Does the Iran War Put America First?

Summary

Podcast Summary: "Does the Iran War Put America First?"
Interesting Times with Ross Douthat
New York Times Opinion – March 5, 2026
Guest: Kurt Mills, Executive Director, The American Conservative

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Overview of the Episode

This episode explores the seeming contradiction between Donald Trump's "America First" campaign promises and the hawkish, interventionist foreign policy of his second administration—most notably leading the US into large-scale war with Iran. Host Ross Douthat speaks with Kurt Mills about the roots of this shift, the internal and external forces shaping America's posture, the role of Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the future of right-wing foreign policy. The conversation is wide-ranging, analytical, and forthright, critically examining the political and ideological dynamics within the Republican Party and conservative movement.

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Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Setting the Scene: Trump’s Unexpected Foreign Policy Turn

• War Footing: The US is at war with Iran, while still backing Ukraine and intervening elsewhere (Nigeria, Venezuela, etc.). This runs counter to the "restraint" and "America First" ideologies Trump campaigned on.
• Perception of Betrayal: Mills argues that the current hawkishness is a betrayal of Trump’s voters and the anti-interventionist right. (01:08–01:51)

2. Why Did Trump Shift to Hawkishness?

• Leadership and Personality: Mills attributes the turn to Trump’s impatience, lack of interest in detail, and a fundamentally agreeable (even pliable) personality that’s been out-maneuvered by hawks within his administration and allied institutions.
  • "The President is impatient. The President does not have the patience for diplomacy." (05:26 – Kurt Mills)
  • "He has not shown the determination and courage to tell them [the hawks] no." (05:37 – Kurt Mills)
• Factions and Constraints: Multiple competing factions exist within the administration—some restraint-oriented—but the President’s management style allows hawkish forces ("the blob") to set the tone (06:42–06:54).

3. The Right’s Foreign Policy Identity Crisis

• What Should Conservative Foreign Policy Look Like?: Mills champions a tradition of "anti-imperial" and "anti-war" conservatism, skeptical of US overseas commitments and entanglements.
  • He distances himself from the term "isolationist": "It seems like a catch all slur... Very few Republicans call themselves isolationist." (12:04 – Kurt Mills)
• Historical Traditions: Prefers the stances of Eisenhower and Taft over Reagan, viewing the latter as overrated and too imperial (13:52–15:01).

4. Are Voters Really Hawkish?

• Elite vs. Mass Opinion: Mills argues that Republican voters tend to follow party leaders; if Trump negotiated peace, they'd support that just as easily as war. He contends grassroots hawkishness is overstated and largely elite-driven.
  • "Most voters are deferential to their party and politicians." (18:16 – Kurt Mills)
  • Douthat pushes back: "Older conservatives... have a stronger hawkish default for sure..." (20:20 – Ross Douthat)
  • Mills notes generational divides but insists elite cues matter most. (20:56–21:32)

5. Foreign & Domestic Forces Driving Interventionism

• Non-American Actors: Douthat asks if actors like Putin and foreign adversaries help drive US decisions. Mills replies that diplomacy could have worked if a real deal were sought and that US policy is reactive and elite-driven.
  • "You have to offer him [Putin] a deal that makes it more attractive than the status quo." (22:37 – Kurt Mills)
• Elite Incentives: The inability to say "no" to any group—domestic or international—leads to continued escalation. (26:04–28:09)

6. The Israeli and Saudi Influence Debate

• Role of Israel: Mills and Douthat debate whether Republican elites are sincere Iran hawks or afraid of criticizing Israel due to potential career repercussions.
  • "There's an attempt to say any criticism of Israel is ipso facto antisemitic... It's a silly and dulling thought technology." (29:48–31:21 – Kurt Mills)
  • Mills: Israeli influence is "a huge deal" and exerts a "disgusting amount" of sway over US foreign policy (39:39 – Kurt Mills).
  • Douthat: There is also realist, interest-based support for US allies in the Middle East, including both Israel and Saudi Arabia (36:18).
• Elite vs. Voter Motives: Ongoing debate whether pro-Israel hawkishness is more about elite pressure or real voter sentiment (40:18–41:16).
• Trump’s Motivations: Mills claims a mix of political alliances, business interests, and fear explain Trump’s approach to Israel; Douthat presses for more clarity (41:48–44:07).
  • "We can't say no to Israel. This will not stop unless he says no to Israel." (42:40 – Kurt Mills)
  • Mills also speculates about Trump’s fear of Israeli and Mossad influence (43:04).

7. Projection: What Happens if the Iran War Fails?

• Potential Fallout: If the war is seen as a failure, Mills contends conservative politics will radicalize further, with potential for "accelerationist" anti-interventionist sentiment.
  • "The fact that the reigning ideology keeps failing will create a more and more radicalized polity..." (49:36 – Kurt Mills)
• Impact on Trump: Approval ratings could drop, especially if the economy sours (51:58–52:51).
• Role of Vance and Other 2028 Contenders: J.D. Vance may face internal conflict between representing anti-war populism and defending administration decisions; potential for primary challenges from anti-interventionists like Tucker Carlson, Steve Bannon, Marjorie Taylor Greene, and Thomas Massie (54:46–58:09).
  • "Vance is going to have to innovate beyond [the VP loyalty] if he wants to be president." (56:40 – Kurt Mills)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Kurt Mills on Trump's Personality:
  "The President is impatient. The President does not have the patience for diplomacy...Fundamentally an underratedly agreeable personality." (05:26)

• On Anti-War Conservatism:
  "I am far more to the latter. I think basically the critics of where America went, particularly Post World War II, lost the battle, but they were right." (13:52)

• On Elite vs. Mass Opinion:
  "It's a D.C., New York intelligentsia thing, fundamentally." (15:45)

• On Israeli Influence:
  "A disgusting amount... a lot of Republican congressmen want Netanyahu to be the president frankly." (39:39) "We can't say no to Israel. This will not stop unless he says no to Israel." (42:40)

• On the Potential for Radicalization:
  "The reigning ideology keeps failing will create a more and more radicalized polity that is actually going to...Trump will look in some ways like a moderate." (49:36)

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Timestamps for Important Segments

• Trump’s shift from restraint to hawkishness: 01:58–05:21
• Mills on administration personnel and factionalism: 03:27–05:21
• Trump’s personality as a cause: 05:26–06:42
• Discussion on elite vs. mass foreign policy opinion: 15:36–21:56
• Debate over Israeli influence: 29:19–44:07
• What if the war goes bad? Future GOP scenarios: 48:42–58:09
• Wrap-up and future right-wing challenges: 54:46–59:28

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Takeaways and Tone

The episode is intellectually sharp, historically aware, and unafraid to address taboos regarding US foreign policy, especially within the GOP. It highlights how presidential personality—more than ideology or coalition-building—shapes American strategy, and it warns of possible radicalization if current hawkish approaches fail. Douthat and Mills disagree at points but share a tone of critical realism about elite incentives, public opinion, and the cyclical nature of American interventionism.

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For listeners who want to understand how the Iran war fits (or doesn’t) within "America First" ideas, and what it foretells about the Republican right’s future, this is an indispensable, candid conversation.

Transcript

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[Ross Douthat]

from New York Times Opinion, I'm Ross Douthit and this is Interesting Times.

[Kurt Mills]

Today, the United States military continues to carry out large scale combat operations in Iran to eliminate the grave threats posed to America by this terrible terrorist regime.

[Ross Douthat]

So whatever happened to America first, it doesn't feel like a war with Iran was quite what Donald Trump campaigned on in 2024.

[Kurt Mills]

We put America first and we're going to end these endless wars. Endless wars, they never stop. You ever see these wars? They go on for 14 years.

[Ross Douthat]

20. And my guest this week thinks it's a big betrayal of the voters who put him in the White House. Kurt Mills is the executive director of the American Conservative, a magazine that champions foreign policy restraint. He argues that the Iran war isn't just a foreign policy blunder. It's a move that could shatter Trump's domestic coalition. Kurt Mills, welcome to Interesting Times.

[Kurt Mills]

Thanks for having me.

[Ross Douthat]

So I'm gonna do some stage setting here for anyone in the audience who doesn't follow all of the ins and outs of right wing foreign policy debates. But you are in charge of the American Conservative magazine, which is a magazine founded by Pat Buchanan, among other people, in opposition to the looming Iraq war. And for a long time, the American Conservative was a pretty lonely voice for foreign policy restraint, a kind of anti war, anti imperial conservatism. But throughout the trial Trump era, it's been seen as much more influential, maybe closer to what Trump himself believes. But here we are. The US Is at war and it is a war. It's not a, whatever, a large scale combat operation. Right? We're at war with Iran, we're still backing Ukraine in its ongoing war with Russia. We've intervened in Venezuela, we've intervened in Nigeria. There's a long list. Right? So whatever this looks like, I would not describe it as a dovish or restraint oriented administration. And however you would describe your faction on the right can call it anti war maga, we can call it America First. Whatever label you want to use seems to be Losing. So give me a big picture account of why that's happened. Why, in the broadest sense, why has the second Trump administration turned out to be much more hawkish than a lot of people expected?

[Kurt Mills]

It seems pretty clear to me that the ultimate deciding factor is the President's personality and own determinations. There are a number of people in this administration, there are real cadres that believe in non interventionism. They were put into personnel throughout the administration in a much more pronounced way than in term one. This generation is younger, I think very notably at the cabinet level, but also at the sub cabinet level. There was every indication that when Trump came in, first day of term two, first month of term two, that they really wanted to get the ball rolling on a number of these endeavors. In fact, they tried before he was even in power. The President's special envoy, Steve Wyckoff, if you remember, the transition in mid January 2025, imposed a ceasefire on the Israelis that was very unpopular among the Israeli right. Trump opened up negotiations and announced it side by side with Benjamin Netanyahu with Iran in April of 2025. Vice President Vance led a caustic showdown with Zelensky in February of 2025, indicating the administration was going to take a hard line in getting out of the war. Even on pet projects of people like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, there was every indication that they were competing factions to try to do diplomacy in Latin America. This may well just be stuff that is written in history books and not remembered actively, but the opening thrust of Trump term two was extremely in this direction. And I think it's worth noting. I also think it had been building for years. There was every indication that it was gonna look very different.

[Ross Douthat]

So, so then what, so what changed? What was the. You said it. You think it comes down to Trump himself.

[Kurt Mills]

The President is impatient. So the President is impatient. The President does not have the patience for diplomacy. I think this is clear. The President does not have the detail oriented mindset to overwhelm the various factions in his coalition. And the President is ultimately fundamentally an underratedly agreeable personality. And so a major part of President Trump's Boss Tweed style of management are people who want to drive the US into war. Right? There are Latin America hawks, there are Iran hawks, there are even conservative hawks remaining on the Hill and in the military industrial complex for Ukraine. And fundamentally, he has not shown the determination and courage to tell them no. And I think you've seen this yes on the right, but you've also seen it on the world stage. He likes Keir Starmer, I know he assailed him yesterday with Friedrich Merz, but generally speaking, that's been a reasonable relationship. He likes Emmanuel Macron, of course, he likes Xi Jinping, and he likes Vladimir Putin. That's a status quo dynamic if you can't say no to anybody. And the status quo is America as an escalatory interventionist power.

[Ross Douthat]

So that's a status quo embodied by not just forces within his administration, but by NATO, the Western alliance. What gets pejoratively called the foreign policy blob. Right.

[Kurt Mills]

A lot of this is just an open source. People are intimidated by foreign policy. I don't think it's actually that complex. Friedrich Mears, the Chancellor of Germany, flew to D.C. immediately when the Iran war started because he sniffed, I think correctly, a grand opportunity for Europe here, or the European internationalists, I should say, which is support Trump on Iran. Lump it. I don't think they would have chosen this, but they don't really care, right? I mean, the Europeans have been contra 10 years ago, when they were all in on the Iran diplomacy. They've been very frosty throughout this process. They don't care about the Iranians. Easy to dump them and try to get Trump back in, all in on NATO and Ukraine. And he said it in the first 20 seconds of his response in his meeting of Trump. He said, yep, yep, we support the end of this regime, but I'm really here to talk about Ukraine.

[Ross Douthat]

How much do you think Trump likes being a hawk, though, too? Right? I mean, yes, so it's impatience with diplomacy, it's agreeableness. But, you know, when I look back at his first term, it was a first term that had, in a way, a kind of establishment Republican foreign policy. In other ways, he very conspicuously resisted figures like John Bolton arguing for escalation against Iran. But there were various moments, right, the assassination of General Soleimani, most notably, where it seemed like Trump took real pleasure in using the US Military arsenal and not being the guy who put boots on the ground in occupied countries, but in being a dynamic actor on the world stage. And that when I look at sort of the pattern from Venezuela to Iran, that's sort of what I. I linked

[Kurt Mills]

it to, the impatience, though. I mean, like, it's, you know, there's disputes, there's negotiations, it's complex, it's hard. He feels like he's getting run over by foreign actors, potentially. You know, he said it yesterday, Israel didn't make this decision. If anything, I forced their hand. He's very competitive and jockish and macho about that, so to speak. But I think you're right that he's attracted fundamentally to the glamour of these strikes. So there is this element to him. But fundamentally, until perhaps this month or until February 28, when we launched the war with Iran, Trump has shown a pretty clear hesitancy to get involved in these grand ways a la the neocons, a la the 2000s.

[Ross Douthat]

So what is the alternative to the kind of internationalist and interventionist consensus that you're arguing that he sort of accepted? What is the right wing foreign policy, the conservative foreign policy that you were hoping for, just in broad strength?

[Kurt Mills]

Look, I think it's important. So, you know, our magazine was founded by Buchanan, and as you mentioned, and Buchanan in a lot of ways was the Tucker Carlson of his age, and also ran for president, which may be forthcoming one day from Mr. Carlson. But Trump and Buchanan had a very bad relationship because they both sort of comically competed over the 2000 Reform Party nomination. And Trump said horrible things about Pat. And I'm only aware of two people that Trump has ever personally apologized to. One, his wife, Melania Trump, after the leak of Access Hollywood, and second, Pat. So even if you think Trump believes in nothing and is a nihilist, which I don't, but if you believe that he is aware of the ideology that he trafficked in in the 2016 primary and has continued to the last 10 years, and that is fundamentally a conservative anti globalism, and it is skeptical of our massive empire overseas, that it serves the Americans, that it serves the national interest. It is skeptical of unending immigration and it is skeptical of free trade. That is what Trump ran on. That is why the conservative establishment lost its mind when he first rose to power. And that is when his back has been against the wall. What he has really reached for. I mean, remember, someone called Ron DeSantis was once favored to beat him in the 2024 primary. And he leaned in hard to the anti war messaging, lean in hard to the trade hawkishness messaging, hard on the immigration. He reached for it again and again and again. And at the same time, of course, a rising young senator called J.D. vance endorsed President Trump early in that primary, when that was not voguish. That was not considered the safe play. And then he backed a withdrawal and skepticism of Ukraine when that was not at all considered the conventional wisdom, even on the right, or at least within the establishment right. He made that, made those bets. And that was an early alliance between the two of them. And I think it tells you that this ideology was Always twinned and linked.

[Ross Douthat]

Do you think of this ideology as isolationist?

[Kurt Mills]

No, but I mean, I think, I mean, what is isolationist?

[Ross Douthat]

Well, that's part of my question. Right.

[Kurt Mills]

I mean, it seems like a catch all slur, right? I mean, I mean, I mean, very few.

[Ross Douthat]

Well, there's a thread that runs through

[Kurt Mills]

Republicans who called themselves as an isolationist.

[Ross Douthat]

No one ever. No one, no.

[Kurt Mills]

Well, people actually called themselves neocons. Right. Like, so that was like a real movement, they called it. They advanced policies that helped ruin the country. But like, that was an actual ideology, I think.

[Ross Douthat]

Although by the time it became controversial, Right. When they started messaging in the early 2000s, you had lots of neoconservatives who would say, well, what is a neoconservative anyway? Right. I guess what I'm getting at is this. There's a strand of Republican foreign policy that is extremely hawkish, aggressive and interventionist. And sometimes for the sake of democracy, sometimes just on general, it's a de facto.

[Kurt Mills]

You see it, it's on an autopilot on Capitol Hill. I mean, the older generation just marinated in it. It's the central nervous system.

[Ross Douthat]

But there's also a thread, a strong thread that runs through actual Republican presidents from Dwight Eisenhower through Richard Nixon and to some extent Ronald Reagan, that is internationalist but skeptical of military intervention. But then there's also a fuller kind of anti imperial, anti war. Right. That says, no, we need to sort of dismantle bases, bring troops home and so on. And I'm curious where in that divide you sit. Do you think that Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan offer a valuable tradition, or do you think they were too imperial themselves?

[Kurt Mills]

First, the magazine represents a range, but I'm happy to answer for myself.

[Ross Douthat]

For yourself.

[Kurt Mills]

Okay.

[Ross Douthat]

But it's also relevant to Vance, to Trump, to these figures. What are they trying to build? Are they trying to sort of change the way the American empire works, or are they trying to retreat and dismantle it?

[Kurt Mills]

For myself, I am far more to the latter. I think basically the critics of where America went, particularly Post World War II, lost the battle, but they were right. And I don't think this is actually an ancient battle because the empire is still going on and America is increasingly stressed, thin in my assessment. And I think their arguments are still alive and well and relevant going into the 21st century. So I prefer Nixon's foreign policy to Reagan's. I prefer Eisenhower's foreign policy to the John Birch Society, but I prefer Robert Taft to Eisenhower. That's where I come from. Reagan, I think, is Similar enough to Obama on the left, which is it's a sort of deity figure where it just doesn't really behoove one to mess with him. But I think we drew the wrong lessons from the Reagan years. And I think Reagan is fundamentally an overrated conservative figure, an overrated president, and a potentially in many ways damaging one.

[Ross Douthat]

When you talk about then the shift that you saw happening on the younger right in appointees to the Trump administration, do you think that a lot of those people agreed with you or do you think that they saw themselves more as saying we're still internationalists, but we're in the Nixon school?

[Kurt Mills]

Yeah, yeah. I mean, I think the people who are in the government are probably functionally closer to the Nixon Eisenhower school, which I still think would be a vast improvement over the default mode of where we have been in the 90s, 2000s, 2010s.

[Ross Douthat]

Okay. Do you think there's actual public support for any kind of sort of anti imperialist, anti war turn?

[Kurt Mills]

Absolutely, absolutely. I think foreign policy is complex. I think it needs leadership. I think it would need a president to explain why we are doing this to the American people. But I think the people who lose their minds when the president pursues a new type of foreign policy, whether this be Donald Trump or even Barack Obama, it is a elite driven game. It is a D.C. in New York thing, that is who's actually opposing it most vociferously. It is not protests in the streets to keep our bases in Bahrain. It is not protests in the streets to make sure that we Borat bag Nicolas Maduro. It is a DC New York intelligentsia thing, fundamentally.

[Ross Douthat]

Okay, let me make a counter argument and see what you think. If you look at polling on the Iran war so far, and again, we're four or five days in, and obviously it can change dramatically. But right now, initially overwhelming numbers of Republican voters support the war. It's not popular nationally. But then Donald Trump himself is not popular nationally. But within the Republican coalition, there's plenty of support for the war. In polls, doesn't seem just elite driven. I think if you looked at polls for the Venezuelan operation, you would probably see something similar. And then over time in polling, I think if you do it on the basis of philosophy, right, you find a lot of sort of default hawkishness among Republican conservative and right wing voters. And there's people who look at the kind of anti war right or the war skeptical right that you represent. But that's also associated with really prominent figures like Tucker Carlson, who you already mentioned, Steve Bannon, all the way now through figures like Megyn Kelly and others. And people say, well, that's actually the elite driven phenomenon. That's a group of people who found a way, this is an attention economy, to monetize a lot of people who are really intensely focused on foreign policy or sometimes really hostile to Israel. We'll talk more about Israel in a minute. But that ultimately Bannon, Carlson, others, they speak for a really sort of hyper engaged 10% of the Republican coalition. But most people are just hawks on the right. And if you say we're going to go to war and kick some ass in the Middle east, yes, if it goes really badly, people will turn against it. But there isn't like a philosophical support for restraint. What do you make of that argument?

[Kurt Mills]

Most voters are deferential to their party and their politicians. So I mean, I just think the, I think the counterfactual to your counterfactual needs to be interrogated. What if President Trump had signed an Iran deal? I think overwhelming numbers of Republicans would have supported that. What if President Trump had opened up business dealings with Nicolas Maduro like he's doing right now with Delsey Rodriguez or trying to. I think that would have been uncontroversial in the population. What if President Trump had pulled out of Ukraine and Ukraine hadn't collapsed and there was an enduring deal where an armistice frees the battle lines? I think that would have been very popular on the right as well. So you see a level of partisanship in this country that is extreme. You see a level of trust on the right in President Trump, which is notable, but I'm not sure, entirely unique. I think, you know, the Democratic standard bearer, Biden, was a weird president. I think a young man, we can agree on that. We stipulate to that. I think Barack Obama, if he was president today, would have similar dynamics on the left and I think that was frustrating for liberals that were meaning that

[Ross Douthat]

the left was notionally anti war.

[Kurt Mills]

But when Obama, there were a lot of left. Obama and Trump have similarities. Right? Or the phenomenons have similarities. There was a lot of left wing intellectual ennui with Obama in the mid 2010s, I'm sure you recall. And it didn't really show up in the polls. Okay. So I think Trump is a big deal. I think whoever leads these parties are big deals. I think presidents are big deals. But I don't really see that as evidence as for hawkishness, actually I see that as evidence for trusting the president or trusting who leads the party or trusting your Party. And I will say this, I'm not a big fan of Bush certainly, but also of Obama, who I think were both failed presidents. They both tried to marshal support in fairly traditional ways, which is the. This is what I believe. I'm gonna do this. I'm gonna spend political capital on it. Iraq, Bush did that. Obama did it for mediocre healthcare reform.

[Ross Douthat]

Wouldn't you at least agree though that there is a strong generational division here where older conservatives and Republicans.

[Kurt Mills]

Yes.

[Ross Douthat]

And again, I think you can see this in opinion polls, have a stronger hawkish default for sure, going back in part to some of the veneration of Ronald Reagan you talked about. But again, I think just connected in a kind of profound way to how conservatives, older conservatives think about their country. Right. That we're the country that won the Cold War. And if you're a patriotic American, you should expect us to be able to do good things abroad. That seems like still a powerful force in public opinion that can't be just reduced to. Trump says it, therefore people go along.

[Kurt Mills]

But I think the story ultimately is an elite one. Cuz I'm still gonna focus on the counterfactual. Let's say Trump did a deal with Vladimir Putin. Let's say Trump did a deal with the Iranians. He said, I solved Biden's war. I did a better Iran deal than Obama.

[Ross Douthat]

Yeah.

[Kurt Mills]

There might have been some people in the country, some right wing radio shows who are like, you know, the mullahs are still up stuff. We gotta do this or do that. But I don't think there would be revolt from the older clientele of the party if Trump had chosen diplomacy versus Trump is choosing war. And there is revolt.

[Ross Douthat]

Is there revolt?

[Kurt Mills]

I think you're gonna see. I think it's gonna be pretty bad.

[Ross Douthat]

Okay.

[Kurt Mills]

Yeah. I mean, it depends. I mean it stipulates how long this war goes. Trump may still off ramp. Trump should off ramp. But like I'm arguing succinctly that it actually would have been politically more savvy for him to do the diplomacy. And the only real explanatory variable in my view is the elite story. That's who was losing their mind at diplomacy.

[Ross Douthat]

What about the explanatory variable of non American actors?

[Kurt Mills]

Oh, I think there's huge too. And I was being maybe diplomatic.

[Ross Douthat]

Well, but not so I don't mean our allies. We'll talk about our allies in a moment. I mean our adversaries. Right. So when I look at what's happened with Russia and Ukraine. Right. It seems to Me that the administration made a big diplomatic push. Right. They twisted the Ukrainian government's arm, as you mentioned, in the famous Oval Office meeting and elsewhere, to get them to be more open to a peace deal. And for various reasons, Vladimir Putin has decided that it's in his interests to let the war go on. And that has left the White House still. They're still negotiating.

[Kurt Mills]

It's a hawkish summary. I think they could have come to a deal that would have been attractive enough for Putin to not continue the war. But that's life. I mean, you have to offer him a deal that makes it more attractive than the status quo.

[Ross Douthat]

Right. But to take the extreme example, if Trump made a deal with Putin and six weeks later the Russian army took Kyiv and occupied two thirds of Ukraine, the public would turn against that, don't you think?

[Kurt Mills]

I think the driving force on why they would turn against it would be hysteria driven from the media and by foreign policy elites. So I stipulate to that. And look, I guess I don't think it was really on offer, though. I mean, we've debated Ukraine all day, but I think let's narrow the zone of what was actually discussed. There wasn't discussion of giving them Kyiv. There was discussions of giving them these four oblasts. There's discussions of security. There are discussions of security guarantees. These are the things that are actually being talked about in all these various negotiations. If Trump did, let's say the 28 point plan, which critics say is a Russian plan from 2025, late 2025, I think if that was initiated, I think that the Ukrainians and the Europeans would complain and liberals in the United States would complain, but that Ukraine would not collapse, that there would be a deal and that that would solve the conflict for the short to medium term.

[Ross Douthat]

Okay.

[Kurt Mills]

And I think the public would not revolt.

[Ross Douthat]

Right. I guess I just.

[Kurt Mills]

I think the Afghanistan scenario is what you raised, basically, which is if the administration had incompetently allowed Ukraine to collapse a la Afghanistan, Yes, I do think Trump would have been blame. Also think the big story there is media and foreign policy elites hammering that issue and making it everything on the airwaves.

[Ross Douthat]

I guess that was the story.

[Kurt Mills]

That was the Fox News story in Afghanistan.

[Ross Douthat]

I guess this is a point where we somewhat disagree in the sense that I supported the withdrawal from Afghanistan. I wrote columns in favor of it. I defended Biden at the time against his critics, at the same time observing the dynamics of that, how it affected perceptions of the Biden presidency. And obviously that reflected the way it was handled as well as the policy itself. It just gave me a sense that there are limits to how anti imperial and withdrawal oriented an American president can be because a lot of Americans are just bought in and sometimes I think for good reasons, sometimes for bad reasons to our sort of broadly ambitious role in the world. And certainly that things that appear as national humiliations, it doesn't take Fox News whipping them up for that to cut into presidential.

[Kurt Mills]

I think if Abigail hadn't happened, I think if the images in the airport had been less chaotic, I think that would have gone a long way.

[Ross Douthat]

Okay, well, let's talk about, as you say, let's stipulate that disagreement and talk more about what you see as the other actors shaping US Foreign policy. So you argue that restraint oriented anti imperial foreign policy could be popular with the right leaders. We've both been writing about these issues for a long time. It has not found the right leaders, even in the form of Donald Trump, a partial Buchananite. So what is the obstacle, what is the core obstacle to elites embracing this kind of foreign policy?

[Kurt Mills]

Those are kind of different questions.

[Ross Douthat]

Yes. Okay.

[Kurt Mills]

Right. I mean, the fundamental obstacle is the president who believes in it and advances it and goes for it. I mean, I would say the same thing. We went into ancient history, the early 20th century. World War II was not popular. Getting into it before it was. And FDR cleverly marshaled public support and world events to get us into that war. And now that's remembered as this sterling success of American power. But it wasn't popular. It was extremely unpopular, actually, in the late 30s. And he basically had to pledge to not get us into the war when he ran for reelection in 1940. And so I think that the idea that Americans have extremely strong convictions on any of this stuff is not true. But I also think that is an argument against their extremely strong convictions for hawkishness. And you mentioned the Bannon, Carlson, Kelly. Right, whatever you want to call it. Because I see this line of critique, but I also think it's very notable that the highest information members of the party and the most engaged voters, because I think you picked up on something smart. Carlson, I've known a while and I think he would be doing this regardless. Bannon pretty much the same. But if there wasn't a market for what they were saying, they wouldn't be doing this probably 10 years ago. I was always told on television that foreign policy, it didn't track. They could barely get me on tv, could barely get people on TV to talk about it. Even when Carlson had me on it was really is kind of almost a favor. That's not the way it is anymore. People are getting madder and madder and more engaged on this subject organically.

[AG Sulzberger]

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[Ross Douthat]

I would say that the way that they're getting madder and more engaged centers around having one very specific villain. Right. Like a primary focus of Carlson especially, but others as well. Right. Is Israeli policy, Israeli influence on the United States. It's true.

[Kurt Mills]

It's true.

[Ross Douthat]

Okay, so it's just true? It's just true. Good. All right, so what tell me about Israeli influence on US Foreign policy.

[Kurt Mills]

Israel's foundation was always twinned with the United States. I mean, this happened in the 1948 election. Truman tilted the scales and helped him win the election in 1948. But fundamentally, since the 90s, since the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli politics has gone in a different direction. And it has been highly twinned with particularly center right intellectuals and elites in the United States with a certain perspective. And it is a perspective that says that Israel can only be secure by thrashing everybody in the neighborhood and breaking them into bits until they're weak. It is a siege mentality. It is a garrison state. And of course, it is very linked to the U.S. where, you know, I believe the numbers are 45% of Jews live in Israel. 45% of Jews live in the United States. 10% live elsewhere. Could be stipulated. Roughly correct. And of course, when the other half of the world's Jewish population is here, and this highly emotional issue there is an attempt to say any criticism of Israel is ipso facto anti Semitic. I think it is. Well, number one, it is the kind of argument that the right is supposed to be against, which is woke political correctness. It's also just fundamentally untrue. And I think it's a silly and dulling thought technology.

[Ross Douthat]

Okay, but five years ago, right. I would say it was fair to say that that kind of critique had a fair amount of purchase in American politics. That people. The critique that says if you criticize Israel too strongly, you're anti Semitic, I don't think it has any substantial purchase right now. I think the Democratic political coalition has been fractured repeatedly, right. In the last few years by debates that are profoundly about Israel and Israeli policy. And as we were just saying, and

[Kurt Mills]

it's now happening to the right, and

[Ross Douthat]

as we were just saying, some of the most influential voices on the right in terms of sort of interest and engagement are intensely critical of Israel. So it seems to me that like one, that taboo is gone to a large degree. If it's gone, then let's actually be substantive. It can't just be that.

[Kurt Mills]

I think you're brushing aside the fear that Israel still engenders, especially among the establishment. And you know this, you know that people feel that their careers will be destroyed if they're at all critical of Israel. And that is still a controlling people.

[Ross Douthat]

Where

[Kurt Mills]

people in media and politics.

[Ross Douthat]

People in media and politics.

[Kurt Mills]

People in media and politics, and to an extent, corporate America.

[Ross Douthat]

But since we're talking about foreign policy, just focus on foreign policy. Is that then an actual driver of US Policy making?

[Kurt Mills]

Sure, absolutely.

[Ross Douthat]

You would say that a big reason that a lot of Republican elites take a much more hawkish line in the Middle east towards Iran, especially than you would favor or than you think most of their voters would favor, is not because they're sincere Iran hawks, but because they're afraid of having their careers destroyed.

[Kurt Mills]

I think it's a mix, I think particularly of older, as we mentioned, this age variable is huge. I think older people are more inclined to actually believe it. And then additionally, I think the clear separation between the interests of the United States and Israel wasn't as obvious in generations past. I think there was a view, especially in the Bush administration, that the world was Fukuist. And so, yes, this was the Israeli position. But if we knock over all these strong Muslim states, Jeffersonian democracy will actually blossom. And look, I understand you can say that different elites in the Bush administration fundamentally said this or disagreed on this or Bolton wanted to go in for this reason. It's different than Paul Wolfowitz. Right, okay, fine. But fundamentally, the marinade was the only acceptable style of government and organization. And society is Western liberal democracy. And other societies that organize themselves in a separate form are fundamentally illegitimate. And I think because Israel styles itself as a Western liberal democracy, I'm not sure it's Western liberal or democracy at this point. They are naturally able to latch on to that cast of mind. That cast of mind is discredited among younger people because this is a heavily indebted society and Americans don't believe in the future, broadly speaking, anymore. But for older Americans, it is a more attractive mode of argument.

[OpportunityAtWork/Ad Council Announcer]

But do you think.

[Ross Douthat]

See, I guess I just don't think that's where the pro Iran war right is right now. I agree that that was a big part of the story of where the right was in the Bush era. Not universally, but a sense that I'm

[Kurt Mills]

not so sure we're out of the Bush era.

[Ross Douthat]

To me, I look at the Trump era and I look at not so much even the people who always supported war with Iran, like Lindsey Graham, but people who have sort of oscillated back and forth between being anti war, pro war, who are shaped, I think, by loyalty to Trump in the ways you describe. I think for a lot of those people, the story they tell themselves now is we don't have any fond illusions about democracy and the end of history. We think the world is a tough place. We think there's a bunch of powers, Russia, China, Iran, most notably, that are hostile to American interests. We think there's a set of powers in the Middle east that are friendly to American interests, including Israel, also including Saudi Arabia, which has also played a substantial role, I think, in pushing for a more hawkish foreign policy from Trump in a way that gets less attention from Tucker Bannon, people like that. No one is out there telling a podcast host you can't criticize Saudi Arabia. Right. In the American media. Right, right, right, but. And yet there's much more criticism of Israel in the American media than Saudi Arabia.

[Kurt Mills]

Yeah, but Israel is much more enmeshed in US Society than Saudi Arabia is.

[Ross Douthat]

But is Israel more enmeshed in the decision making patterns of US foreign policy than Saudi Arabia over the last 25 to 50 years? I feel like there's a. I think there's a fundamental underestimation of the place of Saudi Arabia from the anti war right? I think there's a bunch of Americans who support working with Arab states and Israel to fight Iran for what they think of as tough minded, realist reasons,

[Kurt Mills]

not just gossip Americans or elites.

[Ross Douthat]

I think Americans who like Trump and currently say they support this war.

[Kurt Mills]

So, yeah, he advances. Yeah, he advances. He is picked aside pretty clearly at this moment. He's gonna flip again.

[Ross Douthat]

Well, no, no. Yeah, no, I want to end by talking about the future.

[Kurt Mills]

It might be likely. Yeah. But I mean, seriously, I mean, like. I mean, the guy flips constantly.

[Ross Douthat]

Oh, yeah, no, no, he could absolutely flip again. But even in terms of foreign policy elites, when I look around the Republican Party, it just seems to me that there's. Yeah, there's a lot of people who are like, Israel's tough. You know, Saudis are our allies. We're weakening an enemy and strengthening an ally.

[Kurt Mills]

I think this is a supine ideology, and I think it has gotten. The essential incentive structure is this. You can discard the things that are unpopular. So the 2000s. Oh, the naive democracy building. Right. Ah, you know, enough on Iraq. We're not going to do that again. Right. The essential lesson of the Iraq war is don't invade Iraq. Right. But everything else that has power, Israeli influence on the United States, the large military, conservative institutions that are still bought in on this, you keep that and you just cook up something new, slightly different, and sell it as fundamentally a rejection of the 2000s. It's not a rejection of the 2000s. This is why the administration is so vulnerable to the criticism that this is so similar to Iraq, because it is so similar to Iraq.

[Ross Douthat]

I don't think it is a full rejection of the 2000s, but I think the people who are supportive of the

[Kurt Mills]

war, again, have people or elites or members of pop.

[Ross Douthat]

Including elites.

[Kurt Mills]

Well, I think it's very different. I mean, look, I think George W. Bush, who was a worse president to this point anyways than Donald Trump, he's the worst president by far in American history, in my opinion. He lost two wars and he crashed the economy. And when he left In January of 2009, 22% low 20s of Americans support him. What does that tell you? Half Republicans supported him even as he was leaving the White House. I think that matters. I think that will fundamentally be true no matter what Trump does. But I think it's only so interesting, Right?

[Ross Douthat]

No, I'm just trying to get at what are the actual conduits of forces that are shaping foreign policy right now. And it just seems like you're telling a story where Israel in particular exerts this kind of influence over people who don't fully agree with Israeli policy but are afraid to argue with it.

[Kurt Mills]

It's one argument, not the fourth or

[Ross Douthat]

are in the thrall of, yeah. Early 2000s ideas about the spread of democracy. Just to be very concrete, how much power do you think Benjamin Netanyahu is exerting over US Foreign policy right now?

[Kurt Mills]

A disgusting amount. I mean, this has been going on for a while. I mean, Benjamin Netanyahu, when he spoke to Congress under, I believe, Speaker Boehner, he was greeted more warmly by the legislature than the President of the United States was at the time. So the Republicans took over Congress in 2014 and he gave an address and it was like he was the president. I think a lot of Republican congressmen want Netanyahu to be the president, frankly. I mean, it's obvious for everyone to see, but it just is fundamentally, again, an elite thing. Netanyahu is not that popular in the United States. No, but among Republican lawmakers and elites he is.

[Ross Douthat]

But the lawmakers and elites reflect.

[Kurt Mills]

Sort of reflect the broad.

[Ross Douthat]

The broad opinion. I mean, no, you.

[Kurt Mills]

Most of those places are low information.

[Ross Douthat]

Okay? But you know Republicans, you know American Republicans, and you know that a default support for Israel that is rooted not in fear of political persecution by Zionists, but by some combination of historical affinities, religious affinities, and hostility to the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has done a lot of bad things to Americans over the years. Like, that's a real core part of Republican sentiment. It may be ebbing among the younger

[Kurt Mills]

generations, but it is not at a majoritarian perspective in the country. I mean, if that was true, Trump would never have been the Republican nominee.

[Ross Douthat]

Right. I'm just trying to stay with Israel because it seems so central to the actual inside the right critique.

[Kurt Mills]

But Trump ran for president.

[Ross Douthat]

Trump ran for president as more of a dove than other Republicans. But throughout his first term, he also constantly boasted about being the best friend that Israel has ever had. He was moving the embassy, he was doing all kinds of things. And again, he's in bed with him.

[Kurt Mills]

He accepted large Israel adjacent financing for his campaign. And you mentioned the Gulf before. The family is obviously in business in the Gulf. And the Gulf was far more of a driver of hawkish foreign policy in the first term.

[Ross Douthat]

I'm trying to understand in certain ways just the future of the right and where right wing foreign policy goes from here. And so it makes a big difference whether we understand Israeli influence on Republican foreign policy as a primarily about the opinions of conservative voters who are pro Israel for a range of reasons. Two, the opinions of elites who are pro Israel for a different set of reasons. Some mixture of sincerity and fear you're arguing versus three, this Narrative where. Well, no, it's about Trump's business deals and deal making in the Middle East. Right. Those are three quite different perspectives.

[Kurt Mills]

They can all be true, they can all be part of the story. I don't understand the contradiction.

[Ross Douthat]

Well, I'm just curious what we think is sort of the defining force here

[Kurt Mills]

as we can't say no to Israel. He's not saying no to Israel. This will not stop unless he says no to Israel.

[Ross Douthat]

Right. And he's not.

[Kurt Mills]

That is the answer.

[Ross Douthat]

And is he not saying no to Israel because he is fundamentally too agreeable or because he's fundamentally corrupted?

[Kurt Mills]

He's agreeable. He is too close to them politically. And I think, yeah, I think he's somewhat afraid of them.

[Ross Douthat]

Why is he afraid of them?

[Kurt Mills]

I think they're an intimidating society and I think people are afraid of Mossad. I think people are afraid of Israeli influence in foreign policy. They are afraid what it can do to people's careers. I think this taboo, as you mentioned, is breaking, but I think it has a lot of explanatory power for Trump. Sure, sure, yeah.

[Ross Douthat]

I mean, you think Trump, you think he's afraid of Israel as a force that could break him, that could attack him and call him an anti Semite, or as a force that could expose dark secrets about him?

[Kurt Mills]

Yeah, I mean, I think the Epstein story is somewhat relevant. I don't know. We don't know because the government's not being transparent. But I think he was in alliance fundamentally from the beginning because of campaign donations and the structure of conservative foreign policy elites with the Israeli hard line. And the Israeli hard line is they don't. Yeah, they want regime change. They also want state collapse in Iran. They don't really want Iran to exist anywhere close to its current form.

[Ross Douthat]

Right. I guess I've just. My sense is just that these things from watching Republican foreign policy in this administration and previously, that these things are over determined and that it ends up being easy for the anti war side to say, well, you know, it's just Israel. And if we fix America's relationship to

[Kurt Mills]

Israel, I think it's a huge deal. I mean, do you think this would be happening without Israel?

[Ross Douthat]

I don't think it would be happening without Israel in the sense that like if an entirely different Middle east existed, the world would be entirely different. Different. But I can certainly tell a very straightforward story where the US relationship to Saudi Arabia, Cold war issues, the Iranian revolution, a lot of different things lead to a long standing US rivalry with Iran without Israel being part of that story. Yes, I can certainly tell that story. I think that Israel matters profoundly to this, in part for reasons related to what actual Republican voters believe, which is something that I think you think is more.

[Kurt Mills]

I'm not arguing we're going to be a naturally good relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran. I think we're a long way from that happening if the Islamic Republic of Iran exists in a year. I think the story, though, is why is this a crisis? Why do we have to do this now? Why do countries have to be evacuated of US Citizens? Why does oil prices have to go up, potentially $100 a barrel? Why is the administration seemingly more interested in being defiant on this issue then its central issue, immigration? I mean, say what you will, and I don't want to debate Minnesota, but the administration caved on that. And they may cave because it's too much on this, but they are really putting their back into this one in a way they didn't do on their central issue.

[Ross Douthat]

Yes, but part of that is that presidents in second terms can find foreign policy crises easier to sort of feel like they have freedom of movement in policy. Right. And Trump himself is.

[Kurt Mills]

But he had a lot of freedom of movement on immigration. I mean, like, the Congress isn't really stopping him.

[Ross Douthat]

Congress isn't stopping him. But I think that courts and public opinion are, from his perspective, actually more difficult adversaries than foreign dictators seem to be, especially in the aftermath of Venezuela, which, again, to me has more explanatory power.

[Kurt Mills]

I think that has a lot of explanatory. I'm not discounting that at all. I think he has become besotted with these quick actions. So the assassination of Soleimani, the 12 day war, the abduction of Nicholas Maduro. No, I think that was a huge story. And why he thought, okay, there's all this pressure on me. A major part of my coalition is losing its mind about Iran. We got to do everything the Israeli hard line wants, but maybe it won't be so bad. Right, Right. And then additionally, there are a number of smart conservatives that are, I think, basically doing the anti. Anti. What we're putting forward, they're not putting forward 2002, 2003, neoconservatism. But, and I think I sense it in the tone of your voice a little bit. Maybe my, my view is overheated. Maybe it's too much. Maybe I drew too many lessons from the 2000s. And I don't know. This looks pretty.

[Ross Douthat]

We gave Times employees a preview of Crossplay from New York Times games. And here's what they had to say. I can finally play with other people.

[Kurt Mills]

I'm pretty competitive. It's fun to beat friends and coworkers.

[Ross Douthat]

I have a J for 10 points. I'm guessing tenga is not a word. Let's see. Tenga is a word. Oh, as in English.

[Kurt Mills]

As a second language speaker, I like

[Ross Douthat]

to learn new words. New York Times game subscribers get full access to Crossplay, our first two player word game. Subscribe now for a special offer on all of our games. So let's say it's pretty bad just to take your own language. You get state collapse in Iran. We don't make any kind of Venezuelan style deal. I don't think the US stays at war with Iran for six months or puts 50,000 troops in.

[Kurt Mills]

I don't know the government, it's very tellingly moved the Overton window on that immediately. Now troops are possible. Now forever wars. Now forever wars are sneer quoted.

[Ross Douthat]

But let me, I'll just give you a scenario where we don't do that. But it is perceived in six months that this was a failure. And Iran is a kind of festering landscape. Right. There's some kind of civil war inside Iran. Maybe we are backing Kurdish militias. We've stopped bombing. There is a more hardline government in power in Tehran that can't control its provinces. Let's say, just as a scenario that is not maybe the worst case, but is quite bad and people agree this policy has gone badly. What does that do to Republican politics and conservative politics going into 2027, 2028 and successors to Donald Trump?

[Kurt Mills]

Yeah, I think there are probably two main views on where the party and where the movement can go. And I think this has been true throughout the Trump era. There is view number one and it is that it is a cult and it is just Trump as a celebrity. And once you get rid of Trump, once he's off the scene, then it can go back to business as usual, a la 2013, 2014, 2015, status quo ante. The other view, and these are obviously extremes. And so I think there's truth in both perspectives. The other view is that the ideology really does matter. And additionally the fact that the reigning ideology keeps failing will create a more and more radicalized polity that is actually going to that Trump will look in some ways like a moderate. Right. And we've kind of talked about it before. It's like this is the sort of idea of, I would say President Tucker Carlson, something like that. Right. This is the real thing this time that Trump will be Remembered as this wobbly interregnum before we get real right wing policy or something like that. I think obviously both of these things are kind of extreme, as you just said, but I am far more towards that and I think because why don't I support the Iran war? Cuz it doesn't work. And I think when it doesn't work it is actually gonna be accelerationist.

[Ross Douthat]

Do you think Republicans, conservatives turn on Trump explicitly in that scenario? The way to some degree they turned on Bush. I was just looking at Tucker's, his post Iran episode, right. And it had a title like Israel's war on Iran. He didn't call it Trump's War on Iran. Right. Is there a like. And you see a lot of that. Is there a dam that breaks for the record?

[Kurt Mills]

I think they're equally culpable. I just want to be absolutely clear. I think Israel and that dynamic set the table. But I think President Trump is responsible for.

[Ross Douthat]

President Trump is. Okay, so 50% blame. So Trump. Do we get to a point where conservatives and Republicans agree with that? Where anyone from Tucker to Megyn Kelly to Bannon and beyond is saying not the neocons have failed, but Trump has failed.

[Kurt Mills]

The economy sets the tone. So it all depends what the economy looks like. But let's say we keep the same economy, roughly. Yeah. We're keeping the money machine going on, we're going into debt. We've basically been doing the same thing more or less since 2009. I think you will see the administration if this war goes on for a while or if we go into something that's Iran looks like a disaster like what you described, say in the autumn. I think you will see an administration that will be in the low 30s, maybe even the high 20s of approval rating. So today I think Trump is in the high 30s. So I'm postulating a five to seven point knock on his approval rating. I think you will see them, this is just projection. I think you will see them in this scenario. If Trump hasn't cut bait, which I think he still very well might.

[Ross Douthat]

But just to pause, even if he cuts bait, if Iran is a disaster area, the policy is still a source of ongoing unpopularity.

[Kurt Mills]

Depends. What it looks like is the IRGC government lobbying missiles and Shahat drones at the Gulf still, I mean to an extent that it would imply that we can't get out at that point. Right. And we have to get back into, defend our assets and defend commerce and air traffic, et cetera, et cetera. So I don't, I think this Projection is hard to do, but I think what you're asking is like, what does it look like if this actually takes a chunk out of his approval rating and how does the infra. Right. Dynamics go from there? I think you will see an administration that you're already seeing elements of this leaning Vance and Rubio get all the attention. But aesthetically and spiritually, this is very Hegsethian. Right. Which is just like it's screaming at the media. It's absolute fetishization of combat and the troops. It's leaning into the most loyal Republicans, which are often religious Republicans. I mean, some of the reporting and the language out of the Pentagon on why we're doing this is pretty astonishing. I think you will see the White House do that. I think you will not see them denounce Trump.

[Ross Douthat]

Outside critics, you mean? Right.

[Kurt Mills]

I mean, look, the Democrats never denounced Biden until they couped him, right. So I think this is the equal and opposite on the Republican side. But I think you will see and this will be criticized. You will see would be successors and you will see the right wing dialogue be all but explicitly condemnatory of Trump, not him. And there is the perspective that this is cowardice. Right. Tucker's attacked, just announced Trump, et cetera, et cetera. Why won't you? Because I think it's not actually the zone of argument that will make the most impact. And so I think you will see the primary debate be pretty vicious and openly condemnatory of the policy, maybe not the person.

[Ross Douthat]

And so what happens to the vice president, J.D. vance, in that scenario? Vance is someone who is very explicitly, as we said earlier in this conversation, associated with some kind of politics of restraint. He is someone who is friends with Tucker Carlson, is sort of broadly associated with anti interventionist populism. You're telling a story where there's a big, big breakdown and attack on the administration from the anti war. Right. What happens to Vance?

[Kurt Mills]

Well, I think number one, the biggest macro question is whether or not Rubio is going to run against Vance would be my number one. And I think it's a weird zone where Rubio actually profits politically from the administration failing. So I think if the 2028 primary race is not attractive, he'll just pass. And in 2032, he'll be remembered as this grand man of state representing a Republican super state Latino. Yeah, he was for the Iran stuff, but it wasn't his thing. Venezuela and Latin America his thing. You could see him. People thought Condi Rice could run. She had more going on than just that. It Wasn't Dick Cheney running? And I think that could be very attractive to Ruby because the reality is, is Rubio being VP with Vance all that attractive?

[Ross Douthat]

Right.

[Kurt Mills]

I mean, if they win, he has to wait eight more years to run in 2036 if they lose. I mean, not since FDR has a losing vice president on the ticket become the president. So it's not great. So I think that's the first open question because you can imagine a Vance Rubio duel. Right. And then I think this stuff actually becomes extremely salient because Vance is clear allies are the interventionists.

[Ross Douthat]

Right.

[Kurt Mills]

But Vance Rubio's clearly the establishment.

[Ross Douthat]

But Vance can't make an argument that his own administration's policies have failed.

[Kurt Mills]

I think he might have to. I want to be clear. So what was the central mistake that Kamala Harris made? Among many. But the central one was, I think, the no daylight policy with Biden. I think Vance is going to have to innovate beyond that if he wants to be the president.

[Ross Douthat]

And is there anyone besides Tucker who you imagine as a standard bearer for a right wing insurgent campaign?

[Kurt Mills]

Yeah. Is there going to be a right wing insurgent campaign challenge to Vance? So Vance is flank. So we're talking about flanks basically here.

[OpportunityAtWork/Ad Council Announcer]

Right.

[Kurt Mills]

So there's the establishment flank because you got DeSantis, Haley, Cruz. Those people are all going to try to flank Vance from like, you know, it's just a cult. We can go back.

[Ross Douthat]

But if the Iraq war. Sorry, Freudian slip right there. Here we go.

[Kurt Mills]

Everyone who's kind of for the war is doing this.

[Ross Douthat]

This is where we at with the Freudian slip. If the Iran war is seen as a failure, it seems to me that the action in the party is not Ron DeSantis running against Ron DeSantis. I'm not saying what the party elites think. I'm just saying the action is who becomes the voice of a kind of this failed narrative. You're saying one, it could be Vance himself.

[Kurt Mills]

It's the Sanders Lane. Right. That's what Sanders did in 2016 is implicitly critical of the incumbent Democratic president.

[Ross Douthat]

Right. But it seems to me incredibly difficult for Vance to do it.

[Kurt Mills]

Yeah, I agree.

[Ross Douthat]

So then it's. It's Tucker. Is there anyone else?

[Kurt Mills]

Well, yes, I think. I think it depends how many of them run. But I think there's clearly four potential anti interventionist critics of Vance who could run. It is Carlson, it is Bannon, it is Marjorie Taylor Greene, it is Thomas Massie. Those were the 4i flag.

[Ross Douthat]

I struggle to imagine any of those four winning a one on one race, but it may be against Vance, against Vance.

[Kurt Mills]

My imagination is not going to be a one on one race. I mean, I think it's very clear that Vance will probably have at least one competitor within his own administration. So if it's not Rubio, Hegseth, Christy Noem, I think have been talked about.

[Ross Douthat]

Sorry. Smile.

[Kurt Mills]

You're not smiling.

[Ross Douthat]

Tiptoed. No. Well, let's.

[Kurt Mills]

Corey Lewandowski's managed one successful then.

[Ross Douthat]

Last question is this though. If the war goes badly, does any of this conversation matter or is it just a poison chalice and no one should want to be a Republican nominee?

[Kurt Mills]

That's why Rubio's sentences are so perverse. I think he is the most untrustworthy politically in the administration.

[Ross Douthat]

Because you think he benefits from an Iran failure?

[Kurt Mills]

I think he benefits from an Iran failure.

[Ross Douthat]

Okay. I'm skeptical that he thinks that way, but I think we've argued enough. Kurt Mills, thank you so much for joining me.

[Kurt Mills]

Thank you.

[Ross Douthat]

Interesting Times is produced by Sofia Alvarez Boyd, Victoria Chamberlain and Emily Holzeneck. Jordana Hochman is our executive producer and editor. Original music by Isaac Jones, Sonia Herrero, Amin Sahota and Pat McCusker. Mixing by Sophia Landman and Pat McCusker. Audience strategy and operations by Shannon Busta, Christina Samulewski, Andrea Batanzos and Emma Kelbeck. Special thanks to Jonah Kessel, Allison Brusic, Marina King, Jan Kobo and Mike Pieretz. And our director of opinion shows is Annie Rose Strasser.