
James Holland describes "five months of hell" where Allied forces battled the Nazis in Italy
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James Holland
Welcome to the History Extra podcast. Fascinating historical conversations from the makers of BBC History magazine. When Allied forces invaded Italy in the summer of 1943, they hoped to be in Rome by Christmas. Instead, it wasn't until June 1944 that the Italian capital was liberated, following a gruelling march up the peninsula that ended with what James Holland describes as five months of hell. In his new book, Casino 44, the historian, author and podcaster zones in on these months and in particular the brutal Battle of Monte Cassino. Rob Attar calls up with James to find out more.
Rob Attar
James, your book covers the early months of the Italian campaign in 1944. But just to give our listeners a sense of what's going on, what's happened in Italy up to this point.
Unknown
Yeah. So the Allies have taken sicily on by the 17th of August 1943, and it's kind of, you know, what do they do next? Do they go into Italy or not? And there's a huge amount of risk in that because it could sort of suck in a huge amount of resources and effort and all the rest of it. But the number one priority for the Allies by this stage is Operation Overlord, which has been agreed the Previous May of 1943 at the Trident Conference in Washington. And, you know, that is their absolute priority in any further operations in the European theater have to be to help Operation Overlord. And there's certain advantages for going into Italy. First of all, you're getting rid of Italy once and for all out of the war. So that's good. And if you get Italy out of the war, that means that either the Germans have to abandon the whole of Italy, but also the Balkans and Greece and the Aegean, which includes Crete and the Dodecanese islands, which are occupied by Italian troops, or replace them with their own troops. And obviously the Germans are going to replace them because they're just, just not going to abandon them. That's a good thing for the Allies because that means they've got to come from somewhere and they're going to come from the Eastern front, but also the Western Front. That's going to weaken the defenses. When Operation Overlord is launched the following May 1944, as it's planned in 1943, then the third reason is to capture Rome, which is a major European capital, one of the most famous cities in the world, and the center of Fascist Italy as it had been. So that's a good thing to do. But the main reason, the one that trumps absolutely everything, is the airfields at Foggia. Now, Foggia is one of the very rare flat areas of Italy about a third of the way way up on the Adriatic coast on the eastern side of the Italian peninsula. And there you could put in bomber airfields with heavy bombers. And the reason you want to do this is so you can attack the German aircraft industry in the Southern Reich. Because what happens, and it also happens on 17 August 1943, the same day that Sicily is captured, is the day of the Schweinfurt rexensberg raid, where 60American bombers from the 8th Air Force get shot down out of a formation of 320 odd, which is completely unsustainable levels and the reason they get shot down so badly is because they're hitting targets which are beyond the range of fighter escort from the uk and there isn't a long range fighter escort at this point. So the Allies are suddenly panicking a bit, because for Overlord to be successful, you've got to have a whole swathe of air superiority over a large part of northwest Europe. Because the moment you land on the beaches in Normandy, the cat's out of the bag and then the race is on between which side can build up decisive amounts of men and materiel. Is it going to be the Allies who've got to come across the sea and kind of slow mo moving boats over 100 plus miles, or is it going to be the Germans already on the continent? You need to be able to slow down the German ability to be able to reinforce a Normandy bridgehead. And you do that by hitting their transportation network, destroying bridges, marshalling yards, railway lines and so on. But you can only do that by very low level, accurate bombing. And you can only do that if you've got control of the skies. Because if you're going low level and suddenly there's lots of Messerschmitts and Focke Wolf above you, you're going to be toast. So it's really, really important that they really, really severely hammer the Luftwaffe and the German aircraft industry, but they're not able to do it from the UK in 1943. So how do you get around this? Well, you get around this by having huge number of bombers in southern Italy. So that is the main reason for going into Italy above all others. And actually they get the Foggia airfields on the 27th of September, and that's a massive tick. They are able to kind of get a toehold in the Salerno invasion, which is launched on the 9th of September. Italy is out of the war. German troops do pour into the Balkans, into Greece, the Aegean, the Dodecanese and Crete, and into Italy itself. So all of that is ticked. The only thing they haven't achieved by Christmas of 1943 is actually capturing Rome, because the Germans have changed their minds. And rather than retreating to the Pisa Rimini Line, which is about 200 miles north of Rome, which was the original strategy, they then decide to actually fight for every yard in a sort of classic Hitlerian way. But Also when the US 8th Air Force tries again to go into the aircraft factories and hit the aircraft industry deep into the Reich in the beginning of October, in the first half of October 1943, again, they get absolutely hammered which then prompts the Allies to go, well, actually, rather than sending six bomber groups of 72 heavy bombers each to Foggy, we're going to up that to 21. And the problem with that is that that is then competing logistically with the ground forces who are already now struggling against a determined enemy that is not retreating. And in conditions and weather and topography, which goes completely against the grain of any Allied attack on the ground.
Rob Attar
So you're saying that they achieved their main objective in Italy, and then in 1944, they've got this big planned for D Day, Operation Overlord. Was there ever an argument for just holding their ground in Italy and then focusing instead on just purely on Overlord?
Unknown
Yes, there is an argument for that, but it's not a very good one. Because the problem is now, having invested so much effort in Foggy, you've got to protect it. And there are more infantry divisions, more German divisions in Italy than there are Allied. And so you need to maintain the initiative against the Germans. A, to attrit the Germans and draw off ever more troops from the Western Front, but B, to get north of Rome to a cushion of about 50 miles, which would then make the Foggia airfields properly safe. The problem is what you can't do is go on the defensive, take your eye off the ball, and then risk a localized counterattack on the eastern side by a mass of German infantry divisions, which you then can't do anything about. And all that investment in Fodger gets lost as it gets overrun again. So that's why you need to sort of maintain the initiative and you need to keep going. You need to get to Rome and indeed beyond Rome, as I say, a buffer of about 50 miles north of the city to make sure that your asset that you've invested so much in Fodga is safe and secure. And also there's that whole point that when you're attacking, your initiative is with you because you're the one that's dictating the base. Whereas if you're on the defense, it's a different proposition altogether.
Rob Attar
In that case, was the allied goal for 1944 essentially? Is it capture Rome? Is that like the main target?
Unknown
Yeah, get north of Rome and get that cushion that you need to make sure that the Fodgia airfields are going to be completely safe. It's once you understand the importance of Foggia in the bigger picture and its relationship to Overlord and winning air superiority over Northwest Europe ahead of Overlord, which is an absolutely non negotiable prerequisite, then it all starts to kind of, you know, the whole drain of the Italian campaign starts to make a whole load of sense. The problem is that the Germans have created this double lock system on the western side of the peninsula. First the Bernhard Line, also known as the Winter Line by the Americans, and then the Gustav Line. And the Bernhard Line joins the Gustav Line about sort of third of the way across the peninsula and then continues over onto the Adriatic coast. And this is not a sort of Great Wall of China or anything, you know, but this is a strung along series of defensive positions working together with one another, preceded by gargantuan numbers of mines and wire and so on, and using the geography very cleverly to make very, very strong defensive positions. And the US Fifth army, which also includes the French Expeditionary Corps and several British divisions as well, managed to break through the Bernhard Line, the Winter Line, by the middle of December 1943. But then they're drawing up towards the Gustav Line and they're coming up towards the Gustav Line in the middle of January 1944, and they've got to get through that. Now, there has been a plan that's been mooted first in November, to do an outflanking operation to get in behind the Gustav Line and destabilize the Gustav Line that way and try and sort of hustle the Germans into pulling back from it. And this was called Operation Shingle. But they kind of ran out of time, because at the beginning of January, or rather in November, Operation Overlord was going to take place in May, which meant that whatever landing craft was still in the. In the Mediterranean would have to go by the 15th of January to get back to Britain in time for May. However, it has then been pushed back a little bit to the beginning of June. This is Operation Overlord. So that gives them a little narrow window to actually resurrect this outflanking operation. The problem is they still don't have very much shipping, so it's only ever going to be limited. And it's a punt, you know, no one is hiding the fact that it's anything other than that. So the plan is to land the US 6th Corps, which again will include British and American troops, behind the gustav line, about 40 miles north of the Gustav line and about 30 miles south of Rome at a place called Anzio, which is another bit of flat area for the Allies to land there, Sixth Court, to land there, then hurtle towards the Auburn Hills, which is a key bit of high ground. And hopefully the combination of that high ground overlooking Highway 7, which is one of the main kind of roads coming south out of Rome and a series of assaults on the Gustav Line to the south that would persuade the Germans to pull back. And it does happen, they do land. Operation Shingle is launched at Anzio on the 22nd of January. And this is following a sequence of assaults on the Gustav Line. And literally every single German commander in Italy is saying, I really think we should pull back at this point. The only person who doesn't is Field Marshal Albert Kessering, who is the commander in chief of German forces in Italy and who is slavishly devoted to his oath to Hitler. And Hitler is saying, no, you must fight for every yard. So he sticks to it. But it is very, very close to actually happening. I mean, that's the amazing thing about it. But because Kesselring insists on fighting and because he's splitting up all his divisions and firefighting constantly and kind of filling every gap with kind of sort of whatever troops he can get his hands on, vast numbers of German troops are getting injured or killed, but they are managing to just hold out. And Antio doesn't achieve its immediate aims and they're unable to break through the Gustav Line as well.
Rob Attar
And the pivotal battle, or the battle that certainly most of our listeners will have heard of is Monte Cassino. And I think that's become known as one of the most challenging, most brutal battles that the Allies fought in the Second World War. Why was it so difficult?
Unknown
The key is really understanding these axes. So you've got one on the Adriatic coast, that's the Via Vadriatica, you've got one in the middle which goes through the Brutsi Mountains and it's very kind of narrow and winding and is, you know, from a mechanized army, that's a bit of a no go. Then you got the Highway 7 on the Tyrrhen coast. It's too close to the coast and it's, it's got mountains coming overlooking it and, you know, it's just not enough room for maneuver. The main road north between Naples and Rome is, is the via Casolina Highway 6. And this runs through the Minano Gap, which is where the winter line had been, the Bernhard line had been, and they've broken through that. But then the next big stopping point is where it goes through the town of Cassino, which nestles at the foot of the Monte Cassino massive, which is on the north eastern side. On the right hand side, as you're looking northwards of the Liri Valley, which is a sort of gap between the mountains The Runci Mountains on one side, on the left hand side, and the Monte Cassino massive rising up to Monte Cara on the right. And then it goes through the town and then sneaks around the edge of the mountain, the foot of the mountain massif, and heads north up through the Liri Valley towards Rome. The problem is that overlooking this is German artillery observers who were then protected by loss of infantry. And there's no way the Allies can get through and use the via Casalina Highway 6 until they've got the peaks above cleared, because observers can direct artillery fire onto that road. So what you need to do is you need to get up onto the massive, get rid of the observers and get rid of the protective infantry, and then you can move on. But until you've done that, you can't. And the problem is that the defenders hold all the aces because they're up in a mountain, they've got high ground and they've got, they're dug in and they're making the most of the topography and crevices and little ridges and all the rest of it. And what happens is the 34th Red Bull Division, American division, goes up there, does really, really well, gets two thirds of the massive. They're so far along this massive, which is sort of V shape as it tapers to its end, they're so far across they can actually see out into the Liri Valley, but they just can't quite clear it. And one of the reasons they can't quite clear it is because the defensive position has been created as a kind of figure of eight, two circles surrounded by, you know, and around the edge of these circles are a series of machine gun posts and German mortars and what have you. And the apex of that is a high point called 0.593, which comes at the end of a long ridge line called the Snake's Head Ridge, and then drops off into a very kind of sudden bluff. And the problem is the Red Bulls just can't quite take 593 because every time they do take it, they get attacked from either side, from mortars and machine guns, from these two circles attacking into them. And so they just can't quite get it. And the problem is that the commanders down in the valley below don't understand this defensive system and don't quite understand the canalizing effect of these ridge lines. First of all, the Snake's Head Ridge and then the Phantom's Ridge and Monte Castelloni and Colle Sant'Angelo. If one thinks of the kind of the Wi Fi symbol that sort of series of semicircular sort of pieces of a pie with the little lines going across it. That's what the Monte Cassino Massive is like. It's like tapers to a triangle. It's got these ridge lines going across it. The problem with the ridgeline is they're very, very narrow. So you can only ever send a certain amount of infantry along there at any one time because you're canalized by the narrowness of the ridgeline and they're just getting hammered by machine guns and mortars every time they try and do it. So you can only ever send a sort of company strength of late, say 100 men at one time, they get hammered, then you send in another one, they get hammered, and so on and so on and so on. So what you need is to be able to direct overwhelming amounts of troops at the enemy at one time. But you can't do it because of the canalising effect of the ridgelines. And as I say, the American generals don't understand this because A, they're not up on the ridge lines and B, because so many of the company commanders and platoon commanders are getting killed or wounded that they're not able to report this back effectively. And this is all happening in the kind of first couple of weeks of February 1944. So the solution is that Alexander then creates the New Zealand Corps with Bernard Freyberg, who's a very famous New Zealander with a Victoria Cross from the First World War to command this corps. And the reason he's made it is because he is the only divisional commander who is a three star general, that is a Lieutenant general as opposed to a more normal Major general, two star general for a division. And so he gets in charge of the corps and that's fine because under him he's got General Francis Tuka, who is the very, very brilliant and inspired commander of the fourth Indian Division. Tuka comes up with a much better plan. Rather than just following up after the Red Bulls, he says, no, what we should do is we should go further up onto the massive where it' but actually it's not as steep and where the ground is much more open and where you don't have these ridgelines so we can attack in greater weight at one time and where the German defenses are less pronounced. That's obviously an inherently sensible idea. But then he gets debilitatingly badly ill with rheumatoid arthritis, hospitalized. And Freyberg is just not the sharpest tool in the shed. And he's one of these people who tends to kind of agree with the last people that he's spoken to. When he goes and presents this plan of Tukas to the Americans, the Americans just go, no, no, no, no, no, no, we're already on there. You just need one, one last push and that' to do. When Tuka hears of this, he says, okay, well that's fine, but what you really need to do in that case, because you're just going to get hammered along these ridge lines, it's not going to work. The only way to do it, if you absolutely going to insist on continuing the fight on the Monte Cassino Massif at the end of this tapering block of mountains, you need to pummel the entire massive with very, very heavy ordnance. The heaviest ordnance you've got, you know, 4,000 pound cookies. And that's going to involve the strategic air forces, the heavy bombers operating out of Foggia. And also, by the way, that kind of mean the destruction of the 6th century Benedictine Abbey, which is perched right at the end of the Monte Cassino Massif. And do you really want that on your conscience? And is that not going to be a really good PR coup for the Germans? And will this not make us, the goodies look like the baddies? He points all this out to Freiburg, but neither him nor the Americans are swayed. And Tukit also says that what you really need to do is make sure that it's not these little kitty bombers, you know, that you've got to do it properly and really, really, really heavy. And he actually gets out of his hospital bed to go and confront Freyberg with this, say, really, really spell it out. And he says you need to follow up with an infantry attack the same time. I mean literally the bombers have just disappeared. Then you need to swamp with infantry. Freyberg, amazingly, despite these very specific instructions and heavy bombers and 4,000 pound cookies, then turns up to 5th army headquarters and goes, I want 36 Kitty bombers, which are single engine bombers, you know, dropping very small amounts of ordnance and destroy the abbey, which is not what Duka has said at all. They come round unannounced, pretty much unannounced. On the 15th of February, they do destroy the monastery, not the rest of the massive. And the infantry, the attacking infantry, are not given enough warning to coordinate their attack. And the whole thing's just a complete fiasco. And the net result is that hardly any Germans are killed. The monastery is destroyed for no end whatsoever. The 4th Indian Division attack, when it does happen, isn't effective because it hasn't been coordinated with the bombers.
Rob Attar
Do we Get a sense that there is a problem of leadership to some extent, going on here. I mean, that's certainly the accusation that's often been levelled at the Allied commanders fighting in Italy.
Unknown
Yeah, well, when Alexander initially creates the New Zealand Corps, it's to burst through into the Livery Valley and give that little extra push that the 34th Red Bulls need after their initial successes. You know, that's how he's envisioning it. It's not to replace the Red Bulls in a slugging match on the Monte Cassino Massif, but that's how it turns out to be. You know, General Mark Clark, who is the fifth army commander, when he sees Freyberg's plan just goes, this is absolutely ridiculous. This is a terrible idea. You know, why on earth would you want to destroy the abbey that's going to achieve absolutely nothing apart from make us look terrible? You know, I'm dead against it. And he puts in writing on 13th February, to Alexander, the army group commander says, you know, I'm really against this. This is not a good idea. And Alexander says, look, I think if we've appointed this new corps commander and we're asking him to attack a formidable defensive system, we should give him whatever assistance he wants. And he's treading carefully because of the politics of coalition warfare, because New Zealand is a dominion to Britain that has punched massively above its weight. There are mutinies going on in New Zealand at the time. So it's a febrile political situation. Alexander is wary about rocking any kind of political boat. He does what Freyberg suggests. But the bottom line is Freyberg has just completely cocked it up. I mean, you know, it's a terrible decision. It's not what Tuca suggested. It's not even what Tuca's brief was. He'd have been much better to listen to Tuka and do what Tuka suggested, but he doesn't. And he's the man in position. And so it's an absolute fiasco. And it's a fiasco again when they, having failed there, that they then try again with Casino Town. Now, you know, Alexander is slightly wary about attacking again. Says, okay, well, that hasn't worked. D Day has been put back to Operation Overload has been put back to June. So we're kind of okay on that. We still got a little bit of time. Wouldn't it be much better to wait for the better weather for it all to dry out? We can bring to bear our huge advantages in air power and mechanization and so on. Once the mud dries out and the sky's clear, et cetera, et cetera. But there is an argument for trying to clear the massive one more time before of that final big operation, which is going to become known as Operation Diadem, which is finally going to be launched on 11th May, 1944. There is a case for trying to kind of clear up Cassino. And actually there's a plan which is on paper, not bad, which is to destroy the whole town with very heavy bombing. I mean, having ignored Tuca the first time, you need to pulverize the whole of the Monte Casino in massive. Freyberg then becomes a convert and goes, actually, what I really need to do now is pulverize the whole of the town, which is already pretty bashed about and is empty of civilians, incidentally. So although it's a bit distasteful, it's not entirely a bad idea. And Clark says to him, yeah, okay, that's fine, but you need to then swamp the town with troops. You know, you need to swamp them with infantry. And you also need to have a plan to clear the Monte Cassino massive. We'll do a frontal attack, but also one round the back. Indian snappers expand this goat track up the back so that Sherman tanks can get round. And Clark makes it absolutely clear to Freyberg that all of this needs to be coordinated into one giant effort all at the same time. What happens is the bombers come over on the 15th of March, when the rain finally stops, pulverize the town. That's then followed by nearly 200,000 shells being fired by the artillery to completely finish it off. But then he only sends in one battalion, which is, you know, 800 men. A second battalion goes in that night and they don't get very far. And when the Germans send down recce parties to see the state of play in the bombed out casino, they're absolutely astonished that night to discover that most of the town isn't occupied by the Allies. And again, that is Freyberg being A obtuse and B, being overprotective of his New Zealand troops and not thinking, you know, There's a whole 78th Infantry Division, a British division, which is on standby, waiting to be used and isn't used. The tanks are on standby to go round the Cavendish Road, this route up the back behind Monte Cassino, which has been created by the Indian sappers. It doesn't happen. You know, why not? And you know, that is just bad generalship on Freiburg's part. And, you know, it's also Unfortunate that the commander of the New Zealand Division, who's taken over from Freiburg, who's a very competent guy called Kippenberger, he loses both his legs on mines at the beginning of March. So that's him out of the action. The guy, Ike Parkinson, who takes over is not much cop either. The guy who's taken over 4th Indian Division is a former kind of TA artillery officer called Dimoline. He's not much cop either. So, you know, it's like a perfect storm, you know, and Freyberg can just about hide his deficiencies as a senior commander if he's surrounded by really good people. But if the people below him are kind of mediocre and second rate, then, you know, his deficiencies become exposed. And that's what happens in those two battles. Fortunately, though, despite those two complete fiascos, by the beginning of May, you know, the two allied armies are side by side, you know, British 8th Army, US 5th Army. And they're able to plan it properly, build up enough strength, use the improved weather conditions and all the rest of it. And that is, you know, that's a triumph, you know, and a major triumph. And Rome finally falls on the 4th of June.
Rob Attar
Your book is subtitled Five Months of Hell, which I guess gives a bit of an answer to my next question, but quite how tough was it for the Allied soldiers fighting these battles?
Unknown
Well, it's tough for all of them, and it's even tougher for the Germans, who are incredibly thinly holding the line. I mean, by any standards today you would expect that 30% casualty losses means that whatever unit you're talking about is now combat ineffective. Well, they're operating with 10% strength, 12% strength, 15% strength. I mean, when the first fager division, the first parachute division arrives in Casino at the beginning of February, it should be 17,000 strong. It's about 2500. I mean, you know, it's absolutely risible. So it's just absolutely horrific. It's also horrific for the. For the Allies, of course, who are just expected to do more with less because of the prioritization of Overlord, because of the Fodger airfields, getting the kind of first dibs on logistics, and because of the conditions, because of the weather, because of the mud in the valleys, because of the difficulty of operating on mountains. It is the poor bloody infantry that are having to do the high yards and having to do it on their own two feet and with the help of mules rather than in trucks and on, you know, with tanks and armor and all the rest of it, so it's incredibly tough. And they're just expected to be in the line longer than they ever would be in northwest Europe, for example. I mean, just generally speaking, you know, by the time you get to the Normandy campaign, an infantryman is very rarely in the, in the coal face for more than four days, very rarely for more than 48 hours. But in Italy, you've got infantry in the front line for kind of two weeks at a time. So it's, it's incredibly tough, it's incredibly brutal. And made worse by the privations that they're having to suffer because of the pouring winter weather and because of the conditions on which they're operating. I mean, you know, you've got people up on Monte Cassino, massive on a mountain for several weeks at a time, you know, 10 days at a time, you know, in the rain, in the cold, being shelled all the time. Shelling is much worse on a mountain because the soil is thin, so the shell, when it explodes, got nowhere to go. And it's also kicking out lots of shards of razor sharp bits of rock. Whereas, you know, for example, a shell lands on a beach, it's being absorbed by the soft sand or indeed on clay soil or whatever. So the lethality of shelling, whether it be mortars or artillery or even a machine gun, is much worse on the top of a mountain than it is anywhere else. So it is just really, really grim. And it's also, I should say, incredibly grim for all the civilians caught up in the middle of it.
Rob Attar
And then I suppose to compound matters for certainly the Allied troops, they're not even necessarily getting the recognition they might feel they deserve because of what's going on with Overlord and because of all the attention being lavished on D Day. They're often known as like a forgotten army, aren't they? Or like the D Day Dodgers, they.
Unknown
Become known as the D Day Dodgers. I mean, I think the thing is, you know, I mean, Italy campaign is kind of front page news until the 5th of June when Rome falls. But of course the 6th of June is D Day and that then takes a priority. And it's not that Italy isn't on the, on the front pages and it's not that it's not written up about in the papers. It absolutely is. I mean, I've got a picture Post magazine From I think October 1944, and it's all about the Italian campaign and that's obviously well after D Day. It's just that it's not the priority. And where it really is less on the kind of lack of national and global recognition. It's more on the supplies and the nature of prioritization. And prioritization just does go to northwest Europe and then subsequently to Operation Dragoon, which is launched on Southern France on the 15th of August, 1944. And, you know, then just after the fall of Rome, on this, on the 5th of June, they're making great headway and they're doing incredible things and pushing the Germans back. And at that point, you know, seven divisions get taken away and a third of their air power for Operation Dragoon, this invasion of southern France to support D Day. You know, just at the moment where they've got the Germans on the run, and that's just very morale sapping for all those who are left behind. I mean, it's really interesting, Rob, but, you know, over the years I've interviewed maybe 40 veterans of the Italian campaign, and I would say off the top of my head, I can't think of a single one, but one Chuck called Ray Seidel, who was combat infantry in the 1st Armored Division. He's the only one who didn't get wounded, but, you know, literally everyone got injured or wounded at some point. I mean, it was just, you know, statistically, Ray Seidel is zero, you know, so, you know, he's an absolute anomaly. And, you know, what I've done for this new book is less look at oral testimonies and more look at diaries and letters, contemporary diaries and letters. And some of the best ones, the ones that who write quite fully, they're fantastic because their characters really, really shine through in a very, very vivid way. They don't all survive. Of course they don't. You're reading these letters or you're reading a diary, then suddenly it stops. And the next day he's been obliterated by an 88 millimeter shell or something. And it's really. It's quite upsetting really, because these guys are very vivid, and as I say, you can absolutely see their characters and what they're like, and then suddenly, boom, just with a heartbeat, they're gone.
Rob Attar
And I remember you saying to me once before that it's really interesting when you read contemporary sources like diaries and letters, that the things the soldiers are focusing on aren't necessarily what they might in later life recollect and also what you might even expect them to be focusing on at the time.
Unknown
Yeah, no, that's absolutely true. I mean, they're all obsessed about air power. They all talk about it, whether they're Germans or British, they always note that planes have been over, and they obsess about letters and getting letters and worrying about letters not arriving and so on. And there is a definitely a sort of universal mood among soldiers, which is it doesn't matter what side you are, you know, you still have the same emotions. I mean, one of the most moving episodes that I found just heartbreaking was this German runner, Anzio. And, you know, he's absolutely exhausted and he finally gets called back out of the line and to go and pick up a mail bag. So he's actually in the kind of rear areas, and he picks up his mailbag and he gets a kind of replacement uniform, and he gets given a kind of a bowl of hot stew, and he's feeling all ready, and he picks up his mail bag and there's in it a whole bunch of cigarettes and all the company's mail. And he just goes back, kind of springing his step because he thinks, I feel better and everyone's going to really love me because I'm bringing this bag of joy, which is letters from home. And while he's always going through one of the waddies, one of these little narrow channels on the sort of western side of the Anzio Bridge, dead. And suddenly the, you know, the Allied artillery opens up and it gets shelled and he slips into this water, this little creek, and gets absolutely soaked and covered in mud and all the mail gets ruined and he just weeps. He can't believe what's happened. And when he gets back, everyone's really nice to him about it, but he just feels completely wretched because he's ruined the mail and he's ruined the cigarettes. He started off his journey feeling kind of on top of the world and feeling better and clean and full of food and, you know, better about life, and came back feeling even worse than when he'd started. And, yeah, it's impossible not to feel sorry for these people because people are still people. They still have emotions and worries and anxieties, and these things really come to the fore. And I think. I think it's important when one is writing a general narrative history to try and be as even handed as possible and try and treat individuals with the respect they deserve regarding what. What side they are, and not be too judgmental. I mean, you can be judgmental, but let the reader judge rather than make all the judgments yourself.
Rob Attar
And on that emotional side, what were the emotions when Rome was liberated, both for the soldiers and also the Italian people?
Unknown
Well, huge liberation for the Italian people. Who'd basically be starved, partly because the Germans didn't have much themselves and partly because of Operation Strangle, which was this Allied air attack to kind of hamper German supply lines, which meant very little was getting into Rome. So they're all really, really struggling, the Romans. So, you know, from their point of view, the hated Germans were out, the Fascists are out, you know, hooray. ALL CHEER for the Allies. And from the Allied point of view, you know, it was the single biggest victory on land that the Allies had achieved up to that point of the war. You know, of course, it gets overshadowed by what happens the following day, the 6th of June, but it's a huge victory and frankly, the Allied armies in Italy deserve all the credit they should get because it's a brilliantly planned battle. It had enough flexibility that when the plan doesn't go exactly according to plan, they can do something about it. And it should be celebrated and commemorated as a huge ally victory that it was, to be perfectly honest.
Rob Attar
Overall, then, despite all the challenges, would you say that these, these months represent a success of the Allies, considering they did ultimately capture Rome?
Unknown
Yeah, I think so. I mean, you know, the original aims for the Italian campaign, you know, get Foggia, get Italy out of the war, draw off lots of German troops and get to Rome. That's been achieved. So, you know, what more can you do? It's also been achieved with a huge expansion of the Foggia airfields, from six heavy bomb groups to 21. You know, that's a massive tick. Not only have they drawn off troops, the German troops to Occupy Italy in September 1943, they've continued to draw off ever more German troops. I mean, the invasion at Anzio prompts even more resupply of troops and forces from Germany into Italy. So drawing it away from the Western Front and the Eastern Front, again, that's a huge tick. But you can't hide the mistakes. I mean, you know, Freyberg's performance at Casino is just, you know, it's dreadful, it's woeful, and you can't avoid the kind of awfulness of the battles and just how dreadful they were. And the frustrating thing, from a historian's point of view, looking back on it, is just that a lot of that was avoidable. You know, they should and could have broken through in February and broken through the Gustav Line, and, you know, they were really, really close, and they could have seen that home with different plans, with different generalship, with different decisions, and that doesn't happen. So that's where the black mark comes. I wouldn't say generally that you can point too many fingers at Alexander or Clark or indeed in this stage, you know, Oliver Leese, who is the 8th army commander. They can only do what they can do. You know, you can criticize Alexander a bit, I suppose, for pointing Freyberg, but. But, you know, there's precedence here and there's politics at play, and this is coalition warfare. And the benefits of having these coalition partners comes of a cost, which is flexibility and freedom to maneuver sometimes, you know, but, you know, what can you do? But overall it's a success, definitely. I think everyone should sort of, you know, back down on kind of being overly critical about the Anzio landings because, again, you know, that's the limiting factor is the number of assault crafts. You know, that's got nothing to do with Alexander or Mark Clark or anyone else. You know, that's to do with the chiefs of staff and how they decide to use the. The limited assets that they've got. And it's a choice, it's a prioritization. And Italy is just not as high priority as the Pacific is to the Americans or Operation Overlord D Day is to chiefs of staff, you know, and that's just the way it is. You can't do everything all the time at full throttle. And the people who are fighting in Italy, you know, that's the price they have to pay.
James Holland
That was James Holland. His book Casino, fortunately, is out now, published by transworld. And you can read a piece by James about the Battle of Monte Cassino in the January issue of BBC History magazine, which is published on 19 December. For more on the brutal Italian campaign of World War II, check out the link in the episode description of this podcast where you can hear more from James as he looks at the wider history underpinning this episode. Thanks for listening. This podcast was produced by Jack Bateman.
History Extra Podcast: "The Bloody Road to Rome: Liberating Italy from the Nazis in WWII"
Overview
In the gripping episode titled "The Bloody Road to Rome: Liberating Italy from the Nazis in WWII," James Holland, a renowned historian, author, and podcaster, delves deep into the harrowing Italian Campaign of World War II. Produced by Immediate Media, the episode offers a comprehensive exploration of the strategic maneuvers, brutal battles, and leadership challenges that defined the Allies' arduous journey to liberate Italy from Nazi occupation. Through detailed analysis and poignant personal anecdotes, Holland brings to life the complexities and sacrifices of this pivotal period in history.
1. The Italian Campaign: An Overview (02:05)
James Holland sets the stage by outlining the Allies' invasion of Italy in the summer of 1943. Initially optimistic about capturing Rome by Christmas, the campaign instead stretched to June 1944, culminating in what Holland aptly describes as "five months of hell." This prolonged struggle was marked by fierce resistance, particularly exemplified by the Battle of Monte Cassino.
Quote:
"When Allied forces invaded Italy in the summer of 1943, they hoped to be in Rome by Christmas. Instead, it wasn't until June 1944 that the Italian capital was liberated, following a gruelling march up the peninsula that ended with what I describe as five months of hell."
— James Holland, 02:05
2. Strategic Importance of Italy and Operation Overlord (03:02)
Holland emphasizes the strategic significance of the Italian Campaign beyond mere territorial gains. The primary objective was to secure the Foggia airfields, crucial for establishing air superiority in preparation for Operation Overlord (D-Day). By liberating Italy, the Allies aimed to draw German resources away from both the Eastern and Western Fronts, thereby weakening their defensive capabilities.
Quote:
"The main reason for going into Italy above all others is the airfields at Foggia... you can attack the German aircraft industry in the Southern Reich."
— James Holland, 03:02
3. The Challenges of Air Superiority and the German Response (07:24)
The discussion shifts to the Allies' struggle to achieve air superiority over Europe. Despite capturing key locations like Foggia, the Allies faced relentless German resistance, particularly from the Luftwaffe. The German Field Marshal Albert Kesselring's unwavering commitment to Hitler's directives meant that the Luftwaffe remained a formidable obstacle.
Quote:
"The problem is that the Germans have created this double lock system on the western side of the peninsula... They're up in a mountain, they've got high ground and they've got, they're dug in."
— James Holland, 07:24
4. Operation Shingle and the Battle of Monte Cassino (12:12)
One of the most intense segments of the episode covers Operation Shingle—the Anzio landings—and the subsequent Battle of Monte Cassino. Holland provides a vivid account of the tactical difficulties faced by the Allies, including treacherous terrain, fierce German defenses, and flawed leadership decisions that hindered progress.
Quote:
"The key is really understanding these axes... there's no way the Allies can get through and use the via Casalina Highway 6 until they've got the peaks above cleared."
— James Holland, 12:12
5. Leadership Failures and Their Consequences (19:20)
Holland critically examines the leadership shortcomings during key operations. He highlights General Bernard Freyberg's missteps during the Battle of Monte Cassino, where his decisions led to the unnecessary destruction of the historic Benedictine Abbey without achieving significant tactical gains. These failures not only resulted in high casualties but also tarnished the Allies' moral standing.
Quote:
"Freyberg's performance at Casino is just... it's dreadful, it's woeful, and you can't avoid the kind of awfulness of the battles."
— James Holland, 19:20
6. The Human Cost: Soldier Experiences and Civilian Suffering (24:11)
The episode poignantly addresses the immense hardships endured by both Allied soldiers and Italian civilians. Holland shares heart-wrenching stories from diaries and letters, illustrating the psychological and physical toll of prolonged combat under brutal conditions. The soldiers faced relentless shelling, extreme weather, and the constant threat of death, with many not surviving their horrific experiences.
Quote:
"It's incredibly tough, it's incredibly brutal... it's impossible not to feel sorry for these people because people are still people."
— James Holland, 24:23
7. Liberation of Rome and Its Aftermath (31:34)
Despite the earlier setbacks and prolonged suffering, the culmination of the campaign saw the liberation of Rome on June 4, 1944. Holland underscores this victory as a significant yet often overshadowed triumph compared to the much-celebrated D-Day. The liberation was a testament to the resilience and determination of the Allied forces, although it came at a tremendous cost.
Quote:
"From the Allied point of view, you know, it was the single biggest victory on land that the Allies had achieved up to that point of the war."
— James Holland, 31:42
8. Assessing the Campaign: Successes and Failures (32:36)
In reflecting on the entire Italian Campaign, Holland acknowledges both the achievements and the avoidable mistakes. While the Allies succeeded in securing key objectives like Foggia and Rome, leadership errors, particularly during the Battle of Monte Cassino, marred the overall campaign. Nonetheless, the strategic gains contributed significantly to the broader war effort by diverting German resources away from other critical fronts.
Quote:
"Overall, it's a success, definitely. I think everyone should sort of, you know, back down on kind of being overly critical about the Anzio landings... But, you know, what can you do?"
— James Holland, 32:45
9. Emotional Repercussions and Legacy (29:09)
The episode delves into the lasting emotional impact of the Italian Campaign on those who fought and endured its hardships. Holland shares a particularly moving story of a German runner at Anzio whose mission to deliver mail tragically ends in despair when his efforts fail amidst relentless shelling. Such narratives highlight the universal human emotions experienced by soldiers on all sides of the conflict.
Quote:
"He just goes back, everyone's really nice to him about it, but he just feels completely wretched because he's ruined the mail and he's ruined the cigarettes."
— James Holland, 29:25
10. Conclusion: A Complex Legacy (35:02)
James Holland concludes by affirming the overall success of the Italian Campaign in terms of its strategic objectives. However, he remains candid about the avoidable mishaps and the severe human cost. The liberation of Rome stands as a significant achievement, but the campaign's legacy is tempered by the lessons learned from its leadership and operational failures.
Quote:
"Overall, it's a success, definitely... what more can you do? It's also been achieved with a huge expansion of the Foggia airfields... But you can't hide the mistakes."
— James Holland, 35:02
Final Thoughts
"The Bloody Road to Rome: Liberating Italy from the Nazis in WWII" offers a thorough and nuanced examination of one of World War II's most challenging and less-discussed campaigns. James Holland's insightful analysis, enriched by firsthand accounts and strategic evaluations, provides listeners with a deep understanding of the complexities and sacrifices involved in the Allies' fight to liberate Italy. This episode not only commemorates the bravery and resilience of the soldiers but also serves as a critical reflection on the importance of leadership and strategic planning in wartime.
For more detailed insights and to explore the broader context of the Italian Campaign, listeners are encouraged to consult James Holland's book "Casino 44" and his featured articles in BBC History Magazine.