra podcast. In fact, he came on here just over a year ago to discuss the remarkable life of Nicholas Wil Winton, who helped hundreds of Jewish children escape Czechoslovakia on the eve of the Second World War. If you'd like to listen to that podcast, all you have to do is click on the link that I'll leave in the podcast description. Okay, Edward. To return to Operation Catapult, in Hindsight, more than 80 years later, do most historians tend to see it as justified and as being militarily effective and has their view on it changed much in recent years?

[Spencer Mizzen]

So I would say, and I'm sure several people might disagree with this, I would say the general consensus from historians is that the attacks were justified and they were essential. And really, certainly from British historians perspectives, the French left little option but to go ahead with this. I can't speak to whether attitudes have changed recently, but certainly from my own research I can agree with that opinion up to a point. It's clear that if Germany had got their hands on the French fleet, that it would have spelt destruction and it's almost certain that it would have sparked complete destruction for Britain and therefore the result of World War II would have been very different. So it was absolutely essential that that happened. What's clear though, when you look at the accounts from those involved and the decision makers at the time, France and Britain were on exactly the same page that the French fleet should not fall into German hands. And there was a plan in place that the French fleet would sail to a neutral port, most probably in the US to avoid falling into German hands. But it was the appearance of the British and the delivery of an ultimatum that the French felt gave them no option but to return fire. And I think where I've landed on this is it was essential that this was done, but it could have been delivered in a peaceful way because fundamentally both nations, the British and French, were on the same page with where they wanted the outcome to be.

[Edward Abel Smith]

And finally, Edward, if there's one fact, something that you learned about this episode in Mirza El Kabir that really stayed with you during your research for the book, that really struck a chord with you, would you mind sharing it with us?

[Spencer Mizzen]

Yes, that's a really good question. I think one thing that really struck me was the impact that this had on Winston Churchill and the normally gung ho, stiff upper lip prime minister was initially desperate that this should end peacefully and really struggled with the decision. And when the events unfolded, family members close advisors, other MPs have all written about how visibly shaken and upset he was by this. And when you put this into the context of all of the decisions that he was making and all of the weight that was sitting on his shoulders at the time, that really struck me. And then the other part as well was, sounds very cliche to say it, but the importance of clear communication. A lot of this unfolded because the communication wasn't clear. What the British were asking, what the French were willing to do, what the threat from Germany really was, what the possible solutions could be. And when you put that in a compressed period of time, just in one day, with messages passing from one person to another to another, you just have a complete breakdown in communication. So that really struck me. Throughout that, as I said earlier, both sides were singing from the same hymn sheet. They just probably didn't realize it at the time. And that was all down to a lack of communication.

[Edward Abel Smith]

Edward, thank you so much for that. That was absolutely fascinating.

[Spencer Mizzen]

Thank you so much for having me.

[Edward Abel Smith]

That was Edward Abel Smith talking to Spencer Mizzen. Edward is a non fiction author, feature writer, documentary maker and podcaster. His latest book, A Hateful Decision, explores the Royal Navy's attack on the French fleet in 1940.