Episode #532: “Constitutions need power,” says Henning Glaser, a Bangkok-based lawyer working on constitutional politics in Asia. In his second appearance on the podcast, he argues that Myanmar’s constitutional problem is less about drafting the perfect text than about whether any text can bind the actors who hold force, and whether there is enough unity to sustain a shared political community.

He describes the early post-independence settlement as broken at its origin, saying the promised autonomy that predated the first constitution “was never really done so from the beginning,” leaving what he calls “the original sin of constitutionalism and statehood” that still shapes mistrust. Later military-era constitutions, in his view, often functioned as cover for power rather than restraint, with the 2008 charter operating as “insurance” that preserved military vetoes and control.

Glaser insists a viable constitutional state “needs a certain degree of unity,” and that unity cannot be manufactured by constitutional language alone. Federalism and peace-making become inseparable challenges, because the constitutional design question sits on top of armed realities, competing visions of federation versus confederation, and minority-within-minority tensions that do not map neatly onto territory.

He also emphasizes “constitutional infrastructure” as a precondition for any genuine rule of law: courts that function, legal education that produces doctrine rather than slogans, a press able to criticize judgments, and citizens able to engage without fear. Courts can guard a constitution only if judges can rule independently and if the broader system accepts rulings without reverting to coercion.

Glaser’s most pragmatic conclusion is that Myanmar may need a tentative constitution first—a minimal framework that can be implemented while institutions, doctrine, and civic capacity develop—because constitutional ambition that exceeds enforceable power risks repeating the cycle of promises made on paper and withdrawn in practice.