
Hosted by Yitzchok Lowy · EN

This lecture examines the philosophy of fasting through multiple frameworks: as a time-management strategy that creates space for spiritual focus by removing daily obligations, as a protest against modern consumerism and the tyranny of constant productivity, and as a communal gathering that redirects resources toward charity and collective introspection. The discussion then shifts to the deeper problem of Jewish cultural survival in exile, arguing that Judaism requires a complete lived culture—not just abstract principles—and exploring the Kabbalistic metaphor of the Torah as a sword that allows Jews to carve out autonomous cultural space within dominant host civilizations, much as the soul must create meaning within the prison of the body.

This lecture examines Aristotle's distinction between natural/common pleasures and chosen/specific pleasures in Jewish ethics, focusing on food and sex as the two bodily pleasures subject to temperance. The instructor argues against materialist reductions of desire, showing how sexual and gustatory desires are mediated by narrative and cultural scripts rather than being purely physical phenomena. The mitzvah of kiddushin (marriage sanctification) transforms base physical desire into interpersonal, story-laden desire directed toward one's spouse, making proper measure a question of direction and context rather than mere quantity or self-control.

This lecture examines Aristotle's hierarchy of human goods and the virtue of temperance, distinguishing between natural bodily desires (shared by all humans) and cultivated, qualitative preferences (specific to individuals and cultures). The instructor argues that modern obesity is primarily a physiological regulation problem rather than a failure of temperance—true temperance concerns *what* and *how* we consume (choosing refined over base pleasures), not merely *how much*. Jewish dietary laws like kashrut exemplify genuine temperance by imposing qualitative order on eating, though modern food abundance presents challenges even these traditional structures struggle to address.

Dialectic restricting temperance to pleasures of body and to sense of touch (NE III.10)

This shiur examines the virtue of zehirus (temperance/self-control) as presented in Rambam's Shemonah Perakim, tracing how abstract virtue-language developed from Biblical Hebrew's verb-based expressions to the Sages' philosophical terminology. The discussion analyzes three rabbinic terms—zehirus, yirat chet (fear of sin), and nefesh shefalah (lowly soul)—showing how they correspond to the Greek concept of sophrosyne, which Aristotle restricted from Plato's general self-control to specifically mean proper desire for physical pleasures. The Rambam follows Aristotle's narrow definition, understanding these virtues not as external control over appetite but as trained aversion to inappropriate physical pleasures, particularly in food and sexuality.

Religious truth operates across three distinct dimensions that are often confused: authority (the source of truth), content (what is being taught), and form (how it is expressed and transmitted). While modern discourse tends to collapse these categories—either demanding blind acceptance of authority or claiming content alone matters—the most critical yet overlooked dimension is form: the specific strategies and vessels through which divine knowledge reaches humanity. Major religious movements succeed not merely through true content or divine authority, but through novel forms of revelation that work powerfully once but become exhausted after use—explaining why there are so few major religions, why prophecy appears to have ceased, and why future religious leadership must discover unprecedented strategies rather than repeat biblical patterns that any contemporary person could imitate.

This lecture examines Shavuot's true meaning as an agricultural festival celebrating the wheat harvest and economic prosperity, rather than simply commemorating the giving of the Torah. The speaker argues that Torah law should be read as utopian social blueprints for creating a just, prosperous society—where following divine economic principles (like leaving gleanings for the poor) leads to tangible material success—not merely as abstract religious obligations. The discussion concludes by challenging the concept of "Torah from Heaven," suggesting that prophets spoke in the normal rhetorical conventions of their time to address real human problems, and that modern distance from this context creates a false impression that ancient revelation was categorically different from rational moral teaching.

This shiur examines the fundamental distinction between virtues (character excellences) and mitzvos (commandments), arguing that mitzvos function as teachers for those who lack proper virtues rather than as ends in themselves. The Rambam and Kabbalistic sources converge on the view that Torah has both an external, utilitarian dimension—guiding people toward virtue through law—and an inner, true dimension concerning knowledge of God and reality. The discussion addresses why the Mekubalim insisted every mitzvah must have metaphysical meaning beyond its practical purpose, leading to interpretive methods like letter permutation, while the Rambam maintained that most mitzvos serve as preparation for the few that directly concern ultimate truth.

The Rambam's approach to supporting Torah scholars is not a prohibition on fundraising but a specific economic model based on business partnership. According to Maimonides, Torah scholars should function as investors who provide capital while others conduct business and share profits, receiving the same preferential treatment friends give each other in commerce. This framework maintains the dignity of Torah study while creating a sustainable support system grounded in mutual benefit rather than charity.

This lesson examines why character development (middos) must precede Torah learning and investigates the fundamental question of which virtues are most essential. The discussion reveals that creating a definitive list of virtues is both practically difficult and theoretically problematic, since any single virtue pursued correctly necessarily implies and requires all others—you cannot have complete kindness, humility, or truth-seeking without the full complement of other virtues. The unity of virtues means that while naming specific character traits helps us notice and cultivate them, genuine virtue exists only in the context of the whole person, not as isolated qualities that can be developed independently.