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Foreign. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most geopolitically charged waterways on Earth. A narrow strip of water which the world's energy supply depends on. And this is not an accident of the present. It's a result of strategic geography that has channeled trade, empire and coercion for centuries. Hormuz matters not because it's large, but precisely because it's narrow. Its ancient map still governs modern power, and disruption here causes global shocks, hitting petrol prices, shipping costs, inflation, food supply chains, insurance, and global markets almost at once. At its narrowest, the strait is just over 20 miles wide. The actual shipping lanes are narrower still, just two miles wide in each direction, separated by a two mile buffer. And yet through that narrow throat passes roughly 20% of daily global oil consumption. That's the first thing to understand. The Strait of Hormuz is not just another waterway. It is the only sea exit from the Gulf to the open ocean. So if you are exporting energy from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE or Iran, this is the route out. There is no comparable alternative at sea. Pipelines can bypass some of it, but not most of it. And as of early 2026, around 20 million barrels of oil a day were moving through the strait. So when people say this is a choke point, it really is not hyperbolic. If we imagine the global energy system like a body, Hormuz is one of the arteries and one of the places where pressure builds up fastest and where a blockage can trigger panic far beyond the immediate site of danger. If you look at the map, your own map, because this is probably quite small for you, you can see why. Because Iran sits on the north coast and to the south is, is the Musandam Peninsula, which is an exclave of Oman that's sort of jutting out beside UAE territory. And the strait links the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, to the Arabian Sea, and then out into the Indian Ocean. So this is not a local passage. It is a hinge between the Middle East, Asia and the wider global economy. Iran does not control all the Strait of Hormuz, but it doesn't have to, because in a choke point that's this narrow, controlling the northern coast is more than enough to give Tehran leverage and effective military control. The strait has been strategically important for far longer than just the age of oil. The opening to the Gulf was already being described in the first century Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, which was like a mariner's guide that noted the mountains on either side and the passage into the Gulf beyond. So for centuries, this mattered because the lands behind it, like Persia, Mesopotamia, even inland Central Asia, were rich in goods, but had no easy access to major ocean ports. Even the first Mughal ruler, descended from Genghis Khan Baba, wrote that almonds were being carried all the way from Ferghana in Central Asia to Hormuz to reach other markets. And that gives you some sense of its role. It was not even then a local passage. It was but a funnel through which inland wealth could reach the sea. From roughly the 11th to the 17th centuries, the kingdom of Hormuz sat exactly where you'd expect it to, and the name itself becomes attached to the strait. So Hormuz had different degrees of autonomy through the centuries, but it grew into one of the world's great commercial centres, controlling both sides of the Gulf and much of the coastal trade running into the Arabian Sea. By the medieval period, it was this renowned international emporium linking the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. Its wealth came from its geography. Hormuz was where inland goods from Persia, Mesopotamia, Arabia, even Central Asia could be moved toward maritime trade routes. By the early 15th century, it was important enough to be visited by Zhenghuming's treasure fleet, and chroniclers described it as prosperous, elegant and wealthy. But getting that type of renown and fame also made it a target. So from the 15th century onward, with the arrival of foreign naval powers, the importance of this strategic geography only grew. After securing Goa in 1510, the Portuguese moved to control strategic emporia across the Indian Ocean. Hormuz was one of those key points because it stood at this entrance to the Gulf. The Portuguese definitively captured Hormuz in 1515 and made it part of their effort to dominate trade routes and build a maritime monopoly. That was, in effect, the first period of sustained Western military dominance in the straits. But it was not uncontested. The Ottomans also understood exactly what Hormuz was a gateway to Middle Eastern trade and a route into the Indian Ocean. Their rivalry with Portugal intensified in the early 16th century, and in 1552, the Ottoman admiral Piri Reis sailed with a major fleet, captured the Portuguese fort at Muscat and moved on to Hormuz. The Ottomans did manage to take the city, but they withdrew and the campaign ultimately failed. Subsequent Ottoman attempts to force the strait also failed, and the Arabian Sea remained in Portuguese control until new European powers, including the Dutch, began to alter the balance in the 17. And of course, the Brits enter the picture. But this struggle is revealing because it tells us that long before the tankers arrived. Hormuz mattered for the same deeper structural reason that it matters today. It is a narrow maritime gate between resources, riches and the wider world. The goods have certainly changed. We're not talking almonds, but the strategic principle has not. Iran's approach to Hormuz has often been described as Janus faced, double faced. In ordinary conditions, Tehran acts as a security provider and keeps the strait open. But when it faces what it sees as existential threats, it incorporates this waterway into a wider strategy of deterrence and brinkmanship. Essentially, it uses the possibility of disruption as a warning shot to the world, and it has done so repeatedly. During the early 80s, Iraq attacked Iran's oil terminal and tankers at Kharg Island. Saddam Hussein's aim, among other things, was to provoke Iran into extreme retaliation, especially closing the strait and thereby dragging the United States directly into the conflict. Iran retaliated against Iraqi shipping, but crucially decided to keep the strait open, which is notable even then. With every incentive to escalate, Iran stopped short of a nightmare scenario. In 1988, the US launched Operation Praying Mantis against Iranian targets in and around the Gulf after Iranian mining operations damaged an American warship. That same year, there was an even darker reminder of how combustible this corridor is. A US guided missile cruiser shot down Iran Air Flight 655 over the Strait, killing 290 passengers after mistaking it for a fighter jet. Since then, Hormuz has remained a stage on which Iran signals, threatens and also calibrates. There were U.S. and Iranian naval standoffs in 2007 and 2008. And in June 2008, Revolutionary Guard commander Mohammed Ali Jafari said that if Israel or the US attacked Iran, Tehran would impose control of the strait, wreaking havoc on the oil markets. And the US response was immediate, that such a move would be treated as an act of War. In 2011 and 2012, after sanctions pressure intensified, Iranian officials again threatened to cut off oil through Hormuz if Iranian exports were strangled. The Iranian vice president at the time said that if Iran's oil could not pass, that others oil would not pass either. The US again warned that closing the strait was a red line and said that it would reopen it by force if necessary. Markets reacted, but analysts also noted that there was obvious constraint here because Iran itself depends heavily on the same waterway. And this is the paradox at the centre of this strategy. Because Hormuz gives Iran huge amounts of leverage, but not unlimited leverage, because Iran's exports are also sea based and because key partners like China, also rely on trade through this channel. So prolonged closure would damage Iran as well as its enemies. And that's why many Iran watchers and analysts think that a full sustained blockade is usually unlikely, even though preparations to mine the strait have been undertaken. So what Iran often does instead is something short of closure, but dangerous enough to remind the world what it could do. And that has included occasional seizures of ships, but sometimes just enough uncertainty to raise insurance rates, rattle markets, and remind every government dependent on Gulf energy that Iran can still touch the system is enough. That leverage once again became acute in 2025 and 2026. In June 2025, after US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, Iran again raised the possibility of closing the STR moves. Iranian lawmakers backed the idea, but the final decision rested with the Supreme National Security Council. Analysts warned that any serious disruption could send oil surging to roughly $100 or $150 a barrel, fueling inflation and economic pain around the world. But the strait stayed open, and within days, oil had fallen back to around $70, which was a sign that markets judged the actual disruption to be quite limited. Then came the 2026 crisis. Insurance rates for the passage through Hormuz rose sharply by late February amid the 2026 Iran War and after the assassination of Ali Khamenei, the IRGC navy were broadcasting that ship passages through the strait were not allowed. This March, the new Supreme Leader confirmed that the strait was closed and warned ships not to enter. Traffic dropped dramatically. Some ships turned back or stayed in port. A few still passed. And this is what makes Hormuz so dangerous. Not just the possibility of closure, but the sheer power of even partial disruption. You don't need to sink every tanker. You just need enough uncertainty to make ship owners hesitate and prices spike. And the world is exposed because alternatives remain limited. Saudi Arabia can use pipelines to the Red Sea. The UAE can bypass some of Hormuz through Habshan Fujarah pipeline. And Iran has some bypass options as well. But these do not come close to replacing the full flow. For centuries, empires fought to command the strait because it linked inland wealth to wider markets. Today, the same logic still applies. Only the coveted cargo in is energy. And the whole world is exposed to the consequences. This is what makes Hormuz so dangerous. Not just the possibility of closure, but the sheer power of partial disruption. You don't need to sink every tanker. You just need enough uncertainty to make ship owners hesitate and prices spike. And the world is exposed because alternatives remain limited. Saudi Arabia can use pipelines to the Red Sea Sea the UAE can bypass some of Hormuz through the Habshan Fujarah pipeline. Iraq has some bypass options, but these do not come close to replacing the full flow. For centuries, empires fought to command the strait because it linked inland wealth to wider markets. Today, the same logic still applies. Only the coveted cargo is energy and the whole world is exposed to the consequences.