Nadav Eyal

Summary

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Podcast Summary:

In These Times with Rabbi Ammi Hirsch
Guest: Nadav Eyal
Date: February 26, 2026
Host: Stephen Wise Free Synagogue

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Episode Overview

This episode features an in-depth conversation between Rabbi Ammi Hirsch and prominent Israeli journalist and analyst Nadav Eyal. Together, they explore current events in the Middle East, particularly the struggle between the West and Iran, the aftermath of the Gaza war, the state of Israeli democracy, and the broader status and future of Western civilization. The conversation weaves Jewish wisdom and values into the analysis, reflecting on democracy, freedom, and the challenges facing both Israel and the global order.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The West’s Struggle with Iran

Timestamps: 02:05 – 16:41

• Nature of the Islamic Republic:

  • Nadav Eyal describes Iran as a state “that tried to fuse together very modern radicalism” with Islamic fundamentalism, referencing the dual influences on Khomeini and the failed experiment mixing right- and left-wing ideologies.
  • “In history, we don’t know of many examples like that… a state founded on the slogans of ‘death to’ another country.” (04:09, Nadav Eyal)

• Threat Profile:

  • Iran is a unique, dangerous, and ultimately “failed experiment” that continues to spread instability, yet its influence in the region is significant, notably through funding and orchestrating violence beyond its borders.
  • Iran’s approach is different from other revolutionary regimes like the Soviet Union; its threats are existential, not ideological exports.
  • “Standing against Iran is the right thing to do. But then the question is of effectiveness, of the costs, of the timing and what will it lead to within Iran.” (07:37, Nadav Eyal)

• Possible Outcomes:

  • Neutralizing Iran’s threat is unlikely without regime change, but the regime could evolve internally—possibly towards a military dictatorship rather than a theocracy.
  • Real change in Iran would likely come from within, not through outside intervention.
  • “The highest likelihood is some sort of metamorphosis from within rather than a full revolution.” (09:47, Nadav Eyal)

• Support Among Iranian Population:

  • Only 20-30% of Iranians actively support the regime, many of them depending on the system for their livelihood or due to geographic/religious ties.
  • The dichotomy of urban elite vs. rural periphery helps the regime maintain power even with minority support.
  • “If a regime still has 20 to 30 percent that support it… you don’t even need 20%. You can rule with much less.” (12:45, Nadav Eyal)

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2. The Aftermath of the Gaza War

Timestamps: 16:42 – 29:33

• War Accomplishments & Remaining Challenges:

  • Israel accomplished many war aims, with most hostages returned and Hamas militarily weakened—but Hamas persists as a grassroots political force among Palestinians.
  • Rebuilding Gaza will require a new approach where Arab partners condition aid on Hamas disarmament.
  • “If Hamas is going to do what it always did… then every single thing they invested in is going to be destroyed anyhow. So they’re saying, now is the time for change.” (18:39, Nadav Eyal)

• On Hamas:

  • Hamas will not disappear but may need to transition from a militant group to a political entity, a transformation seen as improbable by many experts.
  • “Hamas’ raison d’être is armed struggle against Israel… if they let go of that, they have no identity.” (21:29, Rabbi Hirsch and Nadav Eyal)

• Tragedy of Palestinian and Israeli Politics:

  • The bitter intra-Palestinian rivalry between Hamas and Fatah, and the role of each’s “brand,” perpetuates the struggle.
  • “First and foremost, Hamas tries to win not against Israel, but within Palestinian society. It’s a faction, and it’s also the majority in the West Bank.” (22:06, Nadav Eyal)

• Impact of Western Protests:

  • Large protests in Western cities were misinterpreted by Hamas leadership as signals of Western governmental weakness and encouragement to prolong the conflict.
  • Demonstrations ultimately emboldened Hamas’ leaders, lengthening the war and worsening outcomes for all sides.
  • “Sinwar and the leaders of Hamas feel emboldened and surprised by these demonstrations. They didn’t expect this kind of support across the West, but they also misread it…dictators don’t understand nuance, democratic societies.” (24:30, Nadav Eyal)

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3. The Crisis of Legitimacy for Israel in the West

Timestamps: 29:00 – 33:27

• Growing Hostility:

  • Antipathy toward Israel is increasing in both American political parties and in Europe.
  • Eyal describes this as Israel’s “most pressing strategic challenge”—more so than military threats from Iran/Hezbollah.
  • “It’s a national crisis. It’s a crisis of legitimacy… If we want to be truthful, we need to acknowledge that it’s also because of the war. Many civilians died in Gaza. These images changed perceptions.” (29:35, Nadav Eyal)

• Media & Political Narratives:

  • The international view of the war is colored both by misperceptions and by the real humanitarian toll.
  • Return of hostages and a ceasefire changed the tone and legitimacy of wartime actions.
  • “The war is getting the hostages back. After you get the hostages back, you don’t have legitimacy as a decision maker to continue the war in the same way.” (31:22, Nadav Eyal)

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4. The State of Israeli Society & Upcoming Elections

Timestamps: 32:15 – 42:56

• Post-Trauma and Division:

  • Despite a briefly unified response after October 7th, political tribalism and social fragmentation are resurgent—intensified by economic and demographic divides, educational deficiencies, and crime.
  • “The Israeli society is in a very difficult position right now… Tribalism is back. It’s harder, harsher, more vulgar sometimes than ever.” (33:33, Nadav Eyal)

• Netanyahu’s Prospects:

  • Eyal assesses the prime minister’s re-election chances as 50/50, buoyed by political skill and the ability to frame the narrative.
  • “Prime Minister Netanyahu is probably the West’s best campaigner… and because of that…I think it’s a 50/50 chance that he’ll actually win the elections.” (41:11, Nadav Eyal)

• Avoidance of National Inquiry:

  • Netanyahu’s refusal to establish a national commission of inquiry after crisis events is highlighted as a singular pattern.
  • “He has formed exactly zero national commissions of inquiry… He knows what can happen with these commissions.” (43:03, Nadav Eyal)

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5. Globalization, Populism, and the Western Crisis

Timestamps: 43:55 – 48:09

• The ‘Revolt’ Against the System:

  • Eyal's book, Revolt, explored global backlash against globalization and the sentiment that systems aren’t working.
  • People’s anger stems from a sense of lost autonomy and being “robbed,” despite improved material conditions—a sentiment fueling political radicalism.
  • “The paradox is: People are living the best sort of life that they have ever lived materially. But so many people feel lost and angry and robbed of their autonomy. That energy is what I labeled the revolt.” (44:25, Nadav Eyal)

• Empathy for ‘The Rebels’:

  • Eyal calls for empathy and understanding of populist anger on both left and right, and urges reform:
  • “The rebels have something going for them. And they’re right… that the system isn’t working anymore, that a reform is needed… revolt has become the status quo.” (46:33, Nadav Eyal)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Dictators and Dissent:

  • “Dictators don’t understand nuance, democratic societies. They brought ruin upon themselves and their own people.” (50:34, Rabbi Hirsch, reflecting on the conversation)

• On Israeli Gratitude:

  • “Israelis are not big on saying todah raba. But when Israelis were alone, they found out who’s going to stand with them, and it’s America and the Jews, the Jewish community in America and around the world.” (48:57, Nadav Eyal)

• On the Fragility of Liberty:

  • “Liberty is fragile. It is always at risk. Nothing is permanent in human affairs. Everything changes. The struggle to preserve, protect, and defend liberty is constant. It never ends.” (50:46, Rabbi Hirsch, closing reflection)

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Important Segments & Timestamps

• 02:05 – Breakdown of the ideological and practical roots of Iran’s regime
• 06:06 – Analysis of Iran’s threat to the West and global impact
• 11:48 – Internal support for Iran’s regime and effectiveness of minority rule
• 16:42 – War in Gaza aftermath, return of hostages, challenges with Hamas
• 21:48 – The nature and future of Hamas’ role in Palestinian society
• 24:02 – The impact of Western protests on the war’s progression
• 29:00 – Israel’s crisis of legitimacy in the West
• 32:15 – Status of Israeli society post-war; social fragmentation; the significance of upcoming elections
• 41:11 – Netanyahu’s electoral prospects and political strategies
• 43:55 – Insights from Revolt, the roots and manifestations of global anger at the system
• 48:57 – Eyal’s heartfelt thanks to diaspora Jews for standing with Israel

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Concluding Reflections

The discussion offers a sobering, nuanced, and deeply informed perspective on the shifting sands of Middle Eastern politics, Israeli democracy, and the dangers faced by open societies. Both Rabbi Hirsch and Nadav Eyal emphasize the enduring importance of vigilance, community, and the defense of freedom—ideas rooted in Jewish ethics but relevant to all liberal democrats. The episode closes with a reminder of gratitude and the fragile, ever-changing nature of liberty.

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For listeners seeking clarity on current Middle East affairs and the existential issues facing Israel, the West, and liberal democracy, this episode provides essential context and honest appraisal—delivered with both intellectual rigor and emotional resonance.

Transcript

[A]

Rabbi I'm rabbi ami hirsch of the stephen wise free synagogue in new york. And you're listening to in these times,

[B]

Free societies are defined by the free exchange of ideas. We believe in persuasion, not coercion, that dissent and debate are at the heart of democracy. They are the source of our power, not a danger to it. Judaism shares this belief. Any argument that is for the sake of heaven will in the end endure. We believe our faith is strengthened, not threatened by inquiry. Perhaps this is why tyrants and dictators have always despised the Jews. My guest today is Nadav Eyal, a senior journalist for Israel's largest newspaper, Yediot Achronot and Ynat. Nadav Eyal received the Sokolov Award, the Israeli equivalent of the Pulitzer Prize, for his outstanding work on the influence of globalization and his reporting on Syrian refugees. Nadav is also a senior research scholar at Columbia University, the chairman of the Movement of Freedom of Information, and a regular contributor to Dan Sinore's podcast, Call Me Back. I asked Nadav to come on the podcast today to help us understand what is at the core of the struggle between the west and Iran and the issues that are shaping Israel in the Middle East.

[A]

Adav Eyal, one of Israel's most prestigious and informative journalists and analysts. Welcome to in these Times.

[C]

Thank you. I'm glad to be here. Rabbi Hirsch.

[A]

Oh, there's so many things on the world's agenda and on the Jewish people's agenda and Israel's agenda that I want

[B]

to talk to you.

[A]

I hope. I know I won't be able to get through everything, but we'll go one by one. Iran is in the news now. What is the at its core, what

[B]

is the struggle about between the west

[A]

and Iran, the United States and Iran, and how is Israel part of that overarching struggle?

[C]

The Islamic Republic is a very interesting creature, scholarly speaking, that tried to fuse together sort of very modern radicalism. If you look at the thinkers that influenced the founder of the Islamic Republic, Imam Khomeini, you see people that some of them were communists, radicals, and they were using Islam in order to preach their radicalism. And there were even two parts within the movement that led to the Islamic Revolution. One part was more right wing and capitalist, and the other one was more left wing and spoke also about trying to allocate resources again and equality, not only equality of opportunity, but real equality between people and taking the properties of the rich, and that a good Muslim can be a rich Muslim. So things that we would have heard from other sects or ideas in the West. And in that regard, the Islamic Republic is a very interesting experiment. It's also a failed experiment of fundamentalism. It tried to fuse fundamentalism with radicalism. They are not that apart radicalism in the meaning of those movements that are sometimes communists or anarchists quite supportive of violence in many cases. And you have a state there, Rabbi Hirsch, that was founded on at least the slogans of death to another country, that is to the United States, or death to Israel. First of all, in history, we don't know of many examples like that. Even if you look at the Soviet Union, which is a classic revolutionary regime, right. It never spoke about death or destruction for the rest of the world. It talked about the need to export the revolution all around the world to liberate. This is not what Iranians that are part of this regime still cry out. Now, when I speak with Iranians, sometimes even though they oppose the regime, they're saying, oh, no, these are just slogans, just slogans. You know, you don't need to take this seriously. We don't really mean that. It's a. It's a cultural thing. First of all, just factually speaking, it's not true. Iran has invested huge amounts of money, the best and the brightest minds of this country, in order to cause harm to the Israelis and to people across the region. And secondly, even if this is just a cultural thing, I think it's extremely meaningful as to the attempt of the Islamic Republic to change the world and to hurt the dominance of America. At any rate, it's a failed experiment. It's a failed experiment mostly for the Iranian people. We know that now. And it's also a dangerous experiment. It has metastasized to spreading death and destruction across the region. And one only needs to see the jubilation around the Arab world or in Lebanon after the fall of Bashar Al Assad was supported by the Iranians, although not Shia himself, but part of the axis, or the way that people are responding to how Hezbollah was hammered by the idf.

[A]

So in that respect, Iran constitutes a threat to the west itself, because what it's opposed to is Western civilization. Freedoms, autonomy, civil liberties. Is Iran a military threat to Europe, to the United States, that justifies marshaling an armada against them?

[C]

Well, it is a threat in the sense that we live in a world in which very small actors can cause a lot of harm, because we live in a world of globalization. Thus, this word globalization is considered somewhat political. Right. And there's a lot of opposition against it. And we can discuss it later if you want, Rabbi Hirsch. But the bottom line is that Iran has managed to do so much with the resources it has. It's not a small country. It has one of the largest oil and gas reserves in the world and it has built its own regional empire. A lot of it was at Paper Tiger. And we discovered this because Israel attacked Iranians during June 2025. And of course the United States joined in in destroying parts of their Iranian nuclear installations. And we saw what the Iranians really can mount. Or at least this is what happened in the past. I think that struggling for a free run or for at least for an Iran that doesn't try to meddle with world affairs by funding terror all around the world, not only in the Middle east, but also in Central and South America, for instance, in Venezuela, for instance, the murderous attack and massacre against Argentinian Jews back in the 1990s and many other examples. So for me it's a non brainer that standing against Iran is the right thing to do. But then the question is of effectiveness, of the costs of the timing and what will it lead to within Iran.

[A]

This Iranian regime has been in power since 1979. That's well over 45 years. Is there any way that the Iranian threat can be neutralized short of regime change?

[C]

As a threat? Probably it cannot. But it could change from within and that's essential. Iran can indeed become a dictatorship that is less a theocracy and something that is more like a military dictatorship led more by the IRGC than an 80 plus supreme leader who's actually a religious figure.

[A]

So you don't see any future. It's not on the table in the short term to replace this regime and to bring in other people who are not necessarily democracy lovers, but at least not so antagonistic to Western civilization. You don't think that's on the table in the short term?

[C]

In the short term, I think that unless there is a huge surprise installed for us and we're talking, we're recording this when we still don't know if President Trump would order a strike. And I need to be absolutely transparent about this. Unless they have some sort of a surprise with opposition elements, which, you know, I can't rule out, we live in a world of surprises, strategic surprises, and this is something I deal with a lot. It's highly or more likely, according to Israeli intelligence, for instance, that the change will come from within. Now that doesn't mean that it's not going to be a dramatic change. People probably remember Franco led the sole dictator, Spain from the 1930s. Well, into the 1960s and 70s. And then he died. And in his will, he ordered that Spain will return to be a monarchy. And it did, and it became a democracy. So this can absolutely happen from within. And I would point out to the fact that a few weeks ago, the Iranians started arresting reformist leaders. Now, I don't think that the Iranian reformist leaders are too different than the mullahs that control Iran right now. It's all different shades of black for me at least. However, the fact that they're arresting them or arrested them is a testimony to the fact that they feel threatened, that they are asking themselves, for instance, maybe the Trump administration has this idea of installing a Rodriguez of sorts in Iran and they want to prevent it. So, yeah, the highest likelihood is from some sort of a metamorphosis from within rather than a full blown revolution. A full blown revolution is something that if will happen, we'll need to see the security forces basically not answering orders. And what they proved, unfortunately, at the beginning of the year, is that they are following orders by the regime, even if these orders are to have a mass killing massacre of their own people.

[A]

What is the true representation of this regime in terms of the Iranian population? It's a huge population, I think 80 million or more Iranian civilians. They used to have, before the revolution, they had relationships with the west, of course, and with Israel. How representative is this form of Islamism in the Iranian regime? In Iran itself, are they really a small minority holding it all together through

[B]

force of arms, or.

[A]

Or are there more such Iranians than

[B]

we would like to think?

[C]

So that's an excellent question, is being asked by security services, intelligence services across the West. What's the true support for the regime itself? And the answers I'm hearing is between 20 to 30%. Between 20 and 30%. And of course, there's a big difference there. And when I ask how come you look at Iranian inflation, you look at water supply, you look at the way that the regime lost the war with Israel at the time and everything that has happened since the revolution at the end of the 1970s. Why do people still support the regime? The answer that I'm getting is twofold. First, there's a large portion of the population that is part of the cycle of the industry, of the market, of the society that makes its living through the regime. The irgc, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, which is actually part of the military apparatus that is supposed to safeguard the revolution. The regime, it has its own supermarkets, Rabbi Hirsch. It has its own factories, its own industries and people are relied on that. So one part is economy, the other part has a lot to do with periphery versus urban centers. Iran is a big country. Iran is what you could label the global south. It's not an OECD developed economy country. And many of these places have a small dirt road leading to it. And the religious figures in that small town or small village are everything. They are both the regime and they are also moral figures for people living there. There is this kind of divide between urban elites and between the peripheries, even in Iran today, which is much more urban than it was 40 or 50 years ago. And there in the peripheries, there is still significant support to the regime. Now, is it meaningful? I can argue that if a regime still has 20, 30% that support it at any given time, and its security forces will shoot at demonstrators that are unarmed of their own people if they are ordered to do so, well, you don't even need 20%. You can rule with much less to that. If you think about empires and colonial powers, you think about the number of people through which the United Kingdom, when it was an empire, controlled the entire subcontinent of India, what we call today India and Pakistan. They managed to do that with less than 10,000 soldiers. So it's about effectiveness in that regard. And the Iranians have proven a lot of effectiveness. But the cracks are there, and this is a reason for hope. This is a failed, failed project that has given miserable lives to the Iranians themselves and has basically failed in almost every factor besides regional influence and cohesiveness of the state. In other words, they managed to control the country, which is in such a big country and in a third world country is a lot. And secondly, they managed to carve a place in the Middle east for themselves and have deterrence. But this was broken during the Joan War. And as to the cohesiveness of the Iranian society, we have all seen the demonstrations, you know, we've just seen in Israel, this massive protest movement. And I was definitely one of the writers that wrote for it as part of the judicial overhaul. So for me, this is a struggle for the soul of Israel. And I wrote that, and I wrote about that extensively. Look at the difference between the civil struggle, the civilian struggle in Israel against the government, and between what has happened in Iran. That's exactly the difference between a dictatorship and a democracy. And even though Israelis felt that this is basically if these laws pass, many Israelis felt the country is absolutely gone, it doesn't exist anymore. Many Israelis said they're not going to volunteer to the armed forces anymore. Even though that was the case, no shots were fired anywhere, not even by mistake. And that's, that's the difference. I'm not saying that to complement the Israeli society. I'm saying that for us to remember the difference between democracies like the United States and, and Israel with all the flaws, with all the flaws, and authoritarian dictatorships like Iran, there is a difference.

[A]

Let me ask you about Gaza now, which is also very much in the news for the time being. The war is over. Many of Israel's war aims were accomplished. First of all, I actually think it's quite miraculous that all of the hostages in fact were, were returned, including the deceased. Israel now controls 53% of Gaza. Hamas has been really decimated in the sense of it can't mount an October 7th type attack for the foreseeable future.

[B]

So Israel won a lot.

[A]

And here we're on the eve of the Trump initiative to rebuild Gaza. Where does that stand? And can any of that happen while Hamas still controls that 47% of Gaza that they control?

[C]

This is exactly the questions of the Council of Peace challenges. And what we're hearing more and more is this resolute approach that Hamas needs to disarm. Hamas will exist. And this is something that everyone who understood anything about Gazan society said from the beginning. Right after October 7th, the ideas that Hamas would cease to exist were simply, unfortunately, impossible. I think it's a tragedy for Israelis. I think it's a travesty not only for the Palestinians, but by the Palestinians for continuing to support Hamas. These are my views. However, it's also a fact of life that it's a grassroots movement within the Palestinians society and it's there to stay again, unfortunately. Now the question is, will it be an armed movement, will it be the sort of army that we saw invading Israel and the type of resolution that it cannot be, that again is not only shared by Israel, that's only natural after seeing the horrors of October 7, but also by different actors. For instance, the United States, the President of the United States, but also, and this is really important, Arab counterparts that are supposed to rebuild Gaza, countries like the UAE and others, they do not want to see Hamas armed. And they are talking about this, speaking about this very seriously, and here's why, because they are expected or they want to help rebuild Gaza and they understand that if Hamas is going to do what it always did, which is to rebuild its abilities right after the war, using part of the funds and the inflow into Gaza, that would lead to another war and then Every single thing they invested in is going to be destroyed anyhow. So they're saying, no, now is the time for change. If there is a window to change something. As to Hamas, it's now. And they need to let go of the armed struggle now. Is that possible? That's the question. It will inherently need some military pressure or deterrence. So they're not going to volunteer to completely disarm. This is not going to happen. They will need some sort of pressure saying this is real. And because Qatar and Turkey did help to get Hamas to the point in which it agreed to. To an incredible bargain proposed by the president, one that if you would have come to me, Rabbi Hirsch, a year and a half ago, and you would have said, I have a great idea, they need to return all the live hostages in 72 hours, I would have said, hey, I think it's a great idea, too, but there's no way they're going to do that. Well, President Trump, Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff, to their credit, expanded that possibility, allowed this, more than allowed this, initiated and made it happen. And somewhat like that, you need to expand your horizon and expect that Hamas can actually change and morph themselves into some sort of political party. Then comes the question, of course, what will they say if they're not a military movement, what kind of a political party are they? And experts of Hamas, mainly military, are saying they're incapable of doing that. I don't know if that's true. I know that the military experts of Hamas are to some extent biased. All they saw is a murderous Hamas, but they're saying Hamas is resistance. Hamas is armed resistance, and they will have no identity if they let go of that.

[A]

You can understand the skepticism of the view that says Hamas is very raison d' etre, is armed struggle against Israel. Why would they give up arms in terms of their raison d' etre of arms struggle? And why would they give up the struggle, which they understand in military terms?

[C]

Yeah, we always see this as Hamas against Israel. But first and foremost, Hamas tries to win not against Israel, but within the Palestinian society. It's a faction, and it's also the majority in the West Bank. For instance, according to every poll, most Palestinians support Hamas. So it is the tragedy of the region of Israelis and Palestinians that we are in the midst of a historic struggle on the life and nature of the Palestinian society, between Fatah, that is nationalist, but mostly, I would say, secular, and between Hamas, that is nationalist, but mostly religious and fundamentalist. Not only religious. The problem, of course, is not that they are religious, but they are violently fundamentalist. And let me give you a quote from a friend of mine that is Palestinian and he supports Fatah, which by the way, doesn't make him a Zionist as far as I'm concerned. But he told me, you know, if Hamas starts supporting a two state solution tomorrow morning, Fatah will say they oppose a two state solution immediately. And I said, why? And he said, it's obvious, because everybody needs to have their own brand name within the Palestinian political life. Brand name of Hamas's. The Jews will never let go of anything. We need to strive for everything. And the brand name of Fatah is we need to make a better life, if needs be, through negotiations with the world and with the Israelis. At least this was the case after Yasser Arafat died.

[B]

Now, Dov, let me ask you.

[A]

You know America well. Do you think the protests here and in the west actually lengthened the war? Do you think they were helpful to the Palestinians? Or did they simply give wind at the back of Hamas and its supporters to continue the war?

[C]

So I wrote about this. I think that the demonstrations to a large extent lengthened the war and caused more harm to both Israelis and Palestinians. And here's what I know. I know that with intelligence reports that were found in Gaza during the war, Sinwar and the leaders of Hamas feel emboldened and surprised by these demonstrations. They didn't expect this kind of support across the west, but they also misread it. All they saw was the demonstrations. Look, dictators, they don't understand nuance, democratic societies. So they don't understand when they see the videos coming from could be New York or it could be Paris of these demonstrations. Their presumption is that this is happening because the regime can't stop it, okay? The rulers can't stop it. They have not lived in democratic societies. They do not understand democratic societies. And then they might give too much credence and weight to demonstrations and protests and listen less, for instance, to what decision makers are saying. And this is, by the way, the same mistake that was done by Sinwar and the leadership of Hamas when they were looking at the demonstrations in Israel. They didn't understand the demonstrations in Israel, although people like me were explaining very literally that these are patriotic protests. And not only patriotic. I wrote about this extensively. I see the fight against the judicial overhaul or the judicial reform, whatever you want to call it. I see that struggle as a conservative struggle. It's a classically conservative struggle, basically saying, don't change anything. Don't change Anything. And we have the flag with us, where Israeli patriots maintain the current model. It's a classic conservative point of view and it was presented also by conservatives that joined together with many, many left wingers and central bloc voters. But what Sinwar in Gaza saw was, wow, the Israeli society is cracking. What I saw is participation, legitimacy, people that are invested with the future of their own country. Proof to the resilience of both the Israeli democracy, but also to the emotional engagement with of people with their country that they are willing to go and fight in the streets for months on end. On what? On the reasonability clause. As one judicial expert told me, if someone would have told me there would be 500,000 people in the street fighting about the exact tenor limits of the Supreme Court justice President, I would have told him, he's crazy. Sinwar saw that and he said, wow, they're not going to come and fight in the next war. People who understood the Israeli society would have said, this is exactly the reason that you should think that they will come to fight the next war. As they did so. These demonstrations in the west were perceived by the Sinwar of the world, by Hamas, as proof that if we just hold on, if we don't agree to a deal to return all the hostages, which is something that Israel always wanted, if we just maintain our position, at a certain point, politics will lead Israel to such a dire condition internationally that Israel will need to stop. And that was a terrible miscalculation by them. My problem, as many others, is not with people that are sympathizing with the Palestinian society and think that innocent people in Gaza should be defended. But these were not these demonstrations what we're talking about, Rabbi Hirsch, and what you so eloquently put in a very now famous speech. These demonstrations were about preaching for the annihilation of an entire country of Israel. Gaza, the war, it's all an excuse for this type of radicalism and incitement for violence and legitimacy for murder of Israelis. And not only Israelis, but also every Jew that ever supported any at any time, Israel or hosted an Israeli reserve soldier in his house for a Shabadina. Right?

[A]

Do you think they're making headway? Israel's reputation in the west has taken a significant hit since October 7th. Are you concerned about that? If you look at the domestic American scene, we have a growing hostility to Israel in both major American political parties. Europe is in, from an Israeli perspective, far worse condition than the United States. Are you worried that these protests, that this constant battering of Israel in public is undermining Israel's standing in the West.

[C]

I am worried. And Israel is in its most dire condition ever. I think we shouldn't be downplaying it or sugarcoating. It's a national crisis. It's a crisis of legitimacy. I would say that from the standpoint of a decision maker in Israel, which I am not, I would have said this is the most pressing strategic challenge to Israel today. More than the Iranians, more than Hezbollah, more than Turkey, growing its influence across the Middle East. The crisis of legitimacy. Because Zionism, if you look at Zionism, was born out of legitimacy. Zionism was always focused both in its theory and also in its practice of how will we be as legitimate as possible. We know we will always be despised and hated by some, but we need to do it the best that we can. And a lot of the support for Israel before Israel was founded and after Israel was founded came from grassroots support that was pressuring politicians. So this should be our conclusion as honest Jews, that this is essential and it should not be disregarded. Now, it's not only about these demonstrations. If we want to be truthful, we need to acknowledge that. It's also because of the war. Many, many civilians died in Gaza. And these images went through the world. They changed perceptions. There were mistakes made. I write about these mistakes by the Israeli government. I'm not taking a moral blame for the war. The war was opened by Hamas. Hamas was hiding behind civilians. Hamas could have stopped the war. And I wrote this again and again during the war. The war can stop in five minutes if they decide to return the hostages. And people wrote to me back, oh, no, no, no. The Israelis have an arch plan of expelling all the Palestinians, right? Do you remember that? And they will never want to stop the war. Look, I've been covering Israeli politics for 25 years and I think I know what the Israeli sentiment is. The war is getting the hostages back. After you get the hostages back, you don't have legitimacy as a decision maker to continue the war in the same way. It's just not the same anymore. And the fact of the matter is, just let's look at the facts. In 72 hours, we got the hostages back and there was a ceasefire in Gaza.

[A]

Yeah, you mentioned the judicial reforms. You're an expert on the Israeli domestic scene and the political scene. 2026 is going to be an election year. There still hasn't been established a commission of investigation, a fully empowered national commission of investigation. And their probably won't be unless the government changes in the aftermath of the elections. And there have been some initiatives of this current government to restore some of the momentum that they lost in the last two and a half years around the judicial reform as well. And then you have the. The draft law in Israel and so on and so forth. And Israeli society is trying to recover after October 7th. Are you able to help us, you know, in broad strokes, understand where is Israeli society now? Is it basically healthy what is likely to unfold in the coming months? And I'm not asking you to predict the elections unless you want to, but what are the main issues that are going to determine the elections?

[C]

So, look, Rabbi Hirsch, nobody invites a journalist to cheer him up, okay? Or this is not what we do. I always say in public engagements, this is not an inspirational conversation. I'm not an inspirational speaker. It's not on my cv. I don't pitch myself as such. My attempt is to give clarity. And the truth is that the Israeli society is in a very difficult situation. People want to hear sometimes in the us, in other places, because they care about Israel. They want to hear about the resilience of the Israeli society. And I spoke about that, I'm writing about that, and I'm absolutely not denying it. I am also very aware that when you are within your own society, some people tend to see the best nuanced challenges and crisis, then actually look at the positives. And this happens in every society. So you speak with people from Amsterdam. Holland is going down the drain, and you speak with people from London. The country is finished. You can hear that in every single country. You speak with, with specific kind of people, by the way, specific kind of demographics. So I want to acknowledge my bias in that regard. I'm also a journalist. I'm tasked with seeing anomalies. Right? This is what I do after saying all that. The Israeli society is in a very difficult position right now. And here's why. The war has somewhat ended, however. Tribalism that was subdued in the first months of the war, political tribalism is back. And it's harder, harsher, more vulgar sometimes than ever. And hatred is there. Hatred was there even before October 7th. But now this is all fused together with a nation in post trauma, with many grieving families that blame the government, which is ultimately responsible, with other grieving families that blame the military apparatus or what they see as the deep state, with half of the coalition voters that believe a conspiracy theory that there was an act of betrayal from within the Israeli system that assisted Hamas. Half of the coalition voters, according to consecutive polls, not one poll. So this is Metastasizing through the Israeli society with the ultra orthodox and conscription issues with the government that tries to push a waiver for the ultra orthodox while their countrymen have served reserve soldiers have served 200, 300, 500 days in reserve service, had their businesses destroyed, family life extremely pressured and challenged and sometimes collapsing. You have the Israeli economy, which is relatively robust and successful, and you see those news bulletins about another exit of another tech company. But for Israelis, the challenge is that in many schools, there's just such a huge crack of the Israeli education system. You don't have a science teacher suddenly at all. They can't find a science teacher. They employ people that are not trained as teachers and don't have academic degrees. And I'm talking in the better parts of the state of Israel. These are the challenges. Policing has basically collapsed in many areas of the country. And crime, for instance, murders within the Arab municipalities. Crime is just shot out of the roof. It's just amazing to see, in the worst sense of the word, the way that Ben Gvir's position as a minister has changed that. And of course, we have the data. The data is that many dozens of thousands of Israelis have left the country. And it's true that this kind of leaving and going back and relocation is part of a global economy. But this data is not a per year. These are people who have left and have stayed to some extent. And it's a worrying trend that shouldn't be sugarcoated. Now, coming to the elections, many Israelis see this as a referendum on Netanyahu, like other elections. And for the Israelis that support the Prime Minister, they see this as detrimental for those who oppose the prime minister. Many of them are basically threatening that if he gets reelected in any sort of form, that's it for them. Now, I wouldn't take these threats seriously if I wouldn't have seen the trend lines in terms of migration out of Israel. And you have a very mixed picture. You have a robust society that has just proved itself during war. You have a very impressive civil society organizations in Israel. There is no other place, I think, better in the world to raise a kid than in Israel. This is a lot of the reasons that people go back to Israel is that, at least for me, this is how I feel about Israel. And a lot of elements that are really impressive, like economy, cyber. We just heard that Palo Alto, a very important cyber company, is going to trade in the Tel Aviv stock exchange because it sees Israel as such a cyber leader. And the relations with the Arab world were sustained during this War. With all these demonstrations, flights to the UAE continued as usual, unlike flights to Europe and sometimes to the U.S. right. So you have all this. And on the other hand, what you have is demography. You have the most growing part of the Israeli society, the ultra Orthodox that won't serve and many of them won't work. And you have a rise of political tribalism and far right sort of Jewish supremacy with Smotrich and Benvir. So the elections will be extremely important in that regard. Every election in Israel is important. Every election in the United States is. Is the most important one. Right. That's the cliche. Well, that. This time it's. It's also true.

[A]

So I asked you, not I did. I. I didn't expect you to predict the results. Let me ask you in a slightly different way. Would it surprise you if after the elections, Benjamin Netanyahu would be the prime minister again?

[B]

Hmm.

[C]

No.

[A]

No. So you think he. That you think there's a reasonable chance that he would eventually win the elections, that is, be able to form a government?

[C]

I think his chances of winning the elections are 5050. I think that as of itself is pretty jaw dropping considering October 7th. But looking at the numbers, and I'm looking at the numbers, I think it's a 50, 50 chance. Now, looking only at the numbers, Rabbi Hirsch, I would say it's 7030 that Bennett or someone else would be prime minister. But I'm giving him a dividend for being such a great campaigner, and that dividend is worth at least another 20%. Prime Minister Netanyahu is probably the West's best campaigner, maybe besides President Trump himself. And because of that, and because he has won so many elections and he controls the agenda, he is absolutely resolved to do everything and anything in order to win. I think it's a 50, 50 chance that he'll actually win the elections. If you look at the polls in terms of responsibility, he managed to do something that I wouldn't have expected him to do, to make the entire issue of responsibility for October 7th completely partisan. It's almost completely partisan. If you are a right winger, you think almost all the blame lies only with the military apparatus. Almost all the blame. And if there is blame and responsibility, it has not evolved to the point in which the prime minister should lose his job for it. If you're in the center bloc or you're in the left wing, you would say it's the prime minister that is almost wholly responsible. And the military branch was somehow led into this. My position was the day of October 7, the day after October 7, that both of these sides are responsible, each in different way, and they should all basically retire. And I'm maintaining that position. Now, every single one of the military decision makers and security decision makers isn't there anymore. There's only one person that was part of the chain of command that is still there, is the Prime Minister. He's not doing too bad,

[B]

which might

[A]

explain why he refuses to set up a national commission of investigation, of course.

[C]

Well, that's, that's a trademark of Netanyahu. Look, he has been a Prime minister in Israel more than any other person in history, including David Ben Gurion. And he has formed exactly zero national commissions of inquiry.

[B]

Why?

[C]

Because he knows what can happen with these commissions. And other prime ministers also knew that, but they caved into public pressure. And also they had their party that came, Rabbi Hirsch, and said, hey, we're not going to go with you on that. So they had people who were profiling courage to refer to John Kennedy's, President Kennedy's book that said, we're not going to go with our party, with our allegiance, with the leader. You need to have this national commission of inquiry, not in this case,

[A]

talking about courage. My last question to you is you wrote a very well regarded book called Revolt, and it was about the worldwide uprising against globalization. What is the status of the democratic West?

[B]

What was that book about? Do you associate globalization with the West?

[A]

Is there in fact a risk to the very lifestyle of Western civilization? And why are people so angry now?

[C]

So this is exactly the question I tried to answer. And here's the paradox. People are living the best sort of life that they have ever lived materially. But so many people feel lost and angry and robbed of their autonomy. And that paradox, that tension, that friction leads to energy. And that energy is what I labeled the revolt. The revolt is leaderless and it sometimes manifests itself with radicalism on the left leaning side. Sometimes it manifests itself with, with racism on the right wing side. Sometimes it even manifests itself as sort of fanatic environmentalism. What combines all of these are the notion, the sentiment, and politics is mostly sentiment that something is wrong with the system, that the system isn't working anymore. Now, people who live usually in urban areas, earn a lot of money, have had their education, academic education. They don't feel that it's the people on the edges of the world that feel the friction, that feel that that world is ending. And what I wrote about in the book is my meetings with anyone from neo Nazis in Germany to Anarchists in Greece that were filling up the Molotov cocktails when they were speaking with me, or coal miners in Marianna, Pennsylvania, that explained to me why their family voted only Democrats for five generations, and now they're going to vote for President Trump. And unlike a lot of writing and some of these meetings were held before the president won the elections in 2016. It's actually the reason I got the book. The book deal was because I did a series on Israeli TV saying that President Trump can actually win this and explaining why. And my general position as to this is of empathy. So unlike expressions about the deplorables or people who cling to their guns and Bibles. My intuition as to this is that the rebels have something going for them, and they're right. They're right in their sentiment, in their understanding that the system isn't working anymore, that a reform is needed, that our hierarchies of power are either inefficient or corrupt or simply not suitable for the world anymore. Now, by saying that a change is very warranted, I'm not saying that I support everyone who's riding that wave or who says that he represents that wave. I'm saying that we need to understand that this is not a bump on the road. It's not people that have been incited by ignorance or by social networks. It's the future, and revolt has become the status quo.

[B]

And we're. We're.

[A]

We're really only at the very beginning of this new phase.

[B]

I mean, if.

[A]

If the consequences weren't so dramatic, it would be a fascinating time to live and explore with all this potential for dramatic change.

[C]

Yes. Yeah, but it's our lives, and usually the good life is a stable life or in a stable time.

[A]

That's what, that's what people yearn for. Stability, which, of course, you get to a certain degree. But the permanent aspect of life is change, and that's the Jewish tradition talks a lot about that, too. Nadavayal, I want to thank you very much. One of the great journalists and analysts of Israel, for sure, and global affairs. Thank you for taking this time with us. You didn't depress me at all. To the contrary, to hear sobering. I'm happy to hear that sobering analysis from people whose job it is to shed light on what's happening in the world for me, is very uplifting. So thank you, and keep doing what you're doing.

[C]

Thank you so much, Rabbi Hirsch, and thank you for the work that you've been doing and for the words that You've been saying during this war, there's something I always say and people who listen to your podcast or in your community, I think they need to hear that from an Israeli. Israelis are not big on saying todaraba, on saying thank you. In retrospect, they don't usually send an email later saying, oh, I enjoyed the dinner. We don't usually do that even in Israel with our friends. And I think that when Israelis were alone, when they felt so lonely, they found out who's going to stand with them. And it's America and it's the Jews, the Jewish community in America and around the world. And as we all discovered, this was done and it had its price and people are paying and have been paying their price and they didn't need to do that. And they did that out of their identification with Israel, with what they felt was a moral obligation. So I'm saying just, I can't speak for anyone but me, but I'm saying that to Daraba.

[B]

What a great way to end the

[A]

podcast then, and wish you well and look forward to reading your next book and all your future articles.

[C]

Thank you so much.

[B]

In reflecting on Nadav's thoughts, it seemed to me that a central theme in the panoply of threats he described is the age old clash between those who use power to liberate and those who use power to coerce, oppress, dominate and destroy. Dictators don't understand nuanced democratic societies. Nadav said Hamas thought it understood Israeli society when they saw hundreds of thousands of Israelis demonstrating weakly against the Israeli government's policies. But they mistook democratic dissent for weakness. They brought ruin upon themselves and their own people. The Iranian government's response to protesters was to slaughter them indiscriminately as a mortal threat to their rule. Some reports estimate that as many as 20,000 Iranians were gunned down in two days by their own government during the January protests. That's the thing about tyrants. They fear diversity. They are afraid of words. They are afraid of thoughts. As Winston Churchill wrote, a little mouse of thought appears in the room and even the mightiest potentates are thrown into panic. Power that is based on coercion rather than consent is brittle. Authoritarian rule often disintegrates from the inside. Not one shot was fired at the Soviet Union. It was it collapsed on its own, like rust on an iron bridge, unnoticed until it's too late. The foundations of the Soviet edifice were too weak to bear its future. Sooner or later, hopefully sooner, the Iranian regime will fall too. I'LL never forget my meeting with Walter Momper, who was the mayor of West Berlin, when the Berlin Wall collapsed. He told me that the day the Wall came down started like any other day. He was in the midst of a television interview, explaining that German reunification would have to wait at least another generation when his beeper began shaking violently. Back then, they used beepers. He needed to get to the Wall urgently. It had just been breached by thousands of East Germans. They demolished the wall in three days. Its foundations were crumbling for three decades. We just didn't notice. Jews wrote the first chapter of the right of peoples to be free, a right bestowed not by pharaohs, kings, or rulers, but by God. Judaism is for freedom, the expansion of human liberties. America's greatest leaders understood this to be the role of the United States as well. What constitutes the bulwark of our liberty? Asked Abraham Lincoln. It is not our frowning battlements, our bristling sea coasts, our army and our navy. All of these may be turned against us. Our reliance is in the love of liberty which God has planted in us. Our defense is in the spirit which prized liberty as the heritage of all. Those of us who live in open societies often take this precious gift of liberty for granted. We rarely think about the frailty of freedom, how hard it is to achieve, and how quickly it can dissolve. It took 400 years to free the Hebrew slaves. Even after escaping Egypt, it still took 40 years to get to the Promised Land, a journey that should have taken no more than 40 days. We tend to forget that most human beings who ever walked the face of the earth were not free. Most people today are not free. We assume that we live at the end of history, when all the great ideological battles have been won. It's not so. Every generation must struggle anew. Liberty is fragile. It is always at risk. Nothing is permanent in human affairs. Everything changes. The struggle to preserve, protect, and defend liberty is constant. It never ends. There is no relaxing. Perpetual vigilance is our lot. Until next time. This is in these times.