A (3:49)

Well, it depends. What do you mean by really beginning? If we speak about the Israel American relationship, then it's quite obvious that it began in 1948. But the thing is that it is not that in 1948, my fault. In 1948, something happened that the day before that did not exist. And all of the sudden, on May 15, 1948, everything changed and something new completely started. The roots of the relationship goes back actually to much earlier times. We can go back to the 19th century at the time when a phenomenon known as Christian Zionists, that is American evangelist, American Protestants started to talk about the need to allow the Jews to go back to their homeland. And they did that for religious reasons. And these religious motivations also, I would say, bred politicians. And the most conspicuous one was President Woodrow Wilson, who in 1917 endorsed the Balfour Declaration, the declaration that called the British made a commitment to help the Jews to establish national home. And that means that basically American engagement with the Zionist project we can say started there. And what happened in my 14th, 1948 was a change of brand. It was no longer the Zionist project, it was now Israel. So the roots of the Israeli American relationship can go back to the beginning of the 20th century, or if you want to, to the 19th century.

B (5:26)

Why does America, why do parts of America identify with Zionism? Why does that take root culturally?

A (5:35)

Yeah, well, it has to do with the history of the Americans. The Americans associate themselves and they speak in biblical language, the whole heritage, the whole American identity. The people who came from Europe and mainly from Britain in the 17th century century, they came to America and they defined themselves. They presented themselves as in terms that were borrowed from the Bible. For example, they described their travel. They escaped from the Pharaoh, the British king, they crossed the sea as the sons of Israel did in the Bible, that was the Atlantic. And then they reach their holy land, the America which was the equivalent of Canaan, the people of Israel's promised land. And all their scriptures and all their ideas and all their identity evolved around the Bible. So they saw themselves as closely associated with the Bible themes with biblical ideas. And that made them very, very close to the people of Israel. And at a certain point, some of them, not all of them, but some of them went a step farther saying, well, the Bible says that the land of Israel belonged to the Jews. The Jews were God's favor people, so we need to help them to go back to their homeland. And that in a very, very, I would say, simplistic manner, we can describe that tie, that connection between Americans and the people of Israel, which eventually became the state of Israel.

B (7:10)

When President Truman recognized Israel in 1948 and was the first country to do so, what were his main drivers? Was it religion, politics, Cold war concerns, the shadow of the Holocaust?

A (7:26)

Yeah, I would say that in the heart of the. We can say all the above in a way, but the real. I think that the real issue, the real thing really the real motive, the real drive, was religion. President Truman was a religious person. He grew on the Bible, and once again, he used biblical rhetoric, biblical metaphors. He viewed the world through the Bible. And for him, the people of Israel were the people of the Bible, the people that God. Once again, they were God's people, and they should go back to their homeland. Now, the beginning of Truman's tie with the Jews was not necessarily. Would not necessarily lead him to support the idea of a Jewish state, the idea of Jewish state as part of Truman's, I would say, agenda that became kind of a political process. But that political process was possible due to, on the one hand, circumstances, but on the other hand, due to his deep belief that that was the right thing to do. It was biblically, but also historically, because Truman also spoke, for example, about. He was very moved by the Holocaust, and he was very moved by the Jewish history of persecution of 2000 years of persecution, which he thought that should be now solved. These people deserve a place to live in peace and not to be persecut. So the combinations of that sentiment and the biblical themes that he really dwelled on, these motivated his political actions. And the opportunity eventually appeared during that period, from 1946 to 1947. Eight, that led him to support and actually to be one of the forces that allowed eventually the establishment of the

B (9:09)

state of Israel in the years after that. If we're thinking now about politics and strategy, leaving the religion aside for one moment, how did America see Israel as an asset in the Middle east, potentially as a burden? Or was it a humanitarian impulse?

A (9:32)

We can't really leave aside religion, because what you described is right. That discussion about whether it was an asset, whether it was burdened, whether it was, whatever it was, it was all there but in the heart of the matter. And the very profound approach of the United States toward Israel, toward the new state was based on that religious themes. However, there were limits. And the limit was that on the one hand, the United States was really, I would say, obligated and did help the Jewish state economically, for sure, diplomatically, it didn't see Israel as a strategic asset. And that was Israel was trying very, very hard to convince American presidents, from Truman on, that Israel could be a strategic asset. But it took time really to convince American presidents that Israel was indeed a strategic asset. So during that time between the American recognition that Israel could be a strategic asset during and until the Americans reached that conclusion. So from 1948 to, I would say the 1960s, 1970s, during that time, it was purely, really both humanitarian and religiously motivated drive to support the state of Israel. And the Americans did that mainly economically. They did that diplomatically and did that, I would say, culturally in the sense of that there was very warm sentiment of American presidents, American politicians, American people towards the state of Israel and very deep appreciation to that project of the new state of Israel. And you can find that almost in every aspect of society. It was not only presidents, it was in the press, it was in the books, it was in newspapers, it was in cultural events. So that was something very comprehensive. And we speak about presidents, but everything I say about presidents is right about men. A lot of American people. The president was not kind of exception in the sense that he was standing against the American people and he was presenting something that the American people would not accept. He was the American people, the American president. He was the president, but he felt something that most Americans felt toward Israel. He got the same education that was the Sunday school. He grew up, or they grew up on the same themes, on the same ideas about what the meaning of Israel, religiously, culturally, historically. So all these things. Eventually the President was acting within and part of an environment which was much broader and included many Americans who saw Israel in a very, very unique place. So the strategic aspect, I would say, was the result of special relationship that were in the heart of this relationship from the very beginning.

B (12:22)

I'm curious, returning to a point you made about how Israel was trying to persuade America that it could be a real strategic asset at the beginning. What were their main arguments back then?

A (12:34)

It was, the argument was, for example, the Americans, together with the British, by the way, they tried to establish an anti Soviet front in the region, in the Middle east, trying to reach out to the Arab states and Israel, who was worried by such an alliance between the United States and the Arab states, the enemies of Israel. Israel told Americans, look, if you need an ally, a reliable ally, a potent ally, Israel is the real address. It's not the Arab states. The Arab states would not fight against the Soviet Union if necessary. Israel is ready, Israel is capable. Israel is oriented towards that. So you need to rely on Israel. The United States, Britain did not accept that because their motives were. And we won't go into that, it's kind of a bit of beyond the topic, but the United States did not accept that argument, which did not, once again, did not really deny the very deep sentiment of the United States toward the state of Israel and the people of Israel.

B (13:40)

Why did President Eisenhower take such a different approach? What was the impact of Suez crisis?

A (13:47)

Yeah, when your question, in a way, you suggest two different themes. Because one theme is. Yeah, because one theme is that Eisenhower took a different approach, different approach from that of Truman, which is a common argument made by scholars. And the second thing is about the zfl. So let's divide it to start with. Eisenhower did not take any different approach as compared to the one that was taken by Truman. Basically, Eisenhower was much more a continuity rather than a change in course in the attitude toward Israel. Eisenhower basically run the same policy. If we take, for example, economic aid, the economic aid, American economic aid to Israel during the Eisenhower time was not only just as high as during Truman's tenure, but even increased and was higher. That was one point. And all in all, Eisenhower described his relationship and certainly his Secretary of State, John Foster Dallas, described the relationship with Israel in terms of the Judeo Christian relation discourse, kind of which these shared values that connect us together. There was a political aspect that is the attempt to come closer to the Arab states. But the Eisenhower administration made it very clear, saying to Israel, look, if we want to get closer to the Arabs, that doesn't mean that that would be on the expense of Israel. We will keep the relationship with Israel as they were. It absolutely didn't mean to bring any change in the special relationship. And they used the term special relationship with Israel. Now, the Zeus affair was something different. The problem with Zeus affair for the Eisenhower administration was that that was a measure taken, taken against violating the United Nations Charter. And Eisenhower cared a great deal about the United nations. And he saw the Israeli and the British and French attack on Egypt in 1956 as an attack against the United Nations. And that was the reason why he pushed Israel and pressed Israel to withdraw from the Sinai which Israel occupied during the war. And at a certain point Eisenhower was asked, why are you pressing so much Israel at the time when the Soviet Union at that time invaded Hungary? And he was asked why you are not treating the Soviet Union the way you treat Israel. And he said, because our expectations for Israel, our view of Israel is completely different. Israel is an ally, Israel is part of the family. So we expect Israel to act differently. We don't have these expectations from the Soviet Union. So that was an isolated event which did not really reflect on the real nature of the Israel American relationship during the Eisenhower administration as against a notion that is quite widespread among scholars, which I think that I kind of try to undermine and to change.

B (16:50)

We're all about that on history uncensored. So thank you for opening my eyes open. I go, yeah, correct perspective.

A (16:57)

My pleasure.

B (16:59)

When does the. Well, I suppose there's a premise to this question, but when does the relationship between the US and Israel move to being more motivated by strategy and what's considered to be in the US's medium long term strategic interests rather than these deep religious bonds, shared confidentialism.

A (17:24)

Yeah.

B (17:24)

I'm assuming that you. That we think today it has moved to that point where the strategy has become more important than the religion.

A (17:32)

Ah, well.

B (17:33)

Or maybe not.

A (17:34)

It's a good point. No, it's a good point because when you say now I must make kind of in break it. I would say I don't deal with the now in the sense that I'm historian. So my perspective is really historical and I'm looking at things from the historical point of view, whether we are. And I guess that you, at a certain point you will ask that question, what's going on today? But. And I will tell you that I have no idea. But when we speak about, when we speak about the now, I'm going to

B (18:10)

heed you into the now.

A (18:12)

Yeah. So that was the spoiler. So religion and that deep sentiment, American sentiment toward Israel existed and exists all over. It was always there and it is still here. The issue is, and this is why I said the strategic relationship between Israel did not create the special relationship. They were the result of the special relationship. Now, the change or the. I would say it was not a change in the sense that it changed. It replaced one way of attitude between the two countries, but it was an addition. And that addition happened in a gradual process. It started with the 1967 war when Israel essentially got under its possession Soviet weapons. And American military men came to Israel to see these Soviet weapons. That was the days of The Cold War. So there was a great interest in. In the Soviet military equipment which now Israel possessed as a result of the war. Actually, it started a bit even earlier, because in the 1950s, Israel tried to convince the United States that it could help the United States from the intelligence point of view, and Israel could offer the United States approach and access to kind of material about the Soviet Union that the United States did not have access to. And there is a very famous example. In 1956, the Soviet chairman, Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev, delivered a very known speech in which he regretted all the things that Stalin did before him. And that became to be known as the secret speech. And Israel managed to get a copy of the speech, and it got it from a Jew in Poland. And that Jew from Poland delivered that speech, the text, the draft to the Israeli embassy in Poland. And eventually the Mossad got possession of that. And the Mossad gave it to the CIA, saying, look, you see, this is the kind of things that we can do. And eventually the United States leaked a speech to the New York Times. So, and that created the beginning of ties between the two intelligence establishments, the Israeli and the American, between the CIA and the Israeli Mossad. But the more profound strategic cooperation continued after the 1967 war. It deepened after the 1973 war, because the 1973 war was the first time that American weapons fought against Soviet weapons in the Middle East. Until 1967, Israel relied mainly on French military equipment. But after the 1967, United States became the main Israeli supplier of heavy arms, tanks and airplanes. And the 1973 war became a war, kind of a superpower war, by proxies Egypt, Syria and Israel. And once again, Israel got a lot of weapons, Soviet weapons, which American officers, American military men wanted to see, wanted to study, wanted to explore. And there was also the experience. How did you fight against Soviet weapons? What was the secret? How you can win that war? So the cooperation deepened and deepened. And in 1980, I would say it reached really the high point from which we are at now. Because in 1980, with the Reagan administration, all in the 1980s, the Reagan administration really not only deepen the strategic relationship, but also formalize them. An agreement of memorandum of understanding was signed between the two countries to create a very profound, established strategic relationship between the two countries. Means of cooperation and dialogue between the security apparatuses of the two countries were established. And we have, which still exists until this very day, a very, very deep mechanism of cooperation and dialogue and exchanges between the two states, between the two defense systems. And we can see this collaboration these

B (22:42)

very days after the Cold War, why did the United States believe it was still in their interest to continue significant military aid and support to Israel?

A (22:55)

Because once again, this is where the religion, that deep sentiment toward Israel still continued to exist. And There was, in 1992, the New York Times famous commentator Thomas Friedman wrote an article in which he predicted the end of the Israeli American special relationship, saying, no more Cold War, the United States doesn't need Israel anymore as a strategic ally. And that's it. And we know what really happened. And the Vice president, the American Vice President at the time, Dan Quell, said, the special relationship between Israel and the United States are not based on strategic consideration. They are based on ideals. They are based on values. So they will continue just as they existed before now. The mechanism existed. So you don't really break it down. Because the Cold War was over, the mechanism continued, the cooperation continued. And at a certain point since 1984, there was also another rationale for the cooperation, which came to be known as the war against terror. Now terror became a kind of a topic and that continued to preoccupy the two governments, the two states, and the cooperation continued. So the Cold War ended by the strategic challenges in the region continued. They changed the nature of these conflicts or challenges, but they still continued. And the cooperation between these two states, the strategic cooperation continued and increased.

B (24:31)

Did 911 supercharge the religious affinity component?

A (24:38)

Yeah, I kind of, I wanted to continue to the 2000 to September 11th, but I said, I'll let you to take me to there. And you are right to make the point. Yeah, you are right to make the point. September 11th, really, I don't think that it changed profoundly because as I said, the relationship was solid, they were strong. You didn't need 911 in order to really have the kind. But it added, I would say, an added value to this relationship. Now people can speak also about the war of civilization, or the clash of civilization, as one scholar called that, and the clash between Christianity or the Judeo Christian tradition and Islam. And you can add various. But I think that in the heart of the matter, what really mattered was more the security and strategic challenges that came out of the September 11 events. And that was now it was a real war against terrorism. And Israel took part in that war, participated in the war, contributed to that war. So you didn't need really, I would say that lofty rhetoric in order to continue the special relationship and specifically the strategic relationship between the two states.

B (26:00)

Please can we talk about the Israel lobby Because I see that this is either treated as a bit of a taboo subject or something that is, I presume, wildly overstated. So how influential has it been over time and what are the mechanisms that it exerts? Influence?

A (26:16)

Yeah, yeah. It's a very good question. And it's not just a compliment. It's a very good question because I'm right now actually I started to write my next book and the title of the next book, the title of my next book is Presidents versus the Israel Lobby. And what motivated me and I really decided to write this book. I was engaged in a different project and I said. In which I was very deeply into that other project and I said, okay, I put a halt on that other project. I'm going to write that book. Because what really kind of made me turning to this new project is the notion that you imply in a way about the power or the alleged power of the Israel Lobby. Since we don't really have time to develop that issue profoundly, let me give you what I will call the bottom line. And if you want, we can go a bit further. But the bottom line is that the Israel Lobby doesn't have the power to change policy. What the Israel Lobby. The power of the Israel Lobby is the ability to present to American decision makers issues that the Israel Lobby assumes needs to be addressed. And if the Americans, and usually they do assume, yes, this is something that we can work on, then the Americans would accept this issue, the subject, the topic, the Israeli argument. But if American president would say, no, this is the thing that the Jewish lobby wants, we can't deliver, then the American presidents would not deliver and the Israeli lobby pressure would yield nothing. And just a very quick example, truman. During the 1948 war, there was a lot of pressure on Truman to lift an arms embargo that initially was imposed by the United States and later by the United nations on the belligerents in the Middle east, which means that Israel officially could not get arms from the United States at the time when it was fighting for its very existence. There was a lot of pressure on the president, on President Roman to lift the arms embargo and he refused despite the pressure of the Israel lobby. And that is one example to the real nature of the Israel lobby. The Israel lobby can raise issues. Usually Americans agree because most of the time the American and Israeli interests aligned in case that the American president would say, no, it is not our interest, we can't do that, then he has no problem withstanding the Israel lobby pressure.

B (28:57)

Where are the main points of contention? Historically in the relationship where the interests don't align.

A (29:04)

Yeah. So until I would say, until the 1967 war, it was mainly around arms. Israel really wanted to see the United States as the main arms supplier for two reasons. One, because Israel wanted the best possible arms, and the best possible arms were American. But another reason was that if the United States would become the main supplier of arms to Israel, that was a kind of a statement. If Americans is ready to provide arms, tanks and airplanes to Israel, that was a security commitment to Israel. So Israel wanted to get that. American presidents were quite reluctant to provide to do that, because first, they understood the implication. And second, they said, look, as long as you can get your arms from other sources, we prefer that you will go there. We will help you to get arms if necessary. And they did that more than once, but we prefer that you will find arms in other places. But once the other places were exhausted, did not exist anymore. In 1967, France, who was the Israeli main supplier, arms supplier, essentially imposed an embargo on arms sales to Israel. And then the United States said, okay, we have no choice, but we will be the supplier. So that that source of contention disappeared after 1967. From time to time, that issue came back again. Israel was asking for some specific kind of arms. The United States would say, well, not right now, but basically it did not really become a major source of friction. Basically, there was nothing really, I would say, fundamental that became source of friction between Israel and the United States. There were what I would call random and incidental events where there was a conflict. For example, in 1991, Israel asked for guarantees of loans from the United States for the absorption of hundreds of thousands of immigrants who came from the Soviet Union to Israel. Israel needed to put a lot of money in settling them in Israel. And President Bush said, I will give you the loan guarantees, but only if you make a commitment not to establish more settlements in the occupied territories. The territories Israel occupied in 1967. Israel. The Israeli government refused to do so. So the President said, if you are not ready to make that commitment, we are not going to give you the loan guarantees. Which once again, was a cause where there was a lot of pressure. The President rejected the pressure of the Israel lobby and essentially continued and refused to give these loan guarantees to Israel. But that was, once again, it was really, I would say, a specific issue. It did not really mean something broader. Reflecting on the very broad nature of the Israel American relationship. So all in all, throughout the history of the Israeli American relationship, there was nothing really, I would say, profound that separated or over which the two states argued.

B (32:24)

You said earlier that presidents obviously embody to some degree the beliefs and opinions of the population. That's how it's supposed to work. But naturally there's a. There's swathes of the population that disagree with presidents and policy. So I'm curious what this relationship has come cost the US And Israel in terms of their domestic politics over time. Where, where has it created vulnerabilities or pressure points?

A (32:58)

I don't think, I don't think it happened. Usually the level of support for Israel, Israel never enjoyed 100% support in any polls. When you had polls, usually the rates of support for Israel and the special treatment for Israel was about 60, 70%. So there were about 30% of Americans who did not identify themselves as either strong or less supporters of Israel. There were those who objected the special relationship between Israel and the United States, but they were in the minority. But that never really, really was translated into, I would say, a political prize that the president or politician paid because of their attitude toward Israel. Because the broad, as I said, the broad. And Israel was never really, I would say, a hard topic in American politics. It was not a topic over which elections, for example, were decided. Even Jews did not vote for a candidate based on their approach toward Israel. You could be kind of no president candidate was ever an anti Israeli, so that problem never existed. So no American had to deal with a pro Israeli candidate, an anti Israeli candidate. And now you need to choose. That never happened. Sometimes you had congressional candidates. One of them was identified as a very pro Israeli. The other one was objecting the ties with Israel or was presenting a policy that Israel did not, not accept or liked. But that was never really the prime issue. It was never a prime issue over which American Jews or Americans at all made the decision how to vote to someone. Sometimes the pro Israeli candidate would get more support, but that was kind of an added value. It was not the real topic. So I don't think that any politician for or against Israel really paid a significant price for their position toward Israel domestically. And certainly it was not the case in Israel because in Israel everyone cherished their relationship with the United States. Now, one argument was, for example, during this debate between Bush, President Bush over the loan guarantees in 1992, the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir struggled quite significantly with President Bush. And one argument. And 1992 was an election year both in the United States and Israel. And Yitzhak Shamir lost the elections. The Likud, the Israeli Likud Party lost. The elections. And one argument was that they lost the elections because of the struggle with the United States. But there is no ground to that argument. I, once again, I published the book on that period and I didn't see the Israel American relationship were not mentioned during the election campaign during that period in 1992. So it was not really a factor in the political, in the results of the election. So I don't think that any politician in Israel or the United States paid the price for their attitude toward Israel or attitude toward the United States.

B (36:22)

I'm going to start this question in the now, but it is a history question. Recent polling shows that there's a particular faction of MAGA, or the populist right in America that is now increasingly averse to supporting Israel and also on the left and younger people in general. Have you seen a deterioration of support from the public over time, or does this read to you as either a flash in the pan or a very sharp change?

A (36:58)

Yeah, the point that you make is really, I would say in a very significant challenge to the historian in the sense that is that really the beginning of a change? I don't know. But as you implied, in a way, no, it's not the first time. For example, in 1987, when the first intifada, the first eruption of the Palestinians in the occupied territories, they erupted against the Israeli military forces, there was a decline in the support of Americans toward Israel. In 1982, when Israel launched the attack against Lebanon and was bombing Beirut, there was a decline in the level of support of Americans toward Israel. So there were cases where the American, and as I said, to start with, the support was never 100%. There was always those, I would say, cases and events that created a different climate toward Israel that always existed. The general trajectory, which I'm not sure if that trajectory had changed today, is still one of support toward Israel. Now, whether what we see today is only kind of ephemeral or is it the beginning of something. You know, some. Someone asked once a historian what was the impact of the French Revolution. And the historian said, well, it is too early to say. Right. So, so I, I really don't know. I, I must say I, I will promise you that if the change will occur, I will be able to explain why it happened. But, but, but I have no doubt Y

B (38:52)

One conversation which has been rife in the last couple of years and fuel has been added to this fire with the newly released Department of Justice files, are claims of Jeffrey Epstein's links to Israeli intelligence. What is your take on that? And does that have any impact on the relationship?

A (39:15)

I'll go to what I think is the easier part of your question, and that is the impact on the Israel American relationship, because I see no impact, nothing at all. As to the substance, as to very claim, once again, I have no idea. I really. I didn't see the files. I am not really into it. I didn't see it. So I can't say to what extent it sounds even authentic and genuine. One thing is, now I wouldn't be surprised if Epstein had connections with Mossad for various reasons. He was a Jew, and he had something to offer in the sense that he could help in various things. Whether these ties existed at all, I have no idea. I wouldn't rule it out. Whether these ties, if they existed, they continued once it was known that Epstein was a convicted felony. That also I don't know. But you need to remember that when we are dealing with the world of spies, then if you have something to hide, you are a very good potential candidate to be used by intelligence services. And I don't say that that was the case with Epstein. What I'm saying is that if that was the case with Epstein, I wouldn't be completely surprised. That is the name of the game, in a way, to take advantage of people's weaknesses and to use them for your benefit. This is what intelligence people do. So I would say, in answer to your question is, once again, it's. I have no idea

B (40:50)

how closely have the CIA and Mossad over time cooperated? And how important is that to the strategic value of the relationship for both sides?

A (41:00)

Yeah. As to the importance, it is important, just as any other cooperation between. In every aspect of their relationship. It's not only militarily or strategically. It's also cultural. It's also economic. It's also. It's only part of a huge puzzle. This is one element within the huge puzzle, but by itself, it's certainly important. As I said, it started in the 1950s, and we don't have a lot of information about that because everything that has to do with the Mossad, everything that has to do with the intelligence organs in Israel is completely secret. The documents that can tell you something are still classified. They are not available to scholars. So we don't know. What we have is kind of memoirs and people making mention of that event or other event. So we do know that the relationship existed between the Mossad and the CIA. They were very close. Just one kind of an example, which, once again, I don't know to what extent it Is true. But the director of the CIA at the time, in 1985, his name was Crosby, I think he tells that in 1985 the United States bombed a Libyan airport in Benghazi. And Crosby says, or the story is that it was Israeli Mossad agents that directed the planes to the Benghazi airport and actually they were on ground at the time of the attack. It is true, it is untrue. I don't know. But that is the kind of, I would say, rhetoric and the way both states see the nature of the relationship. But it is quite clear that the relationship are closed, they are very tight. And we can see in a way the outcome of these ties today in the war against Iran. There is no question that a lot of the Israeli and American achievements in Iran are the result of. Of this very close cooperation between the CIA and the Mossad. I have no doubt about that, even if I have not a single proof of that.

B (43:09)

What would you say, as a historian of the relationship between the US and Israel surprises you about it, if anything, or is unexpected about the relationship?

A (43:24)

What surprised me a bit, and the truth is that I have kind of a problem when you ask me that kind of question. Usually I have to think what kind of answer will surprise you because I know everything, so nothing surprised me in a way. Right. But when I. Yeah, it's kind of what is new, because for me a lot of the things are not new.

B (43:48)

Interpreted is another way to answer.

A (43:51)

No, I think that a lot. No, no, I understand the question. And again, as I said, I think that there were, for example, and I have, I must say I am presenting a position that is argued by scholars. It is not something that the extent of the. That religious cultural approach, American approach toward Israel, the level and the depth of this relationship and the nature of. Of the ties which were based on religious sentiment. That was really, for me quite a surprise. I didn't realize the extent of that. When I started to learn and to see how much, how deep it was. It was quite interesting for me. And the fact that it was something. Think about that. If you think about relationship between two states, how many states you can say that have special relationship for so many years, the longevity of the relationship between Israel and the United States. We are talking at least about 75 years of special relationship. I don't know any example of special relationship between two states that extended into such a period of time, a long period of time. That is quite unusual. And I think that that is a testimony to the fact that the relationship are based on something which is not just, I would say, interest, ephemeral, something that, you know, with the change of circumstances, they lose their base and logic. It was something. And the relationship survived crisis and the relationship survived the change of events. They survived the end of the Cold War. So. And that is something, once again, that is something that I would say. I'm not sure if I would use the word surprise, but I didn't really see that. And it was really through my research that I saw that. Yeah, that goes on like that. And President Bush, for example, the father who was considered to be kind of not really deep into Israel. And when you study really, George Bush, you see, no, he was strong supporter of Israel, despite the fact that many of the ingredients that, from which President Bush was made of, in terms of his religious education, in terms of upbringing, wouldn't make him a very natural candidate to become kind of a Christian Zionist, a very strong supporter of Israel. Yet he was. It was because that was the American climate, I would say that was the American environment. That was the American ground from which these seeds of special relationship had developed and grew. And President Bush was part of it. So eventually, now, I was not surprised to see, for example, that President Obama, who again, he was quite different in his profile, in his, I would say, natural attitude toward Israel. You wouldn't assume naturally that he would be such a supporter of Israel, but he was also, because he grew on the same ground as all other American presidents, politicians and people and Americans. So that longevity and these deep roots, I would say that is quite, well, if not surprised, interesting.

B (47:17)

Professor David Tao, thank you so much.