Podcast Summary: "The Case for Real Regime Change in Venezuela"

Podcast: Interesting Times with Ross Douthat
Host: Ross Douthat, New York Times Opinion
Guest: Elliott Abrams, former US special representative for Venezuela
Date: January 7, 2026

Episode Overview

This episode investigates the apparent regime change in Venezuela, questioning its scope, legitimacy, and implications for democracy, U.S. interests, regional security, and foreign policy. Ross Douthat interviews Elliott Abrams, a veteran of Republican administrations and a key architect of U.S. policy in Latin America, to analyze the recent ouster of Nicolás Maduro, U.S. intentions, and the prospects and pitfalls of genuine regime change versus cynical power transition.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. What Has Actually Changed in Venezuela? (00:03–02:55)

• The US and global observers debate whether Venezuela’s regime change is genuine or simply a surface-level switch of leadership.
• Abrams emphasizes that the “regime is still in place” (02:05)—Maduro’s ouster hasn't led to meaningful democratization.

Elliott Abrams (02:05):
"I was arguing for a policy of regime change and we don't seem to have that policy. The regime is still in place in Caracas fully. ... The frontman Delsey Rodriguez is being accepted by the United States. She is surrounded by indicted drug trafficking criminals who are still in place."

2. Why Regime Change in Venezuela Matters to the U.S. (02:55–04:59)

• Venezuela was formerly one of Latin America's leading democracies, now a source of regional instability and mass migration.
• Security concerns: alliances with actors like Cuba, Russia, China, Iran, and Hezbollah; use of blank passports for covert movements and arms transfers, including the risk of Iranian drones and missile technology reaching Venezuela.
• Humanitarian crisis: 8 million Venezuelan refugees impacting neighboring countries and U.S. border policy.
• Economic factors: oil and rare minerals, but Abrams downplays their importance relative to strategic and humanitarian interests.

Elliott Abrams (03:17):
“Under Chavez and Maduro, they've ruined all that. It's now a brutal dictatorship... 8 million Venezuelans... have moved out, which creates obvious difficulties for all of their neighbors, including us.”

3. Venezuela as a Security Threat (04:59–06:21)

• Concrete cooperation between Venezuela’s regime and Iran/Hezbollah, including the provision of blank passports and potential for drone and missile threats to the U.S. mainland.
• Drug trafficking: While fentanyl is overblown as an issue, cocaine flows from Colombia through Venezuela remain significant. The ELN now operates mainly from western Venezuela.

Elliott Abrams (05:21):
“We know that Iran has helped not only give drones to the Venezuelan military, but help them learn how to build drones. ... Now we're talking about drones that can hit not only Puerto Rico, but hit the continental United States.”

4. Current U.S. Policy Calculation and Critique (07:44–11:32)

• The Trump administration appears to accept a gradual, negotiated transition—working with existing regime elements, possibly in exchange for concessions on oil, security, and geopolitics.
• Abrams warns that this approach is naïve, overestimating corrupt officials’ willingness to cede power, and underestimating moral and practical impediments to genuine democracy.

Elliott Abrams (09:23):
"We are relying on a bunch of criminals to drive themselves from power willingly, to commit suicide... There is always a negotiation with the army... But these people are not generals. These people are just criminals."

On political prisoners:
"It was fairly shocking to me that in all the appearances administration people made over the weekend ... he did not demand the immediate release of all political prisoners. Why not?" (10:50)

5. Debate on Supporting Democracy vs. ‘America First’ Realpolitik (11:32–14:06)

• Ross raises a scenario: what if the U.S. prioritizes strategic alignment over democracy, installing a new dictator loyal to U.S. interests?
• Abrams counters that corrupt regimes cannot deliver real economic recovery; political repression remains a concern.

Elliott Abrams (12:47):
"I do not think we'll have the economic revival that we want—that the United States wants—with this corrupt group in power. ... I just don't think it's going to be possible for the administration to turn away from that and say, those are our people. If they thought they had to shoot demonstrators, that's fine. I don't think that's possible."

6. A Negotiated Path to Democracy: The Abrams Plan (14:06–17:08)

• Abrams recommends a model from 20th-century South America: a structured negotiation between opposition, regime, and military, with timelines for elections, guaranteed amnesties, and external mediation (perhaps by the Vatican).
• Strong U.S. support for pro-democracy forces is essential to dividing ‘Chavista’ politicians from truly criminal elements.

Elliott Abrams (14:19):
"You do need a negotiation between the people in power and the democratic political forces... There's always a negotiation with the army. There's always a process. It does take time. There is always an amnesty…"

7. Leverage and Further U.S. Options (17:08–22:28)

• U.S. leverage includes military force, economic sanctions, and targeted intelligence against regime leaders’ assets.
• Abrams describes the difference between previous efforts (2019–2020) and now: successful U.S. military action against Maduro has changed the negotiation landscape, making threats more credible.

Elliott Abrams (17:59):
"We are blocking their oil exports. ... There are some intelligence things I would like to see being done right now, too. Padrino's family—they seem to live very well. Why don't we say to Padrino, that's over. We're coming for your money?"

8. Comparisons with Past Democratic Transitions (22:28–26:56)

• Examples from Uruguay, Argentina, Chile: negotiated settlements between military juntas and opposition leading to democratic openings.
• Abrams distinguishes between past military rulers seeking legitimacy or retirement and the current criminal entrenchment in Venezuela.

Elliott Abrams (23:47):
"The difference is that the generals wanted an amnesty for human rights violations, but they weren't in it to get rich... This is a different crowd. ... it's a criminal junta that's now, and we have them under indictment."

9. The Role of the Venezuelan Military (24:26–26:56)

• Abrams stresses the need for the opposition and the U.S. to persuade the regular military to join a negotiated settlement, by promising amnesty, professionalization, and severing ties with the old criminal leadership.
• The military remains a linchpin for orderly transition.

10. Risks of Military Escalation and Counterinsurgency (27:46–34:52)

• Douthat and Abrams probe how far the U.S. might and should go militarily—beyond “snatch and grab” operations and blockades, could that extend to deeper intervention?
• Abrams rejects “Iraq analogy” fears, suggesting Venezuela’s social structure and history make civil war unlikely, but concedes there are risks if criminal groups resist.

Elliott Abrams (29:41):
"I would really urge everyone to stop making Iraq analogies. This is not the Middle East. ... This is a homogeneous society with a long history of democracy.”

11. Lessons from 20th-Century U.S.-Latin America Policy (35:00–42:16)

• Douthat notes the tension in U.S. policy between formal support for democracy and the historical willingness to back “our son of a bitch” anti-communist dictators.
• Abrams pushes back, arguing that since the 1970s, the U.S. has promoted democracy more consistently, especially under Reagan (Pinochet, South Korea, Philippines) and later presidents.

Elliott Abrams (38:39):
“When Ronald Reagan came to power... he did not adopt the policy of backing the military junta in El Salvador... The policy of the Reagan administration was to promote democracy wherever and whenever we could. Nobody likes to admit that, but that's the historical fact.”

Memorable Quotes & Moments

• On U.S. Leverage:
  “Why don't we say to Padrino, that's over. We're coming for your money? And saying the same thing to Delsey Rodriguez and the rest of them. We're coming for your money. You're gonna end up out of office, probably out of your country and destitute unless you play ball with us.” — Elliott Abrams (17:59)
• On Moral Responsibility:
  "I believe one of our greatest assets is the association of the United States with the cause of liberty, and they seem to be abandoning that as well." — Elliott Abrams (51:21)
• On Historical Comparisons:
  "Stop with those comparisons [to Iraq and Libya]. I think what we should be making is Latin American comparisons. And those are actually, I think, more helpful and lead to a little bit more optimism." — Elliott Abrams (29:41)

Timestamps for Important Segments

• Opening / What is happening in Venezuela? — 00:03
• The argument for real regime change — 02:55
• Geopolitical threat assessments — 04:59
• U.S. policy critique — 07:44
• Debate: Realpolitik vs. democracy — 11:32
• Abrams’ alternative plan — 14:06
• Limits and risks of military action — 27:46
• Past transitions & U.S. historical role — 35:00
• Internal Trump administration debates — 43:01
• Closing reflection: America's moral standing — 51:07

Conclusion

Elliott Abrams remains deeply skeptical that current U.S. policy will bring real democracy to Venezuela, seeing the new “regime change” as insufficient without stronger support for democratic forces, credible guarantees for the military, and a willingness to neither legitimize nor collaborate with entrenched criminal figures. He draws on history to advocate for negotiated transitions—always difficult, always requiring amnesty—but warns that abandoning America’s moral leadership and democratic values threatens both U.S. interests and its unique global position.

The tone of the episode is sharp, historically literate, and often skeptical. Douthat challenges, Abrams argues forcefully, and both remain alert to the moral and practical complexities of intervention, negotiation, and power in Latin America.